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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines four discrete periods of sovereign default and restructuring over the 
past 135 years and seeks to explain the observed variation in aggregated bargaining 
outcomes between debtor states and private creditors. Utilizing a power-based analytical 
framework borrowed from Barnett and Duvall (2005), the study assesses the relative 
impact of four principal regime components on distributional results: the private creditor 
representative body (institutional power); the degree and orientation of creditor country 
govemment/IFI intervention (compulsory power); the structure and condition of the 
capital markets (structural power); and, the discursive practices surrounding sovereign 
default (productive power). The analysis suggests that the key private creditor institutions
-  the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, the American Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council, and The London Club - have only marginally influenced results, and 
that outcomes were instead driven by the action (or inaction) of creditor governments, the 
structure of capital access (centralized or decentralized), and the relative condition of the 
private capital markets (robust or collapsed). The paper concludes that compulsory and 
structural regime elements are therefore more salient than institutional ones in the 
sovereign debt bargaining exercise. From a public policy perspective, this study cautions 
those who seek a newly-constituted, 21st-century bondholder council, since such an 
institution -  like its historical predecessors -  would find its impact on the sovereign debt 
management process highly circumscribed. The thesis also challenges economic theory 
on the matter of sovereign repayment incentives, arguing that the “either-or” nature of the 
reputation-sanctions debate (Eaton-Gersovitz (1981) vs. Bulow-Rogoff (1989)) distracts 
from the fact that these incentives have operated simultaneously over the past 135 years. 
More specifically, the evidence suggests that structural and compulsory regime elements
-  the equivalent of reputation and sanctions in the formal models -  have largely 
reinforced one another in the sovereign debt restructuring process, thereby amplifying 
their impact on negotiating outcomes in each historical period.
3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
While this thesis examines sovereign debt restructuring over the past one hundred and 
thirty-five years, it is important that I first acknowledge some important debts of my own.
I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr. Daphne Josselin, who has guided this project since its 
inception as a master’s thesis at the London School of Economics. I can only hope that 
every PhD student has a supervisory experience like mine. It has been both a privilege 
and a pleasure to work with Dr. Josselin, whose dedication to my progress, intellectual 
rigour and unerring judgment have all contributed much to the pages which follow.
I would also like to acknowledge the advice and counsel I received from other members 
of LSE’s International Relations Department: Drs. Andrew Walter, Mark Duckenfield, 
Razeen Sally, and Jeffrey Chwieroth, in addition to Professors Michael Cox and Margot 
Light. It is most fortunate that LSE is a place where the walls between departments are 
permeable. This afforded me the opportunity to engage with scholars in other disciplines 
and seek their counsel, like Dr. Ken Shadlen of the Development Institute and Dr. Cheryl 
Schonhardt-Bailey of the Government Department. I especially appreciated the many 
cups of coffee that Dr. Gus Van Harten of the Law Department agreed to have with me. 
During our meetings, he would inevitably (and patiently) explain some of the more 
esoteric legal concepts that I confronted in my research. Also, Robert Kissack (now Dr. 
Kissack) deserves special recognition for helping me put my analytical framework to 
much better use.
Moving outside the confines of LSE, there are an equal number of people to mention. In 
what may have been a case of e-mail serendipity, Dr. Eric Helleiner connected me with 
Matthew Tubin, a PhD student at the University of Pennsylvania. Matthew is one of the 
few people who share my keen interest in bondholder councils, and his encyclopaedic 
knowledge of matters relating to sovereign debt allowed him to give me much in the way 
of specific feedback on my case study chapters. I am not only grateful for his critical 
input, but also for his continued friendship. Through Matt, I had the great pleasure of 
meeting Tom Callaghy, his faculty advisor and someone whose prolific scholarship in the 
field of sovereign debt management has enlightened all of us.
I owe a rather large debt to Dr. Christian Suter for sharing his historical data sets on 
settlement periods and bargaining outcomes. Without Dr. Suter’s early, painstaking work, 
my research would not have been possible. I am especially thankful for the time he spent 
locating his original spreadsheets and for his willingness to review them with me in 
Switzerland. His kindness even extended to translating some of the key text for a non- 
German speaker.
The important groundwork laid by the historian, Dr. Michael Adamson, on the Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council (“FBPC”) was something I hoped to build upon in this 
dissertation. Michael generously took the time to meet me when I was in Stanford, and he 
then agreed to read and comment upon my draft chapters. With his work as inspiration
4
and his helpful suggestions, my next academic endeavour might be a more complete 
study of the FBPC.
During the time I spent at the Centre for Global Economic Governance at University 
College, Oxford, I had the good fortune to meet Dr. Louis Pauly. I wanted to thank him 
for his time, his words of encouragement, and his advice regarding potential avenues for 
publication.
This dissertation also required me to impose on the good offices of two research libraries 
-  the Guildhall Library in the City of London and the Green Library at Stanford 
University. I cannot thank the curators of those institutions enough for their patience as 
they arranged for hundreds of dusty (and heavy) boxes to be pulled from storage. Special 
thanks go to Stephen Freeth at the Guildhall Library, and Tony Angiletta, Robert Trujillo, 
and Bill O’Hanlon at Stanford. While at Stanford, I also had the pleasure of meeting 
Professor Michael Tomz, who took the time to discuss my research project and offered 
me some valuable suggestions regarding methodology.
The many market practitioners who agreed to interviews have added both colour and 
depth to my analysis. While most of them preferred to keep their participation 
anonymous, I am able to publicly thank Mr. John Petty, President of the FBPC. It should 
become evident to any reader that, absent the cooperation and candour of all the 
interviewees, I would only have been able to tell part of the story.
In closing, I want to thank those who have been closest to me for the longest. I was 
blessed with parents who taught me that anything was possible, and I was blessed again 
with a husband who seems to make everything possible. His understanding, support and 
enthusiasm for this endeavour never waned, and his sacrifices over the past several years 
will never be forgotten. It is therefore to him that I dedicate this dissertation.
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Sovereign Default Through the Ages...................................................... 12
1.1. The Cycles of Sovereign Default  ................................................................... 12
1.2. Private Creditors vs. Sovereign States -  The Ad Hoc Machinery........................ 14
1.3. Private Creditor Representative Bodies as a Regime Component........................17
1.4. Bargaining Outcomes in Sovereign Debt Restructuring Since 1870....................18
1.5. The Research Agenda.............................................................................................21
1.5.1. A Power-Based Analytical Framework.............................................................................. 21
1.5.2. The Four Faces of Power.....................................................................................................22
1.5.3. Methodology.........................................................................................................................25
1.5.4. The Relevance of the Research Project and Proposed Original Contributions................ 26
2. Why Sovereigns Repay and Creditors Settle: An Assessment of 
Economic Theories of Debt..................................................................... 29
2.1. Economic Theory: Why Do Sovereigns Repay?...................................................29
2.1.1. Reputation vs. Sanctions.................; ...................................................................................30
2.1.2. Cases from Economic History: Shortcomings of the Reputation-Sanctions
Debate.......................................................................................................................................33
2.2. Economic Theory: Why Do Creditors Settle -  A Zero-Sum or Positive-Sum 
Game?..................................................................................................................... 35
2.3. Debt Strategies in Practice.....................................................................................38
2.4. Economic Theory and International Law: The Illiquidity-Insolvency Debate.... 40
3. The Four Faces of Power and Regime Theory: Building the 
Analytical Framework..............................................................................43
3.1. Theoretical Explanations for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regimes.................43
3.1.1. Realists and the Power-Based Framework..........................................................................44
3.1.2. Neo-Liberal Institutionalists and the Interest-Based Framework.......................................45
3.1.3. Realists vs. Neo-Liberal Institutionalists: Locating Sovereign Debt Regimes in the 
Literature....................................................................................................................................47
3.1.4. Constructivists and the Ideas-Based Framework................................................................ 50
3.2. IPE Theory: Hegemony and the Pattern of Sovereign Debt Settlements..............51
3.3. The Four Faces of Power in Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regimes.................. 52
3.3.1. Compulsory Power................................................................................................................53
3.3.2. Structural Power....................................................................................................................56
3.3.3. Productive Power..................................................................................................................58
3.3.4. Institutional Power................................................................................................................60
3.4. Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regimes: Game Theory and Negotiation 
Analytics................................................................................................................. 62
6
4. An Institutional Counterweight to Sovereign Power? The 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders and Sovereign Debt Workouts 
in the 19th Century..................................................................................... 65
4.1. The Corporation o f  Foreign Bondholders and the Four Faces o f  Pow er................65
4.2. The W orld Before the C FB H   .................................................................................. 67
4.3. The Creation o f  the CFBH  and Institutional Pow er.....................................................69
4.3.1. The CFBH: The Progeny of British Bankers and Politicians......................................... 70
4.3.2. Institutional Form and Funding of the CFBH.................................................................73
4.3.3. The Operational Rules of the CFBH.............................................................................. 77
4.3.3.1 .The Negotiation and Default Management Process..................................................... 77
4.3.3.2.Bondholder Meetings.................................................................................................78
4.3.3.3.The Role of the Financial Press and the CFBH Library...................................................78
4.3.3.4.Answering Bondholder Queries...................................................................................79
4.3.3.5.Rules for Preventing Inter-creditor Inequity.................................................................. 80
4.3.3.6.CFBH Ethics...............................   80
4.3.4. Bondholder Incentives to Accept CFBH Settlement Offers......................................... 80
4.3.5. Assessing Institutional Power...................................................................................... 82
4.4. Structural Pow er...................................................................................................................83
4.4.1. Withholding Credit....................................................................................................... 85
4.4.2. Coordination Among British, Continental and U.S. Exchanges.................................... 89
4.5. Com pulsory Pow er..............................................................................................................91
4.5.1. Leveraging the British Consular Network and Government Institutions.......................94
4.5.2. Super-Sanctions: Economic Control and Military Intervention.....................................97
4.6. Productive Pow er.....................   101
4.6.1. Productive Power and the Evolution of International Law......................................... 102
4.6.2. Productive Power and U.S. State Defaults.................................................................. 105
4.7. Pow er and the Production o f  Bargaining Outcom es in the 19th C entury .............108
5. Pushing on a String? The Foreign Bondholders Protective Council 
and Sovereign Debt Restructuring from the 1930s to the
1950s...........................................................................................................121
5.1. The Foreign Bondholders Protective Council and the Four Faces o f  Pow er.......121
5.2. The Performance o f  the FBPC: Default Cases and Bargaining O utcom es.......... 124
5.3. The Am erican Debate: A  Government or Private Institution for 
Bondholders?........................................................................................................................ 128
5.4. The Creation o f  the FBPC and Institutional Pow er.................................................... 129
5.4.1. Institutional Form and Operating Rules of the FBPC..................................................130
5.4.2. Staffing of the FBPC....................................................................................................133
5.4.3. CFBH Impression of FBPC Staff.................................................................................137
5.4.4. Institutional Funding of the FBPC................................................................................138
5.4.5. The S.E.C. Investigation.............................................................................................. 139
5.4.6. The Accomplishments of the FBPC.........................  145
5.4.7. Assessing Institutional Power Against Structural and Compulsory Power.................. 147
5.5. Structural Pow er...................................................................................................................148
5.5.1. The Collapse of the Private Capital Markets in the 1930s............................................ 149
5.5.2. Lack of Disciplined Cooperation between the FBPC and NY Stock Exchange............ 151
7
5.5.3. Disciplined Cooperation between the CFBH and the London Stock Exchange........... 152
5.5.4. The Lending into Arrears Policy of the U.S. Government and World Bank................153
5.5.4.1.Bolivi a.................................................................................................................... 156
5.5.4.2.Yugoslovi a.............................................................................................................. 156
5.6. Com pulsory Power: U .S .................................................................................................... 158
5.6.1. The Absence of Super-Sanctions in the 1930s.............................................................158
5.6.2. State Department Intervention in Bondholder Negotiations.........................................160
5.6.3. Undermining the FBPC with Official Public Statements.............................................163
5.7. Com pulsory Power: U K .................................................................................................... 166
5.7.1. Clearing Arrangements............................................................................................... 166
5.7.2. Linkage of Trade and Debt Policies............................................................................ 169
5.7.3. Linkage Between British Consular Offices and the CFBH..........................................170
5.8. Productive Pow er................................................................................................................ 171
5.9. Power and the Production o f  Bargaining O utcom es in the Interwar and Post-W ar 
Periods...................................................................................................................................175
6. When Creditors Were King: The “London Club” Bank Advisory 
Process, the Creditors’ Cartel and Sovereign Debt Restructuring in 
the 1980s.................................................................................................... 177
6.1. The London Club and the Four Faces o f  Pow er..........................................................177
6.1.1. Parallels Between The London Club and the CFBH..................................................... 181
6.1.1.1 .Institutional Power....................................................................................................181
6.1.1.2.Compulsory Power................................................................................................... 181
6.1.1.3 .Structural Power.......................................................................................................182
6.1.1.4.Productive Power..................................................................................................... 182
6.2. The Performance o f  the London Club: Default Cases and Bargaining 
O utcom es............................................................................................................................ 183
6.3. The Creation o f  the London Club and Institutional Pow er...................................... 188
6.3.1. The Onset of the 1980s Debt Crisis.............................................................................188
6.3.2. The London Club as a Negotiating Body.....................................................................189
6.3.3. The London Club Economic Sub-Committees.............................................................192
6.3.4. London Club Guiding Principles and Negotiations......................................................193
6.3.5. London Club Legal Conventions................................................................................. 194
6.3.6. The Weaknesses of the London Club Bank Advisory Process.... :...............................196
6.3.6.1 .The Principle of Consensus........................................................................................196
6.3.6.2.Debtor Confusion: The Lack of Coordination Among Classes of Creditors.......................196
6.3.6.3.London Club Fatigue: Negotiation Without End........................................................... 197
6.3.7. W hy Did It Take So Long? W as the London Club the Right Process?... 198
6.4. Com pulsory Pow er..............................................................................................................200
6.4.1. The Coercion of Regional Banks................................................................................. 201
6.4.2. The Coercion of Non-U.S. Banks................................................................................ 205
6.4.3. The Coercion of Debtor States.................................................................................... 207
6.4.4. Why Debtor States Didn’t Organize into a Negotiating Cartel.................................... 212
6.4.5. Coercive Role of the IMF............................................................................................215
6.5. Structural Pow er.................................................................................................................. 216
6.6. Productive Pow er................................................................................................................ 219
6.6.1. Avoiding the “D” Word: The Usefulness of the Illiquidity Diagnosis......................... 219
8
6.6.2. The Changing Characterization of Sovereign Default in International Law.................. 222
6.6.3. The Persistence of the Idea of Honour.......................................................................... 223
6.7. Pow er and the Production o f  Bargaining Outcomes in the 1980s........................ 224
7. Better a Debtor? The Institutionless Regime of the “Market-Based 
Exchange” and the Evolution of Sovereign Debt Restructuring Since 
1998.........................................................  227
7.1. Sovereign Lending in the 1990s and B eyond.............................................................. 227
7.1.1. The Institutionless Regime and Bargaining Outcomes: 1998-2005.............................. 229
7.1.2. The Four Faces of Power: Explaining Regime Formation and Outcomes Since
1998..................................................................................................................................231
7.2. Structural Pow er and the Regime D ebate..................................................................... 233
7.2.1. The Rise of Debtor-Designed Collective Action Clauses............................................. 234
7.2.2. CACs: A Reflection of Sovereign Debtor Preferences..................................................23 8
7.2.3. CACs: Majority Representation....................................................................................240
7.2.4. CACs: Majority Amendment........................................................................................244
7.2.5. CACs: Majority Enforcement.......................................................................................245
7.2.6. The Shift from Bank Debt to Bonds and the Myth of Bondholder Collective Will 247
7.2.7. Capital Market Promiscuity..........................................................................................249
7.2.8. Debtor Control Over the Text of Bond Indentures........................................................251
7.2.9. Revision of IMF “Lending into Arrears” Policies.........................................................251
7.2.10. Creditors Fight Back: The IIF and the Principles -  Re-opening the Regime
Debate?............................................................................................................................ 253
7.3. Com pulsory Pow er and the Argentine D efault........................................................... 256
7.3.1. Argentina: To Intervene or Not?................................................................... 257
7.3.2. “W” Meets the Argentine Debt Crisis...........................................................................258
7.3.3. U.S. Promotes IMF Mid-Crisis Loan to Argentina.......................................................259
7.3.4. The IMF and the Power of the Debt Sustainability Model............................................261
7.3.5. Argentina to the IMF: “Ciao”....................................................................................... 261
7.3.6. Creditor Governments and the IMF Ignore Bondholder Concerns................................263
7.3.7. The Reaction of Holdout Creditors and Possible Remedies......................................... 264
7.4. Productive Pow er................................................................................................................265
7.5. Pow er and the Production o f  Bargaining Outcomes in Today’s M arkets............ 269
8. Sovereign Debt Management: Implications for Theory and
Policy......................................................................................................... 275
8.1. Theoretical Implications: Beyond the Sanctions-Reputation D ebate....................275
8.1.1. The 19th Century and the 1980s: Outcomes Favour Creditors...................................... 276
8.1.2. The Interwar/Post-War Periods and 1998-2005: Outcomes Favour Debtors................ 277
8.2. Policy Im plications: The Efficacy o f  Bondholder C ouncils................................... 278
8.3. Areas for Further Research..............................................................................................280
8.4. Sovereign D ebt M anagem ent and the Implications for Global Financial 
G overnance..........................................................................................................................282
9. Primary Sources...................................................................................... 287
10. Bibliography............................................................................................288
9
LIST OF TABLES AND APPENDICES
TABLES
Table 1A: Private Creditor Representative Bodies........................................................................................... 15
Table IB: Debt Forgiveness and Settlement Times..........................................................................................19
Table 1C: Negotiating Outcomes Between States and Private Creditors........................................................20
Table ID: The Four Faces of Power in Sovereign Debt Restructuring...........................................................25
Table 2A: Commercial Bank Negotiating Strategies in the 1980s.................................................................. 39
Table 3 A: The Four Faces of Power in Sovereign Debt Restructuring [Expanded]...................................... 62
Table 4 A: Bargaining Outcomes in Sovereign Debt Restructuring................................................................ 66
Table 4B: Sample Size of CFBH Bondholder Meetings................................................................................. 78
Table 4C: Sample Collateral Offerings from Sovereign Debt Instruments (1854-1909).............................. 82
Table 4D: Pre-World War I British Foreign Investment................................................................................. 83
Table 4E: European and US Shares of Foreign Investment Stocks (1870-1913)...........................................84
Table 4F: Number of Sovereign Defaults (1821-1975)................................................................................... 84
Table 4G: Creditor Country Government Intervention (1821-1975)............................................................ 100
Table 5A: Bargaining Outcomes (1871-1975).............................................................................................  125
Table 5B: Internal Rates of Return for Dollar and Sterling Bonds Issued 1923-1930................................ 126
Table 5C: Internal Rates of Return for Dollar and Sterling Bonds Issued 1920-1929................................ 126
Table 5D: Bargaining Outcomes for FBPC vs. CFBH on German Government Bonds............................. 127
Table 6A: Bargaining Outcomes (1871-1975).............................................................................................  184
Table 6B: Bargaining Outcomes (1926-1997).............................................................................................  184
Table 6C: Bank Exposure to Sovereign Debtors as a Percentage of Bank Capital (1982-1992)................185
Table 7A: Debt Restructuring Outcomes (1998-2005)................................................................................. 230
Table 7B: Net External Borrowings by Emerging Markets Countries -  Official, Bank and Non-Bank
Flows.................................................................................................................................................................247
Table 7C: National Interest Rates in Selected Developed and Emerging Market Countries....................250
Table 8 A: Power and the Production of Bargaining Outcomes................................................................. 276
APPENDICES
Appendix 4 A: Sample Periodicals and Journals from CFBH Archives........................................................ I l l
Appendix 4B: Compulsory Power Case Studies............................................................................................ 112
Appendix 7 A: Proponents of a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring............................... 271
Appendix 7B: Author Interviews............................................  274
10
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABRA Argentine Bond Restructuring Agency
BAC Bank Advisory Committee
BIS Bank for International Settlements
CACs Collective Action Clauses
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFBH Corporation of Foreign Bondholders
EMBI Emerging Markets Bond Index
EXIM Export-Import
FBPC Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
FSIA Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
G-5 Group of Five (US, Germany, France, UK, Japan)
G-7 Group of Seven (Group of Five + Canada, Italy)
G-10 Group of Ten (Group of Seven + Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland)
GCAB Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries
HM His/Her Majesty
IBA International Bankruptcy Agency
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICSID International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
IFI International Financial Institution
IIF Institute of International Finance
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPE International Political Economy
IR International Relations
LDC Less Developed Country
LIBOR London Inter-bank Offer Rate
LOLR Lender of Last Resort
MP Member of Parliament
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
PSI Private Sector Involvement
ROSC Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes
SDDS Special Data Dissemination Standards
SDRM Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SIA State Immunities Act
US United States
UK United Kingdom
WWI World War I
WWII World War II
11
Chapter 1 
Sovereign Default Through the Ages
We stop this recital with misgiving, for our prophetic soul tells us what will happen in the future. 
Adjustments will be made. Debts will be scaled down and nations will start anew...And the process known 
fo r more than two thousand years will be continued. Defaults will not be eliminated Investors will once 
again be found gazing sadly and drearily upon foreign promises to pay.1
Max Winkler
1.1 The Cycles o f  Sovereign Default
In the fourth century B.C., ten Greek city-states walked away from their debt 
obligations to the Delos Temple.2 A little over two millennia later, Argentina ceased 
payment on 178 foreign bonds with a face value totalling $81.8 billion dollars.3 While 
ancient Greece may have brought us the first recorded act of sovereign default, and 
Argentina, the largest, the intervening years have witnessed consistent and disruptive 
episodes of sovereign bankruptcy.
At the centre of international bond finance in the 19th century, London witnessed 
two periods of large-scale sovereign lending and default. The first began in 1822, when 
Latin American states borrowed heavily to finance their wars of liberation. In most cases, 
default followed shortly on the heels of initial bond floatations, with some rescheduling 
negotiations lasting sixty years.4 But troubled Latin American debtors were hardly alone 
in their predicament. Beginning in the late 1830s, nine U.S. states, including Maryland, 
Pennsylvania, Mississippi and Louisiana, all suspended debt service. Investor outcry in 
London and Paris was so loud that London-based Barings took it upon itself to finance 
the political campaigns of state candidates who would prioritize raising new taxes in 
order to settle the defaulted obligations. This strategy was largely successful with one
‘ Winkler (1933), p. 179.
2 Dammers (1984).
3 Republic of Argentina (2005).
4 Aggarwal (1996), p. 19.
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notable exception: the state of Mississippi refused to negotiate with British 
representatives and remains in default to European bondholders to this day.5
The second lending boom of the 19 century began in 1860, with capital flowing 
back into Latin America, Egypt and Turkey. Euphoria swept the London bond market 
from 1870 to 1873 during which time it seemed that “any government which claimed 
sovereignty over a bit of the earth’s surface and a fraction of its inhabitants could find a 
financial agent in London and purchasers for her bonds.”6 Unscrupulous underwriters 
even managed to sell bonds to an eager but unsuspecting public on behalf of fictitious 
countries.7 The first Great Depression of 1873 brought this cycle of lending to an abrupt 
halt, and defaults ensued once again. Although the Bank of England was successful in its 
efforts to save Barings, one of Britain’s leading merchant banks, from its near fatal 
exposure to Argentina in 1890, investor enthusiasm for sovereign bonds predictably 
waned.
The end of World War I marked the ascendance of American power and the rise 
of New York as the world’s financial centre. Despite this shift, boom and bust lending 
cycles continued just as they had in 19th century London. By 1933, in the depths of the 
Great Depression, twelve Latin American and nine European countries, including 
Germany, curtailed at least part of their debt servicing. Some defaults remained uncured 
into the 1950s.8
The post-World War II era seemed to usher in a new, and seemingly more stable, 
era of sovereign financing. While defaults had historically been followed by renewed 
bond market access in the 19th century, the experience of the Great Depression had the 
effect of closing the bond market to sovereigns. And, with capital controls enshrined in 
the Bretton Woods regime, the early post-war period saw bi-lateral and multilateral 
official lending replace private bonds as the primary source of financing.
5 McGrane (1935); Dammers (1984), p. 78; The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report 
of 1987. Note that Florida, although counted as one of the nine states, was technically a territory at the time 
of default.
6 Aggarwal (1996), p. 27.
7 Tomz (2001) identifies the fictitious state as Poyais, a country invented by a Scottish adventurer named 
Gregor MacGregor who devised the fraud on a trip to the Mosquito Coast, off modem day Nicaragua. See 
also Lipson (1985b), p. 44.
8 Winkler (1933); McGrane (1935); Borchard and Wynne (1951b); Kindelberger (1978 [2002]); Dammers 
(1984); Eichengreen and Lindert (1989); Aggarwal (1996); Eichengreen and Fishlow (1996).
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This era of official lending reigned until the 1970s, when the growth of the 
offshore Eurodollar market enticed commercial banks to recycle large surplus deposits 
from oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries as loans to developing countries. Such direct 
financing by financial institutions had last been attempted by the Bardi, Peruzzi, and 
Medici banks of medieval and Renaissance Italy. However, the lessons of history were 
lost on the commercial bankers of the 1980s. Just as the Bardi and Peruzzi banks failed in 
1327, when Edward III of England repudiated his debts, major money centre banks in the 
1980s stood on the precipice of insolvency when the Latin American debt crisis began.9 
The decade-long restructuring process that followed Mexico’s default in 1982 was 
ultimately resolved with the adoption of the Brady Plan, in which banks offered partial 
debt forgiveness and exchanged their bank loans for collateralized bonds. The Brady Plan 
had the effect of returning defaulted sovereign debtors to the bond markets for the first 
time since the 1920s, ironically sowing the seeds for the next round of sovereign debt 
troubles. Beginning in 1994 with Mexico, contemporary sovereign financial crises once 
again circled the globe, extending to Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina.10
1.2 Private Creditors vs. Sovereign States  -  The Ad Hoc Machinery
Despite this long history of sovereign default, no formal sovereign bankruptcy 
framework has ever evolved at the international level. So, how have private creditors and 
sovereign states negotiated mutually acceptable settlements following a default? Most 
would say that it was through a series of ad hoc representative bodies that emerged in 
different historical periods with two principal purposes: to consolidate the interests of a 
disparate group of private creditors and act as a focal point for negotiation with sovereign 
states.11 Since the 19th century, we have seen the emergence of three such bodies in major 
centres of capital export: The British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (“CFBH”), 
The American Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (“FBPC”), and the “G5-centric”
9Dammers (1984), p. 77; Cline (1995).
10 “Default” shall be taken to mean the cessation of principal and/or interest payments as required under the 
debt contract. “Restructuring” will refer to any instance in which debtors and creditors come together to 
renegotiate the terms of a debt contract, either pre- or post-default. “Sovereign debt management” will have 
a meaning that is equivalent to “restructuring”. Debt held by official creditors is excluded from this 
analysis.
n The Market-Based Debt Exchange is not a creditor representative body but a process in which investors 
are canvassed by a sovereign’s bank and legal advisors for comment on proposed exchange offers.
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London Club. The table below provides a brief overview of each entity along with the 
market-based debt exchange, a practice which has emerged since 1998 to partially 
compensate for the lack of a bondholder representative:12
Table 1A: Private Creditor Representative Bodies
Name Date o f  Origin Type o f  Organization
The Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (“CFBH”)
1868
(ceased operations in 1988)
Legal entity. Formed in 1868 but granted 
a license under the 23 rd Section of the 
Companies Act in August, 1873. In 1898, 
the CFBH was reconstituted under a 
special Act of Parliament.
The Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Council (“FBPC”)
1933
(still operative, although largely dormant)
Legal entity. Founded by the U.S. State 
Department in December 1933 as a non­
stock, non-profit organization under the 
laws of the State of Maryland.
The London Club
(the only body to represent commercial 
bank, as opposed to bondholder, interests)
1976
(still operative, although with a lower 
profile since 1980s Latin American debt 
crisis)
Informal organization. Developed during 
debt negotiations with Zaire, Peru, 
Turkey, Sudan and Poland from 1976 -  
1981, but emerged as a distinct 
negotiating body during the 1980s Latin 
American debt crisis.
Market-Based Debt Exchange 1998 Informal but increasingly patterned 
process by which sovereign debtors, 
represented by investment bank and legal 
advisors, approach investors with 
exchange offers, either pre- or post­
default.
Sources: The Corporation o f  Foreign Bondholders Annual Report (1873); Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Annual Report 
(1936); Rieffel (2003).
The fact that today’s markets lack a bondholder representative remains the subject 
of intense debate, and there has been no shortage of recommendations to revive one. For 
instance, after the International Monetary Fund failed in its bid to create the functional 
equivalent of a supra-national bankruptcy court, the Institute of International Finance 
(“IIF”), a group acting on behalf of large financial services firms, redoubled its efforts to 
mandate bondholder representative committees, albeit on a voluntary, case-by-case basis. 
In so doing, the IIF built on recommendations made by other market practitioners and 
academics since the mid-1990s.13
12 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report o f 1873, pp. 6-7; Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council (1941-1944), Reptirt of 1941-1944, p. xiv; Rieffel (2003), p. 97; Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council (1936-1977).
13 Krueger (2002); Institute of International Finance, International Primary Markets Association et al.
(2003); Institute of International Finance (2006); Institute of International Finance (2007). The IIF strongly 
encourages sovereign debtors to fund bondholder committees at the time of a default as part of its 
Voluntary Code of Conduct. See also MacMillan (1995a), Eichengreen and Portes (1995), and Portes
(2004), all of whom discuss the efficacy of resurrecting bondholder councils.
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Why should we attempt to reconstitute a bondholder council in the 21st century? 
The IIF argues that such a body would markedly improve the fairness of the sovereign 
debt management process.14 Without them, bondholders since 1998 have been subjected 
to an increasingly patterned process called the Market-Based Debt Exchange.15 This 
practice offers debtors and creditors limited scope for communication through investment 
bank and legal advisors, and it falls far short of the negotiating model of previous eras. 
Since its goal is simply to determine the lowest market-clearing price at which a 
successful exchange will take place, investors have described it as “aggressive” and 
“non-consensual.”16 This is largely because, absent negotiation, sovereign debtors make 
unilateral, one-time, “take-it-or-leave-it” offers to bondholders.17 Creditors - and those 
who represent their interests - see the bondholder council as a way to counteract the 
perceived one-sidedness of the current exchange process.
It is important to point out that bondholder councils are not only being 
recommended as an antidote to unfairness; they are also seen as a way to improve 
efficiency. At the moment, when a sovereign defaults, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
as to how the process will unfold. How will debtor states communicate with creditors? 
How can information be shared between debtors and creditors and among creditors 
themselves? In previous eras, bondholder councils were the focal point for bargaining 
and information dissemination. For these reasons, MacMillan (1995a, 1995b) and Portes 
(2004) highlight the efficiency gains that could be reaped from the creation of a more 
formal bondholder representative today: enhanced information flows, reduced 
uncertainty, and more coordinated decision-making across different bond issues and 
different classes of debt.18 While the goals of sovereign debt reformers to improve the 
fairness and efficiency of the process are worthy, the question remains: how much have 
private creditor representative bodies actually contributed to the sovereign debt 
management process in the past? What can an investigation into their historical operation 
tell us about their impact on negotiations between debtor states and private creditors? Did
14 Author Interview O.
15 The Market-Based Debt Exchange has taken shape since 1998, after the Russian debt crisis.
16 Author Interview D.
17 Bulow and Klemperer (1996). The authors argue that auctions are more favorable than negotiations; the 
debt-exchange process is more closely aligned to an auction process than a negotiation.
18 MacMillan (1995a); MacMillan (1995b); Portes (2004).
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these entities make such important contributions -  either by improving the speed of the 
negotiations or the fairness of distributional results - to warrant their resurrection today?
In seeking answers to these questions, this thesis has endeavoured to make both 
empirical and theoretical contributions to the existing sovereign debt literature. From an 
empirical perspective, fresh insights are offered into the operation, staffing, and funding 
of the CFBH, FBPC and London Club, and the role these institutions played in sovereign 
debt management. In the case of the American FBPC, we have been able to draw upon 
newly available archival sources to supplement the limited secondary literature. 
Theoretically, the analytical framework that will be developed in this study attempts to 
bridge two sides of the debate in economic theory regarding sovereign repayment 
incentives.19 In so doing, the thesis makes the following key arguments: i) that private 
creditor representatives were not as critical in the production of bargaining outcomes as 
previously thought; and, ii) that the two sovereign repayment incentives that have been 
characterized in economic theory as competing -  sanctions and reputations-  instead 
operate concurrently and have reinforced one another in debt restructurings since 1870. 
The relevance of the research project and its contributions will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 1.5.4. In the next section, the focus returns to the sovereign debt 
restructuring regime and the development of our analytical framework.
1.3 Private Creditor Representative Bodies as a Resime Component
While we are interested in assessing the independent effects of private creditor 
bodies on sovereign debt restructurings, we maintain that the focus of the current policy 
debate on these entities has construed the process of sovereign debt management much 
too narrowly. Drawing from economic theory as well as primary and secondary empirical 
sources, we would argue that it is more accurate to portray the private creditor 
representative body as simply one element in a much larger regime for sovereign debt 
restructuring.20 This gives us the scope to examine not only the more institutionalized 
aspects of the process -  like the CFBH, FBPC and London Club - but also the variables
19 Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Bulow and Rogoff (1989a); Bulow and Rogoff (1989c).
20 Krasner (1983). Also, see Haggard and Simmons (1987), p. 493. In this study, we will use the term 
regime in accordance with the widely accepted formulation by Krasner (1983): “implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” in 
the issue area of sovereign debt management.
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outside the creditor representative body which have impacted the efficiency and fairness 
o f sovereign debt management. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, we will
91define a sovereign debt restructuring regime to include the following four elements:
• Creditor Representative Body: Depending upon the historical period, the 
dominant organization would be the CFBH, the FBPC or the London Club. We 
intend to give the Market-Based Debt Exchange the same analytical standing as 
its more formal counterparts, remaining mindful of the fact that it is a patterned 
process, not a legal entity or recognized organization.
• Degree and Orientation of Creditor Country Government Intervention: We 
are interested in examining the willingness of creditor country governments to 
intervene directly in the negotiation process between defaulting states and private 
creditors. This intervention has taken many forms throughout history, from 
military campaigns to subtler forms of moral suasion. And, the orientation of this 
intervention is also important. During certain periods it has worked to benefit 
private creditors while at other times it has worked to their detriment.
• Structure and Condition of the Global Capital Markets: The structure and 
condition of the capital markets has historically exerted an influence on sovereign 
debt negotiations. For example, centralized control of the markets provides 
creditors with greater leverage, while market collapse or a high degree of market 
liquidity tends to work in favour of debtors.
• Characterization of the Act of Default: It is important to consider that all 
episodes of sovereign default take place in distinct historical eras, each of which 
ascribes a unique meaning to the act of default. These meanings, in turn, help 
define the permissible array of remedies available to creditors, many of which are 
enshrined in an evolving framework of international law.
1.4 Bareainins Outcomes in Sovereign Debt Restructuring Since 1870
Now that we have more accurately identified the components of sovereign debt 
restructuring regimes, we can look at the outcomes produced by those regimes across
21 These four variables have been distilled from economic theory as well as a detailed review of the 
empirical record.
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time. In our study, we intend to use two key variables to measure outcomes: the average 
length of time from default to settlement (an efficiency measurement) and the amount of 
debt forgiven (a distributional/fairness measurement). Time measurement is important 
because it has customarily been the case that the longer the negotiation process, the more 
punitive it is to the debtor. This is because defaulting countries are generally unable to
access the capital markets until they have reached an acceptable settlement with their
00creditors. The level of debt forgiveness is important since it represents the result of the 
redistributive bargaining process. If private creditors forgive thirty percent of the 
contractual debt, this thirty percent becomes a gain which accrues to the benefit of the 
sovereign debtor. However, if the thirty percent level is agreed after two years, it is much 
more valuable to the debtor state than if it is agreed after twelve years. For this reason, 
the two variables must always be examined in tandem. The table below helps to illustrate 
this point.
Table IB: Debt Forgiveness and Settlement Times
Settlement Period (Years) Debt Forgiven (%) Outcome
Long Low Punishes Debtors
Long High Balanced
Short Low Balanced
Short High Favours Debtors
We have aggregated a number of separate econometric studies over these four 
historical periods to provide a starting point for assessing the variance in outcomes across 
eras. The data show that both settlement periods and levels of debt forgiveness were 
dramatically different under the auspices of each regime:23
22 Tomz (2001). The only exception in Tomz’ model was Greece, which secured a loan in 1833 while in 
default. He attributes this to the loan guarantee offered by England, France and Russia.
23 Suter (1992), pp. 91-95; Cline (1995); Bowe and Dean (1997), p. 12; Singh (2003), p. 12; Sturzenegger 
and Zettelmeyer (2005a); Roubini and Setser (2004a), Table A3; Dhillon, Garcia-Fronti et al. (2006); 
Miller and Thomas (2006b); Rieffel (2003). Quantifying the period from default to settlement was a device 
borrowed from Suter (1992). Measuring debt forgiveness is more universally recognized in the literature as 
a way to quantify the outcome of a negotiation. These figures are discussed in more detail in the case study 
chapters.
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Table 1C: Negotiating Outcomes Between States and Private Creditors
Time Period Dominant Creditor 
Representative Body
Number o f Cases Average Time from 
Default to Settlement
Debt Forgiveness
1871-1925 Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders
52 6.3 years 12%
(15.9%)*
1926-1975 Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council
37 • 10.1 years 23.2%
(55.9%)*
1980 - 1997 The London Club 21 8.5 years 35%
1998-2005 Market-Based Debt 
Exchange
6 1.19 years 48.67%
Sources: Suter (1992); Cline (1995); Bowe and Dean (1997); Singh (2003); Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005a); Roubini and 
Setser (2004a); Dhillon, Garcia-Fronti et al. (2006); Miller and Thomas (2006b); Rieffel (2003).
*Bracketed results for the periods beginning in 1871 and 1926 also take into account the forgiveness of accrued interest 
and reductions in contractual interest rates. They were calculated using data sets provided by Christian Suter which are 
also available in Suter’s Schuldenzyklen in der Dritten Welt (1990). These recalculations help to put the earlier debt 
forgiveness figures on a more comparable basis with those beginning in 1980. Also, the average time from default to 
settlement in the period 1980-1997 does not account for interim accords under the multi-year rescheduling agreements; 
in this era, settlement dates are taken to mean the dates on which debt forgiveness was finally agreed under the Brady 
Plan.
The data account for all cases of sovereign debt restructuring in each period, and 
suggest that the relative capabilities of states and private creditors in the negotiation 
process were different depending on the operative regime.24 Sovereigns clearly paid more 
to investors in some periods than in others. For instance, British bondholders in the last 
quarter of the 19th century and commercial banks in the 1980s fared better than their 
Depression era and 1990s counterparts. Also, it is important to reiterate that that we are 
not ascribing these results solely to the workings of the creditor representative body. As 
we stated earlier, these organizations are part of the larger regime of debt restructuring, 
and their impact needs to be evaluated in context.
24 In the period 1871-1975, default and restructuring cases are confined to bond debt. In the period 1980- 
1997, these cases are confined to commercial bank debt because bond debt was viewed as too difficult to 
restructure. Bondholders therefore enjoyed de facto seniority in this era, despite the fact that their claims 
were pari passu with the banks. In the period 1998-2005, both bank and bond debt are restructured. 
However, our study focuses on bond debt since it was the most significant component of sovereign 
borrowing in this period; additionally, data for commercial bank debt forgiveness is not available. 
However, it should be noted that in the 1998-2005 period, both the London Club and the Market-Based 
Debt Exchange operated simultaneously.
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1.5 The Research Agenda
The history of sovereign debt restructuring therefore presents us with an 
important puzzle. How do we explain the historical variation in bargaining outcomes 
between debtor states and private creditors? For instance, is there a single aspect of 
the regime that is critical in producing the outcome? Or, do the various regime 
components work together such that they offset or reinforce one another to produce the 
observed results? How much independent impact does the private creditor representative 
body have? The research agenda of this thesis has been to devise an analytical framework 
that will help answer these questions.
Bargaining outcomes will not be measured by looking at individual cases of 
negotiation, but rather at aggregated outcomes in each of the four historical periods that 
correspond to the principal operation of the private creditor representative bodies cited 
above. While we acknowledge that variation can occur in individual instances of 
negotiation, we maintain that the regime’s performance can best be judged by measuring 
outcomes for the largest number of cases in each historical period. Additionally, we have 
excluded debt held by the official sector - governments and multilateral financial 
institutions - from this study. However, we remain keenly interested in how the actions of 
the official sector influence outcomes for private creditors. As a result, the undertakings 
of bi-lateral and multi-lateral players in sovereign debt restructurings will be a key focus 
of this study. Although we will not be examining bi-lateral, Paris Club bargaining results, 
we will seek to isolate the ways in which official actors either promote or hinder the 
bargaining prospects of private creditors.
1.5.1 A Power-Based Analytical Framework
We intend to employ a power-based framework to analyze the outcomes produced 
by sovereign debt restructuring regimes over four historical periods. As we will explain 
more fully in Chapter 3, this is in part because we consider sovereign debt management 
to more closely approximate a zero-sum - as opposed to a joint-gains -  issue-area. The 
characterization seems appropriate since the act of negotiation seeks to redress 
distributional conflicts. In game theoretical terms, the process is not characterized by 
Nash equilibria that are Pareto suboptimal, but rather by disagreements about which point
21
along the Pareto frontier should be chosen.25 In other words, it is not generally the case 
that two parties to a debt negotiation can jointly improve their outcomes through 
cooperation. In fact, any improvement to the outcome of one party will most likely result 
in an injury to the second. That is because once the decision is taken to negotiate, each
party knows that any concession on his part translates into a gain for the opposing side.
26Also, sovereign debt management is always and everywhere a political phenomenon. 
This is not only because one party to the negotiation is by definition a state; it is also 
because creditor country governments have often inserted themselves into the process. 
These considerations lead us to conclude that power and bargaining leverage are more 
salient when trying to explain regime design and outcomes across time.
1.5.2 The Four Faces o f Power
We have chosen to use the particular power-based framework developed by 
Barnett and Duvall (2005b) since it is well-suited to an analysis of a process as multi­
faceted as sovereign debt restructuring. Barnett and Duvall generate a taxonomy of four 
types of power which captures the different aspects of the sovereign debt management 
regime discussed earlier: i) the private creditor representative body; ii) the degree and 
orientation of creditor country government intervention; iii) the structure and condition of 
the capital markets; and, iv) the evolution of the meaning of default. They define power 
more generally as “the production of effects...that shape the capacities of actors to 
determine their circumstances and fate.”27 Within this context, they consider power to 
have a polymorphous character, identifying the distinct types as institutional, 
compulsory, structural, and productive.
25 Krasner (1992), p. 336. A Nash equilibrium is said to exist whenever two or more players in a game are 
unable to gain by a change in their strategies given the strategies being pursued by others. Such a non- 
cooperative equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal and could therefore be improved upon by some form of 
cooperation. Pareto-optimality is said to exist when there is no feasible way for one party to improve 
his/her welfare without lowering the welfare of someone else.
26 We have borrowed the famous phrasing from Milton Friedman, who said that inflation was “always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”
27 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 42. The definition has been adapted for our purposes by eliminating the 
phrase “in and through social relations.” This is because we need to accommodate the concept of 
impersonal market forces in our analytical framework.
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Institutional power is taken to mean “the control that actors exercise indirectly 
over others through diffuse relations of interaction.” For our purposes, institutional 
power will correspond to the bargaining process mediated by the private creditor 
representative body. In other words, it is the power that unified creditors can exercise 
through the CFBH, the FBPC and the London Club, permitting us to offer some 
assessment of the independent effect of these bodies on negotiated outcomes.
Compulsory power refers to “relations of interaction of direct control by one 
actor over another actor.”29 In a sovereign debt restructuring context, this type of power 
would normally be exercised by creditor country governments or other official sector 
actors. It can either help or frustrate the interests of private creditors, depending upon its 
orientation. In the 19th century, we saw Britain intervene on behalf of private creditors in 
a number of sovereign default cases, thereby strengthening the position of bondholders 
and improving their bargaining outcomes.30 In the interwar period, by contrast, the U.S. 
government tended to undermine private creditor interests by inserting itself into the 
negotiation process and routinely pressing bondholders to accept sub-standard 
settlements.31
Structural power is defined as “the production and reproduction of positions of 
domination and subordination that actors occupy.”32 Barnett and Duvall used the 
examples of capital-labour and master-slave as structural positions. In our analysis, we 
will be interested in the structural positions of capital exporters and capital importers 
(which are roughly similar to core and peripheral countries) and how those roles generate 
unequal capacities and privileges in a debt restructuring exercise. More specifically, we 
will want to examine the benefits that credit exporters have traditionally enjoyed in 
designing the rules of debt management regimes and controlling the supply of credit to 
developing countries. We will also consider that structural power accrues in certain 
periods to impersonal market forces, making the market another distinct “actor” in the
28 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 43.
29 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 43. Private creditors have not generally been able to exercise compulsory 
power in the sense their remedies tended to be limited to those that could be exercised through joint action. 
Even today, when private creditors are able to bring a suit directly against a sovereign state, this type of 
remedy has proved to have limited value in practice.
30 Suter (1992), p. 93.
31 Adamson (2002).
32 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 43.
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sovereign debt restructuring process. We therefore need to inquire about the condition of 
the markets in each historical period. Are they highly liquid and permissive, highly 
controlled, or have they collapsed? During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 
condition of the capital markets provided defaulted sovereigns with little incentive to 
repay, since regaining market access was seen as largely impossible, even if debt 
obligations were fully honoured. And, when markets were highly centralized, as they 
were in the 19th century and the 1980s, creditors had much greater bargaining leverage, 
since they effectively controlled the supply of new credit to sovereign borrowers.
Finally, productive power is taken to mean “the socially diffuse production of 
subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification.”33 In other words, it is the power to 
create and fix meanings. Barnett and Duvall point out how basic categories of 
classification, including “civilized,” “rogue,” or “democratic” state, are all examples of 
productive power since they create meanings that are taken for granted in the world of 
politics. Such processes can be readily observed in the issue-area of sovereign debt 
management. Policymakers before the Great Depression routinely referred to sovereign 
default as an “uncivilized” act or a breach of international and moral law.34 In the 1930s, 
we see a shift in perception as both Britain and Germany found themselves facing serious 
debt problems. The old stigma placed on developing countries did not suit western 
industrialized countries very well, and soon default was seen more as a calculated policy 
response to external economic and political shocks, including war. By the 1980s, 
sovereign default became a technocratic problem, one that was best managed by 
macroeconomists and “remedied” through a debtor’s enactment of Washington 
Consensus directives.35 While historical changes in the meaning of default did coincide 
with adjustments in regime design, we have also been attentive to their source. For 
example, where these pronouncements and prescriptions came largely from capital 
exporting countries, their basis was identified as material and not the manifestation of 
some universal normative code.
This framework has helped us to better analyze the outcomes in complex 
negotiations between private creditors and sovereign debtors across time, by highlighting
33 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 43.
34 Winkler (1933), p. 9; Mitchener and Weidenmier (2004).
35 Williamson and Kuczynski (2003).
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how power capabilities are accorded to different aspects of process. The schematic below 
illustrates this approach:
Table ID: The Four Faces of Power in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Regime Element Aspect o f Power
Creditor Representative 
Body
-» Institutional Power 
(Organization- Mediated)
Degree and Orientation of 
Creditor Country 
Government Intervention
-> Compulsory Power 
(Direct)
Condition of Capital 
Markets and Structure of 
Sovereign Lending
Structural Power (Market- 
Determined)
Default characterization 
and generally accepted 
standards of creditor 
behaviour towards 
defaulting sovereigns
-> Productive Power 
(Meaning- Determined)
1.5.3 Methodology
Our research has included an examination of archival material for both the 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders and the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council. 
The CFBH produced detailed annual reports for each year of its operation, as well as over 
five hundred volumes of clippings and three hundred volumes of original
• 36correspondence, all of which are housed at the Guildhall Library in the City of London.
A similar record of close to one hundred boxes of original, unprocessed material has been 
preserved in the annual reports of the FBPC and the Council’s archives which are held at 
Stanford University.37 These archives had not yet been researched since they were only 
recently moved by the FBPC to Stanford. We were fortunate to have been the first 
researcher granted permission to examine the original source material for the FBPC.
More relevant to an analysis of the post-1982 period will be nearly twenty 
interviews with a wide range of market practitioners, including sovereign debt advisors, 
capital markets professionals, bank creditor officers, central bankers, IMF staff, bank 
lobbying organizations, lawyers, rating agency professionals, and finance and treasury
36 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987).
37 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1941-1944); Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936- 
1977).
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ministers from emerging markets countries. A list of completed interviews appears in 
Appendix 7B.
1.5.4 The Relevance o f the Research Project and Proposed Original Contributions
Sovereign debt restructuring is an issue-area that exhibits some of the main 
tensions that are of interest to political economists: those between developed and 
developing countries, state and non-state actors, and states and markets.
In the case study chapters which follow, we have used the “four faces of power” 
model to isolate those elements of debt restructuring regimes that are most responsible 
for producing bargaining outcomes. Our findings have both theoretical and practical 
significance, and also refute some of the longstanding conventional wisdom held about 
the CFBH, FBPC and London Club.
In Chapter 2, we assess the shortcomings of economic theories that seek to 
identify sovereign repayment incentives. We present evidence that makes us question the 
efficacy of the “sanctions-reputation” debate, which we see as artificial and unproductive 
when trying to account for the variation in bargaining outcomes in different historical 
periods.38 We establish an alternative theoretical basis for analyzing sovereign debt 
regimes in Chapter 3 and argue that if “sanctions” and “reputation” are analyzed instead 
as “compulsory” and “structural” power, it becomes clear that is not necessary to choose 
between them. They are both factors in the sovereign default calculus and tend to work in 
tandem to produce bargaining outcomes. In fact, our findings in our case studies 
(Chapters 4 though 7) indicate that since 1870, the compulsory power exercised by 
creditor governments in conjunction with structural (or credit-export) power, have been 
key drivers of negotiating results between debtor states and private creditors, reinforcing 
one another in the bargaining process. So, rather than debate the relative merits of 
sanctions vs. reputation, it appears to be far more useful to examine how compulsory and 
structural power interact to amplify one another in the same way across time. We 
maintain that these two forms of power have been principally responsible for the 
observed variation in bargaining outcomes in sovereign debt restructuring over the past
38 Bulow and Rogoff (1989a); Bulow and Rogoff (1989c); Eaton and Gersovitz (1981).
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135 years, meaning that the impact of private creditor representative bodies has been 
overestimated.
From a practical perspective, we believe that this research project will make a 
♦contribution to the public policy debate concerning reforms to the international financial 
architecture. As we noted earlier, the IIF has been extremely active in attempting to shape 
;a new regime for sovereign debt management. The thrust of its agenda has been to 
improve communication and transparency on the part of sovereign debtors, but also to 
institute a debtor-funded private creditor representative body at the outset of each 
restructuring. Along with the IIF, other market practitioners and academics have called 
for the resurrection of bondholder councils.39 This thesis argues that private creditors - 
even those that purportedly had capable representation -  were much less powerful in a 
sovereign debt restructuring exercise than previously believed. Upon closer examination, 
the CFBH - the bondholder council viewed most favourably by economic historians -  
was highly dependent upon the sympathetic disposition of the British government toward 
its interests and the discipline of the London exchanges in restricting defaulters from 
accessing British capital markets. While the presence of the CFBH may have helped with 
administrative matters, bargaining results were not institutionally driven. Even the 
London Club, routinely praised as a model of effective creditor coordination, would not 
have held together as a negotiating body were it not for the coercion and control 
exercised by G-7 governments and the IMF. The cause of creditors in the 1980s was also 
advanced by the fact that private banks had been the principal suppliers of loans to 
emerging market countries since the 1960s. So, there was no alternative bond market for 
developing countries to tap. In short, the bargaining outcomes achieved by the 
commercial banks during the Latin American debt crisis flowed principally from the 
structure of the world credit markets and the active role played by the official sector, and 
not from the organizational features of the London Club. Given this analysis, it becomes 
clear that although we can establish a new bondholder council today, its results will not 
necessarily replicate those of the late 19th century or 1980s. Contemporary outcomes will 
be more dependent upon the attitudes of creditor governments and the configuration of 
modem global capital markets, neither of which bode well for today’s investors.
39 Portes (2004); MacMillan (1995a).
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In terms of the broader sovereign debt management literature, most of it has 
tended to focus on a single period, country or region, while there are occasional examples 
of scholars seeking to compare two historical periods -  for example, the 1980s and the 
1930s or the 19th century and the 1990s.40 Ours is the first study to investigate all four 
periods, beginning in 1870 and ending with the Argentine debt exchange in February, 
2005. Also, since the early 1980s, the literature on financial crises has accorded a 
privileged position to the IMF. There is no doubt that the IMF has played a critical role in 
debt restructurings over the past twenty-five years, but the fact remains that private 
capital flows to developing countries dwarf official IMF lending 41 We therefore intend to 
redress this imbalance in coverage by highlighting the importance of private banks and 
bondholders in the debt restructuring process.
We also believe that there is an important gap in the literature relating to the 
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council. This organization has been the least understood 
of the historical creditor institutions and also the least examined. Our research project 
addresses this gap by contributing a more robust picture of the FBPC (Chapter 5) through 
a careful review of its unprocessed archives and interviews with the Council’s current 
President and former Deputy Treasury Secretary. We take issue with those who have 
branded it as an institutional failure, preferring instead to demonstrate how the FBPC was 
hampered by the same compulsory and structural regime elements that worked to benefit 
its predecessor, the CFBH 42
Our analysis begins in the next chapter with a review of the relative merits and 
shortcomings of economic theories related to sovereign repayment incentives. We will 
point out the important gaps that exist between formal economic models of debt and 
restructuring negotiations in practice, and suggest how our proposed analytical 
framework might help to bridge those gaps.
40 Eichengreen and Lindert (1989); Bordo, Eichengreen et al. (1998).
41 IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2007.
42 Adamson (2002); Adamson (2005).
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Chapter 2
Why Sovereigns Repay and Creditors Settle: An Assessment of 
Economic Theories of Debt
Since sovereign loans are owned by the governments o f countries, repayment is not constrained by the net 
worth o f the country, but by that component o f net worth that the government can (or is willing to) 
appropriate.43
Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz
2.1 Economic Theory: Why Do Sovereisns Repay?
In the absence of any formal, international bankruptcy framework, private 
creditors and sovereign states have had no choice but to negotiate mutually acceptable, 
post-default settlements through the ad hoc regimes that have emerged over time. Many 
economists consider these regimes to be “woefully inadequate” insofar as they lack the 
efficiency, fairness and predictability that we normally associate with well-designed 
domestic bankruptcy systems.44 Yet, despite the aspirations of those contributing to the 
considerable body of prescriptive debt management literature, very little of what they 
have proposed has been implemented.45 Supra-national bankruptcy schemes have never 
been adopted, and, as we will discuss later, only a diluted version of the collective action 
clauses (“CACs”) first advanced by Eichengreen and Portes (1995) found their way into 
sovereign bond issues beginning in 2003. In fact, the way in which CACs were 
' implemented fell far short of the standards advocated by Eichengreen and Portes and the 
G-10 (1996,2002).46
If the machinery that has evolved over time to deal with sovereign debt crises has 
been less than optimal, then it is probably useful to ask: Why do sovereigns ever repay? 
After all, under conditions of anarchy in the international system, in which there exists no
43 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), p. 500.
44 Sachs (2002), p. 257.
45 Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002); Oechsli (1981); Sachs (1995); Chun (1996); Cohen (1989); Schwarcz 
(2000); Clementi (2001); Cooper (2002); Cymot (2002); Miller (2002); Bossone and Sdralevich (2002); 
Griffith-Jones (2002); Miller and Zhang (2003); Ghosal and Miller (2003); Kroszner (2003); International 
Monetary Fund (2003a); Sharma (2004); Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2005); Miller and Thomas (2006b).
46 See Drage and Hovaguimian (2004) for an analysis of the implementation of the G-10/Rey Report 
recommendations. See also Eichengreen and Portes (1995); Group of Ten (The Rey Report) (1996); and, 
Group of Ten (2002).
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generally accepted supra-national authority to uphold or enforce the sovereign debt 
contract, what is it that compels states to honour their obligations to creditors?47 The 
answer to this question is part of an ongoing theoretical debate in the economic literature, 
a debate that has been largely defined by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Bulow and 
Rogoff (1989a, 1989c). While the former prioritize the importance of reputation, the 
latter privilege the potentially damaging effects of sanctions 48
2.1.1 Reputation vs. Sanctions
Eaton and Gersovitz argue that sovereign debtors repay because the act of default 
affects their reputation, thereby limiting or even prohibiting their access to capital 
markets.49 Since the ability to borrow offers them consumption smoothing benefits in the 
future -  permitting them to finance a balance of payments deficit and avoid domestic 
adjustment - they will refrain from default in order to maintain the entitlement of market 
access. Following this logic, Eaton and Gersovitz claim that lenders do not furnish 
sovereigns with an unlimited amount of credit; instead, a ceiling is reached at the level of 
indebtedness which makes a state indifferent between the loss of borrowing access in the 
future and the one-time gain associated with debt repudiation.
Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) expand on this model by appealing to game 
theory. They argue that lenders infer the future behaviour of sovereign debtors according 
to their past behaviour. And, since states have an infinite time horizon, “their identity is 
remembered by their opponents” meaning that their “reputation as cooperative players 
can succeed in enforcing some degree of cooperation” regarding repayment.50 In 
addition, the authors maintain that in order for the loss of market access to be seen as a 
credible sanction, not only do existing lenders need to withdraw credit; potential new 
creditors must abstain as well. Taking the 1980s Latin American debt crisis as their 
reference point, they assert that syndicate banks were successfully able to coordinate their
47 The term “anarchy” is employed by international relations scholars to refer to the state of affairs between 
polities in which “unilateral power or cooperation may provide order” but where there is “no generally 
accepted authority or world government to settle disputes and enforce law.” This differs from the 
commonly understood definition of the term “anarchic” which implies disorder. (Definition taken from The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary o f Politics (2003), p. 15.) This is in part the reason that international law has 
never been able to match the precision of domestic law.
48 Eaton and Gersovitz (1981); Bulow and Rogoff (1989a); Bulow and Rogoff (1989c).
49 See Kletzer and Wright (2000) for additional support of the Eaton-Gersovitz position.
50 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), p. 493.
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responses to troubled debtors by withholding credit, since punishment within the 
syndicate would be meted out to any bank that did not play by the rules.51 Also, whenever 
existing lenders refused to make incremental loans to a sovereign debtor, their informed 
refusal acted as a signal to potential new lenders to shun the debtor too.52
Kaletsky (1985) looks at debtor incentives to default from a cost-benefit 
perspective.53 He maintains that since the enforcement of private legal sanctions by 
creditors is so difficult, they often do not represent the most significant costs of non­
payment. He goes on to say that incentives to repay are driven more by a borrower’s 
desire to enjoy the benefits that come from “advanced nation status, with...low risk 
premiums and full integration into international goods and capital markets.”54 Cline 
(1995) agrees and adds that many of the formal economic models do not sufficiently 
account for elements like “honour or national pride in the commitment to international 
rules of the game.”55 However, both Kaletsky (1985) and Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) are 
challenged to explain how, in the 1990s, the sovereign restructuring cases of Mexico, 
South Korea and Russia were all met with prompt renewal of market access.
In the competing theoretical camp, Bulow and Rogoff (1989c) claim that evidence 
in favour of a pure reputational argument is weak; they contend that industrialized 
country creditors can impose real, direct costs on borrowing countries, the most important 
being the blockage of trade credit. By interfering in the international goods market, 
creditors can force countries to conduct trade without letters of credit and in secret, 
roundabout ways to avoid the seizure of goods. So, by forcing a sovereign debtor to 
forego the gains from trade, creditors can incentivize recalcitrant states to repay. 
Although Bulow and Rogoff use trade interference as an example, direct sanctions could 
also include things like withholding international aid or even war. The authors find the 
reputational model to be so inadequate, that they argue in favour debt forgiveness 
whenever possible, since “debt that is forgiven is forgotten.”56
51 For additional support from the perspective of market practitioners, see Mudge (1984); Gibbs (1984); 
and, Hurlock (1984).
52 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), p. 493.
53 Kaletsky (1985).
54 Cline (1995), p. 141.
55 Cline (1995), p.141.
56 Bulow and Rogoff (1989c), p. 49.
31
Those who found the sanctions argument compelling did not have to look far for 
empirical support During the 1980s debt crisis, political pressure from creditor country 
governments, and most especially from the United States, carried the “implicit message 
that sanctions of a non-financial kind” would be imposed on any sovereigns that failed to 
service their debt.57 The U.S. Treasury Secretary gave a grim description of what would 
happen in the event of default:
The foreign assets of a country would be attacked by creditors throughout the 
world; its exports would be seized by creditors at each dock where they 
landed; its national airlines would be unable to operate, and its sources of 
desperately needed capital goods...virtually eliminated. In many countries, 
even food imports would be curtailed.58
In fact, the literature is replete with empirical studies that privilege either reputation or 
sanctions as the principal incentive for sovereign repayment. Arguing in favour of 
reputational incentives we find Cole, Dow et. al. (1995), English (1996), and Tomz 
(2001, 2004), among others.59 Those finding strong evidence in favour of sanctions 
include Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990), Krugman (1989b), Lipson (1985b), O’Brien 
(1993), Ozler (1993), Klimenko (2002), and Weidenmier (2004).60 Finally, when looking 
at the 1930’s, Cardoso and Dombusch (1989), Jorgenson and Sachs (1989), and Lindert 
and Morton (1989) all argue that defaulting sovereigns eventually settled with their 
private creditors in the absence of either sanctions or reputational considerations, 
undercutting the explanatory power of either model.61 In Chapter 5, we will address this 
specific case and demonstrate how both structural and compulsory regime elements 
worked in tandem to produce the bargaining outcomes unique to the interwar and post­
war periods. While sanctions and concerns about market access appear to have been 
absent from the sovereign default calculus in the 1930s and 1940s, this was not in fact the 
case. There was a market for capital; it was simply that this market was controlled by the 
official sector. Both the US government and its agencies, and later the multi laterals,
57 Krugman (1989b), p. 292.
58 O'Brien (1993), p. 100.
59 Cole, Dow et al. (1995); English (1996); Tomz (2001); Tomz (2004).
60 Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990); Krugman (1989b); Lipson (1985b); O'Brien (1993); Ozler (1993); 
Klimenko (2002); Weidenmier (2004).
61 Cardoso and Dombusch (1989); Jorgenson and Sachs (1989); Lindert and Morton (1989).
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showed a willingness to lend to countries despite their record of default. Also, 
compulsory power was evident in the debtor-friendly role played by the American 
government. In many ways, American investors ended up being sanctioned by their own 
government in the settlement process. Given that both power elements worked in favour 
of debtor states during this era, sovereigns were able to dramatically scale down their 
debt obligations to bondholders with little residual damage. So, by recasting the debate in 
terms of structural and compulsory power, we have been able to surmount the puzzling 
question of sovereign repayment incentives during the interwar and post-war periods. In 
the next section, we have summarized some other empirical findings from the economic 
history literature in order to highlight the weaknesses of a pure “reputation vs. sanctions” 
debate.
2.1.2 Cases from Economic History: Shortcomings o f the Reputation-Sanctions Debate
Cole, Dow et. al. (1995) and English (1996) examined the defaulting southern 
U.S. states in the mid-19th century, finding evidence in favour of reputational incentives, 
while Weidenmier (2004) looked at the same cases and argued that it was the presence of 
sanctions that drove repayment.62 In support of the reputational argument, Cole, Dow et. 
al., and English argued that placing direct sanctions on a defaulting U.S. state was 
exceedingly difficult. It was not feasible to cut off trade with one state, since free trade 
within the U.S. allowed goods shipped to non-defaulting states to cross defaulting state 
lines. And, eliminating trade with the U.S. as a whole would have been extremely 
damaging for the British economy. The ultimate direct sanction, war, was out of the 
question, since war with one U.S. state would have provoked an immediate response 
from the federal government. However, even while the particular facts of mid-19th 
century America made sanctions unrealistic, English points out that most states 
eventually repaid their debts. He argues that this is because in the important years leading 
up to the Civil War, those states that repaid British bondholders were able to access 
European capital markets. So, reputation, and not sanctions, drove state behaviour.
62 Cole, Dow et al. (1995); English (1996); Weidenmier (2004).
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By contrast, Weidenmier (2004) asserts that sanctions were an important 
consideration in the Confederate default calculation.63 Although leading investment 
houses in Britain might have been wary to “market war debt for a pro-slavery 
government with such a poor capital market reputation,” the South did succeed in floating 
cotton bonds in England and the Confederacy did make payment on them, right up until 
March 1865, when Northern forces were at the gates of its capitol. Weidenmier argues 
that the South repaid mainly because of the “threat of trade and trade credit sanctions by 
gun manufacturers.”64
Lindert and Morton (1989) conducted an analysis of bond lending from 1850 - 
1970 and concluded that “defaulting governments have seldom been punished, either 
with direct sanctions or discriminatory denials of later credit”, undercutting the 
theoretical positions of both Eaton-Gersovitz and Bulow-Rogoff.65 While some countries 
that defaulted in isolation before 1918 were punished, Lindert and Morton found that 
credit rationing and trade retaliation in the 1930s was not targeted at defaulting countries 
but was instead indiscriminate and systemic. The U.S. and other credit exporters denied
loans to virtually all developing countries, whether they had been faithful repayers or
66not.
Jorgenson and Sachs (1989) reported results that were consistent with Lindert and 
Morton (1989) in their empirical study of all sovereign (and sovereign-guaranteed) bonds 
issued in the 1930s for five Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Columbia and Peru. What they found was that although Argentina was the only faithful 
repayer in the group, it was rewarded with exactly one new loan in the late 1930s, a loan 
that was issued for refinancing purposes only. Beyond that, Argentina received no special 
treatment. And, when Latin American countries returned to the capital markets in the 
1950s, no systematic debt pricing differences between Argentina and other Latin 
American countries appeared.67 Cardoso and Dombusch (1989) provide further evidence
63 Weidenmier (2004).
64 Weidenmier (2004), pp. 8 & 19.
65 Lindert and Morton (1989), p. 234
66 Lindert and Morton (1989), pp. 231-232.
67 Jorgenson and Sachs (1989), pp. 73, 74,75 & 79.
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of creditor amnesia by demonstrating that Brazil, a 1930s defaulter, had no more trouble 
borrowing in the 1960s than its more fiscally disciplined neighbour, Argentina.
The only one to take exception to these findings was Ozler (1993). He concluded 
that borrowers were in fact penalized by past defaults, especially if those defaults 
occurred in the more recent past. His analysis found that the defaults of the 1930s had a 
small but statistically significant impact on borrowing terms, adding 20 basis points to 
future borrowing costs, while post-war defaults added 30 basis points.69
Although these two theoretical approaches to explaining sovereign repayment 
incentives - reputations vs. sanctions - are often painted as competing, they are not 
mutually exclusive. In fact, given the divergent results produced by many empirical 
studies on this issue, some involving the very same cases, we do not see a strong rationale 
for continuing to privilege either incentive. That is the reason we incorporate them both 
into our power-based framework and conceptualize them as involving distinct causal 
mechanisms that can be simultaneously operative.70 In this way, we can make a 
determination as to how they might reinforce each other, or neutralize one another, in a 
given period. In translating the two incentives from economic theory to our power model, 
we consider sanctions to be a form of compulsory power, and reputation (or access to 
funding) to be a form of structural power. Also, our model will seek to go beyond the 
incentives debate and explain not only why sovereigns repay, but why they repay more in 
some periods than in others. Finally, our analysis will expand upon the contemporary 
debate by examining the potentially independent impact of private creditor representative 
bodies on bargaining outcomes.
2.2 Economic Theory: Why Do Creditors Settle  -  A Zero-Sum or Positive-Sum Game?
Can creditors ever view debt forgiveness as an act that will ultimately benefit 
them? As the 1980s debt crisis progressed, many economists began to theorize about the 
efficacy of debt forgiveness, trying to frame it as being mutually advantageous to the 
sovereign state and the private creditor group. The defining contributions in this regard 
were from Krugman (1988, 1989a, 1989b), who developed the concept of debt
68Cardoso and Dombusch (1989).
69 Ozler (1993), pp. 611-612.
70 Tomz (2004), p. 2.
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“overhang” and the “debt Laffer curve.”71 In his formulation, a condition of overhang 
exists when a country’s debt grows to a level that makes full repayment unlikely. This is 
because overhang acts as a disincentive for investment and economic growth. Why? 
Because the larger a country’s debt, the more likely it is that the benefits of good 
economic performance will accrue to creditors in the form of interest and principal 
payments, and not to the country itself. In other words, overhang undermines the normal 
pro-growth bias of a debtor state, which in turn affects the lenders’ expectations for 
repayment. The debt Laffer curve graphically represents the point at which a debtor 
moves into an overhang position. Cline points out that the principal problem with 
Krugman’s argument is that, despite being intuitively appealing, there were empirically 
very few countries that were on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve; and, most
noimportantly, none of them were in Latin America. This meant that, in accordance with 
Krugman’s theory, an offer of debt forgiveness on the part of creditors would not have 
resulted in a joint-gains outcome, but would have instead become a one-sided gift by 
private creditors to Latin American debtor states.
Apart from Krugman, other economists tried to make the theoretical case for a 
joint-gains outcome from partial debt forgiveness. Sachs (1986) and Sachs and Huizinga 
(1987) shared Krugman’s conviction about the disincentives created by high levels of 
debt. However, they also faced a similar problem -  their data suggested that very few 
sovereigns were on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve, once again undercutting the 
notion that joint gains from debt forgiveness were possible in the case of Latin 
America.73 .
Offering an opposing view, Corden (1988) maintained that debt relief need not 
necessarily enhance the position of creditors by producing an incentive for debtor 
countries to adjust.74 In his opinion, debt relief could also produce a disincentive for 
adjustment. He argued that, at the extreme, if a country were granted full debt relief, it 
would no longer find it necessary to adjust since it would not need to generate a higher 
level of resources to satisfy its foreign creditors. In fact, in his formal model, Corden
71 Krugman (1989a); Krugman (1989b); Krugman (1988).
72 Cline (1995), p. 162.
73 Sachs (1986); Sachs and Huizinga (1987).
74 Corden (1988).
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locates the pro-incentive effects of debt relief only in a very exceptional case: where a 
country would be pushed to subsistence levels of consumption in the absence of debt 
forgiveness. Since such empirical examples were largely confined to sub-Saharan Africa, 
Corden’s model did not have wider application to the debt problems of Latin America. In 
addition, countries that operated so close to subsistence levels of consumption did not 
generally have access to private capital markets. Their funding tended to come solely 
from bi-lateral governmental loans, multilateral institutions and aid agencies, putting 
them outside the remit of this research project.
In tackling the same issue, Helpman (1989) offered a highly qualified answer to 
the question of whether debt relief could ultimately benefit creditors as well as debtors:
My results show that the desirability and likelihood of voluntary debt 
reduction depend on circumstances. Creditors benefit from a write-down of 
debt in some circumstances and lose in others.
Helpman demonstrates that in the absence of capital mobility where there is a high degree 
of risk aversion in the debtor country, creditors do not gain from debt writedowns. This is 
because the gains from debt relief are used to fund consumption, not investment. 
However, the prospects for creditors improve as capital becomes mobile and the level of 
risk aversion drops, since, in this case, debt reduction leads to an increase in domestic 
investment. Yet, in Helpman’s model, the possibility of a joint-gains outcome relied on
circumstances that could be theoretically specified but were largely absent in the real
lfi
world. During the 1980s debt crisis, financial autarky was not the exception but the 
rule. Access to capital was both centralized and tightly controlled by the banking 
syndicates, and most of the “new money” was not available for investment since it was 
being used by debtor states to fund accrued interest owed to the banks; hence, capital 
movements were largely circular. So, while Helpman theorized about the conditions of 
capital mobility and risk tolerance that would spur domestic investment and increase a 
sovereign’s repayment capabilities, it remained a challenge to apply his work to the 
specific cases of Latin America.
75 Helpman (1989), p. 308.
76 Cline (1995), p. 173.
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As the crisis progressed, many of the models developed by economists were not 
able to provide the direction and clarity required by policymakers who were being 
increasingly forced to address the weaknesses of the multi-year rescheduling process as 
well as the coordination difficulties among private creditors. While scholars debated the 
circumstances under which debt forgiveness could produce a joint-gains outcome, those 
who tried to make the case for debt relief more forcefully, like Krugman and Sachs, 
ended up with models that ultimately excluded just those Latin American states whose 
debt burdens they were hoping to alleviate.
2.3 Debt Strategies in Practice
With the benefit of hindsight, one can more readily identify the shortcomings of 
the theoretical literature that evolved to address matters of sovereign repayment 
incentives and debt relief in the 1980s. First, empirical data could not be easily reconciled 
with formal models that forced a choice between reputational considerations and 
sanctions to explain repayment. Second, while economists were focused on trying to 
make the case for joint gains from debt relief, the applicability of their models to the 
specific cases of Latin America turned out to be rather limited. Their work was 
necessarily in a process of continual evolution as policymakers sought guidance to assess 
their strategic options. While formal models can contribute meaningfully to our 
understanding of certain aspects of the debt restructuring process, as a practical matter, 
what happens in a loan negotiation is often the result of a series of human decisions.77 As 
Eaton, Gersovitz et. al. (1986) point out, while theoretical analysis is both valuable and 
appropriate in principle, it faces a number of limitations in practice. The most obvious is 
that questions of information are logically prior to analysis; and when these cannot be 
adequately addressed, it makes the endeavour of formal modelling that much more 
formidable.78
Dooley (1989) outlined four practical strategy options that were available to the 
banks and the sovereign debtors in the 1980s. All of these strategies were employed at
77 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), p. 486.
78 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), p. 503.
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different times, although the unilateral, partial default option was exercised in a limited 
way only by smaller debtor countries.79
Table 2A: Commercial Bank Negotiating Strategies in the 1980s
Strategy Description Effect
W ait and See Banks keep loans at book value 
and limit new lending to fund 
accrued interest. Hope that 
debtors “grow” out of problem.
Negative for debtor country
Creditors Share Expected 
Losses
Banks increase loan loss reserves, 
but maintain full contractual 
claim on debtor country.
Negative for bank earnings
Loss-Sharing and Debt Relief Banks write-off loans and forgive 
contractual obligations o f debtor.
Negative for bank earnings; 
positive for debtor states
Unilateral Partial Default Debtor defaults. Negative for bank earnings and 
for reputation of debtor states
Source: Dooley (1989)
What this table illustrates is that there was no obvious, positive-sum strategy for 
the banks and sovereign debtors to pursue. This observation not only helps to account for 
the lengthy negotiation process, but also highlights the importance of IMF/govemment- 
sponsored mediation, which allowed the parties to surmount both their collective action 
problems and their coordination deadlock.
We can conceive of a restructuring process more broadly as one that either brings 
a “solvent, willing-to-pay debtor through a liquidity crisis” or enables “an insolvent or 
unwilling-to-pay borrower to postpone the inevitable sanctions it will suffer when 
repayment ultimately is not made.”80 The question arises as to why a creditor would 
continue to acquiesce in the latter case. Generally, this is for one of three reasons: i) they 
hope that the problem will ultimately be proven to be one of illiquidity; ii) if this is not 
the case, then they will use the time to seek out other private or public lenders to assume 
their loans; iii) failing all else, they hope that by the time people recognize that the loan is
ft 1uncollectible, those responsible for it will have long departed from the bank. In other 
words, the 1980s debt crisis, like other financial crises in history, was managed by people 
who had imperfect information and were naturally worried about the potential damage to
79 Dooley (1989), pp. 79-81.
80 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), pp. 510-511.
81 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), pp. 510-511.
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their reputations and livelihoods. In addition, this characterization of the debt 
restructuring process identifies one of the most difficult assessments a creditor needs to 
make: is a sovereign debtor illiquid or insolvent? We will next discuss how this 
distinction has been made in international law and economic theory, as well as its wider 
implications for debt restructuring in practice.
2.4 Economic Theory and International Law: The Illiauiditv-Insolvencv Debate
From a legal perspective, Borchard (1951a) defines state insolvency as “the 
condition of affairs when the state or its government fails to perform its financial 
obligations to creditors, by non-payment in whole or in part of interest, principal, or 
sinking fund.”82 He goes on to explain that non-payment (or default) can be in good faith, 
when a clear inability to perform is present, or in bad faith, when a country is able but 
unwilling to honour its obligations. In practice, it is often difficult for creditors to 
determine the category into which the default falls, since even borrowers who are able to 
pay find it expedient to make claims of financial distress.
Some have denied that a state can, in theory, become insolvent. This is in part 
because of its unlimited taxing power, and, as Borchard, points out, the ability “to 
alienate even a part of its public domain for the benefit of creditors.”83 However, as a 
practical matter, there is a point at which taxation becomes economically and political 
unfeasible; also, it is hard to envisage a modern-day case where territory would be ceded 
voluntarily. Therefore, the net worth of a country, unlike that of a firm, cannot be easily 
measured in a simple “assets minus liabilities” equation.
Economists have suggested that we instead think of a country’s net worth as the 
“discounted present value of its trade account.”84 In other words, the total value of a 
country’s resources is not meaningful, because the only way the assets of a country can 
be transferred to foreign investors is through the trade account. This more restrictive net 
worth definition allows us to see how sovereign borrowers can reach a point where they 
are unable to service their external debt. Additionally, Krugman and Obstfeld (2003) 
discuss the concept of an intertemporal budget constraint which must be met by a
82 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 115.
83 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 118.
84 Eaton, Gersovitz et al. (1986), p. 501. See also Diaz-Alejandro (1984).
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government in each period. They assert that in cases where real interest rates on 
sovereign debt exceed a country’s GDP growth rate, the debt to GDP ratio rises. Unless 
corrective action is taken by the government to reduce the debt, it will rise to the point 
where interest rates are too high or lenders refuse to roll over loans and call for 
repayment instead. This leaves the sovereign facing the prospect of default.85 While 
some countries, like the U.S., appear to have had the ability to run chronic deficits since 
the 1930s, emerging markets countries are not accorded the same flexibility and therefore 
have less room to manoeuvre when their debt levels rise.
Krugman (1988) dismissed the illiquidity-insolvency distinction on the grounds 
that “it is simply unknown whether the country can earn enough to repay its debt.”87 
Cline (1995) argues that while it may be a difficult distinction, “that is why the public 
pays central bankers and IMF experts: to make such judgments.”88 It is interesting to note 
that even Paul Volcker, the Federal Reserve Chairman at the time of the 1980s debt 
crisis, stated that the distinction between insolvency and illiquidity is easier to make in a
OQ
textbook than in the real world. And, Robert Rubin, Treasury Secretary during the 
Asian financial crisis in the 1990s, commented that the two terms are “approximately 
useless” in any crisis context where a policy decision needs to be made.90 We can deduce 
from these comments that the practical and even theoretical difficulty of assessing 
whether a country is illiquid or insolvent adds to the already uncertain atmosphere of a 
sovereign debt restructuring process. With such a critical aspect of the negotiation 
essentially indeterminate, it is not surprising that sovereign debt negotiations have been 
arduous, often disintegrating into redistributive bargaining exercises.
In the next chapter, we intend to build on this concept of redistributive bargaining 
and borrow from both international relations and IPE theory to construct a framework for 
analyzing sovereign debt restructuring regimes. More specifically, we will i) situate these 
regimes within the literature, ii) examine the theoretical lineage of our four “faces” of 
power, and, iii) tie each aspect of power to a key element of the debt management
85 Krugman and Obstfeld (2003), p. 182.
86 Hamilton and Flavin (1986), p. 809. See also Mosley (2000).
87 Krugman (1988), pp. 256-257.
88 Cline (1995), p. 161.
89 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 210.
90 Rubin (2003b), p. 283.
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process. Finally, we will argue our case for power as the most appropriate lens through 
which to analyze the variation in bargaining outcomes produced by sovereign debt 
regimes across time.
42
Chapter 3
The Four Faces of Power and Regime Theory: Building the 
Analytical Framework
Financial crisis occupies a place in international political economy analogous to that o f nuclear war in 
international politics, implicit as a backdrop to much concern about maintaining habits o f cooperation, but 
eventually unthinkable. 91
Miles Kahler
3.1 Theoretical Explanations for Sovereisn Debt Restructuring Regimes
As we discussed in Chapter 1, the goal of this research project is to explain the 
historical variation in bargaining outcomes between debtor states and private creditors in 
sovereign debt restructurings. In order to answer this question, we need to better 
understand the sovereign debt regime itself. What kind of regime is it and how can we 
best conceptualize it? What are its key features and how does it work?
The impetus for regime creation remains a subject of debate in the literature that 
breaks down roughly along realist, neo-liberal institutionalist, and constructivist lines. It 
is important to point out that the main research programs tend to be state-centric; even 
neo-liberal institutionalism, which started out by challenging the realist focus on states in 
regime creation, was eventually “redefined away from complex interdependence toward a 
state-centric version more compatible with realism.”92 However, we would argue that 
there is nothing about the commonly accepted definition of a regime that would exclude a 
purely private, or even a hybrid (public-private) structure. Private sector actors -  like 
banks and investors -  can establish international regimes, or join together with states to 
establish regimes of mixed “parentage.”93 In other words, the accepted definition should 
not limit our conception of the regime formation process to the interaction among states 
alone.94 This provides the scope necessary to situate hybrids, like sovereign debt 
restructuring regimes, within the existing literature. Therefore, even though our
91 Kahler (1986c).
92 Cutler (2002), pp. 26-27.
93 Haufler (1993), pp. 94-95.
94 Haufler (1993), p. 97.
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discussion of the literature will make frequent reference to states, we need to keep in 
mind that private or hybrid regimes can be substituted for state-sponsored ones.95
There is another characteristic of sovereign debt restructuring regimes that 
separate them from the descriptions commonly found in the literature: they tend to be 
“imposed” rather than “negotiated.” What is the difference?
A negotiated regime is one that arises from a conscious process of bargaining 
in which the parties engage in extended efforts to hammer out mutually 
agreeable provisions to incorporate into an explicit agreement.. .An imposed 
regime, by contrast, is an agreement that is favoured by a single powerful 
actor (or in some cases a small coalition of powerful actors) that succeeds in 
inducing others to accede to its institutional preferences.96
Sovereign debt management regimes are better characterized as imposed regimes, since 
their content is generally not a matter for negotiation between private creditors and 
sovereign states. In fact, it has customarily been the case that these regimes are 
established by creditor groups unilaterally.97 While sovereign debtors implicitly 
recognize their authority when engaging them in a restructuring negotiation, they have 
typically not been a party to the regime’s establishment.
3.1.1 Realists and the Power-Based Framework
Realists maintain that power plays a critical role in the formation, the content, and 
ultimately, the impact of international regimes. Some argue more specifically that 
regimes are structured by and reflect the distribution and configuration of power in the 
international system, casting doubt on the capacity of regimes to exert an independent 
influence on outcomes 98 Even those who ascribe some causal significance to regimes 
maintain that “power is no less central in cooperation than in conflict between nations.”99 
Carr (1964) cautioned that while regimes appeared to be antidotes to power, they were in 
fact “stealth weapons of domination.”100 Strange (1983) believed that even the concept of 
a regime was pernicious because it obscured the power relationships that were the
95 Haufler (1993), pp. 95-96.
96 Levy, Young et al. (1995), pp. 281-282.
97 The only exception would be the Market-Based Debt Exchange which is a process that has been 
controlled by debtor states.
98 Young (1983), pp. 248-249.
99 Hasenclever, Mayer et al. (1997), p. 3.
100 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 68. See also Carr (1964 [1981]).
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proximate causes of behaviour in the international system.101 Others see regimes as 
mobilizing bias, such that certain issues are organized “in” while others are organized
10*5“out.” For example, a self-interested player could use its power to create a regime that 
secured optimal outcomes from the system taken as a whole or even to enhance its 
preferred values.
Those with a realist orientation observe that regimes tend to be created at times of 
“fundamental discontinuity in the international system,” finding a high degree of
1ftTcorrelation between the distribution of power and regime characteristics. In the case of 
sovereign debt restructuring regimes, we do observe a positive correlation between the 
outbreak of global economic crises and the establishment of private creditor 
representative bodies, organizations that were important elements of debt management 
regimes. In addition, these bodies tended to form around the dominant centres of capital 
export, linking them more closely to sources of material power.
3.1.2 Neo-Liberal Institutionalists and the Interest-Based Framework
In contrast to realists, neo-liberal institutionalists, most closely associated with the 
work of Keohane (1983, 1984), take their cue from microeconomics, explaining regime 
formation by the metaphor of supply and demand. This approach to the analysis of 
regimes has become the dominant paradigm, forcing other schools of thought to define 
themselves by making reference to it.104 While the power-oriented research program 
focuses on issue-areas that are redistributive in nature, neo-liberals privilege the prospect 
of joint gains from cooperation. They argue that regimes are supplied by states “acting as 
political entrepreneurs who see potential profit in organizing collaboration.”105 The 
profits, or joint gains, arise when cooperative arrangements reduce transaction costs, 
increase transparency, and promote compliance through collective monitoring. Neo­
liberals argue that we would expect to see regime formation whenever coordinated action 
has the potential to produce better outcomes for all parties than independent,
101 Krasner (1983), p. 6; Strange (1983).
102 Bachrach (1962), p. 949.
103 Krasner (1983), p. 357.
104 Hasenclever, Mayer et al. (1997), p. 23.
105 Keohane (1993), p. 34.
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uncoordinated action.106 In other words, in many issue-areas, states can be seen to have 
mutual interests, so international politics need not only be about zero-sum games.
While Keohane helps to explain why states demand regimes, collective action 
theory sheds some light on the supply question. We cannot simply infer supply from 
demand, since the creation and maintenance of regimes involve costs. Even if each state 
in a group would obtain some benefit from the creation of a new regime, failures of 
collective action rest on the premise that “individual rationality is not sufficient for
107collective rationality.” As Olson (1965) pointed out: “it is not in fact true that the idea 
that groups will act in their self-interest follows logically from the premise of rational and 
self-interested behaviour.”108 Collective action problems are generally associated with the 
provision of public goods - goods whose benefits are both non-rival and non­
excludable.109 Olson believed that unless a group were small or some form of external 
coercion or selective incentive were present, rational and self-interested parties would not 
act to achieve the common good. In his view, small groups were qualitatively different 
from larger ones; the larger the group, the greater the chance of inefficient, uncoordinated 
(Nash) behaviour.110 Olson identified a “privileged” group as one in which at least one 
(or some) of its members would be willing to provide a collective good, even if it were 
forced the bear the entire cost itself. A group that fits this description is likely to exist 
when the members are unequal in size or have a disproportionate interest in the public 
good.111 In this same vein, Keohane invoked the theory of hegemonic stability to explain 
the supply of regimes.112 A hegemon unilaterally supplies public goods, like an open 
trading system or a global currency, because it is in the interests of the hegemon to do so.
106 Keohane (1983); Keohane (1984); Keohane and Nye (2001).
107 Sandler (2004), p. 18.
108 Olson (1980 [1965]), pp. 1-2.
109 Sandler (2004), p. 17. Benefits are non-rival when a unit of a good can be consumed by one party 
without detracting from the consumption opportunity o f the same unit that is available to other parties. 
Non-excludable goods, once provided to one, are available to all. Examples include such things as national 
defense and clean air.
110 We observe a Nash equilibrium whenever two or more players in a game are unable to gain by a change 
in their strategies given the strategies being pursued by others. Such a non-cooperative equilibrium is 
usually not Pareto-optimal and could be improved upon by some form of cooperation.
111 Reisman (1990), p. 150.
112 Keohane (1984), p. 78. This theory accounts for the provision of global public goods by making 
reference to die distribution of power in the international system; in other words, hegemonic powers play 
an important role in the provision of public goods.
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Given the divergent approaches taken by realists and neo-liberal institutionalists, which 
paradigm best captures the attributes of sovereign debt restructuring regimes?
3.1.3 Realists vs. Neo-Liberal Institutionalists: Locating Sovereign Debt Regimes in the 
Literature
Realists have taken aim at some of the central tenets of neo-liberal 
institutionalism. Grieco (1988), for example, believes that the research program 
overlooks the fact that states are concerned with relative and not absolute gains, 
emphasizing power not as a means but as an end of statecraft; Snidal (1991) replies that 
relative gains seeking only applies in special cases, meaning that this behaviour does not 
greatly diminish the chances for international cooperation.113 He also argues that a 
hegemonic power structure is not a necessary pre-condition for international cooperation; 
the collective action of a small, like-minded group (defined as a “k” group”) can 
substitute for a hegemon.114
Most relevant for our purposes is how one conceives of the sovereign debt 
restructuring process -  as a redistributive or a joint-gains exercise. We would argue that 
redistribution is at the core of any negotiation in this issue-area, placing it more firmly in 
the power-based research program. While some degree of cooperation is necessary 
simply to enter into a negotiation exercise, once this threshold has been crossed, the 
process more closely approximates a zero-sum game. This is largely because creditors 
and debtors are negotiating over the allocation of a scarce pool of resources that resides 
within the debtor state. And, historical episodes of outright repudiation are rare, meaning 
that private creditors and debtor states have generally been able to muster the minimum 
level of cooperation necessary to permit a negotiation process to proceed.115 Also, as we 
discussed earlier, the fact that these regimes are imposed rather than negotiated suggests 
an important role for power. And, since the power-oriented research program seeks to 
explain outcomes “in terms of interests and relative capabilities rather than in terms of 
institutions designed to promote Pareto optimality,” it would seem to have better
113 Grieco (1988), p. 486; Snidal (1991), p. 722.
114 Hasenclever, Mayer et al. (1997), p. 101.
115 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 129.
47
application to the issue-area of sovereign debt management.116 In other words, power- 
oriented analysis is relevant for analyzing those situations that fall outside the purview of 
neo-liberal institutionalism: zero-sum games.117
Although Keohane makes the argument in After Hegemony that both power and 
exchange are important in determining outcomes, the concept of power recedes into the 
background.118 Instead, the book privileges the ways in which regimes can help to 
surmount problems of market failure and help states move to the Pareto frontier. By 
contrast, a power-oriented research program focuses on how power is used to promote a 
more favourable distribution of benefits, something that lies at the heart of many of the 
issue-areas of international politics -  including national security and, we would add, 
sovereign debt restructuring. According to Krasner (1992):
there are some issues in international politics, especially but not exclusively 
related to security, that are zero-sum. What is at stake is the power, that is, the 
relative capability of the actors. Market failure is never at issue here; one 
actor’s gain is another’s loss.119
Therefore, one cannot assume that all regimes arise to address questions of market 
failure; those that are intended to resolve distributional issues -  like sovereign debt - 
belong to the power-based research agenda.
Given the orientation of their research program, it is not surprising that Keohane 
and Nye (2001) characterized the 1980s debt regime as a process that was designed to 
achieve joint gains. In their judgment, “when a country default seems likely, the common 
interest calls for a collective effort to save the system.”120 This interpretation, which was 
the minority view, was rather one-sided, especially since prioritizing the goal of saving 
the financial system had the effect of privileging the interests of banks over debtor states. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1989a, 1989b) examined the same period and adopted a decidedly 
more conflictual perspective on the negotiation between debtors and creditors, one in
116 Krasner (1992), p. 362.
117 The failure of economic theory to make a convincing case for a joint-gains outcome in the 1980s debt 
crisis has been discussed in Chapter 2. The case for a joint-gains outcome is more convincing for highly- 
indebted poor countries than it is for middle-income developing countries that have private market access.
118 Keohane (1984). See Chapter 6.
119 Krasner (1992), p. 364.
120 Keohane and Nye (2001), p. 293.
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which both parties focused on protecting their own interests.121 Kapstein (1992) argued
that “the international response reflected in large measure the distribution of power
100capabilities.” Biersteker (1993) concurred, seeing the 1980s global debt regime as one 
that evolved “with a clear distributive bias, one directed principally against the 
developing countries.”123 Devlin (1989) went even further, maintaining that:
Formally, the banks present their committee structure as a public good, that 
is, an innocent mechanism of coordination among the hundreds of lenders, 
which facilitates the rescue of the borrower...But there is a potentially dark 
side to the committee structure as well: it can facilitate collusion and the 
formation of an effective cartel geared to skewing the distribution of the 
costs.”124
As Devlin points out, while there is a public goods aspect to the committee -  in the sense 
that it could attempt to overcome free-rider problems associated with the large number of 
lenders - by joining together in a committee headed by the world’s largest financial 
institutions, the creditors created a formidable negotiating bloc, one whose power was 
derived from its monopoly control of credit flows.
Additionally, we would expect to see collective action problems arise in the 
creation of creditor committees because investor groups have historically been large, 
more closely resembling Olson’s “latent” group than his “privileged” group. This implies 
that we should anticipate the presence of either coercion or selective incentives in the 
formation of private creditor institutions across time. However, to the extent that there is 
a hegemonic power structure, we might also see the establishment of such bodies eased 
by the willingness of certain creditor country governments to play a role in their creation. 
For instance, the CFBH was created with the support of the British Parliament and the 
FBPC was the progeny of the Roosevelt administration. Likewise, the London Club 
formed around the interests of G-5 governments and the IMF, since these official sector 
players were keenly interested in preserving the solvency of the global banking system.
121 Bulow and RogofF(1989a); Bulow and RogofF(1989b); See also Yang (1999).
122 Kapstein (1992), p. 268.
123 Biersteker (1993), p. 2.
124 Devlin (1989), p. 218.
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3.1.4 Constructivists and the Ideas-Based Framework
Constructivists believe that regime formation is the result of shared values and 
beliefs as well as a common understanding of causal mechanisms. They contend that 
“the building blocks of international reality are ideational as well as material.”126 Unlike 
their realist and institutionalist counterparts, constructivists argue that we cannot treat 
interests as exogenously given; their formation depends upon the body of accepted 
knowledge that shapes the perceptions of decision makers. Often, this knowledge is 
channelled through epistemic communities.127 However, one important limitation of 
cognitive approaches is that they cannot predict the point at which consensual knowledge 
or shared values will result in cooperation.128 Apart from this limitation, a number of 
scholars have successfully used an ideational approach to explain outcomes in the global 
political economy, including McNamara (1998), Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), Sinclair 
and Thomas (2001), Widmaier (2003,2004), Best (2004,2005), and Sinclair (2005).129
In an attempt to bridge the divide between realists and constructivists, critical 
constructivists argue that certain powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of 
idea formation. As a result, they “see a weaker autonomous role for ideas...because ideas 
are viewed as more tightly linked to relations of material power.”130 Adler (1997) 
maintains that power plays a critical role in the construction of social reality, especially 
since it enables an actor to define the underlying rules of the game while co-opting other
l i t
players to commit themselves to those rules as part of their self-understanding. We 
acknowledge the importance of both the creation of meanings and the control over 
knowledge in the process of sovereign debt restructuring, and we intend to capture these 
ideational components of the regime with the concept of productive power described in 
Chapter 1. However, we do not believe it is possible to de-link ideas and norms from 
material power considerations -  either military or economic - in the issue-area of
125 Young and Osherenko (1993), p. 250.
126 Ruggie (1998), p. 879.
127 Haas (1992), p. 3.
128 Haggard and Simmons (1987), p. 510.
129 McNamara (1998); Finnemore and Sikkink (2001); Sinclair and Thomas (2001); Widmaier (2003); 
Widmaier (2004); Best (2004); Best (2005); Sinclair (2005).
130 Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), p. 398. See also Gordon (1980).
131 Adler (1997), p. 336.
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sovereign debt management. As a result, each of the case study chapters will argue that 
productive power is best seen as a by-product of material power.
3.2 IPE Theory: Hesemonv and the Pattern o f  Sovereisn Debt Settlements
One scholar has proposed an interesting linkage between the distribution of power 
in the international political economy and the patterns of debt settlement. Suter (1992) 
made one of the few attempts to bridge several historical periods - between 1820 and 
1975 -  in his examination of the recurring cycles of sovereign default and the variations 
in settlement terms. He argued that in periods of core rivalry, like the 1930s, creditors 
tended to be divided and poorly organized. This permitted peripheral debtors in the 
interwar period to get more favourable settlements than they could during periods of 
uncontested hegemony. By contrast, if we look at the last quarter of the 19th century, 
when the financial supremacy of Britain was unquestioned, debt settlements favoured 
creditors.132 Suter’s argument is both appealing and empirically supported for the 
timeframe under consideration in his study. However, one of the objectives of our 
analysis is to see how this argument fares if we extend it through the current period and if 
we look at it more deeply on an intra-period basis. When we do this, we find that the link 
between hegemony and debt settlements is not as straightforward as Suter originally 
hypothesized. For instance, the powerful creditors’ cartel of the 1980s operated 
successfully in a period when U.S. hegemony was arguably in decline.133 There is also 
conflicting evidence for the 1930s. Eichengreen (1991) maintained that although British 
bondholders may have been identified with a receding hegemon, they nevertheless 
obtained better results than their U.S. counterparts in negotiations with a number of 
1930s defaulting states.134 So, while the hegemony hypothesis may not work as well for 
our purposes, we do believe that the way in which Suter privileges power considerations
132 Suter (1992), p. 39.
133 Keohane (1984). International relations scholars like Keohane argue that the U.S. peaked in terms of its 
hegemonic power in the years immediately following World War II on several measures, including its 
share of world trade and the relative size of its economy. Since the 1970s, they argue that U.S. hegemony 
has been in gradual decline, leading to the rise of a multi-polar world with the U.S., the EU and China/Asia 
sharing power. In Keohane’s work, he argues that regimes offer an alternative to maintaining order and 
cooperation among nations in the absence o f a clear hegemonic power.
134 Eichengreen (1991).
51
is worthy of further development, and, for this reason, we have decided to expand on his 
original power hypothesis in our research project.
3.3 The Four Faces o f  Power in Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regimes
Thus far, we have situated sovereign debt regimes in the power-based literature, 
and our next step is to catalogue the key features of these regimes. As we already 
discussed in Chapter 1, we have proposed using the power-based framework developed 
by Barnett and Duvall (2005) since it captures four types of power - compulsory, 
structural, productive and institutional - each of which has relevance to a key aspect 
of the sovereign debt restructuring process. It would be hard to deny that power is one of 
the most important organizing concepts in social and political theory. In fact, noteworthy 
taxonomies of power have been advanced by a number of scholars, including Weber 
(1968) and Mann (1986). For Weber, there were three principal types of power (or 
legitimate domination): i) rational; ii) traditional; and iii) legal.135 Mann argued that there 
were four sources of power: i) ideological; ii) economic; iii) military; and, iv) political.136 
This highlights one of the drawbacks of using power an analytical tool: researchers are 
often unable to agree on a common definition or set of definitions.137 The model 
developed by Barnett and Duvall (2005) owes a debt to this early scholarship since it has 
grown out of the broader literature on power. Its value as an analytical device, not unlike 
those which preceded it, is precisely its ability to integrate different conceptions of power 
rather than see them as competing. As Baldwin wrote:
135 Weber (1968), pp. 215-253. Rational: rests on “a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of 
those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.” Traditional: rests on “an established belief 
in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them.” 
Charismatic: rests on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person, and of the normative patterns.. .revealed by him.”
136 Mann (1986), pp. 23-28. Ideological: power that is “wielded by those who monopolize a claim to 
meaning.” Economic: power that “derives from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social 
organization of die extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature.” 
Military: power which “mobilizes violence, the most concentrated, if bluntest instrument of human power.” 
Political: power which “derives from the usefulness of centralized, institutionalized., .regulation of many 
aspects of social relations.”
137 Hay (1997), quoting Ball, p. 45.
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it is time to recognize that the notion of a single overall international power 
structure unrelated to any particular issue-area is based on a concept of power 
that is virtually meaningless.138
In fact, by combining different aspects of power into a single framework, we are in a 
better position to examine how they might offset, or augment, each other in a sovereign 
debt bargaining exercise.139 Our framework will also enable us to provide a more robust 
explanation for variations in bargaining outcomes, while at the same time permitting 
some generalizations across time.140
3.3.1 Compulsory Power
Each of the four “faces” of power that form our analytical framework has a 
specific provenance in the literature. The concept of compulsory power can be traced 
back to Max Weber, who defined it as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of 
the basis in which this probability rests.”141 A comparable interpretation of compulsory 
power can be found in the classic formulation by Dahl (1957): “A has power over B to 
the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do.”142 Like 
Weber, Dahl conceived of power as agency-centred, inasmuch as he focused his analysis 
on the behaviour of actors within the decision-making process. Waltz (1979) treated 
power as a “fund of capabilities that enables the more powerful in general to work their 
wills with greater regularity than the weak.”143 Both Krasner (1981) and Strange (1999) 
used the term “relational” power when referring to this same ability to “change outcomes
138 Kapstein (1992), quoting Baldwin, p. 265.
139 Schneider (2005), p. 669.
140 Fuchs (2005a). In a similar vein, Fuchs (2005) looked at the interaction of three aspects of business 
power - instrumental, structural, and discursive - to show how multi-national corporations have assumed 
increasing rule-making authority in regulatory matters as well as participation in public-private 
partnerships.
141 Carlsnaes, Risse et al. (2002), p. 180. Weber argues that every genuine form of domination implies a 
minimum level of voluntary compliance and therefore enjoys a claim to legitimacy. Under this 
interpretation, it would be unlikely that Weber would use the term “compulsory power” the way it is used 
in this study. That is to say, he would be unlikely to support the view that compulsory power could include 
the use of military force. However, the other interpretations of “compulsory power” would support its use 
in this context. See Dahl (1957), Waltz (1979), Krasner (1981) and Strange (1999).
142 Dahl (1957), p. 201.
143 Waltz (1979). Also quoted in Lentner (2004), p. 6.
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or affect the behaviour of others in the course of explicit political decision-making
, , 1 4 4processes.
Compulsory power in the sovereign debt restructuring process has largely been 
exercised by creditor country governments, since private creditors could not normally 
address their grievances directly to debtor states. If private creditors were not successful 
in appealing to their home governments for intervention, they customarily settled for 
indirect avenues to redress defaults - the private creditor representative bodies. For 
instance, in the period from 1821 -  1925, close to 20% of debt settlements involved 
creditor country governments taking some type of political or economic control over 
sovereign debtors.145 Borchard and Wynne (1951b) chronicled the spectacular case of 
Egypt, in which gradually increasing involvement ended with Britain’s military 
intervention in 1882.146 The blockade of Venezuela in 1902 by Britain, Germany and 
Italy ended with the capitulation of that country’s recalcitrant dictator and full repayment 
four years later.147 Despite protests from Latin American countries, the Hague Peace 
Conference of 1906 legitimized the use of force in cases of debt disputes, but only if the 
defaulting states refused international arbitration.148 While direct government 
intervention in the 19th and early 20th centuries is commonly believed to be more the 
exception than the rule, the fact of the matter is that most negotiations took place with the 
tacit understanding that the use of force remained a distinct possibility.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the U.S. State Department took an active 
role in the settlement of defaults with private creditors. However, the orientation of that 
intervention was decidedly different from what had gone before. Under the U.S.’s Good 
Neighbour Policy, there was little scope for applying pressure to Latin American debtors, 
and Wallich rightly concluded that when the government intervened, “the respective 
debtors [would] be treated very considerately.”149
As the 1980s Latin American debt crisis unfolded, Kahler (1986c) argued that 
politics needed to be brought back into the discussion of the debt crisis, especially since
144 Krasner (1981), p. 122; Strange (1999). Note that Strange used a definition that was similar to Dahl’s. 
The quote is from Kranser (1981).
145 Suter (1992), p. 93.
146 Borchard and Wynne (195 lb).
147 Mauro and Yafeh (2003), p. 23.
148 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1907.
149 Wallich (1943), p. 335.
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political considerations were having an impact on the operation of the international 
financial system. He noted the emerging activism on the part of creditor country 
governments and the IMF, and he explored the important relationship between 
commercial banks and their home governments.150 Some, like Wellons (1985), saw the 
governments of the G-5 playing a role as important as the London Club in the 1980s debt 
negotiations.151
The less visible role of creditor governments and the IMF since 1998 has in some 
ways been a reaction to the handling of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the charges of 
moral hazard levied against the IMF for its large lending packages to countries like 
Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. As the case of Argentina’s 2001 default will 
demonstrate, creditor governments, most especially the U.S., have offered less overt 
support for private creditors since 1998, preferring “market-based” solutions instead. The 
effect has been to strengthen the hand of sovereign debtors in restructuring negotiations,
i i .
especially when compared to the 1980s and the 19 century.
It is interesting to note that creditor country government intervention has been a 
common theme throughout the history of sovereign default. It took different forms -  from 
military intervention in the 19th century to the imposition of IMF structural conditions in 
the 20th and 21st centuries -  but it has remained an acceptable course of action. As a 
result, the potential for this type of intervention remains part of the sovereign default 
calculus, influencing the outcome of debtor-creditor negotiations.
We would expect to see compulsory power play an important role in the 
sovereign debt restructuring process in the following cases: i) where creditor country 
governments have overriding diplomatic or geo-strategic objectives with respect to a 
defaulting state; ii) when sovereign defaults have the potential to create systemic risks 
that would reverberate negatively on creditor country markets; iii) where the property 
rights of private creditors have been openly or unfairly abused and creditors have no 
alterative (legal) means of seeking compensation from a defaulting sovereign; and, 
finally, iv) where there is a close, collaborative relationship between a creditor country 
government and private creditor groups.
150 Kahler (1986c).
151 Wellons (1985).
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3.3.2 Structural Power
While the concept of compulsory power was important in explaining outcomes in 
international relations, scholars soon pointed out that it was not the only aspect of power 
worthy of investigation. Bachrach (1962) argued that power is janus-faced, insofar as its 
complex nature is obscured if we focus narrowly on the decision-making process. In his 
view:
power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing 
social and political values and institutional practices...To the extent that A 
succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from 
bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously 
detrimental to A’s set of preferences.152
So, while the first face of power - compulsory power - focused on the effect that one 
party can directly have over another in a negotiation, this second characterization - 
structural power - is more concerned with the larger context in which that negotiation 
takes place. Krasner (1981) called this second type of power “meta-power,” or the 
capacity to structure the environment in which decisions are made. Gruber (2000) 
referred to it as “go-it-alone” power, meaning the ability to unilaterally alter the status 
quo.153
Similar themes of structural power run through Marxist theories which posit that 
workers offer their labour to private firms voluntarily, but only because the alternatives in 
a capitalist system -  unemployment and impoverishment -  would be far worse. World 
systems theorists also employ this notion of power when they argue that “structures of 
production generate particular kinds of states identified as core, semi-periphery and 
periphery.”154 In other words, structural forces embedded in the global economy are 
directly responsible for how states conceive of their identities and formulate their 
interests. Hurrell and Woods (1995) see structural power as responsible for a certain 
degree of path dependence for weaker states in the system. They maintain that not only
152 Bachrach (1962), p. 948. See also Bachrach and Baratz (1963). See Strange (1999) and Gruber (2000) 
for treatments of agency-centered and context-centered approaches to power. Strange develops the concepts 
o f “structural power” and Gruber discusses “go-it-alone” power, both of which describe a form of power 
that involves the strategic manipulation of alternatives. Also, see Gill and Law (1989) for a discussion of 
the structural power of capital.
153 Krasner (1981), p. 122; Gruber (2000).
154 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 54.
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do these states have very little influence in defining the global agenda, their highly 
restricted choices “carry powerful political implications, not just because they submit to 
the will of larger states...but because, over the longer term, weak states’ decisions 
constrain their future options.”155
Strange (1999) used the term “structural power” to refer to this same agenda- 
setting, context-creating capability, and argued that structural power could be amplified 
by several things, including control over the supply and distribution of credit.156 In fact, a 
number of scholars have argued that as the scope of the market began to widen in the 
1980s, and as technology and communications have advanced, these factors have 
contributed to “the rising structural power of internationally mobile capital.”157
Structural power is a critical aspect of the sovereign debt management process. Not 
only do the reciprocal roles of capital importer and exporter imply a certain set of 
privileges (or disadvantages), the structure and condition of the capital markets are also 
important determinants of the outcomes of sovereign debt negotiations. In various 
historical periods, the sovereign debt market could be described in one of three ways: i) 
highly centralized and controlled, ii) highly decentralized and promiscuous, or iii) 
collapsed.
In the last quarter of the 19th century, British investors were largely in control of the 
capital export markets. Foreign investment rose from £245 million in 1854 to £3.9 billion 
in 1913, giving the CFBH considerable leverage and credibility when it threatened 
debtors with loss of market access.158 The same was true of the highly centralized debt 
markets of the 1980s, when the banks of the London Club were the sole source of private 
credit to Latin American debtor states. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1984) maintained that 
what could have been a serious but manageable recession turned into a major crisis 
mainly because of the abrupt change in the conditions and rules for international lending 
by the banks.159 Highly centralized or controlled markets, therefore, tend to favour the 
interests of creditors in a restructuring process.
155 Hurrell and Woods (1995), p. 456.
156 Strange (1999).
157 Gill and Law (1989), p. 480.
158 Lipson (1985b), pp. 40-41.
159 Diaz-Alejandro (1984).
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The global macroeconomic situation of the 1930s had the opposite effect, with 
market collapse inviting sovereign default mainly because private creditors could not 
hold out the reward of new financing to those countries that honoured their debt 
obligations.160 And, in the 1990s, we see that highly decentralized and liquid markets 
have had surprisingly the same effect on debtor incentives as collapsed markets. When 
sovereigns are able to return to the private debt market quickly after a default, they are 
more likely to consider the default/restructuring option. Mexico issued new debt in the 
capital markets within a year of its 1994/1995 crisis, as did Korea and Russia after their 
respective crises in 1997 and 1998.161 Therefore, structural power can, at different points 
in history, accrue to the benefit of either sovereign debtors or private creditors. We 
would therefore expect to see structural power push outcomes in favour of creditors when 
private capital markets are highly controlled and centralized. On the other hand, structural 
power would benefit debtors when private markets are either i) highly liquid and 
promiscuous, or ii) collapsed.
3.3.3. Productive Power
In sharp contrast to compulsory and structural power, productive power concerns 
itself with discourse and the systems of knowledge “through which meaning is produced, 
fixed, lived, experienced and transformed.”162 Discourses can be conceived as sites of 
power since they help determine both the possible and acceptable courses of action in the 
international political economy. According to Bourdieu (1991), “the power of 
constituting the given through utterances” is an “almost magical power which enables 
one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force.”163 As a result, particular 
discourses have played a role in the formation of sovereign debt restructuring regimes to 
the extent that they have rendered certain remedies on the parts of creditor states 
acceptable. Etymologically, the word default is derived from the Latin “de” which is a
160 Armella, Dombusch et al. (1983).
161 Interview K.
162 Barnett and Duvall (2005), p. 55; See also Gordon (1980) for a compilation of the writings o f Foucault 
on this subject
163 Bourdieu (1991), p. 170. Bourdieu refers to this as symbolic power. He argues that “what creates the 
power o f words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the social order, is the belief in 
the legitimacy of words and those who utter them.” See also Ives (2004), p. 173, for a discussion of 
Gramci’s poltics of language. For Gramsci, “the production of meaning and language in the context of past 
linguistic pressures and understandings cannot be separated from any project o f social change.”
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prefix denoting intensive force, and “fallere,” meaning to deceive or cheat. Taken 
together, the meaning of default is “an utter and complete deception of a creditor by a 
debtor.” According to Winkler (1933):
Regardless of terms and definitions, the practise of disregard for creditors is 
held in abhorrence everywhere. Government default, irrespective of 
classifications and erudite definitions is...a breach of its obligations under 
domestic and international, and always, moral law.164
This conception of default led U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 to include 
sovereign default among those actions which “loosened the ties of civilized society” 
necessitating the intervention of a “civilized” nation.165 Such an interpretation helps us 
understand why creditor country governments might have chosen to intervene by force on 
behalf of their private creditors in the 19th and early 20th centuries. They also provide 
insights into the development of international anti-expropriation and international 
property law in the 19th century. It was widely accepted that the taking of an alien’s 
property -  including the refusal to honour a debt contract -  required an offending 
sovereign to pay prompt and fair compensation.166 At the time, these rules helped to 
maintain the economic and social order necessary for the conduct of international trade 
and capital export, and their development was closely linked to the rising importance of 
Britain as a capital exporter. Most critically for our purposes, they prescribed the 
boundaries of acceptable behaviour between defaulting sovereigns and their creditors. In 
this historical example, productive power worked to the benefit of creditors insofar as 
exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity were allowed in cases where property 
rights were blatantly abused.
In the issue-area of sovereign debt management, productive power appears to be 
largely an attribute of capital exporters and the institutions and organizations connected 
to creditor country governments. These groups have generally been responsible for how 
default is perceived as well as the array of remedies that are deemed acceptable at 
different points in history. So, our focus will be on how and why this particular group of 
actors formulated and changed their views on default and how this impacted their
164 Winkler (1933), p. 9.
165 Rippy (1934), p. 195.
166 Lipson (1985b), p. 38.
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preferred policy measures for dealing with sovereign debt crises. We would expect to see 
productive power play a meaningful role in cases where an actor’s ability to use other 
forms of power is severely restricted. Elsewhere, productive power is likely to operate in 
an auxiliary capacity, playing a subsidiary role to institutional, compulsory, and structural 
power.
3.3.4 Institutional Power
Institutional power is power that is mediated or diffused by the formal or 
informal bodies that operate between two parties. For the purposes of our analysis, the 
private creditor representative bodies - the CFBH, FBPC and London Club -  as well as 
the Market-Based Debt Exchange are taken to represent sources of institutional power. 
They are analytically important and distinct from the capabilities directly possessed by 
individual debtors and creditors since they circumscribe behaviour through their 
decisional rules, delegation of responsibility and division of labour. However, the rules 
and decision-making procedures of institutions can also create “winners” and “losers.”
By their very nature, institutions can influence outcomes in ways that favour some 
parties over others, unevenly distributing their collective rewards “long into the 
future.”167 For this reason, an independent analysis of the features of the private creditor 
representative bodies will enable us to ascertain how much autonomous influence they 
had on sovereign debt negotiations and what types of institutional bias are detectable.
The CFBH was widely judged to be an extremely effective organization in its 
own right. Aside from its ability to deny market access to defaulted states, it also 
coordinated its activities with fellow bondholder committees on the Continent and, 
eventually, in the United States. The institution commanded a great deal of respect from 
investors and debtor states alike. This was in part due to the fact that many CFBH board 
members were former British diplomats who, as a result of their position and experience, 
developed trusted relationships with foreign governments. Such relationships eased the 
way for difficult debt negotiations.168 In addition, the CFBH’s non-profit status removed
167 Barnett and Duvall (2005), pp. 48 & 52. This concept of institutional power is different from the 
sociological view offered by Mills (1963). In Mills’ work, societal power resides principally with the 
political, economic and military institutions that can shape history, while the institutions of family, 
education and religion are pushed to the side and largely subordinated to the “big three.”
168 Mauro and Yafeh (2003).
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the prospect of pecuniary motivation from its recommendations to bondholders, 
recommendations which were largely seen as credible and nearly always accepted.
Although very little has been written about the FBPC, the principal verdict in the 
literature seems to be that it was much less effective than its British counterpart, with 
some even branding it a failure.169 Since the FBPC was established only in 1933, it did 
not enjoy the longevity and experience of the CFBH, and yet it faced the prospect of 
negotiation in the midst of one of the most trying periods in economic history - the Great 
Depression. After just a few years of operation, Adamson (2002) argues that the U.S. 
State Department effectively supplanted the institution as chief negotiator with defaulted 
Latin American states. Observing the organization’s intransigent insistence on full 
repayment of interest and principal, the State Department came to believe that the 
objectives of private bondholders were in direct conflict with America’s geo-strategic 
preference for regional stability.
The literature on the London Club and the 1980s debt crisis more than makes up 
for the paucity of material devoted to the FPBC. There is wide agreement among those 
writing on the 1980s debt crisis that the risk of insolvency in the global banking system 
unified the interests of commercial banks (through the London Club), the IMF and 
creditor country governments, pitting a powerful creditors’ cartel against a weak and 
divided set of debtor states. Devlin (1989) focuses on the bargaining process between 
commercial banks and Latin American debtors, suggesting that the banks made the most 
of their enhanced bargaining leverage by increasing their profits and capital bases while 
Latin American economies faltered.170
We would therefore expect to see creditors wield more institutional power in the 
following cases: i) where creditor groups are small, relatively homogenous, or share a 
common set of objectives; ii) where a creditor representative group is seen to have 
authority by virtue of its integrity and experience; and, iii) where the interests of private 
creditors are generally aligned with those of creditor country governments.
As indicated in the table below, the analytical framework discussed in this chapter 
has allowed us to link each regime element to an aspect of power from the Barnett and
169 Adamson (2002).
170 Devlin (1989).
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Duvall (2005) taxonomy. It also expands on the table presented in Chapter 1 by 
identifying the actors that are most likely to wield each type of power.
Table 3A: The Four Faces of Power in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Regime Element Aspect o f  Power Locus o f Power
Creditor Representative 
Body
Institutional Power 
(Organization- 
Mediated)
CFBH, FBPC, 
London Club
Degree and Orientation 
of Creditor Country 
Government 
Intervention
Compulsory Power 
(Direct)
Creditor country 
governments, IFIs
Condition of Capital 
Markets and Structure 
of Sovereign Lending
Structural Power 
(Market-Determined)
Centres of capital 
export, commercial 
bank balance sheets, 
official sector 
“lending into arrears”
Default characterization 
and generally accepted 
standards of creditor 
behaviour towards 
defaulting sovereigns
-» Productive Power 
(Meaning-Determined)
Credit exporters, 
policymakers, 
international lawyers, 
macroeconomists, 
NGO’s
3.4 Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regimes: Game Theory and Nepotiation Analytics
Before we close, it is important to point out that there are a number of scholars 
who have employed game theory to analyze the process of sovereign debt restructuring. 
Most notable among them is Aggarwal (1996).171 For decades, game theorists have been 
searching for a method that would allow them to predict the outcome of strategic, human 
interaction using only data on the order of events and a description of the players’ 
preferences.172 There are a number of unrealistic assumptions that need to be made by 
game theorists in their quest to create an effective model of strategic bargaining, and 
while this approach may have applicability in cases that involve repetitive, well- 
structured negotiations, their utility in the issue-area of sovereign debt negotiations is 
highly suspect.173 For one thing, a fundamental requirement of game theory is that each 
player is aware of the rules as well as the preferences of the other players, a state of 
affairs that is rarely found in actual negotiations. This insistence on complete information
171 Aggarwal (1996).
172 Sebenius (1992), p. 347. Citing Ariel Rubenstein.
173 Sebenius (1992), pp. 346-347.
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appears prominently in Aggarwal’s work on strategic interaction in debt rescheduling. 
His model assumes that each player knows the other player’s payoffs as well as the rules 
of the game. To assume otherwise, would be to make the model unwieldy.174 However, in 
the interests of parsimony and in an effort to create a more tractable analytical 
framework, Aggarwal edits out a critical element of reality. According to Tomz (2001), 
“one simply cannot understand international capital flows and debtor-creditor relations
17^without putting imperfect information... at the center of the analysis.”
Aside from uncertainty, there is the important, and unpredictable, human element 
that we alluded to in Chapter 2. People tend to exhibit well-informed and purposive 
behaviour in a negotiation, but they are generally not pure utility maximizers that fit the
17Adescriptive categories of “imaginary, idealized, [and] super-rational.” In fact, it is in 
the more realistic world of bounded rationality and imperfect information that negotiation 
analytics attempts to make a contribution. Both Putnam (1988) and Odell (2000) have 
proposed negotiating models which do not aspire to the level of prediction, but do assume 
intelligent, goal-seeking behaviour on the part of participants within the larger context of 
incomplete information.177 As an example, Kahler (1993) employed Putnam’s two-level 
game to help illuminate a series of negotiations between developing countries and the 
IMF.178 Given the unique and non-repetitive nature of sovereign debt restructurings, we 
would argue that negotiation analytics can deliver a more realistic assessment of these 
cases than game theory. That being said, we would also point out that both approaches 
are intended to be used when looking at specific instances of negotiation, and not at 
results produced by aggregating bargaining outcomes over decades. Since this project 
contemplates the latter, neither game theory nor negotiation analytics will play a role in 
our research.
We therefore trust that the analytical framework we have elaborated here will 
allow us to better illuminate the connections between power and negotiating outcomes in 
sovereign debt management across time. In the next chapter, we will use this framework
174 Aggarwal (1996).
175 Tomz (2001), p. 33.
176 Sebenius (1992), pp. 348-349.
177 Putnam (1988). Odell (2000).
178 Kahler (1993).
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to analyze regime formation and the resulting bargaining outcomes during the era 
dominated by the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.
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Chapter 4
An Institutional Counterweight to Sovereign Power? The 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders and Sovereign Debt 
Workouts in the 19th Century
The cause o f the British bondholder is at last likely to be taken up with energy and skill. The British lender 
has been by some foreign borrowers so defrauded and oppressed that it is absolutely necessary some 
measures should be devised for his protection.
Observer 
November 7, 1868
That an association which is, after all, only a combination o f private individuals, should have acquired so 
great an influence, and should have dealt with [sovereign] debts amounting to [an] enormous total... 
seems almostfabulous -  almost like a fairy tale offinance.
Sir John Lubbock, 
Corporation of Foreign Bondholders, 1890
4.1 The Corporation o f  Foreign Bondholders and the Four Faces o f  Power
thAccounts of the sovereign debt restructuring regime of the late 19 century have 
largely privileged the role of the British Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (“CFBH”), 
arguing that its establishment in 1868 was responsible for enhancing the efficiency of 
sovereign debt workouts and improving bargaining outcomes for private bondholders. In 
many ways, the CFBH was considered to be an institutional counterweight to sovereign 
power and received much of the credit for improvements to the private investor-sovereign 
state negotiation process. For instance, Borchard (1951a) extols the CFBH for having 
“the great advantage of operating under an excellent constitution,” attributing its 
achievements to the “character and capacity of the men” who carried out its policies.179 
Esteves (2005) argues that the institutional innovation of the CFBH was chiefly 
responsible for shortening default durations and increasing bondholder recoveries in the 
period from 1870 to 1914.180 Eichengreen (1991) and others give the CFBH credit for
179 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), pp. 211-212.
180 Esteves (2005), p. 32. According to Esteves, efficiency improved insofar as default durations were 
reduced and bondholder recovery rates were increased.
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being a more effective organization than its continental European and American 
counterparts, while Suter (1992) contends that the ability of bondholders to “enforce hard 
terms of debt settlements against the interests of debtor countries” would have been 
severely impeded had it not been for strong investor networks like the CFBH.181 Finally, 
Mauro and Yafeh (2003) argue that “while similar bondholder associations were 
established in other countries at various times in history, the CFBH was the longest-lived, 
best known, and most important of these institutions.”182
Much of what we have come to believe about the efficacy of the CFBH can be 
summarized in the table below.183
Table 4A: Bargaining Outcomes in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Time Period Dominant Creditor 
Representative Body
Average Time from  
Default to Settlement
Debt Forgiveness
1871-1925 Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders
6.3 years 12%
(15.9%)*
1926-1975 Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council
10.1 years 23.2%
(55.9%)*
1980-1997 The London Club 8.5 years 35%
1998-2005 Market-Based Debt 
Exchange
1.19 years 48.67%
Sources: Suter (1992); Cline (1995); Singh (2003); Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005a).
*Bracketed results for the periods beginning in 1871 and 1926 also take into account the forgiveness of accrued interest 
and reductions in contractual interest rates. This provides a more comparable result with the periods that begin in 1980.
The data suggest that, prior to 1998, the period marked by the dominant operation of the 
CFBH held the most impressive record for efficiency of settlements (6.3 years on 
average). Of equal importance is the fact that this era required the smallest concessions 
on the part of private creditors for debt forgiveness over the past 135 years (12%).
This chapter intends to challenge the conventional wisdom about the role of the 
CFBH. Using the power-based analytical framework outlined earlier, we will 
demonstrate how the institutional capabilities of the CFBH, although not insignificant,
181 Suter (1992), p. 86; See also Eichengreen (1991), p. 164; Eichengreen and Portes (1989), p. 21.
182 Mauro and Yafeh (2003). Other private creditor representative bodies included: the Association Beige 
pour la Defense des Detenteurs de Fonds Public (Belgium); the Association Nationale de Porteurs Fran§ais 
de Valeurs Mobilieres (France); the Caisse Commune des Porteurs des Dettes Publiques Autrichienne et 
Hongroise (France); the Committee of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (Netherlands); the Conseil de la 
Dette Publique Repartie de l’Ancien Empire Ottoman (France); the Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Council (U.S.); and the League Loans Committee (Britain). See Winkler (1933), pp. 156-178.
183 Suter (1992); Cline (1995); Singh (2003); Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005a).
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were largely overshadowed by compulsory and structural regime elements that favoured 
private creditors and contracting houses beginning in 1870. We intend to show how the 
“accomplishments” of the CFBH were attributed incorrectly to the institution simply 
because it operated coincidentally with these other forms of power in the international 
system. Our analytical framework will also dispute the practice of equating -  or 
confusing -  the CFBH with the sovereign debt restructuring regime of the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. Instead, we believe it to be more accurate to portray the institution as 
just one element of that regime.
This chapter will therefore present a systematic examination of the power 
capabilities - institutional, compulsory, structural and productive - that drove the 
sovereign debt restructuring process of the late 19th century. Our goal is to better 
illuminate how the 19th century debt regime came into being, how it produced the 
observed bargaining outcomes presented above, and which aspects of the regime were 
most responsible for driving those outcomes.
4.2 The World Before the CFBH
iL
For most of the 19 century through the beginning of World War I, London 
enjoyed a pre-eminent role as the “money capital of the world.”184 From the 1820s to the 
1860s, the British were considered to be one of the five major powers in the world 
system, eventually rising to “a position of international economic hegemony.”185 Britain 
was home to two of Europe’s largest contracting houses, Baring Brothers and N.M. 
Rothschild. These houses were principally intermediaries who earned their fees by 
placing loans with private investors. For reputational reasons, they were keenly interested 
in underwriting bonds of high quality, since defaults reflected poorly on their judgment. 
However, as time passed, smaller and more short-sighted competitors joined the fray, 
hoping to participate in the highly profitable underwriting opportunities presented by 
international debt. These second-tier banks were less discerning about quality than the 
more visible Barings and Rothschild, thereby driving down underwriting standards and 
increasing the risks of default.
184 Jenks (1927), p. 5; See also Aggarwal (1996); Aggarwal and Granville (2003).
185 Aggarwal (1996), p. 19. The other four major powers were France, Prussia, Russia and Austria.
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Prior to the establishment of the CFBH in 1868, the two most significant default 
episodes occurred in Latin America (1820s) and the United States (1840s). The newly 
established Latin American states had borrowed heavily in the 1820s to finance their 
wars of liberation from Spain as well as to smooth domestic consumption. In fact, 
between 1821 and 1825, they borrowed close to £48 million.186 The purposes to which 
these loans were devoted - war and consumption - did little to enhance Latin America’s 
longer term debt service capabilities. As a result, starting with Columbia in 1826, 
widespread defaults ensued.
While Latin America was falling into disrepute in the 1820s, the State of New 
York had borrowed successfully in the British markets for the construction of the Erie 
Canal; this project returned a handsome profit to bondholders who consequently showed 
an even greater interest in new issues of U.S. municipal governments. Both the southern 
and mid-western U.S. states were particularly eager to borrow so they could compete 
with New York, and set out ambitious targets for infrastructure projects and the internal 
development of state banking systems. The states’ debt grew dramatically from $13 
million in 1820 to $170 million in 1838.187 When the Bank of England stopped accepting 
American paper for discount over concerns about creditworthiness, trade credits 
disappeared altogether. The first state to default was Pennsylvania in 1840. Widely 
considered to be one of the wealthiest states in the nation, the default came as a shock to 
British bondholders.
How were these default episodes addressed by bondholders? In Latin America, 
default settlement was sporadic. While Chile came to an agreement in 1842, agreements 
with other Latin American states were reached only in the 1850s, 1860s and 1870s, with 
the last agreement completed with Mexico in 1888. In the U.S., the defaulting states lost 
access to the British capital markets and therefore had to rely on internal resources to 
fund development. While the majority of states settled within the decade in order to 
regain British market access, other defaults dragged on into the 1860s and 1870s;
I o o
Mississippi, which repudiated its debt, remains in default to this day.
186 Aggarwal (1996), p. 22.
187 Aggarwal (1996), p. 23.
188 Borchard and Wynne (1951b); McGrane (1935).
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In response to the spate of pre-1870 defaults, the London financial press did 
allude to rumours about the establishment of a bondholder representative committee. 
However, this committee never materialized.189 Instead, private creditors were forced to 
rely on temporary representative bodies to persuade sovereign debtors to settle. There 
were a number of evils associated with these private committees. According to Borchard 
and Wynne (195 la), they tended to:
spring into being at the initiative of persons seeking to profit from the 
bondholders’ need of having organized representation but who have 
otherwise...no connection with the defaulted issue, own no bonds, have little 
or no experience in the field, enlist a few distinguished names for fa9ade, and 
then impose onerous and oppressive conditions on the bondholders...Aside 
from the desire to share in fees, membership in such committees is induced 
by a desire for public recognition, publicity, [and] inside information.190
In addition, it was often the case that the different creditor committees competed with one 
another, a state of affairs that did not always work to the advantage of private creditors.
Britain’s experience with the defaults of the 1820s and 1840 helped the idea of a 
formal and permanent bondholder committee to gain wider acceptance. And, if this 
permanent body were accredited in some way, it would have greater political and 
financial authority to undertake negotiations with debtor states. Finally, as the early 
papers of the CFBH attest, the structure of the temporary committees:
deprived them of such influence with either the home or foreign governments 
as would produce any practical result. The present purpose is to have a 
standing committee or council, the permanency of which will be an element 
of power, and composed of men of indisputable eminence in the financial 
world.191
4.3 The Creation o f  the CFBH and Institutional Power
What was it that finally prompted the creation of the CFBH? The literature provides 
several possible motivations. Some argue that it was the desire of issuing houses to
189 McGrane (1935), p. 52. The British press discussed a permanent representative committee as early as 
1843.
190 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 184.
191 Archives of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (hereinafter, the “CFBH Archives”) (1868-1869). 
Guildhall Library, City of London. File Ms34827. Extracts relating to the establishment of the CFBH. 
Italics mine.
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assuage their conscience. They see the institutional innovation arising from a sense of 
obligation on the part of the bankers who were responsible for selling the bonds to the 
investing public, calling the CFBH the “conscience of the loanmongers.”192 Others 
maintain that the issuing houses wanted to see defaults cleared as quickly as possible so 
they would be free to issue new bonds for a previously defaulted state. In this narrative, 
the CFBH arose from the self-interest - not the conscience -  of the private banks. In fact, 
the interests of the issuing houses have been cited as reasons for why, despite the 
widespread defaults of the 1820s and 1840s, the CFBH was not created earlier. Esteves 
(2005) argues:
The intention to constitute a self-standing organization of bondholders met 
with the objections that it might be perceived as thwarting the action of the 
great financial houses and that foreign governments may react adversely, 
again damaging the position of the issue houses. As a result, the latter had to 
be co-opted into the Council.193
Jenks (1927) agrees and documents that the majority of the Council that ran the CFBH 
was composed of bankers or members of the brokerage houses.194
Lastly, there are arguments that detect the hand of the British government at 
work, hoping that a permanent body would provide sufficient incentives for British 
capitalists to continue to lend overseas, a practice that had an enormously positive effect 
on the British economy through the City of London.
4.3.1 The CFBH: The Prozenv o f  British Bankers and Politicians
The founder and first president of the CFBH, Isidor Gerstenberg (1821-1876) has 
largely been forgotten in the secondary accounts that narrate the origins of this private 
bondholder representative body, despite the fact that he was singularly responsible for 
bringing it about.195 It is helpful to recount some of Gerstenberg’s story, since it serves to 
illustrate the proximate motivations for the establishment of the CFBH.196
192 Jenks (1927), p. 288.
193 Esteves (2005), Appendix I.
194 Jenks (1927).
195 Gerstenberg’s name appears only once in the account of Borchard and Wynne (195 la), and does not 
appear in any other secondary sources concerning the CFBH. We are able to recount his contribution from 
archival sources only. Ironically, Gerstenberg was a close friend of Ferdinand Lassale, who later became a 
German socialist leader with ties to Marx. Lassale sent Marx to Gerstenberg for financial help when Marx
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Gerstenberg was bom in Breslau, Germany in 1821, and was sent to his uncle in 
Manchester in 1841. There he represented Abraham Bauer, a textile merchant of 
Hamburg. He was quickly singled out for his talents and abilities, and, at the age of 20, 
he was relocated to London to become the representative of Abraham Bauer & Co., an
1Q7acceptance house, in the City. As a banker, Gerstenberg was a well-known figure in 
the city and had first-hand knowledge of the defaults of foreign governments which 
involved, in his view, great losses to the investing public. He had been identified with 
several of the temporary bondholder committees which had dealt with the aftermath of 
defaults in Latin America, most notably Venezuela.
In his earliest attempts to gain support for a permanent bondholder representative 
body, he tried to creatively enlist the support of Baring Brothers, the leading contractor of 
foreign loans in the City. To get their attention, he wrote:
the ad hoc committees in their unsuccessful endeavours to protect the 
interests of bondholders had allowed the excellent opportunity to escape of 
acquiring the territory of California for [Britain].198
According to Gerstenberg, California had been offered by the Government of Mexico, to 
whom it then belonged, in part payment of its defaulted debt to British bondholders. But 
“the opportunity, he deplored, was missed.”199 He hoped that his appeal to a sense of 
national self-interest in an age of imperial ambition would bring Barings on board. 
Gerstenberg further argued that the plan he was proposing was “one calculated to supply
was living in London. So, the intellectual progenitor of socialism received assistance from one of the 
earliest champions of the rights of global capitalists. See CFBH Archives (1950-1952). File Ms34603, Vol. 
2, Document 327/1163R. Isidor Gerstenberg biography.
196 CFBH Archives (1821-1876). File Ms34829. Presidents of the Council. There are a few reasons why 
Gerstenberg may have been written out of the history of the CFBH. His contribution could have been 
underestimated since he had to resign his leadership position of the CFBH quite early (in 1875) due to poor 
health. He then met an untimely end in an unexpected accident on a ferry crossing from Ostend to Dover in 
1876. However, the more likely reason is that he disagreed with his successor, Sir John Lubbock, on the 
institutional form of the CFBH. Gerstenberg supported a profit-making CFBH, and in its original form the 
Corporation did make considerable profits. Its conversion in 1873 into a non-profit organization was due to 
the fact that the majority of its leaders supported Lubbock in his view that it was unseemly that an 
institution charged with representing British capital before foreign debtor governments should be motivated 
by pecuniary interests.
197 He became a naturalized citizen in 1847 and a member of the Stock Exchange in 1852. At the age of 38 
(1860), he married Bauer’s youngest daughter.
198 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Reprint from the Transactions o f the Jewish Historical Society 
o f England, Vol. XVIII.
199 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Reprint from the Transactions o f the Jewish Historical Society 
o f  England, Vol. XVIII.
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a great public want and likely confer a boon upon the Bond-holding community” of 
Britain.200
Baring Brothers indicated that they could not get directly involved in 
Gerstenberg’s project since they underwrote a large proportion of these bonds and 
perceived a conflict of interest. In other words, they were concerned that their good
relationships with sovereign issuers might be threatened if Barings openly supported a
001committee to assist private bondholders. However, Gerstenberg did not leave empty- 
handed; Thomas Baring offered him a number of useful contacts through which to pursue 
his idea. One such person was Frances Levien of the London Stock Exchange. After two 
years of exploration and negotiation, they called the now historic meeting at the London 
Tavern on the 11th November, 1868, at which “the foundation of the Council was laid.”202 
It was presided over by the Right Hon. George Goschen, statesman and financier. 
Goschen, of the firm Fruhling and Goschen, and also a cabinet minister, adopted the 
proposition forwarded by Gerstenberg. The motion was seconded by Charles Bell, MP, 
also of the financial firm Thomson, Bonar, and Co. The men agreed that “watching over 
and protecting the interests of holders of foreign capital is extremely necessary and 
desirable.”203
It is important to point out that the majority of the founding members of the 
CFBH had existing - or previous - associations with private or merchant banking firms as 
well as brokerage houses. Since many of these firms were also large underwriters of 
sovereign bonds, they were interested in maintaining as open a market as possible for 
these bonds. And, because they appeared to have interests that were aligned with 
bondholders -  to settle defaults expeditiously and maintain sovereign debtor access to the 
capital markets -  their motivations were not initially questioned.204
200 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Reprint from the Transactions o f the Jewish Historical Society 
o f England, Vol. XVIII.
201 The conflict of interest perceived by Barings is not one that investment banks acknowledge today. 
Today’s firms accept that they can both underwrite bonds and then act as a settlement advisor if those 
bonds end up in default, earning fees for both services.
202 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Reprint from the Transactions o f the Jewish Historical Society 
o f England, Vol. XVIII.
203 CFBH Archives (1950-1952). File Ms34603, Vol. 2, Document 327/1163R. Isidor Gerstenberg 
biography.
204 Jenks (1927), p. 289.
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Gerstenberg suggested that the “none but gentlemen of position and influence 
ought to be invited to form the Council.” It was to be composed of men that would 
inspire great confidence in the bondholders. The Members of Parliament for the City of 
London were seen as being the most desirable, since their governmental influence would 
be of great assistance to the institution. The Chairman of the Stock Exchange was also 
invited.205 In fact, of the first batch of eleven members of the Council, there were four 
MPs, all of whom had strong ties to the City of London 206
At the founding, Gerstenberg noted how the CFBH had received the support of 
“some of the great houses, such as those of Louis Cohen and Sons, Thomson, Bonar and 
Co., Horsman and Co., and G. and A. Worms.”207 The CFBH boasted that it was “vitally 
connected with the trading and financial interests of the City of London, the centre of all 
loan operations in the world.”208 In fact, Mr. Charles Bell, of the firm Thomson, Bonar 
and Co., reported at the CFBH’s inaugural meeting:
no greater proof of the vast importance of the question and the interests 
involved could be afforded than the attendance of the heads of so many 
eminent banking firms and financial houses at that meeting.209
Bell had no doubt that a council composed along the lines suggested by Gerstenberg 
would carry great weight with the British government. However, in light of the close 
connection between the CFBH and important financial houses like Balfour, Grenfell and 
Hambros, there were legitimate concerns that the institution would be particularly liable 
to pressure from City financiers 210
4.3.2 Institutional Form and Funding o f  the CFBH
When the CFBH was first formed in 1868, the body was initially called the 
Association of Foreign Bondholders. It was capitalized with £60,280 at 5% interest, with 
the funds coming principally from loan contracting houses. Only one bond at £100 each
205 CFBH Archives (1869). File Ms34827, Clipping from the Morning Post, February 3, 1869.
2°6 c p b h  Archives (1869). File Ms34827, Clipping from the Times, February 3,1869.
207 CFBH Archives (1868). File Ms34827, Clipping from the Morning Herald, November 12, 1868.
208 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1876, p. 9.
209 CFBH Archives (1868). File Ms34827, Clipping from the Morning Post, November 12,1868.
210 Platt (1960), p. 25.
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was offered to each permanent member. However, these bonds were transferable (and 
perpetual) certificates of membership that would survive the repayment of the original
911£60,280 of capital. Operating expenses were normally reimbursed by the payment of a 
moderate commission by the foreign government with whom the CFBH arranged a debt 
settlement. And, where that condition could not be met, the bondholders would be asked 
to assume the payment on a pro-rata basis. In practice, however, it was very rare for the 
bondholders to assume the payment of commissions.212
The organization was renamed the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders when it 
was transformed into a not-for-profit organization in 1873 under License from the Board 
of Trade pursuant to the 23rd Section of the Companies Act. This process also permitted it 
to enjoy limited liability without having the word “limited” in its title. Since the CFBH 
was no longer focused on profit-making activities, any original subscribers who wanted 
to be paid out were permitted to withdraw. However, most remained and were eventually 
paid out in full in 1885. Once the CFBH had achieved non-profit status, any commissions 
that were earned were directed to supporting the public work of the organization. If a 
surplus remained after defraying the expenses of the CFBH, it became part of the General 
Fund of the institution, which was held in trust for the benefit of British investors; none 
of the official members of the CFBH had any interest in the surplus funds beyond the 
sums that were fixed for their remuneration by Parliament2,3
It is important to remember that when the CFBH was first established, its mission 
was twofold: to protect the rights of bondholders and to maintain the public credit of 
foreign governments.214 By pursuing the latter goal, the issuing houses were to be assured 
a steady stream of business.
As Jenks (1927) reminds us, the activities of the City of London at this time were 
more individual than corporate:
Sixty odd merchants and bankers competed in ever shifting combinations to 
derive their maximum advantage from public needs...In the rapidly growing 
caste of “made men,” bankers and brokers found themselves aristocrats. 
Politicians sought their favors and bestowed them with honors...The Barings,
211 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1873, pp. 6-7.
212 CFBH Archives (1890). File Ms34828. Memorandum from Sir John Lubbock, February 24, 1890.
213 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1924, p. vi.
214 CFBH Archives (1880). File Ms34587, Rules and Regulations of the CFBH, February 19, 1880.
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who had migrated from Germany two generations before blossomed into the 
baronetage with an Anglo-Saxon pedigree.
As time progressed, there were allegations that the banks and brokers “sometimes 
enjoyed a majority, or, at least, a blocking position in the organizations set up to protect 
the interests of the principals [the bondholders] during the settlement of defaulted 
bonds.”216 In fact, in 1897 the Economist reported:
a powerful influence is exercised upon the bondholders by the issuing houses, 
who find it practically impossible to do fresh business with the borrowers 
while the default lasts, and who are, therefore, naturally anxious that some 
sort of settlement be arrived at, more especially as settlements of the kind, 
yielding substantial pickings in the way of commissions, are frequently 
followed by new loans.217
Since the CFBH meant to protect the rights of bondholders and maintain the credit of 
foreign governments, it was vital for sovereign defaults to be cleared in order that debtor 
states could renew their capital market access. The second objective indirectly benefited 
the large issuing houses in London, who were precluded from doing new issue business 
with a defaulted sovereign. The CFBH did eventually draw criticism for being too willing 
to settle quickly. There were also charges that the organization agreed to settlements that 
were not as favourable to bondholders as they should have been due to the excessive 
influence within the CFBH of the contracting houses 218 Others have pointed out that it 
was not only the contracting houses that pushed for settlements, but also the CFBH, since
|  Q
it did not get paid its fees on issues that remained in default.
Borchard and Wynne (1951a) note the growing public opprobrium in the 1880s 
and 1890s over allegations that the CFBH was serving limited interests at the expense of 
the bondholders.220 As these allegations grew, the permanent certificate holders of the 
CFBH began to look covetously upon the substantial fund - around £100,000 - that the
2,5 Jenks (1927), p. 19.
216 Esteves (2005), p. 6.
217 The Economist, Vol. 55, 1897.
218 Mauro and Yafeh (2003), p. 14.
219 Lipson (1985b), p. 46.
220 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 206. See also Esteves (2005), Appendix I: “the British Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders was repeatedly accused in its first two decades of existence of yielding excessively to 
pressure from the issue houses. In 1898, the Corporation was reorganized by an act o f Parliament that took 
heed of these problems by ruling for a minority of representatives o f issue houses in the governing body of 
the Corporation.”
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organization had amassed by 1896. Two years later, many of these same members were 
agitating to return the CFBH to a profit-making body.221
To avert a potential standoff with the investing public on this issue, the 
management of the institution requested that it be reincorporated under a special act of 
Parliament. In 1898, the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders Act was passed, creating a 
quasi-public body and entrusting it with the duty of watching over and protecting the 
interests of foreign bondholders.
While many of the functions of the CFBH were retained, the management of the 
operation was materially reconfigured so as to reduce the influence of the private loan 
houses in the decision-making process. This in part helped to address some of the public 
concerns about the power of the banks within the CFBH and to give bondholders more 
direct management oversight. Beginning in 1898, control of the CFBH was vested in a 
council that consisted of twenty-one members.222 Within this group, representation was 
apportioned as follows:
• six members were nominated by the British Bankers Association;
• six members were nominated by the London Chamber of Commerce;
• and, nine members were chosen from the bondholding public.223
The new structure gave private bondholders a seat at the management table along with 
powerful firms in the City of London as well as a larger voice in decision-making. It is 
interesting to note that the CFBH viewed itself as only the first step in protecting 
bondholder interests and had ambitions for a global network of protective institutions:
This Council deems it of importance to the interests of bondholders and the 
maintenance of public credit in general, that institutions similar to ours should 
gradually be formed in most, or if possible, in all financial centres, and that
221 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 206. See also CFBH Archives (1970). File Ms34603, Vol. 9, 
Document 327/1708. Letter from CFBH to Bank of England. In 1970, an internal document appears which 
sheds light on how the CFBH was funded after most of the defaulted debts had been settled. The CFBH 
received a £15,000/year subsidy from the Bank o f England, as well as unofficial contributions from the 
clearing banks, the British Insurance Association, and the Association of Investment Trust Companies.
222 CFBH Archives (1898). File Ms34587, Master Copy of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders Act, 
1898.
223 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1924, p. v.
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whilst acting locally for their immediate constituents, they should co-operate 
with each other for the common cause.224
In fact, some measure of cooperation was achieved with the Continental and U.S. 
representative bodies that developed between 1898 and 1933. These included the 
Association Beige pour la Defense des Detenteurs de Fonds Publics (Belgium); the 
Association Nationale de Porteurs Franca is de Valeurs Mobilises (France); the Caisse 
Commune des Porteurs des Dettes Publiques Autrichienne et Hongroise (France); the 
Committee of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (Netherlands); and, the Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council (U.S.).
4.3.3 The Operational Rules o f the CFBH
How did the CFBH work? The earliest handwritten minutes (1873-1877) provide 
an excellent overview of the operation of the institution. Meetings were generally 
concerned with appointing individuals to various sub-committees which were ostensibly 
dedicated to country-specific negotiations. Some of these committees had a status that 
was more or less permanent, especially if they were dedicated to covering a serial 
defaulter. The minutes show that up to 20 committees were active at any point in time.225
4.3.3.1 The Negotiation and Default Management Process
The President and Vice-President of the CFBH were ex-officio members of all 
committees. They also monitored the progress of each negotiation and would often adopt 
legal measures, like granting powers of attorney to various representatives, so that they 
would be authorized to act for the CFBH with foreign governments. Committee members 
would travel to the defaulting country and meet with the finance minister or even the 
country’s chief executive. They would conduct their own negotiations and then return to 
London. In consultation with the Council, they would present a proposed restructuring 
plan to the membership, usually in a general meeting of bondholders. The minutes also 
reproduced various texts of telegrams from overseas negotiators updating the CFBH on 
their progress. Technically, the CFBH had no power to legally bind investors; it could
224 CFBH Archives (1874). File Ms34589, Vol. 1.
225 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1903.
226 CFBH Archives (1873-1877). File Ms34589, Vol. 1.
77
only make a recommendation. However, given the limited avenues of recourse available 
to bondholders, CFBH recommendations were generally accepted. According to the 
organization’s management, “dissentients were ultimately convinced.”
4.3.3.2 Bondholder Meetings
In order to help with investor persuasion, the CFBH would organize bondholder 
meetings for the purpose of communication, education, and decision-making on a 
particular offer of settlement. A permanent headquarters was established at 25 Moorgate 
to facilitate these processes. The table below illustrates the manageable size of most 
bondholder meetings, averaging between 50 and 200 individuals.
Table 4B: Sample Size of CFBH Bondholder Meetings228
Defaulting Country Date o f Bondholder Meeting # o f  Bondholders Present
New Granada 1872 70
Santo Domingo 1873 143
Santo Domingo 1874 83
Costa Rica 1874 200
Santo Domingo 1875 60
Venezuela 1880 (January, 27) 103
Venezuela 1880 (September 2) 48
Source: CFBH Archives: Files Msl5806, MsI5801; Msl5779; and, MsI5772.
4.3.3.3 The Role of the Financial Press and the CFBH Library
The role of the CFBH reading room was important. The CFBH subscribed to a 
host of English language newspapers globally, and was diligent in clipping from those 
papers any item which would be of interest to British bondholders, especially those which 
had to do with finance, commerce, railways, public works and political economy. 
Sometimes, there would be multiple clippings in a single day, and it was often the case 
that an interested party could follow a single country’s political and economic progress 
over the course of years. The level of detail was also impressive. For example, the
227 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1874.
228 CFBH Archives (1880). File Ms 15806, Vol. 2. Venezuelan Committee Minute Book; CFBH Archives 
(1873-1874). File Msl5801, Vol. 1. Santo Domingo Committee Minute Book; CFBH Archives (1869- 
1880). File Msl5801, Vol. 2. Santo Domingo Committee Minute Book; CFBH Archives (1874-1885). File 
Msl5779. Costa Rica Minute Book; CFBH Archives (1872). File Msl5772. New Granada and Columbia 
Minute Book.
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Economist (1874) provided its readers with a full accounting of the finances of Egypt. All 
sources of revenue were accounted for, including tithes on land and date trees, taxes on 
industry and commerce, and receipts from the Egyptian railway administration.229 The 
Financier (1873) lists amounts received on the external debt of Turkey broken down by 
type: tobacco, salt and spirits taxes, land taxes, tithes, and sheep taxes.230 Appendix 4A 
provides a detailed list of all publications that appeared in the clippings files for selected 
countries. Over sixty periodicals could be found in our samples on a regular basis in 
country-specific volumes. In many cases, the clippings followed events on a daily basis, 
demonstrating the interest and depth of knowledge of the British investing public in the 
status of CFBH negotiations. The CFBH also arranged lectures and discussions on 
subjects of interest to its members on a periodic basis in the Hall of the Councilhouse. 
And, it placed at the disposal of bondholders very valuable and often confidential 
information that it received from its agents operating in various countries. It is likely that 
the availability of such information helped facilitate coordination among creditors.
4.3.3.4 Answering Bondholder Queries
The CFBH soon became the focal point for all inquiries from British bondholders 
regarding overseas loans. This meant that the organization had to be sufficiently staffed 
to receive and respond to requests from the British investing public, as well as from other 
national bondholder associations and interested parties in the British government. By way 
of illustration, a file containing Santo Domingo loose correspondence from 1900-1918 
contained approximately 675 letters from individual bondholders making queries about 
the status of the negotiations. This file also contained correspondence from French and 
Belgian bondholder associations. Finally, there were letters from seemingly helpful 
contributors who were visiting Santo Domingo and trying to offer “on the ground” 
intelligence to the CFBH. This file gives one a sense of the enormity of the paperwork 
that the staff of the CFBH had to deal with on an ongoing basis.231
229 CFBH Archives (1874). Clippings File, Egypt, Vol. 1. Economist, June 27, 1874.
230 CFBH Archives (1873). Clippings File, Turkey, Vol. 2. Financier, September 6, 1873.
231 CFBH Archives (1900-1918). File Ms34780. Loose correspondence regarding Santo Domingo.
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4.3.3.5 Rules for Preventing Inter-creditor Inequity
While inter-creditor inequity is a problem that has become increasingly common 
in today’s sovereign debt restructurings, in 1877, the CFBH established a rule that “no 
settlement with foreign creditors would give preferential treatment to any class of 
investors.”232 This resolution grew out of problems encountered with the Turkish 
settlement in the 1870s, when those creditors that had easily accessible collateral (in the 
form of Egyptian tribute payments held at the Bank of England) pursued their own 
negotiations and fared better than fellow bondholders whose collateral was held in 
Turkey.
4.3.3.6 CFBH Ethics
The CFBH exhibited a high degree of ethics. No archival evidence pointed to any 
accusations of wrongdoing or bribery. The rules and regulations of the Council did 
include the power to remove an official for taking any personal benefit for the relief of 
bondholders and also prohibited him from engaging on his own account in any trade or 
profession, unless special permission were given by the CFBH. He was also prohibited 
from any “insider trading” of securities under negotiation 233 It seems that the CFBH was 
designed to be as far above reproach as possible.
4.3.4 Bondholder Incentives to Accept CFBH Settlement Offers
Why were bondholders so compliant when it came to CFBH settlement 
recommendations? The record shows that in virtually all cases, bondholders agreed to 
accept the terms of settlements negotiated by the institution on their behalf, despite the 
fact that it had no power to legally bind individual investors.234 While the institution was 
clearly proficient at bondholder education and organization, we would argue that the 
willing acceptance of settlement proposals is better explained by two, historically- 
specific reasons, both of which restrained bondholders from successfully launching 
autonomous action against defaulting states: i) strict adherence to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, and ii) the need to manage complex, international collateral pools.
232 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 419.
233 CFBH Archives (1880). File Ms34587, Rules and Regulations of the CFBH, February 19, 1880.
234 We even find examples where bondholders accept settlements which the CFBH does not recommend.
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i) Lack of Commercial Carve-outs to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity: In the
♦It •19 century, the doctrine of sovereign immunity made it virtually impossible for private 
creditors to sue sovereign states, and in the rare instances where they tried, judgments 
were largely uncollectible.235 For example, in the case against the state of Virginia, 
bondholders brought their claims to the U.S. Supreme Court, and even though they 
succeeded in getting a favourable judgment, they failed to collect on it. And, to make the 
process even more difficult for the aggrieved investors, local bar associations made sure 
that any lawyers attempting to represent British bondholders ran the risk of losing their 
license to practice.236 ^
It wasn’t until the 1970s that we saw any formal reinterpretation of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity with respect to government borrowings. In 1976, under the U.S. 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and in 1978, under the U.K.’s State Immunity Act, 
governmental activities that could be construed as commercial could also be subject to 
the standard precepts of commercial law. This permitted individual creditors to bring suit 
against a defaulting state in the country of issue (usually New York or London) freeing 
them from the vagaries of local courts.
th tilii) Predominance of Collateralized Bonds: Bonds in the 19 and early 20 
centuries were often secured by tangible assets, such as railways or even tax or customs 
revenues. Railway finance bonds alone accounted for more approximately 40% of British 
overseas investments in the 1870-1914 period.237 Taking control of and administering a 
railway or a customs house required significant resources and therefore benefited from 
centralized organization. And, if creditors felt they had no other option than to request 
their government to intervene by use of force to foreclose on collateral, a respected 
organization with close governmental ties was better positioned to execute this task than 
an individual creditor. In fact, most collateralized bond examples come from the 1870- 
1914 period.
235 Borchard and Wynne (195 la).
236 Mauro and Yafeh (2003), p. 23. Other attempts at legal redress included Costa Rica (1874), Brazil 
(1897), and New Zealand (1901).
237 Bordo, Eichengreen et al. (1998); Fishlow (1986); Eichengreen and Fishlow (1996).
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Table 4C: Sample Collateral Offerings from Sovereign Debt Instruments
(1854 -1909)
Borrower Date(s) o f  Loan Collateral
Egypt (Daira Loans) 1870; 1877 Hypothecation o f real estate owned by Khedive of Egypt
Columbia 1854 Revenue from tobacco monopolies
Columbia 1861 Thirty hectares of land
Costa Rica 1872 Revenue from liquor and tobacco monopolies
Ecuador 1908 Revenue from salt monopolies
Nicaragua 1909 Revenue from tobacco monopolies
Costa Rica 1871;1872 State-owned railways (enterprise)
Honduras 1867 National forests (enterprise)
Santo Domingo 1869 National forests (enterprise)
Greece 1881 State domains
Honduras 1870 State domains
Peru 1909 Salt tax
Tunisia 1864 Olive tree tax
Turkey 1863 -  1908 Sheep tax
Turkey 1854;1871; 1877 Tribute payment from Khedive of Egypt paid to an account 
at the Bank of England
Source: Borchard and Wynne (1951a)
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in World War I, the CFBH was able to boast 
the settlement of all defaulted sovereign bonds with only two exceptions: Honduras, 
which had been in default since 1873, and the intractable U.S. State of Mississippi, whose 
1840s default remains to this day.
The CFBH survived as an institution until 1988, when, after arranging for the 
settlement of in excess of $1 billion in foreign bonds, the decision was taken to liquidate 
it. Spurred by agreements to settle pre-1917 claims against the Soviet Union and pre- 
1949 claims against China,239 Mr. Eric French, the council’s manager, said: “The 
outstanding defaults were not large enough to justify keeping the organization going.”240
4.3.5 Assessing Institutional Power
The CFBH was a useful institutional innovation insofar as it centralized 
bondholder negotiations with defaulting sovereigns, educated the bondholding public,
238 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 90.
239 CFBH Archives (1988). File Ms34618. Clipping from the Guardian, April 21, 1988. The CFBH was 
furious with the terms of the Chinese deal, since the British government accepted an inferior deal so as to 
open up the London bond markets to China, which had been banned by the Bank of England since the 
default in the 1940s.
240 CFBH Archives (1988). File Ms34618. Clipping from the Financial Times, April 21, 1988. The 
unsettled debts included the State of Mississippi ($7 million) as well as the City of Dresden and the Free 
State o f Saxony, then part of East Germany (£800,000).
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offered assurances of equitable treatment, performed important administrative services, 
and operated with a high degree of integrity. However, despite these characteristics, we 
would argue that its effectiveness was largely tied to aspects of the sovereign debt 
restructuring regime that lay outside the institution - most notably the structural power of 
British capital and the willingness of Britain to use compulsory power in ways that often 
benefited bondholder interests. In other words, it was not the rules, staffing, funding and 
procedures of the CFBH that were chiefly responsible for producing bargaining outcomes
tli tliin the 19 and early 20 centuries. Instead, these outcomes can be attributed to the 
dominance of the British capital markets and the use of a wide range of sanctions on 
defaulting states - from moral suasion to military intervention -  by the British 
government and its representatives. The role of the CFBH largely consisted of leveraging 
these elements of power - elements that were external to the institution but part of the 
regime for sovereign debt management. In the discussion which follows, we will examine 
the important contributions of structural and compulsory power to bargaining outcomes 
in this period and attempt to answer the question: How successful would the CFBH been 
without them?
4.4 Structural Power
After the Napoleonic Wars and for most of the nineteenth century, Great Britain 
assumed a hegemonic position as a result of its supremacy in production and commerce. 
As the leading centre of international capital accumulation, British markets were the main 
source of long-term borrowing for developing states.241 The sheer size of British foreign 
investment was compelling, quadrupling between 1854 and 1874, and then quadrupling 
again before World War I:
Table 4D: Pre-World War I British Foreign Investment242
Total British Foreign Investment (1854-1913) £ (millions)
1854 245
1874 1,104
1894 2,155
1913 3,990
Source: Lipson (1985b)
241 Suter (1992), pp. 26-39.
242 Lipson (1985b), pp. 40-41.
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In fact, during the period 1870-1913, only four countries accounted for 85% of the entire 
stock of international investment: Britain, at 44%, had a market share that was more than 
double that of France, its closest competitor. Germany lagged at 13%, and the United 
States, employing most of its capital domestically, exported an anaemic 8% of the global 
total.243 Britain’s highly visible position as chief capital exporter in the 19th century was 
therefore an important structural reason why a private bondholder representative body 
emerged there first.
Table 4E: European and U.S. Shares of Foreign Investment Stocks (1870-19131
Country Britain France Germany United States All Other
Share o f  Foreign
Investment
(1870-1913)
44% 20% 13% 8% 15%
Source: Fishlow (1986)
Another structural variable appears to determine the timing of the establishment 
of the CFBH: the onset of the first Great Depression of the 1870s. This crisis more than 
doubled the number of default cases from the previous era -  from 25 to 52. Since the 
private bondholders most affected by the sharp rise of state insolvencies were British, it is 
not surprising that the CFBH was formally licensed by Britain’s Board of Trade in the 
early 1870s.244
Table 4F: Number of Sovereign Defaults (1821-19751245
Default Settlement Periods Number of Cases
1821-1870 25
1871-1925 52
1926 -  1975 37
Total: 1821 -1975 Total Cases: 114
Source: Suter (1992)
What role did structural power play once the CFBH had been established? There 
are two key aspects of structural power that emerge in the literature concerning the
243 Fishlow (1986). Today’s markets are more highly dispersed as follows: English law (41%); New York 
law (35%); Japanese law (10%); German law (7%). See Becker, Richards et al. (2001).
244 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. xxiii.
245 Suter (1992), p. 91.
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CFBH. First, many have argued that the CFBH’s principal sanction was its ability to 
withhold credit.246 In other words, governments that defaulted on debt to British 
bondholders would be denied fresh access to the British capital market until such time as 
an acceptable settlement had been agreed with bondholders 247 The second aspect of 
structural power concerns the coordination between London, Continental and American 
exchanges to ban defaulting states from issuing new debt globally. This is an activity 
which Lipson (1985b) referred to as a “self-interested manipulation of the centralized, 
transnational financial system.”248 We will examine each of these aspects of structural 
power in turn.
4.4.1 Withholding Credit
iL
That the CFBH acted as a 19 century gatekeeper for the most liquid capital market 
in the world is a power ascribed to the institution by virtually all secondary accounts. 
Even the CFBH itself makes this connection. In its Annual Report of 1873, CFBH 
management writes:
The very association of Bondholders brings with it elements of independent 
influence, the full value of which is little appreciated. It does not lend money 
like the great financial establishments and parties of bankers...but the 
negative power of withholding money...exercises its own influence when 
applied at a proper time.249
Lispon (1985b) agrees, arguing that “short of active government intervention, [the 
CFBH’s] most powerful weapon was the denial of further credit.”250 And, Esteves (2005) 
writes:
The main contribution of bondholder’s organizations was their ability 
to...align the sovereign’s incentives through a reputational mechanism, 
making it harder for a defaulting government to refinance itself in the
246 Platt (1960), p. 32.
247 Platt (1960), p. 33. And, even more draconian sanctions were reserved for debtor states refusing good 
faith negotiations with the CFBH; they could find all of their existing debt de-listed from the London 
exchange.
248 Lipson (1985b), p. 46.
249 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1873, p. 60.
250 Lipson (1985b), p. 46.
85
international capital market before it had settled its old debt with its 
creditors.251
While there is wide agreement in the literature that the power of withholding market 
access from a defaulting sovereign resided with the CFBH, it was actually the case that 
this rule was adopted independently, by the London Stock Exchange in 1827, well before 
the CFBH came into existence. According to The Law and Customs o f the Stock 
Exchange'?51
The Committee will not recognize new bonds, stock or other securities issued 
by a foreign government that has violated the conditions of any previous 
public loan raised in this country, unless it shall appear to the Committee that 
a settlement of existing claims has been consented to by the general body of 
bondholders.253
Even Judge Snagge, the chief counsel of the CFBH confessed that “the Corporation 
would be powerless, and the Council would be paralyzed, if it were not for the assistance 
it received from the Stock Exchange.”254 In other words, the power to control market 
access resided not with the CFBH, but with the Stock Exchange. And, the power of the 
Stock Exchange was in turn defined by the size and scope of the British money markets. 
The CFBH’s role in this instance was confined to nothing more than notifying the Stock 
Exchange of a default or a settlement.
The ability of structural power to trump institutional power in this instance can be
tViillustrated simply. If the CFBH or Stock Exchange were based in Belgium in the 19 
century rather than Britain, the rules excluding defaulters from market access would have 
had little impact on the behaviour of defaulting states. The rules were only powerful 
because these institutions were located within the world’s largest and most liquid capital 
market.
Can we find empirical support for the efficacy of the rules banning defaulters 
from obtaining new credit in the British markets? Empirical research credits the
251 Esteves (2005), p. 2.; See also Tomz (2001) and Tomz (2004) for arguments in favor of maintaining a 
reputation that ensured continued capital market access as the principal incentive for sovereign debt 
repayment.
25 Lipson (1985b), p. 154.
253 The Law and Customs o f the Stock Exchange (1905). Rule 63, p. 179.
254 Platt (1960), p. 34. Italics mine.
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settlements of many mid-19th century U.S. state defaults with the ability of the Stock 
Exchange to successfully withhold market access until a mutually agreed settlement was 
concluded. This is instructive because these defaults occurred in the period prior to the 
establishment of the CFBH. Cole, Dow et. al (1995) and English (1996) argue that it was 
virtually impossible to punish a defaulting U.S. state with trade embargoes, since free 
trade within the U.S. would allow goods shipped to non-defaulting states to cross 
defaulting state lines. Even more important, eliminating trade with the U.S. as a whole 
would have been extremely damaging for the British economy. The ultimate direct 
sanction -  war - was out of the question since any military campaign waged against a 
single U.S. state would have provoked an immediate response from the federal 
government. English (1996) argues that even though these more aggressive tactics were 
impractical, most states eventually repaid their debts. He maintains they did so because in 
the important years leading up to the Civil War, those states that settled with British 
bondholders were rewarded with access to British and European capital markets.255 It was 
therefore this incentive that drove repayment.
It was also the case that British bondholders did not distinguish between the credit 
of the U.S. federal government and that of its constituent states. This meant that as long 
as U.S. state defaults continued, the U.S. federal government would have a difficult time 
issuing debt in Europe. In fact, in the summer of 1842, when agents for the United States 
Treasury came to London to solicit a loan, they got an unexpectedly chilly reception from 
bankers:
‘You may tell your government,’ said the Paris Rothschild to [the United
States representative] Duff Green, ‘that you have seen the man who is at the
255 English (1996), pp. 259-268. For example, neither Mississippi nor Florida (non-payers) issued new 
bonds in the period before the Civil War. Also, the British press frequently connected market access with 
prosperity: “The repudiator denies that credit will restore prosperity... but the history of the world shows 
that, with all nations, sound credit has resulted in prosperity. Pennsylvania and Maryland both made an 
experiment in repudiation...Their industries languished, their affairs...sank down to the bottom. Imbecility, 
peculation, maladministration, and ignorance ruled both States, until, when, at the worse, the people rose in 
their might, with returning good sense, and gave their affairs into the hands of their best men, saying to 
them, settle this matter honestly and fairly and it was settled. From that very day they began to progress, 
and their prosperity has exceeded that of most States of the Union.” See CFBH Archives (1880). Clippings 
File, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee, Vol. 1. Financial Chronicle, October 2, 1880.
256 Cole, Dow et al. (1995), p. 365; English (1996).
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head of the finances of Europe, and that he has told you that they cannot 
borrow a dollar, not a dollar.’2 7
It was not only in the case of the U.S. that attempts were made to regionalize otherwise 
isolated instances of default. The same tactic was used in the case of Venezuela in 1874 
to encourage neighbouring states to pressure the offending government into a settlement:
The treachery displayed by the Government of Venezuela is without parallel 
in the financial history of the world, and ought to stand as a beacon warning 
the public against investing in South American Securities...Unfortunately, 
the injury done by Venezuela is not limited to her own Securities, but will 
have a blighting influence on all other South American Stocks, whether 
deserving or not.258
Of course, withholding market access was only a useful sanction so long as a debtor state 
needed to raise foreign capital. The objectives of the CFBH were consistently thwarted 
by those defaulters that “neither wished nor wanted to regain access to the London capital 
markets or to Europe more generally.”259 Once again, this implies that structural factors 
were more salient in determining the outcomes of the default settlement process than the 
institutional rules and procedures of the CFBH.
On this same point, the financial press was quick to point out how a defaulted 
borrowers’ need for fresh capital affected the bargaining leverage of the CFBH:
The Council’s task in the future may be more formidable than ever before...If 
debtors no longer need, or choose, to borrow afresh, or if the British capital 
market is no longer free, by choice or necessity, to meet their needs, the 
Council’s task may call for almost superhuman skill and tact260
Certainly, the keener a country’s desire for new loans, the more cooperative its posture 
toward the CFBH.261 And, during the 19th and early 20th centuries, most settlements were 
followed by a “prompt return of the outcast to the foreign capital markets almost as soon 
as the ban on exclusion was withdrawn.”262
257 Jenks (1927), p. 106.
258 CFBH Archives (1874). Clippings File, Venezuela, Vol. 1. Financier, August 18, 1874.
259 Mauro and Yafeh (2003), p. 13.
260 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Clipping from the Economist, April 2,1938, pp. 16-17.
261 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. xxiv.
262 Borchard and Wynne (1951a).
88
4.4.2 Coordination Amonz British. Continental and U.S. Exchanges
In attempts to further improve its bargaining leverage, the CFBH established 
informal ties with bondholder representative bodies in Europe, and eventually, the U.S. 
While the British organization recognized the “power of withholding money” in its own 
capital markets, it saw the potential to consolidate power more generally by engineering 
global bans on capital access for defaulting sovereigns. According to the CFBH, the 
success of such an endeavour depended upon “a real and cordial union with our friends in 
Holland, Germany, France and Belgium; and [was]...greatly promoted by that disposition 
to maintain public credit in the United States.”263
The CFBH reported that it was “in friendly relations with the presiding bodies of 
the Continental money-makets,” making specific references to them in the Annual Report 
of 1873:264
The Council finds a strong disposition [in France] to cooperate as 
before...Also, the relations of the Council with the Bourses of Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam are constant because Holland for centuries has taken part in 
financial operations in various countries abroad...and still maintains her high 
position in this respect....[and] the spirit of cooperation is being most 
effectually manifested by the Bourse of Frankfort.265
As time passed, conferences of the various associations of bondholders from different 
countries were held twice a year in London or Paris.266 And, CFBH correspondence was 
routinely copied to bondholder associations in Switzerland, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. Finally, after the U.S. established its bondholder representative body in 
1933, the head of the CFBH wrote:
you know from experience that value which we here all set on the liaison 
between our two councils and the very happy personal relations which you 
have yourself established.268
263 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1873, p. 61.
264 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1873, pp. 49-50.
265 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1873, pp. 11-12.
266 Q7QH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Clipping from the Economist, April 2,1938, pp. 16-17.
267 CFBH Archives (1949). File Ms34603, Vol. 1, Document 327/1062. Letter from Butler (CFBH) to 
Rogers (FBPC).
268 CFBH Archives (1949). File Ms34603, Vol. 1, Document 327/1077A. Letter from Butler (CFBH) to 
Rogers (FBPC).
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Did the cooperation work? It was not always effective, as there are a number of examples 
where national interests took precedence over the procedures of private bondholder 
associations. For example, despite being blacklisted on the London Exchange, Ecuador 
was able to secure credit from the French and later the Americans.269 And, Guatemala 
was able to obtain credit from Germany and the U.S. despite the fact that it was in default 
to British bondholders.270
Other empirical studies that favour structural forces over institutional ones in 
settlement outcomes include Kelly (1998) and Rose (2002). Kelly argues that incentives 
to repay came not from the existence of the CFBH but from a country’s trading 
relationship with Britain. Given Britain’s unique position as “the world’s dominant 
military, industrial, commercial and financial power, these trade and financial links were
771more than likely central factors in determining repayment throughout the period.” 
Overall, she finds that the successful borrowers’ share of trade with Britain averaged 
35.5% while the unsuccessful borrowers’ trade shares with Britain were quite a bit less, at 
24.3%. Her analysis suggests that trade ties with England determined a country’s 
willingness to pay during the age of Pax Britannica.272 For instance, states like Argentina 
viewed Britain as a key trading partner and settled with British bondholders, despite its 
geographic location in the Western Hemisphere. By contrast, smaller Central and Latin 
American countries evaded Britain but settled with American creditors.273 This implies 
that structural forces were in fact more critical than investor representative bodies. Rose 
(2002) also highlights the correlation of trade links and debt repayment, since his 
empirical analysis concludes that sovereign default leads to an 8% decline in trade that 
persists for 15 years.274 His study attempts to quantify the costs of default as well as 
highlight the strong incentives debtors have to repay their principal trading partners.
269 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1911; Kelly (1998), p. 42.
270 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Reports of 1895 and 1908.
271 Kelly (1998), p. 41; See also Rose (2002).
272 Kelly (1998), p. 44.
273 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1911, p. 26.
274 Rose (2002).
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4.5 Compulsory Power
While the literature recognizes the existence of compulsory power in the
tl i  tlisovereign debt restructuring process in the 19 and early 20 centuries, it is widely 
agreed that the use of such power was the exception rather than the rule. As a 
consequence, these activities are never systematically addressed, and where they are 
acknowledged, their effect is minimized because they are believed to have occurred in 
isolated instances.275 We intend to argue that this was not, in fact, the case. A closer 
examination of empirical data suggests that compulsory power attached to over 30% of 
the cases of sovereign default in this era. And, the percentage rises to 40% if one 
considers the face amount of the defaulted debt rather than the number of default cases. 
Therefore, far from being the exception to the rule, compulsory power helped to 
materially shape bargaining outcomes between sovereign states and private creditors in 
the pre-WW I era.
In our analysis, the term compulsory power has normally been exercised by 
creditor country governments over debtor states. This is because private creditors had 
limited ability to directly coerce debtor states and needed to rely on the good offices and 
cooperation of their own governments to take action. That is to say, sanctions can be 
most effective when they are applied to defaulters by creditor country governments and 
not by banks or private creditors.277 From a legal perspective, Borchard and Wynne 
(1951a) observe that “diplomatic protection is not a right of the bondholder but a 
privilege of his government, in its discretion, to extend.”278 The concept of diplomatic 
protection has a long history in international law, tracing its origins back to the clan 
theory of human society. Reflecting a more primitive form of social organization, it was 
commonly believed that “an injury to any member of the clan was deemed an injury to 
the clan itself, to be avenged by group sanctions.”279 Vattel then replaced the concept of 
“clan” with “nation,” and by so doing, he argued that intervention by a government was
275 Lindert and Morton (1989); Eichengreen and Lindert (1989); Mauro and Yafeh (2003); Suter (1992).
276 The measurable aspects of compulsory power include the assumption of control over the fiscal affairs of 
a debtor state and military intervention (otherwise labeled “super-sanctions”)- Lower levels of compulsory 
power (including use of the good offices of the British government by the CFBH) are harder to empirically 
measure, although they did occur with great frequency.
277 Kaletsky (1985).
278 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 230; See also Lieberman (1989).
279 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 230.
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justified on the grounds that an injury to a citizen is also an injury to his state. This 
interpretation implies that in certain cases, creditor country governments would not only 
have the right, but perhaps even the obligation, to intervene and vindicate the injustice 
done to a nation’s bondholders by a defaulting foreign state.280 Others have argued that in 
deciding whether to use compulsory power:
it makes a great difference whether prevalent attitudes regard capitalists in 
general as benefactors or scoundrels, capital placement abroad as good or bad 
for the nation, property rights as special privileges in the interests of an 
exploiting class or as eternal and unchangeable absolutes at the foundation of 
law and morality.281
This implies that the prestige of the merchants and financiers of the City of London 
insured them careful attention from their government, especially in an era when much of 
society found itself re-organized around pecuniary pursuits and British national wealth 
was bound up with their success.
Historical accounts of 19th century sovereign debt negotiations tend to underplay 
the role of compulsory power and creditor country government intervention. This is in 
part due to the fact that the British government produced some well-known statements for 
public consumption that served to distance H.M. Government from the interests of 
private bondholders. For example, there is the often cited public statement by Lord 
Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary, that “the losses of imprudent men who have 
placed mistaken confidence in the good faith of [debtor] governments would provide a 
salutary warning to others.”283 In other words, British government intervention was not to 
be expected for the bail-out of private bondholders who knew the risks they were taking 
when they purchased foreign government securities. This was in keeping with the spirit 
of Herbert Spencer’s remark: “The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of 
folly is to fill the world with fools.”284
In his public statement, Lord Palmerston was narrowly defining the risks that the 
state would assume on behalf of foreign investors. However, it is important to point out
280 Shea (1955), p. 9.
281 Staley (1967), Chapter 8.
282 Staley (1967), Chapter 8.
283 Aggarwal and Granville (2003), p. 68. The quote is taken from Palmerston’s 1848 circular.
284 Lipson (1985b), p. 45.
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that in practice, Palmerston was more flexible. He later said that the question of whether 
the matter of non-payment of private debt should be taken up by diplomatic negotiation 
“turns entirely on British domestic considerations.”285 And, “should the loss become so 
great ‘that it would be too high a price for the nation to pay for such a warning.. .it might 
become the duty of the British Government to make these matters the subject of 
diplomatic negotiations.’”286 So, if the national interest happened to coincide with the 
interests of bondholders, the latter might expect some assistance.
There are also more dramatic examples of the constructive ambiguity practiced by 
British politicians on the matter of sovereign default. The same Lord Palmerston who 
preached non-intervention publicly, stated privately to a Caribbean government that:
the patience and forbearance of H.M. Government...have reached their limits, 
and that if the sums due to British Claimants are not paid within the stipulated 
time...H.M.’s Admiral commanding on the West India station will receive 
orders to take such measures as may be necessary to obtain Justice from the 
nation in this matter.287
We intend to demonstrate how the sovereign debt restructuring process of this era 
was much more politicized than the laissez-faire characterization of nineteenth century 
capitalism would have us believe. In fact, we have been able to categorize, and in some 
cases measure, the broad range of action that constituted compulsory power in this era. 
The least visible was the tacit permission the British government gave the CFBH to 
leverage the power of the global British consular network. For example, bondholders 
were allowed to access the diplomatic or consular services of the government to obtain 
confidential information, deliver messages to defaulting sovereigns, or receive payments 
on behalf of bondholders. In some cases, the British government even facilitated the 
collection of pledged revenues. At the other extreme, we see active creditor country 
government interventions in the domestic affairs of foreign states, which most often 
consisted of assuming control over a debtor’s finances. Some examples of compulsory 
foreign economic control included Turkey, Greece, Egypt, Tunis, Morocco, Haiti and 
Santo Domingo. Finally, in the cases of Mexico (1861) and Venezuela (1902), we find
285 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 234.
286 Jenks (1927), p. 125.
287 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 240.
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debtor countries that ended up on the receiving end of armed intervention. We intend to 
examine each of these three activities -  leveraging the British consular network, 
assuming economic control over a foreign debtor state, and armed intervention -  in the 
sections which follow.
4.5.1 Leveraging the British Consular Network and Government Institutions
At the founding of the CFBH in 1868, the management of the Council stated that 
it would press its claims “on the notice of Her Majesty’s Government, and would seek for 
its aid an authority” which isolated creditors lacked. The founders believed that “the 
duties of the Council... [could] be used to great effect by exercising a moral power...over 
our own Government by inducing them to interfere if their good offices can do 
anything.”289
Members of Parliament for the City of London, many of whom served on the 
governing Council of the CFBH, proved to be useful intermediaries with the government. 
For example, Isidor Gerstenberg, Chairman of the CFBH, was able to enlist the support 
of three City parliamentarians on the matter of Venezuela (Lionel de Rothchild, G. J. 
Goschen and R. W. Crawford). They urged the Foreign Secretary, Earl Russell, to 
consider “the justice and necessity of Government intervention on the bondholders’ 
behalf.”290
Archival correspondence reveals an active and regular communication between 
the CFBH and the British Government. In fact, copies of CFBH correspondence were 
routinely sent to the following: Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office; 
Secretary to H.M. Treasury; and, the Chief Cashier of the Bank of England 291 This close 
connection was reported by the financial press, as this summary from the Economist 
attests:
288 c p g jj  Archives (1868). File Ms34827, Clipping from the Morning Herald, November 12, 1868.
289 CFBH Archives (1868). File Ms34827. Clipping from the Standard, November 12,1868.
290 Platt (1960), p. 26.
291 CFBH Archives (1963-1964). File Ms34666, Document 211/7. Additional recipients also included the 
financial community and other bondholder associations as follows: Secretary of the Share and Loan 
Department of the Stock Exchange; Secretaiy, British Bankers’ Association; Secretary, Accepting Houses 
Committee; Secretary, Issuing Houses Committee; FBPC-New York; and French, Belgian, Swiss and 
Dutch bondholder protective councils.
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Although the Council is in no way under official control...[c]ontact between 
the Council and the Departments [H.M. Treasury and H.M. Foreign Office] is 
continuous...Representations are frequently made by the Government at the 
Council’s request through diplomatic channels. Except where questions of 
policy intervene, such requests are nearly always granted.292
Platt (1960) goes further, arguing that:
British legations and consulates acted on occasion almost as agencies for 
bondholder interests, and British diplomats were constantly engaged in 
forwarding the bondholders’ representations to the various governments, 
transmitting the governments’ answers to the bondholders, [and] arranging 
for the equitable divisions of debts.293
The CFBH also tended to use the British consular network as a data collection network. 
For example, in Santo Domingo, the British Vice Consul reported the 1901 Annual 
Budget of Santo Domingo to the CFBH: “I received orders some time ago from H.M. 
Consul General at Port-au-Prince to furnish the Foreign Office with certain data 
requested by the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders.”294 In addition, the Foreign Office 
was asked by the CFBH to procure a copy of the arbitration agreement between the U.S. 
and Santo Domingo from the U.S. ambassador in London.295
Why was the CFBH so successful in engaging the British government on its 
behalf? Archival documents relating to the establishment of the CFBH credit the 
“statutory character and complete independence” of the organization, maintaining that 
these attributes allowed the CFBH to always engage “the sympathy and collaboration of 
H.M. Treasury and H.M. Foreign Office.” Information which would otherwise be 
impossible to disclose to a body without these attributes was frequently made available to 
the Council. And, in cases of outright default, the record maintains that “His Majesty’s 
Government always follow such negotiations very closely and give to the Council their 
fullest support.”296
It is not clear how “completely independent” the officers of the CFBH were from 
the British government. CFBH Council members and government officials shared similar
292 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Clipping from the Economist, April 2, 1938, pp. 16-17.
293 Platt (1960), p. 41.
294 CFBH Archives (1902). File Ms34780. Letter from British Vice Consul at Santo Domingo to the CFBH.
295 CFBH Archives (1903). File Ms34780. Letter from H.M. Foreign Office to the CFBH.
296 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Memorandum on History of CFBH.
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social backgrounds, and in many cases, senior CFBH staff had either held respectable 
positions with H. M. Government (in Parliament, Treasury or the military) or were 
former diplomats. In the period 1895-1905 there were no less than 13 MPs either serving 
in the management of the CFBH or on one of its Committees.297 In fact, the 1938 Annual 
Report has a complete list of those who served as members of the Council since 
inception: of the 107 members, 13 had Lord as their main title; 12 Honourables or Rt. 
Honourables; 12 Sirs; 9 high-ranking military officers or judges, and 6 Earls or 
Viscounts.298
As time elapsed, the two groups became so close that the CFBH even took to 
interviewing ambassadors before they assumed their overseas posts, especially when the 
foreign country in question was an important capital importer. In a letter to Sir Jeffrey 
Wallinger, the proposed new British ambassador to Brazil, the head of the CFBH writes:
[we] hope of being able to meet... before you take up your appointment at Rio 
de Janeiro...we are normally able to have such meetings with our 
Ambassadors before they take up appointments in countries with whose 
foreign debts we may have to deal. 99
The close connection between the CFBH and H.M. Government also extended to those 
cases where the British government took responsibility to “receive payments or to 
supervise the collection of securities.”300 Often, this role fell to the Bank of England, an 
institution that developed a special expertise in the administrative aspects of private debt 
collection. For example, the Turkish loan of 1854 was secured by the Egyptian tribute 
payment, an amount which the Khedive of Egypt agreed to pay the Sultan of Turkey. The 
funds for the tribute were paid directly into a special account at the Bank of England for 
the benefit of bondholders.301
297 Platt (1960), p. 25.
298 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1938; Mauro and Yafeh (2003), p. 21.
299 CFBH Archives (1958). File Ms34603, Vol. 4, Document 327/1347. Letter from Butler (CFBH) to Sir 
Geoffrey Wallinger (new British Ambassador to Brazil). See also CFBH Archives (1944). File Ms34620, 
Document 391/32. Letter from H.M. Treasury to Lord Bessborough (CFBH); CFBH Archives (1963-1964). 
File Ms34666, Document 211/1 A. Letter from Sir Otto Niemeyer’s office (British Government) to Dana 
Munro (FBPC).
300 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1873, p. 49.
301 CFBH Archives (1874). Clippings File, Turkey, Vol. 2. Daily Telegraph, April 9, 1874. The amount 
was paid to Turkey in consideration of the fact that the Turkish ruler agreed to allow the Khedive’s son to
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While many have marginalized the importance of these activities, we maintain 
that they had a decidedly positive effect on the position of bondholders. When a request 
from British bondholders is delivered to a defaulting state’s finance minister from the 
British Consul General, its impact and significance is far greater than if the same message 
were delivered by the head of a private bondholder body. In fact, in sworn public 
testimony to the Securities and Exchange Commission, J. Reuben Clark, President of the 
CFBH’s American counterpart, the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, maintained 
that the British Government went further in its diplomatic support of the CFBH -  
especially with respect to allowing its foreign service to act as agents of the CFBH -  than 
the State Department ever did.302 This support lent an element of compulsory power to 
the process that benefited British bondholders at the expense of American ones.303 Also, 
the fact that there are so many instances in which the CFBH petitioned the British 
government to intervene in difficult cases highlights the limitations of the institutional 
body in effectively regulating defaults.
4.5.2 Super-Sanctions: Economic Control and Military Intervention
Despite historical interpretation to the contrary, Britain has seldom remained 
completely indifferent to the treatment of its nationals by a defaulting foreign 
government. In a number of cases, government intervention went far beyond “diplomatic
succeed him as ruler of Egypt. Also, The Bank of England was not a public entity at this time, although it 
maintained close ties to the British government.
302 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 251.
303 See also Eichengreen and Portes (1989), p. 21; Eichengreen (1991), p. 164. While some credit the 
CFBH with the fact that British bondholders received more favourable treatment in their interwar 
negotiations with Germany than their U.S. counterparts (due to its experience, organization, etc.), 
compulsory and structural power were more far more salient than institutional power in this instance. The 
British Foreign Office was intimately involved with the negotiations, sometimes allowing them to be 
conducted by Embassy officials. The British Treasury even made it quite clear that the status of private 
debts would be taken into consideration when making a decision on whether to extend official credit to 
Germany. Finally, since Britain was running a trade deficit with Germany in the 1930s, it threatened to 
offset that trade balance for the benefit of private bondholders. A 1934 Act of Parliament was to create a 
clearing office to recover, out of the proceeds of German trade with Britain, a sufficient amount in sterling 
to pay interest on the British tranches of the 1924 Dawes Loan and the 1930 Young Loan. By contrast, the 
U.S. did not have a trade position with Germany that would allow it to sequester funds for its bondholders. 
In addition, President Roosevelt urged U.S. bondholders to settle to cement good economic relationships 
and asked his ambassador to Berlin to “lend what personal, unofficial aid you can, but no more.” The 
different political approaches taken by the U.S. and Britain explains why Germany treated its British 
bondholders more favourably than its U.S. counterparts. The nominal rate of return realized on German 
issues purchased in the 1920s was 3.6% annually for sterling bondholders, but only 1.1% for dollar 
bondholders.
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exhortation” and led to “the establishment of alien control over the part or whole of the 
finances of a defaulting state, or even over its entire administration.”304 The decision of 
the British government to come to the aid of bondholders in a more overt and forceful 
way was largely dependent upon a few key variables. First, it was generally the case that 
that the more blatant the abuse of British property rights, the more emphatic the 
response.305 Second, governmental intervention was more likely to be forthcoming in 
circumstances where the bondholders had a specific pledge of assets. This is because the 
British government could more easily justify active diplomatic protection when it was 
linked to the safeguard of contractually-agreed security arrangements.306 Finally, most 
scholars agree that exceptions to the public stance of non-intervention were often made 
for strategic purposes.307
These variables are often cited in the most spectacular cases of forceful foreign 
intervention for the benefit of private bondholders. In 1861, Great Britain, along with 
France and Spain, undertook a military campaign in Mexico, with France ultimately 
installing its own emperor, Maximilian.308 Egypt’s default in 1875-1876 led Britain to 
take increasing economic control over the financial affairs of the Egyptian government. 
And, at the Congress of Berlin, the leading powers of Europe signed a declaration which 
created the Ottoman Debt Administration in 1881, a vehicle whose role was to collect 
and administer the collateral that secured the Ottoman public debt. In 1902, Britain, 
Germany and Italy established a blockade around Venezuela, successfully forcing the 
country’s recalcitrant dictator, General Cipriano Castro, to settle its defaulted foreign 
debt. And, the U.S. government intervened militarily in Santo Domingo (1905) by 
sending gunboats and establishing a customs receivership to ensure the repayment of 
European and American bondholders.309 All of these measures were draconian enough to
304 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. xxv.
305 Lipson (1985b), pp. 49-50.
306 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 98. As we saw earlier, collateralized bonds were much more common 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries than in any other period.
307 Platt (1960); Lipson (1985b).
308 This project was less than successful, with Maximilian I, a brother of the Austrian emperor Franz 
Joseph, killed in a coup in 1867. Following the execution, the Mexican government repudiated die 
Maximilian debt of £20 million.
309 Dammers (1984), p. 80; Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 242. A second objective of the U.S. 
intervention in Santo Domingo was to repel any possible European military adventure in the Western
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serve as a warning for other would-be defaulters. In fact, Fishlow (1989) points out that 
the memories of the resolution of the Turkish and Egyptian defaults of the 1870s, which 
led to foreign economic control and loss of sovereignty, lingered for quite some time and 
“cast a shadow of fear over all subsequent negotiations.”310
Before discussing individual cases, it is important to first examine the broader 
historical record on intervention during the period from 1870 to World War I. If we 
believe that creditor country government interventions were important drivers of debt 
settlements in this particular era, we need to offer empirical grounding for that position. 
Two important studies have attempted to measure the effects of super-sanctions on the 
sovereign debt restructuring process. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005) and Suter 
(1992). For purposes of this analysis, super-sanctions will be defined as either armed 
military intervention and/or the taking of external fiscal control over a country’s finances.
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005) find strong evidence to support the case that 
super-sanctions were not only effective but also a commonly used enforcement 
mechanism over the period 1870-1913. While these sanctions were applied selectively, 
often based on the geo-strategic importance of a defaulting state, the authors conclude 
that any nation that defaulted on sovereign debt “ran the risk of gunboats blockading their 
ports or creditor nations seizing fiscal control of the country.”311 They discovered that, 
conditional on default, the probability that a country would be “sanctioned...was greater 
than 40% during the period 1870-1913.”312 This figure is much higher than previously 
believed, and suggests that such sanctions served as a credible threat to deter future 
default. The authors also found that approximately two-thirds of these sanctions took the 
form of “gunboat diplomacy or the loss of fiscal sovereignty by the defaulting 
country.”313 The remainder involved some type of seizure of property in the defaulting 
state, usually connected to collateral foreclosure.314
Hemisphere; the U.S. agreed to do its part to enforce debt contracts in Central and South America in the 
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
310 Fishlow (1989).
311 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), pp. 2-7.
312 The authors find that super-sanctions were employed 30% of the time during this period but on more 
than 40% of the defaulted debt. The 30% finding with respect to the number of cases would be consistent 
with Suter (1992).
313 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), p. 2.
314 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), p. 7.
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One of the interesting findings of their study was that after the implementation of 
super sanctions, on average, “ex ante default probabilities on new debt issues fell by more 
than 60 percent, spreads declined by almost 800 basis points, and defaulting countries 
experienced almost a 100 percent reduction of time spent in default”315 In fact, only 
countries that surrendered their fiscal sovereignty had the ability to issue meaningful 
levels of new, post-default debt on the London exchange.
While Suter (1992) maintains that super-sanctions were rare, his conclusion is 
based on the measurement of sanctions across a longer time horizon: 1821 -  1975.
Table 4G: Creditor Country Government Intervention (1821-1975)316
Default Settlement Periods Number o f  Interventions Number o f  Cases
1821-1870 4 25
1871-1925 15 52
1926-1975 1 37
Total: 1821-1975 Total Interventions: 20 Total Cases: 114
Source: Suter (1992)
He argues that creditors took some form of political or economic control of debtors in 20 
out of a total 114 settlements in the period from 1821 - 1975, which is only 18% of the 
time. This result coincides with the conventional wisdom about interventions. However, 
15 of these 20 cases occurred in the 1871-1925 period, meaning that in the period under 
examination in this chapter, compulsory power played a role close to 30% of the time. 
This figure, based on the number of cases, matches the one used in Mitchener and 
Weidenmier (2005).317
In addition, while Suter concludes that investors suffered a reduction of principal 
in this period of 12%, this amount is arrived at after adjusting for instances where 
creditors enhanced their position by taking political or economic control of debtor 
property. Backing out these values, principal reduction would have been approximately
315 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), p. 3.
316 Suter (1992), p. 91.
317 Suter (1992), pp. 92-93. According to Suter (1992), only 4 interventions took place in the 1821-1870 
period and just one took place in the 1926-1975 period. In addition, in 9 debt arrangements, debtors ceded 
property rights to creditors in return for a partial scaling down of the face amount of the debt. The preferred 
assets tended to be land or railways. Some examples are: Columbia (1861 and 1873, land); Costa Rica 
(1885, railways); Ecuador (1885, land; 1897/1898 railways); El Salvador (1899, railways); and Paraguay 
(1855, land). Once again, 7 out of 9 cases (close to 80%) of ceded property rights occurred during the 
1871-1925 period.
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22.8%. Therefore, compulsory power had a material impact on bargaining outcomes in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries: it helped to reduce the average time a sovereign 
debtor spent in default and also the amount of principal that bondholders were required to 
forgive. The implication of this analysis is that compulsory power was a far more critical 
factor than previously thought in determining the outcomes of sovereign debt 
negotiations in the age of Pax Britannica?Xi
In Appendix 4B, we provide four illustrative case examples of super-sanctions in 
the 1875 -  1914 period. Two of these cases (Turkey and Egypt) involve the usurpation of 
domestic fiscal management by foreign European powers, another involves a European 
military operation to coerce repayment (Venezuela), and the last case involves both 
military intervention and fiscal management by the U.S. for the benefit of European 
bondholders (Santo Domingo). In all cases we find that compulsory power led directly to 
a reduction of time spent in default, and in the cases of fiscal intervention, the 
improvement of a country’s credit standing in the global capital markets.
4.6 Productive Power
In the issue-area of sovereign debt restructuring, productive power has played a 
role; however, we believe that its role was subservient and closely linked to structural and 
compulsory power in the 19th century. That is to say, capital exporters were largely able 
to define what it meant for a sovereign to default as well as the array of remedies that 
could be justified to cure it. These remedies were eventually enshrined in an evolving 
framework of international law. And, as we have discussed earlier, the material resources 
of capital exporters gave them an advantage in seeking redress from the more intransigent 
cases, like Turkey, Egypt, Venezuela and Santo Domingo. In addition, we hope to show 
how productive power was used quite effectively to supplement structural power, 
especially in the case of the defaulted U.S. states in the mid- to late 19th century. With the 
use of compulsory power ruled out by Britain in this instance, the combination of
318 Lipson (1985b), p. 54. Platt found at least forty examples of British armed intervention in Latin America 
between 1820 and 1914. ‘Twenty-six o f these episodes were to enforce claims of British subjects for 
outrage and injury or to restore order and protect property.” Weidenmier (2004) argues that trade sanctions 
were effective in promoting debt repayment by Confederate borrowers in British markets.
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structural and productive power pushed most of the defaulted States -  with the exception
of Mississippi- into a settlement with British creditors.
What is the origin of the word “default”? Etymologically, it derives from the
Latin, de fallere. De is a prefix signifying intensive force, and fallere, means “to deceive”
or “to cheat.” Taken together, the word suggests a debtor’s thorough and complete
deception of his creditor. “Repudiation” is also from the Latin, re, indicating repetition,
and pudere, to be ashamed of. The significance of this combination is that anyone who
110repudiates a debt is to be “ashamed only of himself.” This idea that default represented
a moral failing on the part of a sovereign state was very much accepted during the 19th 
century and continued through the time of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
4.6.1 Productive Power and the Evolution o f International Law
While international law, despite its ambitions, has never been able to match the 
precision of domestic law, a body of rules relating to foreign investment and sovereign 
default began to evolve at the beginning of the 17th century.320 Hugo Grotius advanced 
the position that an unpaid debt owed by one monarch to another was a “just cause for 
war” and that, in the event the debtor monarch refused to pay, his properties, or those of
191his subjects, could be confiscated for compensation under the law of nations.
Emmeric de Vattel was of the opinion that “an injury to an alien was actually an 
injury to the state of that alien and thereby justified measures by the state to seek redress 
and compensation.”322
It was not until the nineteenth century that the pecuniary claims of individual 
foreign creditors were addressed by international law:
Where the contract is between a state and a foreign individual the matter 
becomes one of international law in the strict sense if and when the state of 
the individual makes his case its own and addresses itself diplomatically to 
the contracting state.323
319 Winkler (1933), p. 8.
320 Lipson (1985b), p. 57; See alsoBuchheit and Gulati (2002); Buchheit (2003); Borchard and Wynne 
(1951a), p. 14.
321 Williams (1923), pp. 7-8.
322 Shea (1955), p. 9. Quotes Emmeric de Vattel (1758). The Law of Nations. Book III. (Carnegie Classics 
of International Law, Edition III), p. 136.
323 Borchard and Wynne (1951a); Williams (1923), p. 8.
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In 1868, the Argentine diplomat, Carlos Calvo, formulated what came to be known 
as the Calvo Doctrine. He argued that armed intervention in Latin America by the 
European powers could not be justified by appealing to international law. Instead, he 
believed that it represented the opportunistic use of force by the strong over the weak. 
Calvo believed that international law did not sanction military intervention on the part of 
creditor country governments for the purposes of recovering debts owed to private 
investors, and in the specific case of Latin America, he believed these actions to be 
discriminatory. He instead put forward the case that international law provided private 
foreign creditors with legal remedies, such as those that were offered by the courts and 
tribunals of the debtor state, and that only after all of these remedies had been exhausted 
could some form of peaceful, diplomatic intervention be permissible.324
The Venezuelan military intervention of 1902 by the European powers prompted 
Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Luis M. Drago, to supplement the Calvo Doctrine. In the 
communique which he forwarded to Washington, D.C., Drago echoed his predecessor’s 
concerns that military interventions were being used by powerful states as a cloak for 
domination and colonization. He further asserted that sovereign bonds held by private 
investors were not valid contracts and therefore not subject to intervention on the basis of 
international law. The Drago Doctrine rested on the tenuous legal grounds that when a 
state issued a bond it was an act of sovereignty, thereby offering the state full rights of 
repudiation and immunity from civil remedies. In other words, the bonds issued by a
“XO csovereign state were not contracts in the commonly accepted legal sense of the term.
The Drago Doctrine was widely disputed in international legal circles and even 
Borchard (1951a) noted that there were certain circumstances where the use of creditor 
country government intervention was justified to collect private bondholder debt, 
especially in cases where the sovereign debtor acted in bad faith by expropriating 
collateral meant to secure external debt.326 In fact, prior to World War I, there appeared to 
be a consensus among the major capital exporters of the world that the expropriation of 
an alien’s property required the host state to pay prompt and adequate compensation.
324 Hershey (1907), pp. 26-28; Lieberman (1989), p. 134. See also VanHarten (2005).
325 Hershey (1907), pp. 26-28.
326 Borchard and Wynne (195 la).
327 Lipson (1985b), p. 38.
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However, as a practical matter, it was often difficult to determine the level of “just 
compensation;” this ambiguity gave credit exporters much more room to manoeuvre in 
negotiations with defaulting sovereigns, leaving the door open for fiscal or military
• • 328intervention.
As American power increased, President Theodore Roosevelt became “a 
dedicated internationalist” who believed in the “civilizing mission of the United 
States.”329 Part of this mission involved upholding the Victorian ideals of self-control and 
self-mastery, both of which had evolved in 19th century Britain. These traits were said to 
define a man’s strength of character and were eventually extended to define the character 
of an entire nation. According to this doctrine, men were required to exercise restraint in 
monetary matters, meaning that they should save and plan for the future instead of 
spending recklessly and defaulting on debt obligations. It was only through this self- 
mastery that they would be elevated to a higher status. Once there, they had the 
responsibility to protect those who were “weaker, self-indulgent, and less rational.”330 
Included in this unfortunate category were women and children, as well as the inhabitants 
of less developed countries. According to Roosevelt, it was only by enforcing these ideals 
within the U.S. sphere of influence that civilization would advance. Rosenberg (1999) 
cites this norm as the one which made U.S. intervention permissible under the 1904 
Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In that pronouncement, Roosevelt said that 
“when the nations of the Western Hemisphere conducted their economic affairs 
irresponsibly...the United States would assume the role of ‘international police 
power.”’331
Some clarity on the issue of intervention was finally achieved at the Hague Peace 
Conference of 1907. The Convention Respecting the Limitations o f the Employment o f 
Force for the Recovery o f  Contract Debts was adopted and ostensibly expressed that
328 “The symbolic role of international law is particularly noteworthy, since it can sometimes turn 
questionable claims into approved obligations or prerogatives...legal symbols, by abstracting from and 
disguising material relations, can serve to authenticate them ethically across nations and social classes. The 
law, Bentham once said, ‘shews itself in a mask.’ The best known symbol in international property law is 
the requirement on ‘just’ compensation. Its meaning is not to be found in some exegesis of Plato. It refers 
to full, prompt, convertible repayment for expropriations. It is, in essence, a cloak for the interests of 
foreign investors.” See Lipson (1985b), p. 55.
329 Rosenberg (1999), p. 32.
330 Rosenberg (1999), p. 33.
331 Rosenberg (1999), p. 41.
104
armed force would not be used to collect private debts, but would remain an option in the 
event that the debtor state refused to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after arbitration, 
failed to submit to the judgement. By 1914, this convention had been ratified by all of the 
powers that were creditor states.332
Some have argued that the norms and rules regarding the protection of foreign 
investment evolved with a certain purpose during the 19th century. Lispon (1985b) 
maintains that the rules on expropriation and just compensation were created and 
enforced so as to ensure the expansion of capital investment overseas. More specifically, 
they were linked to the changing international role of Britain. According to Lipson, since 
the “rules defined the minimum conditions for the internationalization of capital...they 
became deeply embedded in the foreign policy of the largest capital exporter.”333
Therefore, the evolution of international law with respect to the protection of 
international capital needs to be understood within the political and economic context of 
the 19th century. Rules were created and sustained by the great European powers who 
also happened to be the world’s principal capital exporters. Their goal was to maintain “a 
unified economic and social order for the conduct of international trade and intercourse 
among independent political units of diverse cultures and stages of civilization, different 
legal and economic systems, and varying degrees of power and prestige.”334 So, 
productive power was tied very directly to structural power in this period. And, the 
success of these rules can be measured by the vast transfer of wealth from developed to 
developing countries in the years leading up to World War I.
4.6.2 Productive Power and U.S. State Defaults
Between 1841 and 1843, eight U.S. states and one territory defaulted on their 
external debt to British bondholders.335 Some states defaulted and then repudiated their
332 Scott (1915), pp. 89-90.
333 Lipson (1985b), p. 38.
334 Lipson (1985b), p. 38.
335 Although these defaults occurred prior to the start date of this study, we believe that they help illuminate 
the role of productive power when compulsory power is highly constrained. The municipalities in question 
were Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania and the 
territory o f Florida. By 1873 -  1874 only Indiana, Louisiana, Florida and Mississippi remained. However, 
new U.S. states were added to the roster of defaulters in 1873-1874: Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Minnesota.
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debt, while others defaulted but sought to settle with creditors. Shock and disappointment 
echoed throughout the British investing community:
To any man of real philanthropy who received pleasure from the 
improvements of the world, the repudiation of the public debt of America and 
the shameless manner in which it has been talked of and done, is the most 
melancholy event which has happened during the existence of the present 
generation.336
Wallis, Sylla et. al. (2004) argue that repudiation was rooted in a feeling by the citizens 
of a state that they had been the victims of corruption. States that did not repudiate their 
debt viewed the financial crisis as emanating not from corruption, but instead from the 
general incompetence of state officials.337 In addition, some of the repudiating states 
believed they had a legal right to disown the foreign debt, especially where statutory 
requirements had been violated.338
The British press was extremely active in publicly condemning the actions taken by 
the U.S. states. They hoped that the states would “deem it a not disadvantageous 
transaction to lay out ten or twenty millions... in purchasing a restoration of their forfeited 
respectability.”339 And, referring to Indiana, the London Times asserted: “Sooner or later 
the people of Indiana will find themselves rich enough to buy a character and wise 
enough to know that it is worth the price.”340 According to one English gentleman:
I never met a Pennsylvanian at a London dinner without feeling a disposition 
to seize and divide him. How such a man can set himself at an English table 
without feeling that he owes two or three pounds to every man in the 
company, I am at a loss to conceive...If he has a particle of honour in his 
composition, he should shut himself up and say, ‘I cannot mingle -  I must 
hide myself - 1 am a blunderer from Pennsylvania.’341
In fact, it was so embarrassing to be an American in London in the early 1840’s that it 
was reported that “at least one American of irreproachable antecedents was barred
336 CFBH Archives (1984-1985). File Ms34628.
337 Wallis, Sylla et al. (2004).
338 McGrane (1935), p. 8. A number of state legislatures required bonds to be sold at par and did not allow 
foreign currency clauses. Where the state’s agents and bankers violated these requirements, it was used as a 
legal basis for repudiation.
339 McGrane (1935), p. 166. Quote taken from London Times, December 3,1846.
340 McGrane (1935), p. 382. Quote taken from London Times, April 29,1847.
341 Winkler (1933), p. 10.
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admission to a London Club, specifically because he belonged to a republic which did not 
fulfil its engagements.”342
From Europe’s perspective, the entirety of America was disgraced because certain 
states had openly repudiated their obligations.343 No matter how much non-defaulting 
states protested and tried to explain the federal character of their government, they were 
still regarded as a “nation of swindlers.”344 While the British found it difficult to view the 
defaulting states as legally or morally unconnected, the Americans possessed a stunning 
lack of national consciousness. They firmly believed that the actions of a few states 
would not injure their credit so long as they continued to meet their debt obligations.
In framing the debate about American state defaults, the British did not limit 
themselves to complaints of moral failing and weakness of character; they saw the 
defaults as reflecting in the most negative way on the very institutions of American 
democracy:
The Americans who boast to have improved the institutions of the old world 
have at least equalled its crimes. A great nation, after trampling under foot all 
earthly tyranny, has been guilty of a fraud as enormous as ever disgraced the 
worst king of the most degraded nation of Europe.345
In an attempt to rally public support for fiscal probity among Americans in 1840, Daniel 
Webster argued that lurking at the bottom of British aspersions was “a strong desire to 
disparage free institutions, by representing them as unworthy of reliance on the part of 
foreigners and unsteady in the sacred obligations of public faith.”346 Therefore, by 
championing debt repayment, Americans could serve the higher purpose of validating the 
American democratic experiment.
The use of productive power by Britain went far beyond efforts to shape opinion 
in the press. For example, Barings, along with five other banking houses, subscribed to a 
£2,000 fund in June, 1843 for the express purpose of appointing agents to Pennsylvania 
to represent foreign creditors. These agents would not only be expected to write press
342 Jenks (1927), p. 104.
343 The Senate of the United States adopted resolutions on March 6,1840 which expressly disclaimed the 
federal government’s responsibility for defaulted state debts. See Jenks (1927), p. 100.
344 McGrane (1935), p. 56.
345 London Times, May 19,1843.
346 McGrane (1935), p. 43.
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accounts urging debt repayment; they also organized meetings of domestic holders of 
state debt hoping that these Americans would feel some solidarity with their European 
counterparts. Of most interest was the fact that the agents were instructed “to endeavour 
to enlist clergy to point out from the pulpit” the “moral wrong and danger to the people of 
not acting honourably.”347
While productive power proved to be a useful supplement to structural power in 
these cases, those American states that eventually settled with British bondholders did so 
mainly because of structural power; that is to say, they wanted or needed renewed access 
to the British and European capital markets. In fact, all of the American states, except 
one, settled with their British bondholders in the absence of any exercise of compulsory 
power. The case of Mississippi remained an outstanding, unsolved case on the books of 
the CFBH when it wound up its operation in 1988, with the institution reporting that “the 
chances of anything being achieved must be next to nil.”348
4.7 Power and the Production o f  Bareainine Outcomes in the 19th Century
The sovereign debt restructuring regime of the 19th century does resonate with 
today’s debates about how to improve the international financial architecture, especially 
in matters of crisis resolution. Parallels are often drawn between today and the 19 
century since the latter is commonly considered to be the first era of globalization - a 
time when open capital accounts allowed western European investment to flow liberally 
to capital-poor developing countries in the Americas, southern and eastern Europe, Egypt 
and Turkey.349 Given the similarities between the 19th century and today, there have been 
discussions about the possible revival of an organization like the CFBH on a global basis 
to coordinate the interests of disparate bond investors in sovereign debt workouts.350 And, 
since sovereign debt restructuring is considered to be a highly redistributive process, any
347 Baring Archives. Letters from Ward to Baring, May 14 and 15,1843; Letter from Baring to Ward, June 
19, 1843 and July 3, 1843. Also, see McGrane (1935), p. 73.
348 CFBH Archives (1969-1970). File Ms34603, Volume 9. Memorandum on status o f Mississippi default. 
The debt was valued at $6.9 million in 1970. According to the Financial Times on April 21, 1988, the total 
face value was $7 million but the past-due interest was calculated at $42 million as far back as 1929.
349 Esteves (2005), p. 1; See also Bordo, Eichengreen et al. (1998).
350 MacMillan (1995a). See also Institute of International Finance, International Primary Markets 
Association et al. (2003) and Portes (2004).
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improvements in the international financial architecture351 that would make it more 
predictable, fair and efficient would have far-reaching benefits for debtor states and 
investors alike.
However, we believe that the recommendation to resurrect the CFBH rests on an 
important misconception: that the CFBH was singularly or even largely responsible for
iL
driving the success of the 19 century sovereign debt restructuring regime. As we have 
argued in this chapter, the power of the CFBH as an institution was overshadowed by the 
structural power of British capital and the willingness of Britain and other powers to 
enforce debt contracts using compulsory power.
On the matter of structural power, it would be difficult to deny the hegemony of 
the British capital market during the age of Pax Britannica. The county’s capital export 
grew sixteen times between 1854 and the eve of World War I, accounting for just under 
half of the world’s total. And, while the power to refuse market access to defaulting 
sovereigns is often ascribed to the CFBH, it was in fact the Stock Exchange that instituted 
that rule in 1827, more than forty years prior to the establishment of the CFBH. However, 
the origin of the rule is not as critical as the source of its power, a source that was 
structural and not institutional.
In examining compulsory power capabilities in this era, we have found that the 
CFBH would routinely use the British consular network as if it were an agency of the 
bondholders. British diplomats would deliver messages, collect sensitive information, and 
arrange payments. Even more compelling is the finding that sanctions involving the 
assumption of economic control or outright military force were much more common than 
previously believed. Interventions occurred in close to 30% of default cases - and on 40% 
of the face amount of outstanding debt. These actions directly impacted bargaining 
outcomes by materially reducing the time spent in default and increasing recovery rates. 
And, longer-term improvements in a debtor country’s fiscal outlook are correlated with
351 The term “international financial architecture” was coined by Robert Rubin, U.S. Treasury Secretary 
during the Mexican and Asian financial crises of 1994/1995 and 1997/1998 respectively. Rubin was 
referring to the rules which governed global capital flows and debt restructuring in emerging markets. The 
Mexican and Asian financial crises spurred policymakers to focus on ways to reduce financial contagion 
and respond in a more fair and predictable manner to sovereigns in financial distress. This initially involved 
the expansion of IMF lending programs to countries experiencing liquidity crises and better IMF 
surveillance and reporting with respect to the banking sector in emerging markets countries.
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activist foreign debt administrations, drawing comparisons to modem day IMF structural 
adjustment programs.
It is likely that history has mistakenly credited the institution of the CFBH with 
achieving bargaining outcomes that in fact resulted from the exercise of structural and 
compulsory power. If so, then this finding has important implications for today’s reforms 
to the international financial architecture. Because, while the institutional body of the 
CFBH may have reflected, leveraged, or even taken credit for this power, it did not 
produce it. This means that the establishment of an institutional twin to the CFBH in 
today’s markets would not, on its own, re-create the regime of the 19th century; nor would 
it be likely to reproduce its bargaining outcomes.
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Appendix 4A
Sample Periodicals and Journals from CFBH Archives
Esvot (1870-18751: 17 Vireinia (1872- Arkansas. China and Japan France (1870sl: Eurone (1930sl: 16
Money Market Review 18751: 28 MississinDi. (1870sl: 25 23 Times
Bondholders’ Register Richmond Enquirer Tennessee (1875- Times Standard Financier Financial News
Financier Journal of the Royal 18831: 17 Economist Times Financial Times
Bullionist, Society of the Arts New York Times Standard Bullionist Moming Post
Ways and Means Times Anglo American Investors’ Guardian Bondholders’ Daily Telegraph
Economist Wall Street Journal Times Money Market Register Message d’Athenes
Times Bullionist Advertiser and Mail Review Globe Board o f Trade
Daily News Bondholders’ New York Herald. Bondholders’ Echo Journal
Monetary and Mining Register Manchester Register Money Market Stock Exchange
Gazette Money Market Guardian Pall Mall Gazette Review Journal
Evening Standard Review The Sun Bullionist Economist Stock Exchange
Daily Telegraph Anglo American Richmond Enquirer Financier Daily News Gazette
Echo Times Standard Echo Hour Hansard
Globe Richmond Whig Financier Herapath’s Railway Monetary Gazette New York Herald
Gazette de Paris Journal of Commerce New York Herald & Commercial Daily Telegraph Tribune
Hour Weekly State Journal Echo Journal Gazette de Paris Evening Standard
Morning Post (Richmond) Pall Mall Gazette South Pacific Times Herapath’s New York Times
Richmond Dispatch McCulloch’s Pacific Mail Railway and Agence Economique
Argentina (18821: 16 Financier Circular Hour Commercial et Financiere
Buenos Aires Standard New York Times Money Market News of the World Journal Glasgow Herald
Times Standard Review Daily Telegraph Whitehall Review
Financial News Cosmopolitan Wall Street Journal Monetary Gazette Moming Post
Financial Times Vindicator Herapath’s Railway Mining Journal Capital and
Bullionist Evening Standard & Commercial Financial Reformer Labour
Standard Echo Journal. Morning Post World
Daily News Daily Picayune Moming Advertiser Pall Mall Gazette
Economist Morning Post Iron Financial Opinion
Statist Daily Recorder Daily News Semaine
Money Market Review Daily Dispatch Truth Financiere
Money & Trade Daily News Panama Star and France Financiere
Morning Post Investors’ Guardian Herald Statist
Daily Telegraph Herapath’s Railway &
South American Journal Commercial Journal
Herapath’s Railway & New York Herald
Commercial Journal Daily Telegraph
Capitalist
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Appendix 4B
_____________________ Compulsory Power Case Studies______________________
Turkey
From Europe’s perspective, one of the principal reasons for placing the fiscal 
administration of a country under foreign supervision was to preserve it as a political 
entity. By stabilizing its finances and ensuring the adoption of sound budgetary methods, 
this strategy would prevent the debtor country from weakening and perhaps falling prey 
to another foreign power. Therefore, European fiscal management had two goals: to 
maintain an acceptable balance of power and improve the returns that European nationals 
could earn on their foreign investments. Borchard and Wynne (1951a) contend that “the 
benefits accruing to the debtors were a welcome, but by no means essential, by-product 
of its operation.”352
During the 1860s, Turkey borrowed extensively in the British and Continental 
markets, largely to support military expenditures as well as for the construction of a host 
of imperial residences for the Sultans. Loans were generally secured, typically by 
revenues derived from monopolies on local commodities. For the added protection of 
investors, a Commission was based in Constantinople, consisting of six members, three 
of whom were named by the Turkish government and three by the agents of the loan. The 
Commission had the duty of collecting the hypothecated revenues and transmitting them 
at fixed intervals to the Bank of England for the semi-annual interest and sinking fund
353payments.
Unfortunately, even with this added measure of protection, the fiscal 
administration in the Turkish government was poor. Tax receipts were kept at artificially 
low levels through evasion or the corruption of tax officials. Bribery and graft were not 
uncommon, especially in light of the subsistence salaries paid to the overstaffed civil 
service. In addition, there was no program in place to centralize control over the national 
budget. Given these problems, widespread defaults ensued during the 1870s which 
eventually brought about the imposition of foreign fiscal management.354 The Ottoman
352 Borchard and Wynne (195 la), p. 287.
353 CFBH Archives (1862). File Ms34801, Volume 1. Notice of Imperial Ottoman Loan.
354 Borchard and Wynne (195 la), p. 148.
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Debt Council was established in 1881 as the part of a comprehensive settlement between 
Turkey and her foreign creditors.
The Council of Administration, or more simply, the Debt Council, was organized 
under the Decree of Mouharrem. It was comprised of foreign bondholder representatives 
and was careful to exclude any “persons with positions in - or official connections to - the 
Turkish government.”355 The Debt Council was initially charged with “the 
administration, collection, [and] direct encashment... of the revenues and other resources” 
ceded to it.356 Some British investors believed that Turkey had been deserted because she 
could no longer afford to pay her English bondholders, and because the construction of 
the Suez Canal freed Britain from its dependence on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 
for its trade route to India. However, this was not, in fact, the case.357
The Debt Council, far from being indifferent on the matter of Turkey’s fiscal fate, 
was a large and pro-active organization. It established its own revenue-collection service, 
employing over 3000 agents. Yet, the Debt Council was not satisfied with the limited 
remit of collecting what the Turkish government was able to pay. Instead, it slowly began 
to expand its role so that it could improve government revenue more broadly. It 
established more efficient and centralized procedures for revenue administration, and 
even began to look at how the government’s principal industrial interests could be 
improved. In this regard, it adopted measures to combat phylloxera, advanced an export 
trade in salt, and championed better agricultural techniques. It was widely agreed among 
investors that Turkey’s fiscal outlook improved markedly after it allowed its creditors to 
manage its customs revenues.358 The Debt Council was even commended on the 
substantial improvement in the country’s debt standing, something which directly 
profited the Turkish Government.
It is interesting to note that the Debt Council remained in place for more than 47 
years. After a series of protracted negotiations, an agreement to replace the Decree of 
Mouharrem was finally reached between the Turkish Government and its foreign
355 Borchard and Wynne (1951 a), p. 284.
356 Borchard and Wynne (195la), p. 284.
357 CFBH Archives (1875). Clippings File, Egypt, Vol. 1. Times, November 26, 1875.
358 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1876, pp. 33-34; Report of 1904, p. 26.
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creditors in June, 1928. It was only with this agreement that the Turkish Government 
regained full financial sovereignty.359
Egypt
Like Turkey, Egypt began to borrow extensively in the foreign capital markets in 
the 1860s. For the better part of this decade, a series of loans were arranged that carried 
high interest rates as well as large discounts; eventually, incremental borrowings were 
required simply to redeem the mounting level of floating rate debt. And, like Turkey, 
Egypt’s fiscal condition gradually weakened given the lethal combination of poor 
economic administration and extravagant expenditure.
In order to stave off default, the British press reported that the Khedive “ha[d] 
applied officially to England to send him two gentlemen competent to undertake full 
charge of Egyptian finances” insofar as the Khedive believed in the need for “certain 
reforms in an administration not...wholly free from the vices that have brought Turkey to 
its present pass.”360 In fact, the dispatch of Stephen Cave, the British Paymaster General, 
was widely regarded as confirmation that the British government would help the Khedive 
put his finances in order.361 The relationship between the Khedive and the British 
financial experts was a tenuous one. By the summer of the following year, the Khedive 
was reported as saying that he “thought England would have sent him a man to counsel 
and enlighten him, but that he found it was intended to subject him to a syndicate.”
The British purchase of the Khedive’s half interest in the Suez Canal was seen in 
the financial press as a “bold stroke of political genius.” On the one hand, it allowed the 
holders of Egyptian bonds to be to “some degree compensated for their late anxieties,” 
improving the outlook for Egyptian finances and clearing the away the fiscal burdens that 
had been an embarrassment to the Khedive. However, while the influx of £4 million to 
the Khedive helped to avert a financial crisis, political interests were even more salient 
insofar as half-ownership of the canal was seen as a way to secure Britain’s roadway to 
India.363
359 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), pp. 284-285.
36° q p b jj Archives (1875). Clippings File, Egypt, Vol. 2. Times, November 29, 1875.
361 CFBH Archives (1875). Clippings File, Egypt, Vol. 2. Echo, November 30, 1875.
362 CFBH Archives (1876). Clippings File, Egypt, Vol. 2. Standard, June 4, 1876.
363 CFBH Archives (1875). Clippings File, Egypt, Vol. 2. Bullionist, November 27, 1875.
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Even with these measures designed to hold back default, the situation in Egypt 
finally reached a crisis point in 1876 when new loans could no longer be floated in 
foreign markets. Initially, a readjustment of the debt was organized under the direction of 
French and British advisors. However, in 1882 this consortium was supplanted entirely 
by Great Britain, which assumed responsibility for “reconstructing and strengthening the 
Egyptian financial system.”364 Britain was, in effect, “given control of Egypt’s purse 
strings for the remainder of the gold standard period.”
The British administration in Egypt had managed to mimic the success of the 
Turkish Debt Council. They inaugurated an efficient tax collection system and restored 
fiscal discipline. In order to accomplish this, they limited the power of the Egyptian 
assembly to authorize spending. As a result, Britain was able to conclude a debt 
settlement with Egypt by 1883. “Nearly a decade after the debt workout, the ratio of 
government debt to tax revenue had been cut in half (from 10:1 to 5: l).”366 According to 
Ferguson and Schularick (2004):
In many ways, there was a modem quality to what happened. The British 
administration of Egyptian finances had much in common with an 
International Monetary Fund mission or rather the way an IMF mission 
would operate if it could call on the Royal Navy to enforce its prescriptions. 
Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, ran Egypt’s finances much like a modem 
structural adjustment program.367
Venezuela
thVenezuela experienced a series of debt service suspensions during the 19 and 
early 20th centuries and is best placed in the category of serial defaulter. Stoppages 
occurred for long periods on six occasions between 1834 and 1905. These numerous 
and prolonged disturbances could be attributed to recurring revolutionary activities which
364 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 149.
365 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), p. 17.
366 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), p. 19.
367 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005). Quoting Ferguson (2004). Colossus: The Price o f American Empire. 
New York: Penguin Press. Also, Ferguson and Schularick (2006) point out how British colonies were able 
to borrow in the London market at much better terms than non-colonies, with the “Empire effect” providing 
a discount of around 100 basis points on borrowing rates.
368 Periods of Venezuelan default: from 1834 tol841, from 1847 to 1859, from 1864 to 1876, from 1878 to 
1880, from 1892 to 1893, and from 1897 to 1905.
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depleted the country’s wealth, slowed economic development, and prompted claims by 
European nationals for injuries to both persons and property.
During one of the default episodes in 1865, the Committee of Venezuelan 
bondholders - of which Isidor Gerstenberg was Chairman - sought the intervention of the 
British Government, backed by letters from Baron Rothschild, Mr. Goschen, and Mr. 
Crawford, three of the City’s MP’s. In his letter, Goschen says:
I have no hesitation in saying that the case of the Venezuelan bondholders is a 
very hard one, fully deserving of the active and energetic interference of Her 
Majesty’s Government...By such action, not only the rights and just claims of 
the British bondholders will be protected, but a signal service will be 
conferred upon the people of Venezuela, whose interests will be considerably 
benefited by the observance of public arrangements on the part of their 
Government.369
At the time, Earl Russell, Foreign Secretary to H.M. Government agreed to make a strong 
representation to the Government of Venezuela with respect to their poor treatment of 
British bondholders.. In fact, when Senor A.L. Guzman, the father of the President of 
Venezuela, arrived in Britain, Earl Russell refused to receive him until “Messrs. Baring 
and the other British holders of Venezuelan bonds shall have received redress for the 
wrongs which they have suffered at the hands of that Government.”370
In addition, a meeting was arranged with the Committee of the Stock Exchange to 
ensure that the sovereign debt of Venezuela as well as the “shares of any company 
connected with Venezuela” would be refused admission to the London market until debt 
service resumed.371
The Committee of Venezuelan Bondholders reported its confidence that “should 
Venezuela persist in her disregard of British claims...the time will soon come when the 
British Government will proceed to active and energetic measures.”372 There were even 
reports that United States government would employ force to “correct the dishonesty of 
the Republic of Venezuela.”373
369 CFBH Archives (1865). Clippings File, Venezuela, Vol. 1. Morning Post, March, 1865.
370 CFBH Archives (1865). Clippings File, Venezuela, Vol. 1. Morning Post, March, 1865.
371 CFBH Archives (1865). Clippings File, Venezuela, Vol. I. Daily Telegraph, March, 1865.
372 CFBH Archives (1865). Clippings File, Venezuela, Vol. 1. Report o f the Committee o f Venezuelan 
Bondholders (pamphlet), 1865.
373 CFBH Archives (1871). Clippings File, Venezuela, Vol. 1. New York Times, May 19, 1871.
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In 1898, Venezuela experienced a revolution which lasted for more than two 
years. During this time, foreign investors suffered a substantial loss of property and the 
country ceased payment once again on its external debt. In response to this event, and 
using the pretext of property damage for British government involvement, Britain, 
Germany and Italy blockaded the ports of La Guiara and Puerto Cabello and seized 
customs houses in December 1902. Germany proceeded with a unilateral bombardment 
of the fort at San Carlos, forcing General Cipriano Castro to acquiesce to the demands of 
the European powers in February, 1903.374 The foreign bonded debt was eventually 
readjusted after negotiations between representatives of the Republic and of the 
bondholders, with the settlement coming into effect in 1905, just three years after the
375intervention.
Santo Domingo
While the objectives of the European powers that assumed economic control over 
defaulting debtors were to i) preserve the existing balance of power, ii) ensure the 
integrity and continued independence of the debtor state, and, iii) improve the chances of 
remuneration for European bondholders, the U.S had a slightly different motivation for 
taking economic control over Central American and Caribbean republics - namely to 
avoid the possibility of European intervention in its hemisphere. The U.S. felt “a moral 
obligation to prevent American republics from defaulting on their bonds, thus eliminating 
a source of legitimate grievances on the part of European bondholders and their 
governments.”376
However, like their European counterparts, American customs administrations 
were not strictly limited to revenue receipt and the straightforward application of these 
revenues to interest and sinking fund obligations. There were instances where the powers 
were more comprehensive and included control over customs rates (Santo Domingo, 
Haiti, Nicaragua), the supervision of internal revenues (Haiti, Nicaragua), the imposition
374 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2004), pp. 7-8.
375 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 147.
376 Borchard and Wynne (195 la), p. 294.
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of public debt ceilings (Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti) and the oversight of public 
expenditures (Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama.).377
In the case of Santo Domingo, efforts at securing a debt settlement by British 
bondholders were first made through diplomatic channels. The CFBH requested that the 
foreign office, through its Consul General in Haiti, deliver a memorial from the 
bondholders to the President of Santo Domingo.378 Later, the Consul General reported 
back that he had delivered the memorial directly to the President and had “recommended 
the claims of the British Bondholders to the attention of his Excellency.”379
In December, 1901, the CFBH applied to H.M. Government to request Lord 
Paunceforte of the British Consulate in Washington, to “enter into communication with 
the United States Government with the object of taking joint action, so as to put pressure 
on the Dominican Government.”380 The CFBH wanted Paunceforte to stress that 
American as well as British bondholders could benefit from the effort.
Rippy (1934) argues that British bondholders were in large measure responsible 
for President Roosevelt’s declaration of the Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the act 
which immediately preceded the U.S. initiation of a customs receivership in Santo 
Domingo in April 1905. This Corollary was formulated in May, 1904 in a letter by 
President Roosevelt to Secretary of War, Elihu Root:
If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and 
political matters, if it keeps order and pays it obligations, then it need fear no 
interference from the United States. Brutal wrong doing, or an impotence 
which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may 
finally require some intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western 
Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore the duty.382
This seems to be confirmed by the CFBH’s Annual Report of 1908: “the British 
Bondholders who exerted their influence to secure Roosevelt’s backing...may be in a
377 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 294.
378 CFBH Archives (1874). Clippings File, Santo Domingo, Vol. 2. Daily Telegraph, July 22, 1874.
379 CFBH Archives (1874). Clippings File, Santo Domingo, Vol. 2. Money Market Review, October 24, 
1874.
380 Rippy (1934), p. 197.
381 CFBH Archives (1902). File Ms34780. Letter from H.M. Foreign Office to the CFBH.
382 Rippy (1934), p. 195.
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measure responsible for the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic 
and the promulgation of the ‘Corollary’ occasioned by that intervention.”383
From the perspective of President Morales of Santo Domingo, the possibility of 
ceding economic control to the Americans was not entirely unwelcome. He was well 
aware that customs revenues were the “the prize for which revolutions were principally 
fought” and in the event they were “safeguarded against seizure by insurgents, the danger 
of rebellion would be considerably lessened.”384 According to Borchard and Wynne 
(1951b), “a Dominican revolution might be briefly defined as the attempt of a bandit 
guerrilla to seize a custom-house.”385
The U.S. sent gunboats to Santo Domingo in 1905 and immediately assumed the 
customs collections process, diverting the funds collected to the American and European 
bondholders of Santo Domingo’s defaulted debt. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2004) 
argued that once this happened “recalcitrant debtors in Central America and around the 
Caribbean were willing to enter into negotiations with creditors ...because of the threat of 
gunboat diplomacy and lost sovereignty (U.S. seizure of foreign customs houses) -  a 
threat that was made credible by earlier U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo.”386
“Big stick” diplomacy was not confined to the seizure of customs houses. The 
U.S. navy toured Central and South America to exhibit its military prowess and U.S. 
officials undertook high-level diplomatic missions throughout the region. U.S. actions 
sparked settlements with Columbia and Venezuela in 1905, Nicaragua in 1910, Costa 
Rica in 1911, and Guatemala in 19 1 3.387 The Roosevelt Corollary could very well be seen 
as a turning point in American foreign policy, since prior to its formulation, Roosevelt 
had a different interpretation of European intervention in the Western hemisphere: “If any
383 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1908.
384 Borchard and Wynne (195 lb), p. 240.
385 Borchard and Wynne (195 lb), p. 240.
386 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2004), pp. 5-6. Italics mine.
387 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987). In the case of Nicaragua, the debt settlement 
took place under the Dawson Pact, a contract which gave New York bankers and the British CFBH the 
right to petition the U.S. government for direct assistance in the event that Nicaragua did not honour its 
obligations to creditors. In addition, the New York firm of Speyer Brothers (also of London) put legal text 
into their agreement with Costa Rica in 1905 that holders of the bonds “should be entitled to apply to the 
United States of America for protection against any violation of, and for aid in the enforcement of, the 
Agreement.” See Platt (1960), p. 9.
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South American state misbehaves towards any European state, let the European country 
spank it.”388
The Corollary also had the intended effect on bond prices in Europe. On average, 
Central and South American bond issues listed on the London Exchange rose 75% after 
one year and 91% after two years, reducing the threat of European intervention in the 
hemisphere. Market sentiment reflected this boom in bond prices. “London 
stockbrokers are driving a roaring trade in South Americans, which have become a 
subject of lively, speculative interest on the theory the President Roosevelt has practically 
guaranteed all South American obligations. They bear the endorsement of ‘big stick’ so 
to speak.”390 And, “stock exchange speculators have read in the recent utterances of 
President Roosevelt...a hint that the United States is disposed to go gunning in Central 
America on behalf of British and other European investors.”391
388 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2004), p. 9.
389 Mitchener and Weidenmier (2004), p. 4.
390 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1905, p. 186. Quote from the New 
York Times, May 5, 1905.
391 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1905, p. 173. Quote from the Daily 
Mail, January 5, 1905.
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Chapter 5
Pushing on a String? The Foreign Bondholders Protective Council 
and Sovereign Debt Restructuring from the 1930s to the 1950s
When you men negotiate there in the [State] Department, you have not only the prestige o f our government 
behind you but you also have the potential power o f the government to bring to bear measures o f coercion 
and force... We poor fellows sit here absolutely naked o f prestige or potential coercive power...I wonder 
whether or not you men in the Department...do realize what a helpless, unarmed, impotent organization 
this Council is.
J. R. Clark
President of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
April 15, 1937
We have no clout unless we get some support from the State Department. The State Department looks at us 
as an annoyance, and without them, it is like we are pushing on a string.
John Petty
President of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
June 27, 2006
5.1 The Foreien Bondholders Protective Council and the Four Faces o f  Power
Accounts of the sovereign debt restructuring regime of the late 19th century have 
largely credited the institutional innovation of the British Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders (“CFBH”) with enhancing the efficiency of sovereign debt workouts and 
improving bargaining outcomes for private bondholders. By contrast, accounts of the 
interwar and post-war regime of the 20th century have delivered a different verdict: that 
the U.S. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (“FBPC”) was a failure. Among 
other things, it has been charged with being ineffective, inappropriately staffed, resource- 
constrained, and intractable, all of which served to produce poor results for private
392 Adamson (2002). See also Eichengreen (1991); Eichengreen and Lindert (1989); Eichengreen and 
Portes (1986); Eichengreen and Portes (1989). Adamson argues that the FBPC failed and was supplanted 
by the State Department before the onset of World War II. Eichengreen’s position is that the CFBH 
produced better results for bondholders than the FBPC since it was a more experienced and capable 
organization, operating under the auspices of a more activist government. It should be noted that secondary 
accounts of the FBPC’s performance are limited.
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investors. These observations are even more significant since the FBPC was designed - 
with the benefit of experience - to be institutionally identical to its British counterpart.
In Chapter 4, we challenged the conventional wisdom about the British CFBH 
and argued that its achievements were less a product of its institutional capabilities and 
more the result of structural and compulsory regime elements that were external to the 
institution and favoured private creditors. We concluded that bargaining outcomes
tVibetween private bondholders and defaulting states in the late 19 century were chiefly 
driven by two things: the structural power of a centralized, hegemonic, British capital 
market, and the willingness of the British government to use a wide array of coercive 
actions - ranging from diplomatic moral suasion to outright military force - to benefit 
bondholders. In our view, the favourable historical judgments about the CFBH derived 
from its ability to successfully reflect -  and sometimes even take credit for - these other 
forms of power.
This chapter will examine the FBPC using the same power-based analytical 
framework. We intend to argue that just as the CFBH was not the institutional triumph 
that it was portrayed to be, neither was the FBPC a picture of abject failure. We will 
demonstrate that, once again, structural and compulsory factors were more relevant to 
determining bargaining outcomes between sovereign states and private creditors. 
However, in the interwar and post-war periods, they tended to work in the opposite 
direction - to the detriment, not the benefit, of American creditor interests.
Since secondary source material concerning the FBPC is limited, our analysis has 
relied heavily on archival research. The FBPC’s records, which were only recently 
donated to Stanford University, were an invaluable source. The archives remain 
unprocessed and generally inaccessible to researchers, so much of the institutional 
analysis which appears in our discussion is taken from records that have been opened for 
the first time.394
393 It was often the case that these actions were not undertaken solely for the benefit of bondholders, but for 
much of the 19th and early 20th century, it seemed that British national interests coincided rather closely 
with the interests of its bondholders. They were therefore the beneficiaries of coercive exercises of power 
such as debt administrations and military action.
394 The author is grateful to the curators of the Green Library at Stanford University, Anthony Angiletta and 
William O’Hanlon, for agreeing to open the unprocessed archives for the first time -  and on an exceptional 
basis - for the completion of this chapter. As the archives have yet to be processed, each citation includes as 
much detail as possible about the document in question.
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These source materials have enabled us to demonstrate how the FBPC was 
undermined, almost from the beginning, by its own government in ways that diminished 
its credibility and virtually eliminated its funding base. In certain default cases, the U.S. 
State Department even supplanted the FBPC as chief negotiator, forcing U.S. 
bondholders to accept sub-standard settlements. In addition, the U.S. government and the 
World Bank made decisions to offer bi-lateral and multi-lateral funding to Latin 
American and Eastern European governments that remained in default to U.S. 
bondholders, an undertaking that seriously compromised the negotiating leverage of the 
FBPC.395 In short, the political expediencies of the interwar and post-war periods - 
keeping fascism and communism in check - led the U.S. government to prioritize broader 
national interests over the interests of private bondholders. With its bargaining leverage 
so eroded and its institutional capacity under constant siege, it is surprising that the FBPC 
managed to continue operating. In fact, we propose that the bargaining outcomes that 
were achieved by the FBPC were delivered to bondholders despite the enormous weight 
of structural and compulsory power arrayed against it.
This particular historical period of sovereign debt restructuring - from the 1930s 
to the 1950s - provides fertile ground for research for several reasons. First, we see the 
establishment of an institution -  the FBPC -  that was virtually identical in structure to the 
CFBH, but which produced bargaining outcomes that were markedly different. As a 
result, this epoch allows us to hold the institutional element constant while evaluating the 
effect that structural and compulsory regime elements had on negotiation. Second, even 
though the FBPC was responsible for handling the largest share of defaults during this 
period, both the FBPC and the CFBH found themselves operating simultaneously in 
certain default cases. Historical data reveal that even in the same negotiation, American 
and British bondholders fared differently, with the latter achieving higher ex post returns. 
This suggests that the CFBH continued to outperform the FBPC, an outcome which 
merits further explanation. Whereas secondary accounts of the period tend to credit the 
more capable and experienced CFBH with these results, we continue to dispute this view.
395 While the U.S. government was initially sensitive to any situations which required it to “lend into 
arrears” it gradually softened this policy to the point that any government which showed that it was making 
an effort to negotiate with the FBPC was eligible for Exim or World Bank financing.
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Instead, we maintain that British bondholders benefited once again from the non- 
institutional sources of regime power in the 1930s and beyond.
5,2 The Performance o f the FBPC: Default Cases and Bargaining Outcomes
Before proceeding to our discussion of the key features of the 1930s sovereign 
debt restructuring regime, it is important that we first establish the context within which 
sovereign state/private creditor negotiations took place. Between World War I and the 
stock market crash of 1929, the U.S. had effectively replaced Britain as the single largest 
creditor nation. In fact, the six-fold increase in U.S. lending activity between the wars had 
brought total American foreign investment levels within reach of those of Britain; by 
1929, America’s total foreign investment was £3 billion and Britain’s was £3.8 billion.396 
Carr credits the rise of the U.S. as a political power “to [its] appearance in the market as a 
large-scale lender, first of all to Latin America, and since 1914 to Europe.”397
Most of the consequential sovereign defaults occurred between the years 1931 to 
1940 and totalled $7,039 billion, although more than half were concentrated in just 
fourteen countries. Among these, the most significant were in Germany ($2.2 billion) and 
Latin America ($2.5 billion).398
Also, we find a greater incidence of default on dollar -  not sterling -  bonds during 
this period. Eichengreen and Portes (1989) argued that this was principally because the 
London capital market was much more adept at discriminating between good and bad 
credit risks. Moreover, London prioritized loans to Empire governments, including 
Australia and Canada, which accounted for 75% of all British overseas government 
issues, “not one of which slipped into arrears.”399 This left American investors holding 
the “lion’s share” of the German and South American bonds that lapsed into the most 
serious defaults.400 For these reasons, the overall bargaining outcomes during this period
396 Lipson (1985b), p. 66. As we recall from Chapter 4, the U.S. only had an 8% share in global foreign 
investment in 1913, while Britain’s share was 44%. See also Fishlow (1986).
397 Carr (1964 [1981]), p. 114.
398 Suter (1992), p. 69. The major countries in default (or involved in debt reschedulings) were Germany 
$2.2 billion; Brazil, $1,267 billion; Romania, $580 billion; Mexico, $500 million; Greece, $380 million; 
Chile, $376 million; Austria, $325 million; Yugoslavia, $320 million; Poland, $300 million; Hungary, $250 
million; Colombia, $151 million; Turkey, $140 million; Uruguay, $130 million; and, Peru, $120 million.
399 Eichengreen and Portes (1989), p. 38.
400 Eichengreen and Portes (1989), p. 39.
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are more attributable to the regime anchored by the American FBPC than by the British 
CFBH, although both institutions were operating simultaneously.
Table 5A: Bargaining Outcomes (1871-1975)401
Time Period Dominant
Creditor
Representative
Body
Duration
o f
Defaults
Capitalization o f  
Interest Arrears
Reduction in 
Interest Rates
Reduction in 
Principal
1871-1925 Corporation of 
Foreign 
Bondholders
6.3 years 71.6% 16.3% 12.0%
1926-1975 Foreign 
Bondholders 
Protective Council
10.1 years 35.2% 34.5% 23.2%
Source: Suter (1992)
This table illustrates the very different results produced under the British CFBH as 
opposed to the American FBPC. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, defaults were 
settled by the CFBH 37% faster than they were by the FBPC. In addition, the CFBH 
regime offered bondholders a greater recapture of interest arrears and principal, while 
requiring them to take a much smaller haircut on interest rates. Overall, the record
f V i  t l isuggests much better bargaining outcomes for creditors during the 19 and early 20 
centuries than during the interwar and post-war periods.
Several scholars have ventured explanations for these results. As we discussed 
earlier, Suter (1992) ties the results of default settlements to the balance of power in the 
international system. He maintains that creditors achieved better results in debt 
negotiations during periods of uncontested hegemony than they did during periods of 
core conflict. In other words, since the post-1930s settlements “coincided with the 
[uneasy] transition from British to U.S. hegemony,” the situation favoured the debtor 
states because they could offer poorer terms to the “old and decaying hegemonic power 
(i.e., Britain).” In addition, Suter argued that the United States did not prioritize British 
interests, but instead preferred to “integrate debtor countries at the periphery into its own
401 Suter (1992), p. 94. Although the period of measurement extends to 1976, the bulk o f settlements were 
reached by the early 1950s. The cut-off date of 1976 is relevant because it signifies the creation of the 
London Club, the successor regime for private creditor-sovereign state negotiations.
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hegemonic power system by granting substantial concessions at the expense of 
Britain.”402
While we agree with Suter’s premise that power matters in sovereign debt 
negotiations, we take issue with his contention that American action undercut British 
bargaining positions. In fact, in work undertaken by Eichengreen (1991) and Eichengreen 
and Portes (1986, 1989) we find that the “old and decaying hegemon” did a remarkable 
job in holding its own against the rising power of America, delivering returns to British 
bondholders that were ultimately superior to those achieved by the American investors.
Table: 5B: Internal Rates of Return for Dollar and Sterling Bonds Issued 1923-
19304113
Internal Rates o f  Return Government Bonds Only All Bonds
Dollar Bonds 3.25% 0.72%
Sterling Bonds 5.31% 5.31%
Source: Eichengreen card Portes (1986)
Table: 5C: Internal Rates of Return for Dollar and Sterling Bonds Issued 1920-
19294M
Internal Rates o f  Return Government Bonds Only All Bonds
Dollar Bonds 4.64% 3.99%
Sterling Bonds 5.18% 5.18%
Source: Eichengreen and Portes (1989)
The tables above illustrate the results of two separate studies on the comparative ex post 
returns achieved by British and American bondholders. In the first table, the internal rate 
of return on sterling issues surpasses that of dollar issues and, in fact, is quite close to the 
statutory rate under the original sterling bond covenants. By contrast, the smaller return
402 Suter (1992), p. 96.
403 Eichengreen and Portes (1986). The bond sample includes 50 dollar bonds for foreign issuers floated in 
the U.S. in the period 1924-1930, and 31 colonial and foreign government bonds offered in the U.K. in the 
period 1923-1930. Note that the sample for the U.K. includes government bonds only.
404 Eichengreen and Portes (1989), pp. 26-29. This updated sample includes 250 dollar bonds and 125 
sterling bonds issued during the period 1920-1929. Once again, in the British sample, no corporate issues 
were listed; we find government obligations only.
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on the full sample of dollar issues is only around 10% of the average contractual rate for 
the period, a decidedly substandard result for the American regime.405
However, in the second, updated study, a larger bond sample was used and we 
find that the realized returns of 4.64% and 5.18% on dollar and sterling bonds 
respectively were, although closer, still much lower that those promised ex ante, which 
were in the range of 7% - 8%. Even though the gap is smaller, British bondholders still 
fared better.406 U.S. investors lost an average of 75% of interest while British investors 
lost only 30% - 50%.407 As a result, the overall returns to U.S. investors during this 
period tend to pull down the average. And, even if we single out the largest sovereign 
default case of the period -  Germany - the same pattern emerges. British bondholders still 
manage to achieve better returns than their American counterparts.
Table 5D: Bargaining Outcomes for FBPC vs. CFBH on German Government
Bonds408
Nominal Rate o f  Return on U.S. Dollar Bonds 1.1%
Nominal Rate o f  Return on U.K. Sterling Bonds 3.5%
Source: Eichengreen (1991)
To sum up, this chapter will examine the four aspects of the sovereign debt 
restructuring regime of the interwar and post-war periods -  institutional, structural, 
compulsory and productive - and explain not only the observed differences in inter-period 
bargaining outcomes but intra-period differences as well. Why did the FBPC produce
aL
inferior outcomes for American bondholders when compared to the CFBH in the 19 
century? Moreover, why did the CFBH continue to outperform the FBPC in the interwar 
and post-war periods? Before moving on to our institutional analysis of the FBPC, it is 
important that we first explain the political impetus behind the organization.
405 Eichengreen and Portes (1986), p. 626.
406 Eichengreen and Portes (1989), p. 27. See also Lindert (1989). This is in part because this sample also 
captures the 1920 -  1923 period, when nominal rates were higher. It is also interesting to note that these 
IRR’s are very close to the returns that would have been achieved on US and UK government bonds over 
the same period (1920-1929). UK consuls, for example, would have yielded 4.5% during the same 
timeframe but would have carried virtually no default risk.
407 Eichengreen and Portes (1989), p. 40.
408 Eichengreen (1991), p. 164.
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5.3 The American Debate: A Government or Private Institution for Bondholders?
While the British CFBH was founded as a private, not-for-profit institution, U.S. 
policymakers had a serious internal debate about whether the new U.S. bondholder 
representative body should be private or public. In the age of the New Deal, as opposed 
to the laissez-faire 19th century, state involvement was seen as an important corrective to 
the market failures of the 1920s. As a result, a special provision had already been made 
under Title II of the Securities Act of 1933 for the creation of a Corporation of Foreign 
Security Holders under U.S. government auspices. However, this institution did not 
automatically come into existence with the passage of the Securities Act. Instead, the 
President was empowered to bring it into existence at any time by a separate 
proclamation.409
If it were not for the persuasive powers of Raymond Stevens, Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission, the FBPC might never have existed. Stevens met privately 
with President Franklin Roosevelt at Hyde Park on August 3, 1933 and convinced him of 
the dangers of establishing a governmental organization under Title II of the Securities 
Act to negotiate on behalf of bondholders. Stevens cautioned him that it might be better 
for the U.S. government to distance itself from the process of sovereign debt negotiation, 
lest U.S. bondholders look at their own government as a debt collector and have overly 
optimistic expectations. In addition, a Title II corporation would create conflicts of 
interest for the U.S. government. As a creditor in its own right, the government would be 
negotiating its own claims along side those of private bondholders. And, if the U.S. 
government were the principal negotiating party for private creditors, sovereign states 
might look to get political concessions as part of a deal, concessions that would never be 
on the table if a private creditor body controlled the negotiations 410 Finally, it was 
believed that a private organization could relieve the State Department of burdens and 
responsibilities which could arise at inconvenient times “when other national interests 
prevented] the exercise of a legitimate influence on behalf of...bondholders.”411 
Roosevelt agreed with Stevens that a private, non-govemmental organization seemed the 
better alternative and penned a note to him:
409 FBPC Archives (1933), File M1287 029.
410 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. S.E.C. Report on FBPC dated May 14, 1937.
411 FBPC Archives (1933). File M1287 029. White House press release dated October 20, 1933.
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R.S., It is my thought that if an adequate Bondholders Committee is set up 
quickly I will hold in abeyance the setting up of the quasi-government board. 
FDR412
A White House press release later confirmed Roosevelt’s assessment that the job of 
negotiating for private bondholders was “primarily for private initiative and interests.” 
The White House was also careful to point out that when the new organization was 
brought into being, it would be “entirely independent of any special private interests,” 
which, in New Deal parlance, meant that it would have no connections of any kind with 
the banks and issue houses. In order to put some distance between itself and the new 
institution, the government announced that it would have no intention of seeking “control 
of the organization,” nor would it “assume responsibility for its actions.”413 However, 
internal State Department correspondence revealed that the government saw the FBPC as 
a useful political compromise insofar as it would allow the administration to escape 
major responsibility for the conduct of negotiations, while at the same time, permit some 
degree of interference 414
5.4 The Creation o f  the FBPC and Institutional Power
How was the FBPC brought into existence? Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, and 
Raymond Stevens, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, invited a group of 
distinguished citizens to join them in Washington on October 13, 1933 for the purposes 
of discussing “the creation of an adequate and disinterested organization for the 
protection of American holders of foreign securities.” Hull and Stevens considered the 
sovereign defaults to be of such importance and significance to American investors as to 
“make its proper handling a public service.”415
412 FBPC Archives (1933), File M1287 029. FDR note attached to letter from Pierre Jay (Fiduciary Trust 
Company of New York ) to Clark (President of FBPC) dated January 23, 1934. Jay thought that this note 
from FDR was of historical significance and should be retained by the FBPC.
413 FBPC Archives (1933). File M1287 029. White House press release dated October 20,1933.
414 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 193. See also U.S. Department of State (1933), p. 934. “...it was hoped 
that the existence of the Council would perhaps lessen the necessity under which the Department of State 
might have to take cognizance of default situations.”
415 FBPC Archives (1933). File M1287 029. Letter from Cordell Hull (Secretary of State) and the Chairman 
o f the Federal Trade Commission to J. C. Traphagen (President of the Bank of New York and Trust 
Company) dated October 13,1933. Identical letters were sent to other invitees.
129
According to a White House press release, only two of the eighteen citizens 
invited to the initial meeting were from the banking community - Mills B. Lane of The 
Citizens and Southern National Bank, and J.C. Traphagen of The Bank of New York and 
Trust Company. The only other financial concern represented was Chubb and Son 
Marine Insurance. Of the remaining fifteen invitees, three were academics and nine had 
U.S. government affiliations; rounding out the list was a lawyer, a publisher and a cotton 
company representative.416 This was in marked contrast to the original meeting of the 
CFBH, which was dominated by banking and City of London government interests.417 In 
fact, the CFBH boasted of its banking alliances, announcing at its founding that it was 
“vitally connected” with these interests and enjoyed the support of “the heads of so many 
eminent banking and financial houses.”418 The proclivity on the part of the Roosevelt 
administration to exclude bankers reflects the low esteem in which issue houses were 
held by the administration in the 1930s. In many ways, they blamed the banks’ greed and 
poor underwriting practices for the extensive defaults experienced by U.S. bondholders. 
They were also deeply suspicious of the banks’ motives, as evidenced by the State 
Department claim that the American banking community was neither “as...closely knit as 
the British, nor were its members as trustful.”419
5.4.1 Institutional Form and Operating Rules o f the FBPC
The organizing committee of the FBPC firmly believed in the efficacy of such an 
institution for a number of reasons. From an international relations perspective, they saw 
the FBPC as a centrally authoritative mechanism that could reduce the friction between 
the U.S. and other creditor nations when dealing with a sovereign bond default. They also 
believed that the FBPC could help to surmount the collective action problems among 
bondholders, since the FBPC’s records indicated that U.S. holdings of foreign debt issues 
were widely scattered throughout the United States, with most issues averaging only 
three bonds per person.
416 FBPC Archives (1933). File M1287 029. White House press release dated October 20, 1933.
417 CFBH Archives (1869). File Ms34827. Clipping from the Times, February 3, 1869.
418 The Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1873-1987), Report of 1876, p. 9. CFBH Archives (1868). 
File Ms34827. Clipping from the Morning Post, November 12, 1868.
419 Sessions (1974), p. 49.
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The FBPC was ultimately organized as a not-for-profit organization under the 
laws of the State of Maryland and incorporated under the name the Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council, Inc. in 1933. Among its main objectives were the protection of 
bondholder rights, the collection and preservation of reports and data with respect to 
public securities, and the negotiation of settlement arrangements with foreign government 
representatives. The FBPC saw its mandate as a fiduciary one insofar as it was to act on 
behalf of the bondholders who had entrusted the representation of their interests to the 
Council.420 In these matters, the FBPC shared many institutional design characteristics 
with its British counterpart. In fact, the organizers maintained that the “rough model 
before everyone’s eyes was the British Council of Foreign Bondholders.”421
It is not surprising that the organizing committee of the FBPC looked at the best 
practices and precedents established by the CFBH and other European bondholder 
committees when setting up the new U.S. organization. They agreed that, like the CFBH, 
the FBPC would be a central organization which would coordinate the work of a number 
of autonomous committees, each of which would be charged with carrying on the day-to- 
day negotiations with a specific defaulting country. With this in mind, the FBPC agreed 
that it should form appropriate special negotiating committees, “cooperating wherever 
practicable with the houses which issued the defaulted bonds.”422 While this seemed to 
contradict the administration’s desire to limit the involvement of the issue houses, in fact, 
the organizers were not so much giving management control to the bankers as they were 
recognizing the need to work with them. After all, the banks had a distinct advantage 
over the FBPC from a negotiating standpoint. First, they acted as fiscal and paying agents 
for the bonds, which meant they had longstanding contacts with the treasury ministries of 
the defaulted governments. And, second, as fiscal and paying agents, they maintained a 
registry of bondholders, making it possible for them to easily identify and communicate 
with bondholders across the U.S.
A more refined policy regarding the composition of specific negotiating 
committees was developed by the FBPC in 1937. It indicated a strong desire to have 
these committees composed as far as possible of “those purchasing bonds at or near the
420 FBPC Archives (1933). File M 1287 029. Certificate o f Incorporation.
421 U.S. Department of State (1933), p. 934.
422 FBPC Archives (1933-1934). File M1287 069. Minutes of Executive Committee, 1933-1934.
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original issue price;” this would create a bias towards protecting the original investment 
of the smaller bondholders and not the investments made by speculators in depreciated 
bonds. It also felt that it was essential to exclude from such committees persons “engaged 
in the active buying and selling of bonds,” either for personal profit or on behalf of 
customers, since they would be able to trade on insider information.423
At inception, the FBPC outlined a negotiating strategy which would ultimately 
bring it into direct conflict with the U.S. Government. The Council observed that “in 
view of the depression and the disorganization of world trade...there is little that can be 
done towards bringing about prompt resumption of interest and sinking fund payments.” 
It maintained that the creation of the FBPC should not been seen by debtor states as “an , 
indication that American bondholders are ready to negotiate permanent settlements on the 
basis of the present impaired capacity of debtors to pay.” The organizers counselled 
patience on both sides since they saw the recovery of world trade as a necessary 
precondition for final settlements.424
Given the FBPC’s posture, all sovereign default situations were approached in the 
same way. The Council never recommended a settlement which called for any reduction 
of the principal of the bond; it also required that the defaulting sovereign recognize an 
acceptable portion of interest arrears. Finally, for even a temporary settlement to be 
recommended, the FBPC insisted that payments of current interest be resumed at the 
stated contractual rate.425 Meetings of the FBPC’s board took place anywhere from twice 
to four times a month in the 1930s and the minutes cover the details of the progress of 
negotiations as well as the administrative issues related to the running of the organization. 
The minutes also offer a sense for how slow, tedious, and expensive the actual 
negotiations were with Latin American states as well as the importance -  and necessity -  
of frequent communication between the State Department and the Council.426
Unlike the CFBH, the FBPC could not hold regular meetings for individual 
bondholders. This was principally for two reasons: their sizable number and their wide
423 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1937, p. 5.
424 FBPC Archives (1933), File M1287 029. Report of the Organizing Committee dated December 18, 
1933. While it seemed like a reasonable approach at the time, and was in fact the same tactic later adopted 
by the Bank Advisory Committees in the 1980s, the U.S. government found that it didn’t share the patience 
of the Council in the years leading up to World War II.
425 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1958-1961, p. vii.
426 FBPC Archives (1936). File M1287 069. Minute Books of 1936 and 1937.
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geographic dispersion throughout the United States. In fact, while the FBPC initially 
registered over 100,000 U.S. bondholders, by 1961, this had grown to over 300,000, all 
of whom expected to receive regular communication from the Council.427 This contrasts 
sharply with the British CFBH that had the ability to hold meetings at 25 Moorgate in
a j q
London for small investor groups that numbered anywhere between 70 and 200. Given 
that U.S. bondholder meetings were impractical, investors who wished to avail 
themselves of the FBPC’s services were asked to register in writing with the Council by 
proving their contact details and the face amount and description of their bonds. Small 
bondholders were assured that there would be no fee for registration and no obligation or 
commitment incurred to the Council by registering 429
5.4.2 Staffing o f FBPC
Although Raymond Stevens of the Federal Trade Commission was Roosevelt’s 
choice to head the FBPC, by February, 1934, Stevens requested an extended leave of 
absence due to poor health, and J. Reuben Clark, the institution’s chief counsel, was 
elected acting President.
Clark’s personality figures prominently in the accounts of Adamson (2002) and 
Sessions (1974) as an explanation for the early friction between the Council and the State 
Department.430 For this reason, it is worthwhile examining Clark’s record. On paper, he 
certainly seemed like a solid choice to run the fledgling FBPC. Educated at Columbia 
Law School, he was an international lawyer, State Department solicitor, and former 
Ambassador to Mexico. He was also a prominent leader of the Mormon Church in Salt 
Lake City 431 His resume seemed well-suited to a role in which he would be called upon 
to negotiate the settlement of debt contracts with foreign governments. However, there 
was one problem: Clark had a rigid and moralistic view about debt obligations, seeing 
fiscal probity, at both the individual and national level, as an ethical virtue. While 
Sessions (1974) attributes this in part to his religious beliefs, it seems that it could be just
427 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1937, p. 7; See also Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1958-1961, p. viii.
428 CFBH Archives (1880). Files Msl5806; Msl5801; Msl5779.
429 FBPC Archives (1936). File M1287 069. Minute Books of 1936 and 1937.
430 Adamson (2002); Sessions (1974).
431 Sessions (1974), pp. 76-77.
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as easily attributable to the fact that Clark was an attorney and an ardent Republican 
functionary. Even his successor, the Hooverite Francis White, shared Clark’s views on 
the sanctity of debt contracts without sharing his religious fervour. Clark took a decidedly 
firm, legalistic view about a government’s capacity to pay:
Few, if any, governments have borrowed beyond their capacity to pay if they 
really had a will to make the necessary levy upon the property of their 
nationals...Under the theory of international law...the whole wealth of the 
nation, including the private wealth of all the nationals of that nation, is 
subject to tax up to extinction for the debts of the sovereign. No nation has 
any right to invoke its lack of ‘capacity to pay’...until it has fully exhausted 
its taxing powers and no debtor sovereign now in default, insofar as the 
Council is advised, has even approached a condition of exhausting its taxing
432powers.
As time progressed, Clark’s legalistic and unyielding approach to debt negotiations made 
him “draw the line between necessity and luxury...far into what [sovereign] debtors 
would usually regard as the necessity side of the fiscal spectrum.”433 Clark firmly 
believed that a debt was a sacred obligation and that the only thing that should stand in its 
way was virtual survival.
What was behind this attitude? First, Clark very much believed that he was 
working in the best interests of the small investor. He maintained throughout his tenure 
that there were no important concentrations of foreign bondholdings in the U.S., and he 
argued that the typical investor had at most one or two thousand dollars of family savings 
at stake. The many letters which the FBPC received indicated to Clark that the majority 
of small investors had been impoverished in the wake of the Great Depression and 
desperately needed the return of their capital. In the 1935 case of Costa Rica, for 
example, the FBPC cited “instances of hardship among holders of bonds who were in 
rather indigent circumstances, to whom it was a real hardship to have the service cut 
down.”434 Since there were hundreds of thousands of these cases across the U.S., Clark
432 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1936, pp. 6-11.
433 Sessions (1974), pp. 106-107.
434 FBPC Archives (1935). File M1287 055. Memorandum to file from White (FBPC) dated June 12, 1935.
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felt that the Council could “by its watchfulness and influence, contribute to the security 
of their savings.”435
Second, Clark understood the phrase “capacity to pay” to have originated in a 
discussion “between sovereigns with reference to obligations running between them.” In 
this legalistic rendering, Clark believed that if sovereign states sought to make 
adjustments to those debts “they were dealing as equals about their own debts, and could, 
with reference thereto, be generous or otherwise as suited their sovereign interests.”436 
This same generosity could not be expected from private bondholders, who were not the 
equals of sovereigns, and were therefore not in a position to trade political advantages for 
debt forgiveness.
While the FBPC’s board was intended to be as free from the influence of banking 
interests as possible, the risks of this position were soon becoming apparent. Clark’s 
knowledge of the financial markets was rudimentary at best. He even openly admitted:
I am not a financier, and I am not a banker...I never bought a bond, I never 
owned a bond, and I regret to say, I was never a member of one of those 
preferential lists for underwriting securities.437
One FBPC board member went so far as to confide the following to the State 
Department: “I live in fear.. .that somebody will presently ask me some questions about 
the [default] situation and I can think of practically no question that I could answer.”
Clark’s successor as FBPC President, Francis White, unfortunately shared Clark’s 
views about a debtor’s “capacity to pay” as well as his lack of experience in financial 
matters; however, it was most unfortunate that these qualities were packaged in a much 
more aggressive personality. White had been Assistant Secretary of State during the 
Coolidge and Hoover administrations and had apparently offended Europeans and Latin 
Americans during his tenure by making statements which “smacked of the old American
435 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1946-1949, p. viii. Even by 1942, this 
picture had not changed. The FBPC has records of Dominican and Chilean holdings in 48 states and some 
20 odd foreign countries and dependencies with the majority still held by their original purchasers. See 
FBPC Archives (1942). Memorandum from White (FBPC) dated February 5, 1942.
436 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1936, p. 7.
437 Sessions (1974), p. 76.
438 Sessions (1974), p. 64.
135
hegemony doctrines” of Monroe and Theodore Roosevelt.439 He was described in the 
New York Press as a “dyed-in-the-wool Tory, hater of Roosevelt policies...[and] on a 
crusade to squeeze the last penny of interest and amortization from Latin American 
governments.”440 In fact, it could have been that the Roosevelt Administration gradually 
began to see the FBPC through partisan eyes. After all, Clark and White may have been 
characterized as dangerous relics from the failed policies of the Hoover administration 441 
And, since the FBPC’s main contact at the State Department, Herbert Feis, was another 
Hoover appointee, the Council may have been shielded from the opinions of the larger 
Roosevelt administration by interacting so narrowly with Feis. This made it possible for 
the FBPC to maintain its rigid policies in the face of mounting frustration and impatience 
on the part of the U.S. government. In a rather impertinent letter dated October, 1939, 
Senator Rust Madison recounts his experience to Roosevelt of visiting the Council’s 
offices earlier that summer:
You can’t expect anything else from an organization run by nice old 
women...and college professors...I really believe something can be done if 
the problem is approached from a practical standpoint rather than from the 
standpoint of an economics...professor and an old maid.442
The FBPC was certainly a convenient target for Roosevelt loyalists but the question 
remains: Was the Council pursuing an irrational settlement strategy? Was it advisable to 
focus so narrowly on temporary settlements and refuse to consider principal forgiveness 
until such time as the global economy had recovered? We would argue that while the 
administration saw this as intransigence, it was not an imprudent stance for the FBPC to 
take. After all, the Council saw itself as having a fiduciary responsibility to hundreds of 
thousands of small bondholders and wanted to maximize the recovery of their capital. 
And, with the global economy in such disarray, any attempt to make early, final 
settlements would have been highly unfavourable to private investors. So, pursuing a
439 Sessions (1974), pp. 115-116.
440 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Clipping from the New York Post, July 25, 1937.
441 CFBH Archives (1942). File Ms34620, Documents 391/2 and 391/5. In a letter from Butler (CFBH) to 
Bewley (British Embassy, Washington, DC), the CFBH proposes that the FBPC might have fallen afoul of 
the State Department because of the personality of Francis White. In a letter from Wade (H. M. Treasury) 
the point is made that the Republican sympathies of White may be responsible for the difficulties between 
the FBPC and the State Department.
442 Sessions (1974), pp. 183-184.
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strategy that involved temporary settlements and long-term patience was not irrational. 
Ironically, this was precisely the strategy that the London Club employed in the 1980s 
when it pushed Latin American debtor states into seven years of debt rescheduling before 
agreeing to any principal forgiveness. Far from being criticized for its approach, the 
London Club enjoyed broad support from the G-5 and the IMF. The major difference was 
that the London Club’s actions were helping to preserve the solvency of the global 
banking system, a goal which was enthusiastically championed by major creditor-country 
governments. By contrast, the FBPC’s bondholders did not present a systemic risk to the 
global financial system; so, all the FBPC managed to achieve by its strategy was to 
frustrate the larger political and strategic objectives of its home government. While it 
may not have been part of the FBPC’s mandate to help achieve these objectives, it was 
nevertheless in the administration’s interests to intervene and paint the FBPC as 
impractical, intransigent, and even incompetent.
5.4.3 CFBH Impression o f FBPC Staff
It is very interesting to note how the FBPC’s British counterpart, the CFBH, viewed 
the management team of the new American Council. Archival sources reveal a decidedly 
negative assessment from the CFBH about the suitability of the men chosen to run the 
FBPC:
There has been in our point of view a progressive decline in the combination 
of character and capacity of three successive Presidents of the American 
Council. The first, Mr. J. Reuben Clark [Feb. 1934], was Treasurer of the 
Mormon Society, had some understanding of business, was by no means 
unfriendly and gave a general impression of honesty and intention. The 
second, Mr. Frances White [April, 1938], was an ex-Minister to Cuba, was a 
rather aggressive personality, viewed debt matters from a pronounced 
legalistic angle, and made one feel that one was dealing with a clever but 
rather unfriendly solicitor, who might fulfil the strict letter of his bond, but 
who did not intend to reveal his intentions and would not inevitably be above 
using truth as a means of deception. The third, Dr. Dana Munro, was a former 
chief of the Latin American section of the State Department and is now a 
professor at Princeton University. We have not yet met him, but his actions 
and our correspondence with him seem to show that he has little beyond an 
academic understanding of the problems with which we have to deal, and that 
he.. .is largely in the pocket of the State Department.443
443 CFBH Archives (1944). Guildhall Library, City of London. File Ms34620, Document 391/26.
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In fact, the British were so unsure of the Council’s viability in 1937 that they contacted 
Herbert Feis at the State Department to find out if they should even make the time to 
meet with the FBPC. The British Council pointedly asked Feis whether “they should talk 
with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. or somebody else.”444 It appears 
that the FBPC not only had an image problem with its own government, but with its 
counterparts in Europe as well. However, the British Treasury ultimately advised the 
CFBH to continue its dialogue with the FBPC because they believed that the American 
Council would “emerge more powerfully outside the present administration.”445
5.4.4 Institutional Funding o f the FBPC
One of the first challenges of the organizers of the FBPC was to find a way to 
fund their operations. There was wide agreement among the original board members that 
“to get the organization up and running quickly” they would ask the banks and issue 
houses in New York and other large cities to agree to advance them money. The FBPC’s 
objective was to repay them over time, in a fashion almost identical to the British CFBH. 
The FBPC anticipated that it needed about $60,000 to cover staff salaries, rent and travel, 
but aimed to raise $100,000 initially.446 The Council’s inclination was to ask those to 
contribute who would reap the greatest benefits from the FBPC’s existence: the issuing 
banks, banks engaged in trade finance, manufacturers engaged in import/export 
businesses, and holders of foreign bonds.447 In December, 1933, Raymond Stevens 
arranged for twenty bankers to meet at the New York Federal Reserve to discuss potential 
funding; Pierre Jay, an FBPC board member, spoke on the same day at the Investment 
Bankers Associations. Both men were successful in getting funding commitments from 
the banks 448
By April 10, 1934, the FBPC had put together membership forms for banks which 
would systematize their annual dues payments by tying them to their level of deposits.
444 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Memo from Clark (FBPC) to file dated January 18, 1937.
445 CFBH Archives (1942). File Ms34620, Document 391/5. Memorandum from Wade (Official in H.M. 
Treasury).
446 FBPC Archives (1933). File M1287 029. Memorandum titled “Plan for Organization of Foreign 
Bondholders Corporation.”
447 FBPC Archives (1933). File M1287 029. Report of the Organizing Committee dated December 18,
1933.
448 Sessions (1974), p. 66.
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The level of dues ranged anywhere from $10 to $250 per year; however, the larger banks 
and issue houses were encouraged to commit up to $5,000 per year. It was an amount that 
Reuben Clark considered to be meaningful, but not large enough to draw attention or 
criticism. The minutes of meetings during 1934 show that there were concerted efforts on 
the part of the FBPC to sign up banks in a pyramid-like way. Larger banks who signed on 
as members were encouraged to bring in smaller regional banks. The various offices of 
the Federal Reserve system throughout the U.S. were used as meeting points to put extra 
pressure on banks, and the FBPC even underwrote the expenses of senior bank officers 
who took the time to recruit new members to the organization. In its initial phases, the 
FBPC was funded almost entirely by the banking community with each meeting of the 
Executive Board presenting new banks to be considered as members.449
In fact, early records indicate that the FBPC obtained commitments for funding 
from the financial community in New York, Chicago and Philadelphia, with $35,800 
raised in 1934 from 24 issue houses and $25,030 raised from 18 banks, for a total of 
$60,830.450 By the end of 1934, membership had grown to 151 banks and issue houses 
(or 75% of the total) with annual contributions of $86,253, very close to the original 
fundraising target451 However, this early success provoked the first attack by the U.S. 
government on the FBPC: an S.E.C. investigation. The newly established regulatory 
body, charged with looking out for the interests of the small investor, became highly 
suspect of the involvement of banks in the FBPC’s funding and wanted to ensure that the 
Council was not being unduly influenced in its decisions by members of the financial 
community.
5.4.5 The S.E.C. Investigation
Before the FBPC had managed to establish itself as a viable institution in the 
minds of U.S. bondholders, sovereign debtors, and the CFBH, its energies were diverted 
to an S.E.C. investigation. Reuben Clark was informed about the investigation in 1935, 
although it formally began on February 25, 1936. He saw the investigators at the S.E.C.
449 FBPC Archives (1934). File M1287 069. Minutes of Executive Committee, 1933-1934. See also FBPC 
Archives (1933). File M1287 029. Minutes ofthe First Meeting of Members dated December 18, 1933.
450 FBPC Archives (1934). File Ml 287 029. List of Annual Membership Contributions, 1934. See also 
Borchard and Wynne (1951a), pp. 196-197.
451 FBPC Archives (1935). File M1287 069. Minutes of Executive Committee, 1935.
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as “very young in their experience of governmental matters” who did not realize “that 
there is honesty outside government as well as in it.”452 He believed that many of the 
New Dealers who were in positions of power at the S.E.C. wanted to close down the 
FBPC and replace it with the Title II governmental organization originally contemplated 
by Roosevelt.453 Meanwhile, at the State Department, the FBPC’s main contact, Herbert 
Feis, said that the Department was hoping the final S.E.C. report would fully back up the 
Council, since the last thing the State Department (or the President) wanted was to “have 
this whole debt problem back in [our] laps the way it was three years ago.” Clark and his 
board were instructed to redouble their efforts and cooperate fully with the S.E.C.454
The S.E.C. report following its investigation was notable in many respects, the 
most important -  and expected - being the sharp criticism levied at the financial support 
which banks and issuing houses provided the FBPC. The S.E.C. required that banks and 
bankers be disqualified from any negotiating committees, and even that former officers, 
directors and partners of banks and issuing houses be disqualified from sitting on a 
committee, at least until a reasonable amount of time had lapsed. It unequivocally 
mandated that the FBPC should receive no financial support from any person or firm in 
the banking community. As Sessions (1974) observed, “in their anxiety to gather a group 
devoid of connections with the investment banking establishment, the organizers had 
failed to recognize that the Council members would be largely unable to do much besides 
lend their names and file letters.”455 Finally, the S.E.C. compelled the FBPC to submit to 
regular oversight by the Commission and the State Department.456 The hope was that this 
new level of transparency would enhance the credibility of the FBPC in the eyes of 
bondholders and sovereigns.
The S.E.C. argued in favour of banning banks and issue houses from FBPC 
membership on the following grounds:
452 FBPC Archives (1935). File M1287 069. Minutes of Executive Committee, 1935.
453 The S.E.C. did conclude that it was a prudent decision not to enact the Title II organization, since it 
would have been funded by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation as an agency of the U.S. government, 
creating awkward conflicts for the U.S.
454 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Transcript o f phone conversation between Clark (FBPC) and 
Feis (State Department) dated April 16, 1937. There were hundreds of letters that arrived at the State 
Department each day from aggrieved bondholders, and State wanted to be able to turn those over to the 
FBPC.
455 Sessions (1974), p. 64.
456 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. S.E.C. Report on FBPC dated May 14,1937.
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1. Issue houses were often called upon to act as fiscal and paying agents for 
sovereign bond issues. Under these arrangements, the banks’ allegiance was to the 
debtor state. If the banks then also took on the role of bondholder representatives, 
their loyalties were necessarily divided.
2. Banks and issue houses often had their own claims against debtor states, and these 
claims generally took the form of short term or trade credits. The S.E.C. believed 
that this was the most egregious conflict, since the banks generally asserted that 
their short-term credits had priority over longer-term bonds. In the grab race for 
limited foreign exchange, the bankers could privilege their own interests at the 
expense of the bondholders.
3. Where American banks had local offices or business interests in defaulted Latin 
American states, the banks’ interests might have been better served by cultivating 
and preserving friendly relationships with the sovereign, and not by vigorously 
advocating the bondholders’ cause.
4. In certain cases, bankers had been accused of fraud by the debtor-sovereign based 
on circumstances surrounding the original bond issuance. The S.E.C. argued that 
this fraud often arose in no small part due to the “utter recklessness with which 
the investment banks vied with one another to bring out a constant succession of 
foreign bond issues.” Where such antipathy existed between a debtor state and a 
banker, that banker would be an ineffective negotiator for the cause of private 
bondholders.457
Although the S.E.C. raised valid concerns, the fact is that the first three objections could 
have also delivered some benefits to bondholders. For instance, a bank that had 
developed a longstanding relationship with a sovereign as its fiscal and paying agent 
could have contributed some measure of trust to the negotiation process, something 
which the FBPC sorely lacked. In addition, the fact that banks were capable of providing 
trade financing also endowed them with some bargaining leverage. They could have used 
that leverage to push recalcitrant debtors in need of short-term credit to the negotiating 
table. And, finally, banks that had a physical presence in a debtor state also had an
457 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 039. S.E.C. Report dated June 21, 1937.
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interest in seeing that debtor states recover. So, while the potential for conflicts of interest 
were present, the S.E.C. never considered how they might also improve outcomes for 
small investors.
Clark was unhappy with the S.E.C. Report and told Cordell Hull, Secretary of 
State, that it was a “trial of the Council.” The report attacked the integrity of three of the 
men who initially served on the board -  Chubb, Traphagen and Thacher -  given their ties 
to the financial industry, and then levied criticism against the FBPC for relying heavily 
on the banks and the issue houses for funding. This was not entirely surprising to Clark, 
who understood the New Dealers’ general hostility toward banking and finance. 
However, Clark took specific issue with the idea that banks were getting preferential 
treatment on their short term trade credits to sovereign defaulters, putting small 
bondholders at a disadvantage. More specifically, he objected to the S.E.C. insinuation 
that the FBPC was not fighting the banks more forcefully on this issue, since the banks 
were funding the Council’s operations. Clark responded by saying that short term bank 
credits were the lifeblood of trade and that he did not view it in the best long-term 
interests of bondholders to “make war” on trade finance. He wondered how else the Latin 
American countries would obtain the foreign exchange to repay the bondholders.458
The S.E.C. report had done great harm to the FBPC, first among bondholders, 
who were no longer sure what position the FBPC had in the eyes of the U.S. 
Government, and second, among sovereign debtors, where FBPC negotiators were 
finding “quite a different [less cooperative] atmosphere” from what they had found 
before. The report had clearly undermined the Council’s authority. In his discussion with 
Cordell Hull, Clark said:
the whole S.E.C. report seemed to be dominated by a very bitter complex 
certainly against Wall Street and everyone in it, and...I was not sure that it 
did not indicate a hostility against our whole economic system -  the Secretary 
interposed to say ‘against capitalism’ -  and I said: ‘Yes, just that -  against 
capitalism;’ and the reading of the Report left me wondering whether that was 
not the real intention of the report, namely to make war upon the whole
459system.
458 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Memorandum from Clark (FPBC) on meeting with Hull 
(Secretary of State) dated June 2, 1937.
459 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Memorandum of meeting between Clark (FBPC) and Hull 
(Secretary o f State) dated June 2, 1937.
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Herbert Feis of the State Department told Clark that if he thought the report was bad, he 
“should have seen it before we got at it.”460 Apparently, the original, unedited version 
was much more damaging to the Council. Feis confided to Clark that despite the 
criticisms, one thing was abundantly clear: the State Department wanted the Council to 
continue its work, “and so [did] the S.E.C.”461 Despite Clark’s negative reaction to the 
report, the State Department saw this as a victory. The S.E.C. concluded that “the 
Council was the more appropriate agency for the protection of the holders of defaulted 
foreign government bonds” when assessed against the possibility of a U.S. government- 
funded, Title II organization 462
However, from an operating perspective, the S.E.C. had severely damaged the 
FBPC’s ability to finance itself. In order to save the Council, Clark agreed to look for 
new ways of fund raising that did not include the banks or the issue houses, although he 
said “the outlook was not too promising.”463 He was forced to immediately cut down on 
the number of directors to reduce the Council’s overhead expenditures. And, while the 
State Department offered government financing, Clark refused on the grounds that “it 
would subject us to all sorts of political pressure and endless Congressional 
investigations,” a prospect he was unwilling to face 464
In July, 1937, the New York press took the view that the FBPC was nearing its 
final days, not only because it was now deprived of its main source of funding, but also 
because the objectives of the FBPC seemed to be at odds with those of the U.S. 
government. The FBPC was demanding that every cent of defaulted debt be repaid, while
46° pBpc Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Memorandum from Clark (FBPC) responding to S.E.C. report 
sent to Feis and Livesey (State Department) dated June 2, 1937.
461 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Memorandum from Clark (FBPC) responding to S.E.C. report 
sent to Feis and Livesey (State Department) dated June 2, 1937.
462 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1937, pp. 12-13.
463 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Memorandum of meeting between Clark (FBPC) and Hull 
(Secretary of State) dated June 2, 1937.
464 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Memorandum from Clark (FBPC) responding to S.E.C. report 
sent to Feis and Livesey (State Department) dated June 2, 1937. Clark believed that the State Department 
made the offer because they were trying to remove the appearance that they were backing a group that was 
financed by the “interests which the bondholders feel somehow took advantage of them or defrauded 
them.”
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the U.S. government sought to keep Latin American friendship by extending “easy 
credits which [would] develop Latin America’s vast wealth.”465
In a fight for its own survival, the FBPC advanced several new capital-raising 
options. White suggested that the FBPC adopt a plan similar to the one endorsed by the 
CFBH in 1936. Although the CFBH began the funding of its operations in 1868 by 
collecting money from individual investors and issue houses, by the 1930s, the British 
institution was “more or less dead on its feet” from a financial perspective. To keep the 
CFBH viable, the Bank of England took on the responsibility of collecting funds from 
issue houses and paying them over to the CFBH to cover expenses. The advantage of this 
arrangement was that the funds were delivered more or less “blind” to the CFBH by the 
Bank of England; therefore, it was not possible to trace the source of the funds, 
forestalling any accusations that the CFBH was doing the bidding of a particular issue 
house. This idea never gained traction in the U.S. and White’s other effort -  to raise 
money from foundations - was largely unsuccessful.466 Ultimately, the FBPC agreed to 
charge a fee of 1/8 of 1% on the principal amount of each bond, with this fee 
incorporated into successful debt settlements.467 This mechanism was instituted in 
February, 1936 and ultimately sanctioned by the S.E.C. in 1939; however, the fees it 
generated were not sufficient to keep the CFBH solvent, mainly because the FBPC was 
not effecting settlements quickly enough.
Signs of severe financial distress begin to show as early as May 1936, when 
Bankers Trust informed the FBPC that it had reviewed its financial statements and did 
not think it would be in a position to repay the bank’s advances. Clark did not even try to 
dispute the bank’s dire assessment. As a result, we see the FBPC forced to redirect its 
attention to recover even the smallest expense - like challenging First Boston over a 
telephone bill and demanding reimbursement468 And, from that point on, the FBPC 
would never again find itself on entirely sound financial footing. In fact, archival sources
465 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Clipping from the New York Post, July 25,1937.
466 pgp£  Archives (1939). File M1287 030. Letter from White (FBPC) to Feis (State Department) dated 
February 11, 1939. Even the Rockefeller Foundation refuses funding to the FBPC. See also Sessions 
(1974), p. 66.
467 FBPC Archives (1955). File M1287 037. Letter from Spang (FBPC) to Robinson (State Department) 
dated December 12,1955. At this point, the correspondence files with the State Department are much more 
concerned with financial and administrative matters, as most of the debt settlement work had been finished.
468 FBPC Archives (1936). File M1287 069. Minutes of Executive Committee, May 26, 1936.
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reveal that fiscal uncertainty would follow the Council for decades. In 1943, Dana Munro 
had to decline a State Department request to send a representative to Peru for negotiations 
on the grounds that “there was the expense involved which could not be justified at 
present.”469 By the time it published its Annual Report of 1958-1961, the FBPC 
announced that it could no longer survive on its current income and needed to dip into its 
small reserve fund.470 And, in 1974, George Woods, FBPC President, alerted the S.E.C. 
that the State Department “should be informed of the precarious financial situation of the 
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council” where expenses had been “cut to the bone.”471 
In the same year, the Wall Street Journal reported that the prime years of the Council 
were plainly past. At that point, it had only one full-time employee -  a secretary -  and it 
was housed in a modest three rooms in lower Manhattan. “We exist on a shoestring,” said 
Alice Popp, the FBPC’s secretary 472
5.4.6 The Accomplishments o f the FBPC
In the face of these numerous challenges, the mere survival of the FBPC is 
commendable. Moreover, what it was able to achieve with such limited resources 
deserves to be recounted. There is no question that the work before the FBPC in 1937 
was daunting. In the course of the year, this resource-constrained institution dealt with 27 
different default situations in 20 countries involving 254 separate bond issues totalling 
$1.8 billion. In addition, it had to operate in a global environment where virtually all 
intergovernmental debts owed to the U.S. by European nations were in default, creating a 
difficult backdrop against which private creditors could press their claims. Great Britain 
alone was in arrears to the U.S. government on loans in excess of $5 billion 473
By 1939, the FBPC announced that of the $2.5 billion of foreign bonds in default 
($1.2 billion in Latin America and $1.3 billion in Europe) the Council had negotiated the 
resumption, continuation or increase in service on over $1.77 billion at the cost to 
bondholders of a mere .0034% of the amount of interest paid 474
469 FBPC Archives (1943). File M1287 070. Minutes of Executive Committee, June 2, 1943.
470 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1958-1961, p. ix.
471 FBPC Archives (1974). File M1287 087. Letters between Woods (FBPC) and Garrett (SEC) dated May 
17, 1974 and October 11,1974.
472 FBPC Archives (1974). File M1287 037. Clipping from The Wall Street Journal dated July 24, 1974.
473 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1937, pp. 17-18.
474 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1939, pp. 6-7.
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By 1951, a more positive public perception of the FBPC’s work began to emerge. 
The New York Herald Tribune article credited the Council with doing “an admirable 
job”475 The institution’s success continued in 1952, when agreements were reached on 
Germany, Japan, Austria and a number of previously intransigent Latin American cases. 
At this point, Bolivia was the sole dollar-bonded indebtedness in all of Latin America on 
which no action had been taken, meaning that much of the work of the FBPC was now 
behind it.476
By July 1958, Kenneth Spang, acting President of the FBPC, notified the State 
Department of the elimination of the Bolivian default. The Department congratulated 
Spang saying that “this is indeed a significant development and the Council is to be 
complimented for the contribution it has made over the past 25 years in dealing with 
these default situations.”477 In a press release, the FBPC announced that in the course of 
its operations, it had “concluded negotiations and made favourable recommendations to 
bondholders on 32 debt adjustment plans of 20 foreign countries, involving obligations 
having a principal of over $3.5 billion.”478
In fact, by 1966, Elliot Butler of the CFBH joked with his U.S. FBPC counterpart: 
“I hope you feel as we do that we have almost worked ourselves out of our jobs by 
settling so many of the outstanding debt problems.”479
Although the British CFBH was dissolved in 1988, the FBPC’s operations 
continued, and in 1988, it named a new President - John Petty, Former Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. In a June 2006 interview, Mr. Petty 
confirmed that while the FBPC was still in existence, it was, for all intents and purposes, 
dormant. There were only three default cases which remained on its books: one for the 
former East Germany where no settlement is believed possible; a $30 million Cuban 
bond where a settlement remains a possibility; and a 1913 sterling/gold loan to China
475 CFBH Archives (1951). File Ms34603, Vol. 2, Document 327/1149.
476 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1951-1953, p. v. The major 
accomplishment was the “Agreement on German External Debts” reached in August 8, 1952 which was 
seen as the foundation stone for the restoration of German public credit.
477 FBPC Archives (1958). File M1287 037. Letter from Beale (State Department) to Spang (FBPC) dated 
July 13, 1958.
478 FBPC Archives (1954). File M1287 037. Press release from FBPC dated November 30,1954.
479 CFBH Archives (1966). File Ms34603, Vol. 7, Document 327/1584R. Letter from Butler (CFBH) to 
Munro (FBPC).
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which persists principally because it is a political “hot potato.” Mr. Petty said that since 
the State Department viewed the FBPC’s requests on these matters to be an “annoyance,” 
his advances to the Department have largely been rebuffed. Therefore, he has chosen to 
get involved with a private group called the American Bondholders Foundation, LLC, 
through which he is working on the 1913 Chinese bond defaults. Frustrated by the lack of 
State Department cooperation, the American Bondholders Foundation turned to Elliot 
Spitzer, acting New York Attorney General, for help.480 Historically, Petty said that the 
only way to get a debtor country’s attention on a bond default matter was for the FBPC to 
successfully enlist the help of the U.S. ambassador to that country. This, in turn, required 
the blessing of the State Department. According to Petty: “We have no clout unless we 
get some support from the State Department. The State Department looks at us as an 
annoyance, and without them, it is like we are pushing on a string.”481
5.4.7 Assessing Institutional Power Against Structural and Compulsory Power
It appears that the FBPC was “pushing on a string” for most of its existence. 
However, we would maintain that its weakness was not institution-specific, but rather the 
result of powerful structural and compulsory regime elements that were external to the 
Council and undermined its effectiveness. As we saw in the preceding section, the
S.E.C.’s insistence that the FBPC eliminate all banking affiliations had the effect of 
crippling its funding activities and limiting its staffing options. So, it was government 
power in the form of regulation that helped, in part, to erode the effectiveness of the 
FBPC. However, we would argue that even if the FBPC had enjoyed a healthy funding 
base and no staffing restrictions, it still would have struggled to achieve better bargaining 
outcomes for private bondholders. Why? Because neither money nor staff would have 
been able to overcome the collapse of the 1930s capital markets and the larger aspirations 
of the U.S. government. In other words, the institutional capacity of the FBPC was 
eclipsed by structure and condition of the 1930s capital markets, the capital export 
monopoly of the U.S. government, and the political priorities of American officials in the 
pre- and post-war periods. These structural and compulsory forces trumped the FBPC and
480 Spitzer was New York Attorney General at the time of this interview. He was subsequently elected New 
York State Governor.
481 Author Interview L.
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were principally responsible for producing less favourable bargaining outcomes for U.S. 
investors. By contrast, Britain’s dire post-war financial position motivated it to boost 
national income by improving bondholder recoveries. Since Britain could not afford to 
have its bondholders accept sub-standard settlements from foreign debtors, compulsory 
and structural power were pressed into service to meet the national interest, and by 
default, the private interests of bondholders. These factors -  and not the institutional 
differences between the CFBH and FBPC -  help to explain the relative out-performance 
of sterling bonds during the interwar and post-war periods. In the following sections, we 
will examine the various manifestations of structural and compulsory power in the U.S. 
and Britain and explain how they helped produce different bargaining outcomes, both 
between and within historical periods.
5.5 Structural Power
While structural power accrued principally to the private capital markets in the 
19th century, these markets had largely collapsed in the wake of the Great Depression. As 
a result, structural power in the interwar period reverted mainly to the U.S. government 
and its agencies - like the Export-Import Bank and the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation - the only parties with the ability to undertake large-scale foreign lending 
programs. After World War II, structural power was also exercised by the multilateral 
economic institutions (the World Bank and the IMF). It did not return in any magnitude 
to the private markets until the 1970s.
How did the elements of structural power affect the position of private 
bondholders in the interwar and post-war years? We intend to show how the FBPC and 
U.S. bondholders were chiefly undermined by the following structural forces: i) the lack 
of cooperation between the FBPC and the NY Stock Exchange, whereby defaulted 
sovereigns were not prohibited from launching unilateral bond exchanges in opposition to 
the FBPC’s recommendations; and, ii) the lending into arrears policy of the U.S. 
government and the World Bank, which permitted the extension of fresh credit to debtor 
states that remained in default to their private bondholders. Finally, we will look at how 
the continued disciplined cooperation between the CFBH, the British banking
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community, and the London Stock Exchange served mainly to strengthen the position of 
British bondholders during this period.
5.5.1 The Collapse o f  the Private Capital Markets in the 1930s
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the ability of the CFBH to successfully restrict 
market access to defaulting sovereigns offered a key incentive for those states to seek 
mutually agreeable settlements with their creditors. Why? Because as soon as investors 
had accepted a settlement, the sovereign would be able to issue new bonds in the 
marketplace. However, following the defaults of the 1930s, this incentive had largely 
disappeared, and with it, a powerful bargaining chip on the part of the newly established 
FBPC. As Jorgenson and Sachs (1989) have observed:
In the absence of the lure of future capital flows (and the threat of their 
blockage) the power of the U.S. Bondholders Protective Council was nil.482
So, the global macroeconomic crisis of the 1930s had removed one of the principal 
enticements for debtor states to negotiate settlements and suffer large capital transfers 
back to foreign creditors 483 Adamson (2002) agrees, and adds that, at the time, it was the 
U.S. government that “enjoyed a virtual monopoly in capital export,” a position it used 
not to further the narrow interests of private investors, but to advance a higher, national 
interest. After all, its main concerns were impeding the spread of fascism, and later, 
communism.484
Wallich (1943) observed the same pattern and advanced similar arguments. At the 
time, he believed that Latin American countries remained in default on their private 
bonds principally because the bondholders were not offering new money as a reward for 
settlement, and the U.S. government began dispensing new credit regardless of the status 
of defaults.485 According to Wallich:
Negotiations between the debtor countries and the bondholders...seem to 
offer very little promise to the latter, because of the holders’ weak bargaining 
position. This weakness derives from the fact that the bondholders cannot
482 Jorgenson and Sachs (1989), p. 69. Quote from Albert Fishlow.
483 Eichengreen and Lindert (1989), p. 6. See also Diaz-Alejandro (1983), p. 39; Wallich (1943), p. 334.
484 Adamson (2002), p. 495.
485 Wallich (1943).
149
hold out to the debtors any immediate prospects of further loans in return for 
a satisfactory settlement, and from the further fact that debtors at present are 
not particularly interested in such prospects, since they can borrow freely 
from the United States government.4 6
As we discussed earlier, post-hoc analysis reveals that the decision on the part of Latin 
American debtors to default did not necessarily damage their ability to return to the 
restored private capital markets in the 1950s and beyond. According to Jorgenson and 
Sachs (1989), although Argentina, the only faithful repayer during the 1930s, did re- 
access the capital markets in a limited way in the 1930s for a refunding issue, it received 
“no special treatment after this episode.” And, when the defaulting Latin American states 
returned to these markets in the 1950s “no apparent systematic differences between the 
defaulters and the non-defaulters” emerged.”487 Cardoso and Dombusch (1989) 
reinforced these findings and showed that from the 1930s to the 1960s, Brazil, the
i O O
defaulter, had no more trouble borrowing than the faithful repayer, Argentina. 
Eichengreen (1991) argued in a similar vein that countries that faithfully serviced their 
debts in the 1930s “did not enjoy superior credit access subsequently.” He observed that 
virtually no country had the ability to borrow material levels of new capital abroad “in 
the 1930s or in the decades following World War II.”489 Lindert and Morton (1989) 
agreed, claiming that “almost no governments in the less developed countries got fresh 
loans, whether they were repaying ones or not.”490
However, the Latin American debtor states of the 1930s could not foresee how the 
capital markets of the future would judge their decisions. They were relying on the past 
for instruction, and had to weigh the 19th century admonitions against sovereign default 
as “uncivilized” and “punishable” against a new and uncharted world, one of 
macroeconomic collapse and the promise of official U.S. lending, regardless of default 
status.
486 Wallich (1943), p. 334.
487 Jorgenson and Sachs (1989), pp. 75-79. Apart from unilateral debt exchanges, only Argentina was able 
to accomplish a refunding in the capital markets in this period. See also Foreign Bondholders Protective 
Council (1936-1977), Report of 1937, pp. 17-18.
488 Cardoso and Dombusch (1989).
489 Eichengreen (1991), p. 160.
490 Lindert and Morton (1989), pp. 231-234. Italics mine.
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5.5.2 Lack of Disciplined Cooperation between the FBPC and NY Stock Exchange.
As we discussed in Chapter 4, the ability of the CFBH, in concert with the 
London Stock Exchange, to deny market access to defaulting sovereigns was one of the 
regime’s chief weapons against defaulters. However, while the Committee of the London 
Stock exchange had the power to deny market access to defaulting governments by 
refusing a listing under Rule 63 of the Exchange, “neither the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 nor the New York Stock Exchange Regulation [had] any provision similar to 
London Rule 63.”491
It may have been that no rule was ever promulgated because of the near 
impossibility for defaulters -  and for that matter, non-defaulters - to access fresh capital 
given the state of the markets. However, in a 1937 report, the S.E.C. uncovered what it 
called a “vicious” and “unconscionable” practice of distressed sovereigns: the making of 
unilateral offers to bondholders “without having attempted to negotiate the terms of a 
readjustment with representatives of the creditors.”492
So, while many believe that the unilateral bond exchange is unique to today’s 
markets, there were in fact several examples of this activity in the 1930s. And, it hinged 
on the ability of a debtor state to list the newly offered bonds on a U.S. exchange, free 
from restrictions. Chile was the pioneer of the unilateral exchange offer in the 1930s, 
making its announcement on January 11, 1938. The FBPC, CFBH, and all the other 
European bondholder associations immediately recommended against it. However, soon 
after the offer was publicized, members of the FBPC frantically contacted the New York 
Stock Exchange to see if they could get more information. Frances White discovered that 
the only thing the listing committee of the Stock Exchange required from Chile was a 
discussion to sort out the details of “identifying the assenting and non-assenting bonds.” 
In other words, aside from sorting out some technical matters and in direct opposition to 
the wishes of the FBPC, the New York Stock exchange was perfectly prepared to support 
Chile’s listing.493 In a more detailed discussion with the exchange about the treatment of 
defaulting sovereigns, the FBPC was informed that bonds were not de-listed from the 
Exchange because they were in default, but because “the foreign government had failed
491 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 173.
492 Buchheit (2003), p. 11.
493 FBPC Archives (1938). File M1287 053. Memorandum from White (FBPC) dated May 10, 1938.
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to register with the S.E.C.” So, there were no procedures in place in the U.S., as there 
were in London, to de-list the bonds of a defaulting state. Nor does it appear that there 
were any effective means to prohibit new listings for a defaulted state that wanted to 
make a unilateral offer to bondholders outside of the auspices of the FBPC.494
Following in the footsteps of Chile, and after a series of unsuccessful FBPC 
negotiations, Peru also decided that it would launch a unilateral exchange. And, again, 
despite the FBPC’s recommendation to the contrary, Peru was able to find a New York 
bank -  the Central Hanover Bank & Trust, Co. - to act as its agent and obtained a listing 
on the New York Curb Exchange 495 Neither the bank nor the exchange made any effort 
to cooperate with the FBPC 496 James Rogers of the FBPC confessed to the British CFBH 
that he was “not quite sure of the precise events connected with the application of Peru to 
list new bonds on the Curb Exchange,” but he was powerless to stop i t497
To his dismay, Rogers later learned that unilateral exchange offers by sovereigns 
were also exempt from S.E.C. reporting requirements, which meant that there would be 
no transparency of results. In other words, there was no way to know what percentage of 
holders actually accepted the offer or whether the sovereign was self-dealing. This was 
important because the sovereign could purchase its own debt in the open market, accept 
the exchange offer, overstate the results of the exchange offer, and cancel the bonds 498 
Unofficial estimates from the Curb Exchange indicate that Peru’s offer was relatively 
successful: 52% of the existing bondholders had consented to it by 1949.4"
5.5.3 Disciplined Cooperation between the CFBH and the London Stock Exchange
The relationship between the FBPC, the New York issue houses, and the U.S. 
exchanges stood in marked contrast to the relationship between the CFBH, the London 
issue houses, and the London Stock Exchange. The British institutions were coordinated
494 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 047. Memorandum from Clark (FBPC) dated May 13, 1937.
495 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1946-1949, p. vi. The New York Curb 
Exchange approved the listing for the new Republic of Peru Sinking Fund Dollar Bonds in 1947.
496 Clipping from the Journal o f Commerce, December 31,1947.
497 FBPC Archives (1948). File M l287 040. Letter from Rogers (FBPC) to Lord Bessborough (CFBH) 
dated January 8,1948.
498 FBPC Archives (1947). File M1287 040. Letter to Williams (Peruvian bondholder) from Rogers (FBPC) 
dated August 26,1947.
499 Clipping from the Wall Street Journal, August 23,1949. $39 million out o f $76 million was offered for 
exchange.
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and disciplined while their American counterparts were not. On the matter of the 
unilateral exchange offer by Peru, the CFBH wrote the following to the FBPC:
We have seen no signs of any pending offer to the Sterling bondholders and it 
is even possible that, owing to the Peruvian difficulty in finding a London 
banker willing to make the offer and to the knowledge that if it is made we 
will oppose it, none will ever be made.500
A few months later, the CFBH told the FBPC confidentially that the Peruvian 
Ambassador approached the British government requesting permission to make a 
unilateral exchange offer and that the British authorities refused the application on the 
ground that such an offer would “from a foreign exchange point of view, be contrary to 
the national interest.”501 The Peruvians persisted and ultimately made an offer directly to 
sterling bondholders, but the CFBH informed the FBPC that the British authorities “will 
not grant permission to any British holders to accept the offer.”502 So, even in this 
instance, where the Peruvian government tried to circumvent the CFBH and the British 
financial community, the British government stood firm and prevented any private 
investors from accepting the direct solicitation. While the FBPC felt strongly that 
“unilateral debt offers were not workable in international finance and should not be 
tolerated,” only the British sovereign debt restructuring regime was able to prevent 
them.503
5.5.4 The Lending into Arrears Policy o f  the U.S. Government and World Bank
As the main engine of capital export in the 1930s and 1940s, the U.S. government 
assumed the structural power that had once accrued to the private capital markets of the
x L  x L
late 19 and early 20 centuries. And, the way in which it would choose to use this 
lending capacity would have profound consequences for the plight of American 
bondholders. In fact, it was not long before the White House would begin to use its power 
of capital export to directly undermine the authority of the FBPC. In December 1938,
500 FBPC Archives (1947). File M1287 040. Letter to Rogers (FBPC) from Butler (CFBH) dated September 
18, 1947.
501 FBPC Archives (1947). File M1287 040. Letter to Rogers (FBPC) from Butler (CFBH) dated November 
4, 1947.
5°2 p g p c  Archives (1948). File M1287 040. Letter to Rogers (FBPC) from Butler (CFBH) dated January 2, 
1948.
503 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1946-1949, p. vi.
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Frances White, then President of the FBPC, noticed a Wall Street Journal article claiming 
that the U.S. government intended to use the Export-Import Bank to encourage trade with 
Latin America. It went on to say that the White House was developing an “alternate plan” 
to clear the defaults with private bondholders. Feeling threatened, White confronted his 
main contact at the State Department, who dutifully claimed ignorance about the source 
of the article and any alternate plans afoot to deal with Latin American defaults outside of 
the FBPC.504
However, by June of 1939, the U.S. government’s position with respect to 
defaulted Latin American states became clear. President Roosevelt was quoted as saying 
that he “wanted to go ahead with his program of $500,000,000 of loans to foreign 
governments and especially to Latin America and that the ‘ancient frauds of the 1920s 
should not interfere with the new sound loans under consideration.’”505 While the State 
Department agreed with White that this type of statement from the President would make 
the job of the FBPC “that much more difficult,” it would be more accurate to say that the 
influence of the FBPC in bondholder negotiations was gradually being eroded. The 
Journal of Commerce even reported that the U.S. government was considering the 
purchase of Latin American bonds to help debtor governments clear their defaults while 
providing some sort of compensation to aggrieved U.S. bondholders. Although this plan 
never materialized, it nonetheless placed the government at the centre of debtor/creditor 
negotiations, again undermining the role of the FBPC.506
When the FBPC tried to condition an Exim Bank loan for Cuba on the settlement 
of private debt, Secretary Morgenthau wondered how “wise” it was to use “a quasi- 
govemmental banking-lending agency...as leverage to collect private debts.” In the end, 
Morgenthau believed that the collection of debts to private bondholders should not stand 
in the government’s way.507
As a result, what was originally a firm prohibition against official lending into 
arrears was diluted to the point where Exim Bank could lend money to defaulting
504 FBPC Archives (1938). File M1287 030. Memorandum from White (FBPC) on call to Livesey (State 
Department) dated December 12,1938.
505 FBPC Archives (1939). M1287 030. Memorandum from White (FBPC) on conversation with Feis (State 
Department) dated June 23, 1939.
506 FBPC Archives (1939). M1287 030. Memorandum from White (FBPC) on conversation with Feis (State 
Department) dated June 23, 1939.
507 Adamson (2005), p. 616.
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governments “as long as the latter had made efforts to resolve their debt defaults.”508 The 
ambiguity about what actually constituted “effort” on the part of a debtor government 
was intended to give the State Department maximum flexibility. Eventually, the New 
Dealers in the Roosevelt administration “proposed, and worked to implement, public 
lending programs without much regard for the settlement of private defaults.”509
U.S. lending into arrears accelerated in 1939 as World War II approached. The 
security interests of the U.S. government required that U.S. capital be used to increase 
political allies as well as secure contracts for a steady supply of war materials, most 
especially from Latin America.510 Wallich (1943) argued that if the U.S. government 
wanted the interests of the bondholders to “take a back seat to national security interests” 
perhaps the bondholders were entitled to some type of compensation. However, it was 
instead decided that U.S. bondholders would subsidize official efforts to win allies and 
secure raw materials by agreeing to debt settlements that were highly unfavourable.511
After World War II, the FBPC noted that the loans made through the Exim Bank 
and the Lend-Lease program were “a major [negative] factor affecting the history of 
sovereign bonds held by U.S. investors.” The FBPC was especially concerned that the 
establishment of the new World Bank and International Monetary Fund would exert a 
similar influence on sovereign bonds held by U.S. citizens. As a result, the FBPC 
contacted the officers of the new multilateral lending institutions and told them that “the 
whole future of public investments in foreign securities hangs on their policies.”512 They 
were again hoping that the multilaterals would be sensitive to the issue of lending into 
arrears to governments in default on their private loans. While it seems that the World 
Bank and IMF tried to avoid lending into arrears, they ultimately followed the precedent 
set by the U.S. government and prioritized larger political goals over the position of 
bondholders. The following examples help to illustrate how the lending into arrears 
policy of the U.S. government and the World Bank helped to strengthen the position of 
sovereign debtors vis-a-vis the FBPC.
508 Adamson (2002), p. 490. Italics mine.
509 Adamson (2002), pp. 479-480.
510 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 229.
511 Wallich (1943), pp. 327-328.
512 Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (1936-1977), Report of 1945, p. 8.
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5.5.4.1 Bolivia
In 1940, American bondholders contacted the FBPC in large numbers to complain 
bitterly about the fact that the U.S. Government was lending bi-laterally to Bolivia while 
the private debts of bondholders had not yet been settled.513 To make matters worse, the 
U.S. later announced that it would make a $10 million loan to Bolivia, which would be 
conditioned upon a “just compensation” arrangement for Standard Oil for the 
expropriation of Standard Oil’s property.514 U.S. bondholders were indignant over the 
actions of their own government to loan money to Bolivia and take a hand in ensuring the 
corporate welfare of Standard Oil but “doing nothing whatsoever for the bondholders.” 
Others noted that while the U.S. was diluting the claims of its own bondholders and 
taxpayers in Bolivia, the “British would certainly see to it that their bondholders were 
well looked after as they always had done and even under present circumstances were 
doing.”515
When Francis White confronted Herbert Feis at the State Department about the 
Bolivian situation, Feis claimed that the hands of the U.S. Government were tied on the 
matter of the U.S. dollar bondholders “since the Nazi influence [in Bolivia] was quite 
strong and they [were] continually stirring up trouble against the United States.”516 In this 
instance, it was therefore necessary to subordinate bondholders’ interests not only to the 
national interests of the United States, but also to the private interests of a U.S. 
corporation.
5.5.4.2 Yugoslavia
In the matter of the Yugoslavian default in 1949, the Department of State first 
asked the FBPC what its attitude would be if it recommended making an Exim loan 
“without attempting first to work out a definite plan for the resumption of service on the 
external dollar debt.” While the FBPC strongly opposed the idea, the Council felt that the 
government would make the loan “whatever [the FBPC’s] attitude, as they felt political
513 FBPC Archives (1940). File M1287 047. Memorandum from White (FBPC) dated June 3, 1940.
514 Clipping from New York Times, March 14, 1941. The expropriation resulted from the charge by the 
Bolivian government that Standard Oil was colluding with Paraguay during the Chaco War.
515 FBPC Archives (1941). File M1287 047. Memoranda from Wylie (FBPC) dated March 28, 1941 and 
April 9,1941.
516 FBPC Archives (1941). File M1287 047. Memorandum from White (FBPC) dated May 24,1941.
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policy required the support of Tito.”517 The FBPC was correct in its assessment as the 
New York Times reported a few months later that the U.S. Government had set up $20 
million in export credits [for Yugoslavia], all of which were granted with the backdrop of 
“intensified Soviet pressure;” the IMF also established a $3 million facility for the 
country.518
In April, 1950, the World Bank began assessing a possible loan to Yugoslavia. 
The FBPC was asked again whether a proposed IBRD loan to Yugoslavia would interfere 
with the chances of the FBPC arriving at a satisfactory settlement with private 
bondholders. The Council responded that it almost certainly would. In an attempt to help, 
the World Bank said that it would draft loan documents for Yugoslavia but tell the 
country that it would withhold disbursement until after a dollar bond settlement had been 
reached. The FBPC was delighted at this news, hoping that it would lead to a prompt and 
favourable settlement for the bondholders.519 However, in a subsequent letter to the 
Yugoslavian ambassador in June, 1950, the IBRD softened its position materially, saying 
that “the Bank does not take the position that definitive debt settlements should be made 
with all creditors before a loan to Yugoslavia is granted;” all the IBRD required at that 
point was “a statement” from the Yugoslavian government “of the amounts which they 
[were] prepared to provide for the service of pre-war external debts.”520 In other words, 
the IBRD was willing to accept something that amounted to nothing more than a 
unilateral exchange offer by the defaulting state.
So, despite its initial efforts to spur a private bond settlement, the IBRD finally 
agreed to make a loan for $25-$30 million to Yugoslavia while the pre-war bonds 
remained in default. The Council was informed directly by the IBRD that although the 
Bank was not “disregarding or forgetting” the FBPC, “the plain fact [was] that the 
Yugoslavian economy [was] busted now,” and required the help of the U.S. and the
517 FBPC Archives (1949). File M1287 070. Minutes of Executive Committee, August 31, 1949.
518 New York Times, October 18, 1949.
519 FBPC Archives (1950), File M1287 043. Memorandum concerning a meeting between Spang (FBPC) 
and Cope (Loan Officer for the IBRD) dated April 21, 1950.
520 FBPC Archives (1950). File M1287 043. Letter from Black (IBRD) to Popovic (Yugoslav Ambassador 
to the U.S.) dated June 5, 1950.
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multilaterals. That being the case, the World Bank pushed the FBPC to accept a token 
settlement on behalf of bondholders.521
5.6 Compulsory Power: U.S.
With super-sanctions no longer permissible under international law during this 
period, compulsory power was exercised by the U.S. government largely to impair the 
position of U.S. bondholders. This was accomplished through i) active State Department 
intervention in bondholder negotiations; ii) government press statements designed to 
weaken the FBPC’s credibility and bargaining leverage; and iii) the consistent, U.S. 
refusal to link its trade and debt policies. By contrast, the British government used its 
compulsory power to benefit its bondholders’ interests by i) supporting clearing 
arrangements and allowing British trade deficits with debtor states to be used for the 
direct benefit of bondholders; ii) actively linking its trade and debt policies; and iii) 
continuing to provide the CFBH with official, consular support. In the sections which 
follow, we will examine each of these manifestations of compulsory power and link them 
back to the bargaining outcomes achieved by American and British bondholders.
5.6.1 The Absence o f Super-Sanctions in the 1930s
Although the use of compulsory power in the form of super-sanctions had an
fh  thimportant impact on sovereign debt negotiations in the 19 and early 20 centuries, 
creditor country governments were constrained by law, custom and experience in the 
exercise of this type of power in periods following World Wars I and II. For example, 
the use of economic weapons, like discriminatory tariffs, were not part of the arsenal of 
American foreign policy after 1934, and even if they had been, it is not clear that they 
would have helped the cause of private bondholders. In addition, armed intervention had 
been outlawed by the Convention Respecting the Limitation o f the Employment o f Force 
fo r the Recovery o f  Debt Contracts at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, 
which permitted such intervention only in the restricted circumstances where the debtor
521 FBPC Archives (1951). File M1287 043. Memorandum of conversation between Spang (FBPC) and 
Gamer (IBRD) concerning Yugoslav settlement dated August 29, 1951.
522 Super-sanctions in Chapter 4 referred to i) the assumption of economic control by a creditor government 
over a debtor state; ii) the forceful foreclosure of collateral located in a debtor state; iii) the use of trade 
embargoes or blockades, or iii) the use of military might to collect defaulted debts on behalf of private 
bondholders.
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ignored, obstructed or failed to submit to arbitration. The use of armed force, “however 
nostalgically viewed-by bondholders,” was a thing of the past; the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission advised bondholders to “eliminate from their consideration the 
use of force as a means of debt collection.”524 President Roosevelt sought to distance 
himself from America’s past debt-related incursions into Latin America by addressing the 
Woodrow Wilson Society on December 28, 1933. In his speech, the President said that 
“the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed 
intervention.” These words were then translated into a formal obligation of the United 
States in the Convention on Rights and Duties o f States on June 15, 1934. In this 
convention, the contracting states agreed not to recognize “territorial acquisitions or 
special advantages which have been obtained by force” insofar as the “the territory of a 
state is inviolable.”525
The senior management of the FBPC agreed with Roosevelt’s sentiments. For 
example, Reuben Clark strongly opposed military intervention in Latin America, but his 
opposition had its roots in bitter experience. As a State Department solicitor and former 
member of the Hoover administration, he had been privy to almost every act of U.S. 
intervention in Latin America. And, the track record was abysmal. According to Clark:
Honduras was still wretched and unstable. Bitterness still rankled in 
Colombia. Haiti was in shambles and racked by civil strife. Cuba was in a 
permanent slump and someday would be ripe for Communism. And, in 
Nicaragua, U.S. interventionism, action and reaction had impinged on one 
another with mounting strain until the thing had sprung closed like a giant 
steel trap.526
However, Clark did appreciate the value of compulsory power in debt negotiations and 
wrote to the State Department in April, 1937, complaining about the limited resources at 
the FBPC’s disposal. He argued that the inability of the FBPC to coerce debtor states had 
constrained its operations by conferring upon it extremely limited bargaining leverage:
523 Sessions (1974), pp. 35-36. See also Janies Brown Scott (1915), The Hague Conventions and 
Declarations o f1899 and 1907 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), pp. 89-95.
524 Eichengreen and Portes (1986), p. 619.
525 Laves (1934), pp. 1048 & 1050-1051.
526 Fox (1980), p. 520.
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I wonder if you men in the State Department really appreciate in what a 
perfectly helpless position the Council is in its negotiations with debtor 
governments. When you men negotiate there in the Department, you have not 
only the prestige of our government behind you but you also have the 
potential power of the government to bring to bear measures of coercion and 
force...We poor fellows sit here absolutely naked of prestige or potential 
coercive power and wholly dependent upon the friendliness or willingness of 
the foreign government...I wonder whether or not you men in the 
Department...do realize what a helpless, unarmed, impotent organization this 
Council is.527
5.6.2. State Department Intervention in Bondholder Negotiations
While the U.S. government had publicly announced its intention to refrain from 
intervening in the affairs of debtor states, either through the use of military or economic 
sanctions, the government did change its mind about the amount of coercive power it 
would bring to bear on the FBPC, and indirectly, on American bondholders. After all, the 
Good Neighbour Policy left the U.S. government little scope for pressuring recalcitrant 
Latin American debtors. As Wallich (1943) pointed out, this policy created the 
impression that any U.S. intervention in debt negotiations would result in the respective 
debtor states being “treated very considerately.”528 And, although the State Department 
initially attempted to follow a policy of non-intervention in private debt negotiations, the 
looming threat posed by Axis governments promoted a more activist stance, one that was 
biased towards achieving fast and efficient settlements. According to Adamson (2002), 
the State Department believed it had only one way to accomplish this: “to insert itself 
directly in the negotiation and settlement process.”529 During 1937, the State Department 
became more prepared to directly influence private creditor-sovereign state debt 
negotiations, and as war broke out in Europe, the State Department “conceded more 
ground to debtors than [the FBPC] or the bankers had been willing to do 
[previously]...They were willing to accept a drastic reduction in debt service on 
emergency grounds.”530
527 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 030. Letter from Clark (FBPC) to Feis (State Department) dated 
April 15, 1937.
528 Wallich (1943), p. 335.
529 Adamson (2002), p. 480.
530 Adamson (2002), pp. 496 & 507.
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It was not long before the administration informed the FBPC that “it was 
removing from the Council the authority to negotiate with the Latin Americans and 
placing it directly with the State Department.”531 While the U.S. government could have 
pushed for the closure of the FBPC and enacted the Title II Corporation in its place, the 
capacity to covertly supplant the FBPC in the negotiations proved to be the more 
attractive decision politically; it provided the U.S. government with the desired level of 
deniability, while enabling it to influence the negotiations such that the outcomes would 
largely favour U.S. national interests. The State Department admitted in correspondence 
that it preferred a private form of bondholder organization to a public one since “it could 
escape major responsibility for the conduct of the negotiations and outcomes.” If it 
concurrently managed to commandeer the operation of the Council, it could both escape 
responsibility and determine outcomes.
The Minutes of the Executive Committee meetings of the FBPC clearly 
demonstrate the active involvement of the State Department in private debt negotiations. 
And, once the authority of the FBPC had been broken by the U.S. government, we can 
also observe a fair amount of tentativeness, subservience and permission-seeking on the 
part of the Council.533 The examples which follow serve to illustrate this point.
In the 1944 case of Colombia, the FBPC reported that it had “no part in the 
negotiations or discussions leading to the offer, which had been carried on through the 
State Department.” And, despite the highly unsatisfactory offer which the State 
Department delivered to the bondholders, the FBPC felt compelled to recommend it, 
since “nothing better could be expected.”534
The Peruvian debt negotiations were rife with State Department interference. In a 
discussion of the status of the settlements in 1943, the FBPC indicated that “the next 
move...was up to the Department of State.”535 The FBPC needed to tread lightly on Peru 
since it was aware of the fact that the U.S. was the main purchaser of its exports. Peru 
supplied the U.S. with the raw materials -  metals, rubber, and flax -  necessary to support
531 Sessions (1974), p. 184.
532 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 193.
533 This was particularly true during World War II and in the years immediately following the war. FBPC 
Archives (1943-1951). File M1287 070. Minutes ofExecutive Committee, 1943-1951.
534 FBPC Archives (1944). File M1287 070. Minutes ofExecutive Committee, October 17, 1944.
535 FBPC Archives (1943). File M1287 070. Minutes ofExecutive Committee, September 1,1943.
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the wartime economy. And, although the FBPC held out hope that their government 
would assist them with debt negotiations, on balance, “[U.S.] strategic and political 
economic concerns outweighed pressure from the bondholders’ group.”536 This was so 
much the case that when the Peruvian government elected to make a unilateral offer to 
bondholders, the U.S. Ambassador said that he was “anxious to have the Council 
recommend the...proposal.” The FBPC ultimately yielded to the Department’s pressure, 
although it did attempt a small protest by reporting the offer to bondholders with the
rather unhelpful caveat that the Council “neither approved nor disapproved of it.”537
/
Although Mexico had been in default for much of the 1930s, the U.S. government 
showed little interest in the status of debt negotiations until the onset of World War II, 
which, as we discussed earlier, altered American security interests in the region. Just as in 
the Peruvian case:
the U.S. needed oil, rubber, metals, and other strategic supplies from 
Mexico...The war fostered a close and interdependent relationship between 
the neighboring countries...By contrast, American concerns with helping the 
bondholders -  never a primary objective to begin with -  quickly 
diminished...the U.S. was eager to see the debt problem go away.538
It is not surprising that once U.S. interest in Mexico was renewed, American pressure on 
the FBPC and private bondholders led to a settlement agreement. The agreement, dated 
November 1942, had terms that were extremely favourable to the debtor state: the 
Mexican government was only required to pay 23.7 cents on every dollar of secured debt 
bonds and 14.2 cents on every dollar of unsecured debt.539 Again, this was a triumph of 
U.S. government interests over those of private bondholders.
Finally, in the case of Brazil in 1940, the State Department covertly engineered a 
settlement agreement on behalf of private bondholders. Herbert Feis of the Department 
informed Francis White of the FBPC that the U.S. was working to have this agreement 
presented as a “unilateral offer on the part of Brazil with the United States out of it and 
not appearing to have taken part in the negotiations.” Feis went on to suggest that White 
remain silent on the Brazilian offer. White exploded in anger, arguing that the request
536 Aggarwal (1996), p. 308.
537 FBPC Archives (1947). File M1287 070. Minutes ofExecutive Committee, June 17,1947.
538 Aggarwal (1996), p. 274.
539 Aggarwal and Granville (2003), pp. 20-21.
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was tantamount to “a suppression of information” and unwise from the Department’s 
point of view in a time when greater transparency was expected from U.S. institutions.540 
In light of the FBPC’s uncooperative behaviour, the State Department simply removed 
the FBPC from all aspects of the negotiation. In fact, White was only presented with a 
final copy of the agreement “on the day the two sides were set to sign it. When he 
protested, the department’s legal advisor told him that national security interests in the 
hemisphere trumped the interests of bondholders.”541
5.6.3 Undermining the FBPC with Official Public Statements
The U.S. government also used its compulsory power to undermine bondholders 
by shaping the debate in the public arena. The bully pulpit of the American government 
gave it an enormous advantage over the FBPC, especially when it chose to make public 
statements that openly supported defaulting states (or their substandard offers to U.S. 
bondholders). In other cases, aspersions were openly cast on the FBPC and its 
management. These politically motivated statements served to undermine the authority of 
the FBPC, further driving bargaining outcomes in favour of defaulting states.
In a 1939 speech, Franklin D. Roosevelt “urged bondholders to settle in order to 
cement U.S. economic relations with its neighbours to the South.” Of course, the implied 
threat in this message was that diplomatic goals would take precedence over private 
ones.542 In the same year, Roosevelt went on record saying that he had been rather 
disappointed by the work of the Council “because it had not gotten very far” in resolving 
the Latin American defaults.543
Much to the chagrin of the FBPC, the President did not confine himself to broad 
public policy statements; he was also willing to get involved in the detailed aspects of 
debt negotiations. On the matter of Cuba, Dana Munro of the FBPC said that he was 
informed by U.S. officials that he would “jeopardize the whole negotiation by standing 
out for...an interest rate higher than 4 14%.” These same officials said that “Mr. 
Roosevelt himself had told several Cubans that this would be a fair rate, and that they had 
been informed that neither the State Department nor the Embassy would support [the
540 FBPC Archives (1940). Memorandum from White (FBPC), February 21, 1940.
541 Adamson (2002), pp. 511 -512.
542 Eichengreen (1991), p. 164.
543 New York Times, October 28, 1939, p. 1.
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FBPC] in insisting on a higher rate.”544 Clearly, no amount of argument or persuasion on 
the part of the FBPC would have had any real effect if its government were not squarely 
behind it.545
Even Secretary of State George Marshall went on record supporting Peru’s 
unilateral exchange offer, one which the FBPC argued was detrimental to the interests of 
bondholders. Marshall said that it was “gratifying to have this...effort to resolve a 
situation which has existed for over fifteen years.” He went on to express his sincere hope 
that the bondholders would accept the offer and that such acceptance would clear the way 
for new Exim Bank credits from the U.S.546
One of the most publicized statements made during this period was by President 
Roosevelt on the matter of the Bolivian default. Roosevelt offered a public apology to 
General Enrique Penaranda, the Bolivian President, for the American loans made to 
Bolivia. Roosevelt said:
if he had anything to do with it money never would have been lent to a 
foreign country at the high interest and commission rates which figured in the 
loan he had in mind...He used the term ‘super-salesmanship’ to describe the 
process by which Bolivians were convinced that they even needed a loan.547
The President’s public position helped him to achieve some political ends, which at the 
time included securing contracts for Bolivia’s raw materials - tin, copper, and rubber - for 
war purposes; however, it also made it highly unlikely that the U.S. would ever openly 
press for the claims of its aggrieved bondholders.
The FBPC discussed this comment by President Roosevelt in its Executive 
Committee meeting on June 2, 1943. One of the board members maintained that in view 
of the president’s public statement, “the Council’s efforts on behalf of Bolivian 
bondholders could scarcely be hoped to bring any satisfactory offer;” the statement also 
“raised in his mind the question of the Council’s usefulness and continuance.”548
544 FBPC Archives (1936). File M1287 057. Letter from Dana Munro (FBPC) in Cuba to Frances White 
(FBPC) dated August 23, 1936.
545 FBPC Archives (1936). File M1287 057. Letter from Dana Munro (FBPC) in Cuba to Frances White 
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546 Clipping from the Financial Times, June 28, 1947.
547 Clipping from the New York Times, May 8, 1943.
548 FBPC Archives (1943). File M1287 070. Minutes ofExecutive Committee, June 2, 1943.
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The financial press seized on Roosevelt’s comments, and argued that “the ‘never 
mind’ of the late President Roosevelt” on the issue of Bolivian bond debt meant that the 
“official American attitude” adds up to a subsidization of those foreign countries by the 
American bondholder.549 British bondholders, who shared some of the Bolivian sovereign 
debt, argued that the words of the American president and State Department also had 
“profound effects on the fortunes of British holders of foreign bonds.” They felt that 
while “Uncle Sam...[could] afford to turn generous to his debtors (often for purely 
political reasons)” the same luxury was not afforded to “impecunious countries like 
Britain.”sso
In fact, the British CFBH found it necessary to appeal to its U.S. ambassador after 
learning of Roosevelt’s statement. Elliot Butler of the CFBH said:
we are constantly finding ourselves handicapped by the U.S. Government’s 
indifference to the claims of bondholders and fear of giving offence to the 
debtor countries...One can appreciate and be grateful for the wisdom of the 
Good Neighbour policy and recognize the necessity of backing this policy 
with substantial credits, but yet see no necessary conflict between the 
execution of the policy and a firm and tactful insistence on reasonable 
settlements of prior loans.551
The CFBH made a very good point. Since the U.S. government had so much negotiating 
leverage with Latin American debtors - especially since it was the sole source of credit in 
the 1930s and 1940s - why did it not firmly but tactfully push for better settlements for 
bondholders? If it was willing to use its leverage to benefit U.S. exporters, by offering 
Exim credits, why wasn’t it similarly willing to tie the provision of new trade credits to 
more generous bondholder settlements? It could be that the bondholders paid the price for 
the New Deal administration’s negative view toward the underwriting banks and Wall 
Street in general. Or, as Tomz (2004) argued, such linkage may not have ultimately 
served the bondholders’ interests, since a sovereign debtor needs foreign currency in 
order to pay its external debts. In addition, trade sanctions would have had major
549 CFBH Archives (1950-1952). File Ms34603, Vol. 2, Document 327/1120. Article by Harold Wincott of 
The Investors Chronicle.
550 CFBH Archives (1950-1952). File Ms34603, Vol. 2, Document 327/1120. Article by Harold Wincott of 
The Investors Chronicle.
551 CFBH Archives (1942). File Ms34629, Document 391/2. Letter from Butler (CFBH) to Bewley (British 
Embassy, Washington, DC)
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distributional consequences, insofar as they would have damaged exporters and selected 
importers in the creditor country. According to Tomz:
the linkage hypothesis requires the central government to side consistently 
with bondholders and banks at the expense of trading interests. This seems 
unlikely, given that exporters and importers have been relatively concentrated 
throughout history, whereas bondholders - the principal lenders to foreign 
governments - have been more atomized.552
5.7 Compulsory Power: U.K.
Even though the U.S. government sidestepped the use of compulsory power in the 
form of trade and credit sanctions to assist its own bondholders, the British government 
regularly employed these tactics. We would argue that this difference in strategy was in 
large measure responsible for the slightly better returns delivered to sterling bondholders 
during this period. In addition, the British government continued to allow the CFBH to 
leverage government assets - in the form of official consular offices -  to strengthen the 
bargaining position of the British private investors. In the discussion which follows, we 
will examine how i) the establishment of clearing operations, ii) the linkage of trade and 
debt policies, and iii) the close relationship between the CFBH and the British consular 
offices positively impacted outcomes for sterling investors. It is important to point out 
that in these cases, Britain may have been less motivated by sympathy for the plight of 
her bondholders and more by the fact that the British economy had been severely 
damaged by the experience of two world wars. As we discussed earlier, recovering 
payments on sterling bonds would help to boost national income. Therefore, the British 
national interest was more closely aligned with the interests of private bondholders in the 
interwar and post-war periods, making it more likely that she would use direct, coercive 
measures for their benefit.
5.7.1 Clearing Arrangements
One of the most effective negotiating tactics on the part of bondholders during 
this period was to threaten the imposition of a clearing arrangement with a defaulted 
state. The mechanics were rather straightforward, but implementation required the 
satisfaction of two important conditions: the cooperation of the bondholders’ home
552 Tomz (2004), pp. 43-44. See also Tomz (2001).
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government and the existence of a trade deficit with the debtor state. Once a clearing 
arrangement was established, an office would be set up in the creditor state to recover out 
of the proceeds of its trade with the debtor state a sum sufficient to service the private 
debt of the creditor state’s bondholders. In other words, the proceeds that would have 
normally gone to extinguish the trade deficit with the debtor state are instead sequestered 
by the creditor country government and used to satisfy the claims of its own private 
bondholders.553
The U.S. was largely precluded from initiating clearing arrangements on behalf of 
the FBPC since the U.S. was running trade surpluses with defaulted states. Britain, on the 
other hand, had trade deficits with several important Latin American states -  including 
Argentina and Uruguay -  as well as with Europe’s largest defaulter, Germany.
In the case of Uruguay, Britain insisted that the country allocate the greater part of 
her sterling exchange in the exclusive settlement of British debts. While this put 
American bondholders at a great disadvantage, there was very little that the FBPC could 
do about it. The New York press reported that “Great Britain holds the whip hand...being 
practically the only customer for Uruguay’s exports of meat and animal products, the 
market in the United States having been closed by import restrictions.”554
When the FBPC launched its obligatory complaint, the Uruguayan finance 
minister said that the country was unable to continue to service its U.S. dollar bonds 
because “Great Britain was insisting that Uruguay furnish funds first...to service all 
British long-term obligations, second...to meet British-Uruguayan trade necessities, and 
third, to pay the dividends due on the very large British investments in Uruguay.” He 
went on to say that he felt the need to comply with British demands since they were 
“backed up by the threat that they will either curtail trade or establish compulsory 
clearings.”555 The FBPC’s plea for State Department intervention in this case went 
unheeded.
The most important clearing arrangements established during this period were 
with Germany. In fact, as soon as Germany declared a moratorium on overseas interest
553 Eichengreen and Portes (1989), p. 21.
554 Clipping from New York Herald Tribune, June 20,1934.
555 FBPC Archives (1934). File M1287 041. Letter from Clark (FBPC) to Hull (Secretary of State) dated 
July 3, 1934.
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payments in the summer of 1933, the Dutch and Swiss rejected the pact and threatened 
sanctions. The credibility of these threats was, once again, enhanced by the fact that both 
countries ran trade deficits with Germany. The strategy on the part of the Dutch and 
Swiss were successful, resulting in an immediate resumption of debt service.556
The FBPC understandably felt that American bondholders were being 
discriminated against as debtor States were “paying full interest on the Dawes and Young 
loans to Europeans and a reduction of interest to Americans.” The Germans argued that 
they had no choice and blamed the threats of creditor country governments for this state 
of affairs.557 The FBPC knew from the outset that American bondholders were at a 
negotiating disadvantage given the configuration of world trade, but the Council 
expressed deep concern over the growing prevalence of inter-creditor inequity in German 
settlements. In fact, the FBPC noted how certain creditor country governments were 
determined to forge separate settlement agreements with Germany, for the express 
purpose of ensuring that their nationals would receive “highly preferential treatment in 
the service of their bonds.”
Britain would soon join the list of nations considering clearing arrangements with 
Germany. The New York Herald Tribune reported in 1938 that:
Whitehall, its patience exhausted, showed that it was not unwilling to put on a 
little economic pressure itself. The result: a payments agreement whereby 45 
per cent of Britain’s current trade debts to Germany are being balanced 
against old German bonded debt to the British.559
As it turned out, merely the suggestion of a debate in the British Parliament was 
sufficient to force Germany’s hand. Before the clearing arrangement could even be put to 
a vote in Britain, a German delegation was dispatched to London, and “within a month an 
agreement was reached providing for full interest payments to British nationals on Dawes 
and Young plan bonds.”560
556 Sweden, France and Belgium used the same tactic with similar success.
557 FBPC Archives (1938). Memorandum from Clark (FBPC) dated July 1, 1938.
558 FBPC Archives (1934). File M1287 069. Memorandum from the Berlin Conference Relating to Long­
term and Medium-Term External German Debts dated May 29, 1934.
559 CFBH Archives (1938). Clippings File, Germany, Vol. Ii. New York Herald Tribune, July 6, 1938.
560 Eichengreen and Portes (1986), p. 620.
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Whereas the British and other European governments took an aggressive stance 
with Germany on behalf of their respective bondholders, the American government was 
much more tentative. Roosevelt was reported as saying to his ambassador in Berlin: “lend 
what personal, unofficial aid you can, but no more.”561 This was partially because the 
direction of American-German trade precluded a credible threat for a clearing 
arrangement, but it did not mean that the American government was necessarily helpless 
in bringing any pressure to bear on Germany. There were other opportunities to link trade 
and debt agreements, and, as the next section illustrates, the British were once again more 
assertive in linking their broader, national policies with the preferences of their private 
bondholders.
5.7.2 Linkage o f Trade and Debt Policies
In 1942, the British Treasury acknowledged that the relationship between the 
United States and the governments of Central and South America would likely be shaped 
by major political considerations, with the interests of bondholders playing “a minor 
part.” But, the Treasury also recognized that the U.S. could “afford to be generous at the 
expense of their bondholders,” while Britain, expecting to face serious balance of
cfi'y
payments problems after the war, enjoyed no such luxury.
So, in addition to its willingness to create clearing arrangements on behalf of its 
bondholders, the British government endeavoured to link new, bi-lateral trade agreements 
with the final settlement of defaulted, sterling debt. In the case of Colombia, U.S. 
bondholders objected to the preferential treatment enjoyed by sterling investors which 
came as a by-product of the British-Colombian trade treaty. The Americans saw the 
British strategy of linking trade and debt as being “very prejudicial to American 
interests.” However, when presented with the same opportunity, Cordell Hull, the U.S. 
Secretary of State, refused to link new U.S. trade agreements to the settlements of old 
debts, preferring instead to keep the two matters entirely segregated.563 The FBPC also 
charged Argentina with discrimination, for “the diversion of revenues...pledged to
561 Eichengreen (1991), p. 164.
562 c p b ji  Archives (1942). File Ms34620, Document 391/3R. Letter from Waley (British Treasury) to 
Bewley (British Embassy, Washington, DC).
563 FBPC Archives (1935). File M1287 047. Memorandum to file from Clark (FBPC) dated December 12, 
1935.
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American dollar bonds to the benefit of sterling bonds.”564 Even Bolivia was asked by the 
FBPC to explain to its American bondholders “why service should be made on sterling 
loans when no interest is being made on dollar bonds.”565
The British were also able to enforce stricter lending into arrears policies on the 
part of the new multilateral lending institutions. When the World Bank announced that it 
was planning a loan to Peru, the British took “violent exception to the loan,” warning that 
“the City [of London] will have nothing to do with the Bank if the Bank pursues such a 
course.” In the end, it was the unrelenting pressure on the part of the British government 
that forced the Peruvians into making a settlement on their defaulted debt on terms that 
were much more favourable to sterling bondholders than originally intended.566
5.7.3 Linkage Between British Consular Offices and the CFBH
Finally, we can explain the variation in outcomes between American and British 
bondholders by the way in which the CFBH could continue to successfully leverage the 
power of the British consular network. The British were well aware that the interests of 
U.S. bondholders were “not regarded by the State Department as needing or deserving 
the protection which H.M. Government endeavours to give British bondholders.” The 
CFBH suggested that the New Deal administration displayed a decidedly negative 
attitude toward the vested interests of Wall Street, and, therefore, the FBPC and 
American bondholders suffered by association.
In stark contrast to U.S. policy, the British allowed the CFBH to “delegate a 
British minister to a foreign country, or his consul-general, as their local agent.” 
Reuben Clark of the FBPC testified that “the British Government goes further in the 
diplomatic support” of the CFBH by allowing its “foreign service to act as agents of the 
Corporation.” By comparison, he argued that the State Department had done very little in 
assisting the FBPC 569 There was no question that the British Foreign Office was more
564 FBPC Archives (1935). File M1287 069. Minutes ofExecutive Committee, July 30, 1935.
565 FBPC Archives (1937). File M1287 047. Letter from Clark (FBPC) to Norweb (Finance Minister of 
Bolivia) dated April 21, 1937.
566 Aggarwal and Granville (2003), pp. 20-21.
567 CFBH Archives (1942). File Ms34620, Document 391/5. Memorandum from Wade (Junior Official in 
H.M. Treasury).
568 Eichengreen and Portes (1986), p. 619.
569 Borchard and Wynne (195 la), p. 251.
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intimately involved in bondholder negotiations, and that this involvement often served to 
improve the position of its bondholders. The Foreign Office dispensed advice to the 
CFBH and would regularly permit Embassy officials to conduct negotiations. The British 
Treasury would also inform debtor states that the status of bondholder debts would 
influence its decision of “whether to extend official credits to foreign countries.”570 By 
consistently lending official support to the CFBH, the British government ensured that 
the demands of bondholders carried greater weight with sovereign debtors.
Since the CFBH enjoyed such broad support within its own government, the 
FBPC found it unfair when the State Department tried to compare the performance of the 
two bodies. For instance, when Herbert Feis of the State Department pointed out how the 
FBPC was doing an inadequate job in Brazil since it did not have a representative in Rio, 
Francis White of the FBPC replied angrily that:
the responsibility for this rested squarely with our Government who 
prevented us from getting funds from the one source where funds could be 
had...The British not only had a banker representative but he had been 
incorporated into the Embassy... [And, if the CFBH is doing a better job] it is 
largely their Government that is doing it and the inadequacy, if any, of our 
organization is due to the fact that we did not get the same support from our 
Government.571
The FBPC was right to point out that the CFBH achieved better results for its constituents 
largely because the British managed to maintain market discipline and boasted an official 
sector that played an active, investor-friendly role in sovereign settlement negotiations. 
How were these negotiations influenced, if at all, by the changing characterization of the 
act of sovereign default?
5.8 Productive Power
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, we saw the act of sovereign default 
characterized as a betrayal of trust and a moral failing, undertaken only by states that 
were willing to breech the rules of civilized international society. The sanctity of the debt 
contract was inviolable, and for this reason, extraordinary pressures were often placed on 
debtor states to settle. Extreme measures, including the assumption of economic control
570 Eichengreen (1991), p. 164.
571 FBPC Archives (1940). Memorandum from White (FBPC), February 21, 1940.
171
by a creditor state and outright military intervention, were not uncommon. However, the 
years of the interwar and post-war periods challenged these traditional assumptions about 
sovereign default in a number of ways.572
Beginning in the 1930s, the default calculus was driven less by considerations of 
honour and more by pragmatism. Latin American states needed to conserve resources for 
domestic purposes and did not see that onerous settlements would be rewarded with new 
capital, especially in light of the collapse of private markets. Matters of honour and 
integrity took a back seat to the imperatives of maintaining economic stability. And, once 
the ethical aspects of the debtor-creditor relationship receded into the background by the 
crushing impact of the Great Depression, debt service took on the appearance of a luxury 
which could no longer be afforded. According to Wallich (1943):
The question ‘to pay or not to pay’ thus tended to be reduced to a simple 
utility calculus: Did the advantages of maintaining a good credit record 
constitute an adequate reward for the sacrifice of continued payments... Faced 
with this question, nearly all our South American debtors decided in favour of 
default, regardless of the relative size of their debt.573
However, Latin American belief in the sanctity of loan contracts was perhaps most 
damaged by “British default on the war debt, Germany’s failure to make payments on the 
greater part of her international obligations, and the derogation of the gold-clause in the 
United States.”574 Even the CFBH recognized that “the question of odium attaching to a 
government as a result of its default on its legal obligations has disappeared more and 
more into the background.” Unfortunately, what disturbed the CFBH was the fact that 
most nations now considered sovereign default to be an accepted practice, keeping with 
the precedent set by Great Britain, who, “as a leader amongst the nations of the world has 
itself set an example as a notable defaulter.”575 Although Britain had defaulted on inter­
572 Lipson (1985b), p. 67.
573 Wallich (1943), p. 322.
574 Wallich (1943), p. 322.
575 CFBH Archives (1948-1950). File Ms34603, Vol. 1, Document 327/216. The letter expresses concern 
that even the Annual Report of the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders in 1936 puts the defaulted debt of 
Britain to the U.S. at over $5 billion, but does not make it clear that this is intergovernmental debt. 
Apparently, this author believes that while it is unethical to default on private debt it is acceptable to default 
on intergovernmental debt.
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allied war debt and not private debt, that distinction was lost on Latin American and 
smaller European states.
With the war debt issue garnering a good deal of media attention, there was no 
question that the average person regarded it to be “a matter beyond argument that Great 
Britain [was] a defaulter,”576 and that the British attitude was influencing the decisions of 
other important states.577 In 1938, the FBPC argued that:
one of the principal reasons the small debtors were not paying their debt was 
because the large debtors were not paying theirs, and among the large debtors 
they were thinking constantly of Great Britain, France and Germany. They 
made no distinction between the inter-allied debt and the ordinary debts. They 
regarded them all as defaulters. The consistent position of these small debtors 
was, if the big fellows do not pay, why should we?578
According to Diaz-Alejandro (1‘983), if we put aside the ethics and legalities of default, 
the economic situation of the 1930s also induced greater tolerance for the actions of 
debtor states. He argued that the statement justifying the suspension of German 
reparations applied equally to other European and Latin American defaults:
When productive resources were allowed to go to waste in idleness and 
countries everywhere were restricting imports to protect jobs, it made no 
economic sense whatsoever to insist on the transfer of real resources as
579- reparations.
Britain made a similar argument in a formal declaration of her unilateral suspension of 
war debts to the U.S. on June 4, 1934. Convinced that the existing system of inter­
governmental war debt had broken down, H.M. Government maintained that there was a 
difference between war debt obligations and normal credit operations for development 
purposes - the most obvious being that war debts were neither productive nor self- 
liquidating. The British government also argued that it was economically impossible to 
make debt transfers to America and that any further attempt to do so would have 
disastrous consequences for trade. The declaration went on to mention the significant
576 CFBH Archives (1948-1950). File Ms34603, Vol. 1, Document 327/216.
577 CFBH Archives (1948-1950). File Ms34603, Vol. 1, Document 327/216. Clipping from the New York 
Financial Chronicle, June 18, 1938.
578 FBPC Archives (1938). File M1287 047. Memorandum from Clark (FBPC) dated July 1, 1938.
579 Diaz-Alejandro (1983), p. 31.
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sacrifices of the British people, suffering tax rates more that twice as high as their U.S. 
counterparts, and the increased burdens of debt service associated with the depreciation 
of the sterling. The declaration finished by saying how any attempt to resume payments 
would “intensify the world crisis and.. .provoke financial and economic chaos.”580
In many ways, the pleas of the British government echoed those that were 
delivered by many of the defaulting states of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Yet, while 
they were developing countries, Britain was not. It was one of the major European 
powers and had been the world’s principal capital exporter and rule-enforcer until 1914. 
The effect of this proclamation, as well as those of the other major European powers, 
would materially change the characterization of the act of sovereign default.
The FBPC and U.S. bondholders were also hurt by the anti-banking discourse that 
gained momentum during the Great Depression. In this discourse, money was represented 
as “a force for greed, corruption and exploitation.”581 According to Rosenberg (1999), 
hostility toward banks appealed to large and disparate voting groups in the U.S, from 
“Bible-belt social conservatives to socialist radicals,” and it helped to carry Roosevelt 
and the New Deal Democrats to power.582 This in part explains the President’s 
belligerence towards the FBPC. The Roosevelt administration, reflecting public opinion, 
routinely acted as if the FBPC were trying to collect on loans that had been intended to 
defraud and exploit unsuspecting Latin American republics.
As we argued in Chapter 4, the great powers who were the capital exporters of the 
19th century were largely able to define what was meant by the act of sovereign default, 
and their material resources allowed them to both prescribe and enforce remedies. 
Eventually, these remedies were enshrined in an evolving framework of international 
law, one that successfully regularized international trade and lending.583 In other words, 
productive power was tied very closely to structural power. In the 1930s, we observe a 
sea change in the characterization of the act of default principally because the same
tFipowers that enforced the sanctity of debt contracts in the 19 century, found themselves
58° p g p c  Archives (1934). File M1287 077. Proclamation of H.M. Government delivered by Lindsay 
(British Ambassador) to Hull (Secretary of State) dated June 4, 1934. For the U.S. response, see FBPC 
Archives (1934). File M1287 077. Letter from Hull (Secretary of State) to Lindsay (British Ambassador) 
dated June 12, 1934.
581 Rosenberg (1999), p. 7.
582 Rosenberg (1999), p. 8.
583 Lipson (1985b), p. 38.
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in default in the interwar period. Suddenly, the arguments that had been used by 
developing countries since the 1820s to suspend debt service -  the crushing domestic 
economic burdens, the devalued currency, the unproductive nature of war debt -  were all 
given legitimacy by the experiences of the Britain, Germany, France and Italy. 
Unproductive spending, the ravages of war and political ambitions had all “invested] 
default with the halo of patriotism.”584
5.9 Power and the Production o f  Bargaining Outcomes in the Interwar and Post-War 
Periods
We set out in this chapter to explain the observed bargaining outcomes between 
sovereign states and private creditors during the interwar and post-war periods, and also 
to assess the institutional relevance of the FBPC to those results. Measurements of 
negotiating outcomes showed a marked decline in settlement terms for bondholders when 
compared to pre-1914 levels: principal reduction was 23% vs. 12%; capitalization of 
interest arrears was only 35% compared to 71%; and the reduction in interest rates was 
34% vs. 16%. By every measure, bondholders of the 1930s and 1940s achieved sub­
standard results relative to their 19th century counterparts. And, when we look at intra­
period results, we find that British investors enjoyed superior returns when compared to 
their U.S. counterparts, both across a wide sample of bonds and in the specific case of the 
German default. Why? The traditional explanation has been that the CFBH was an 
effective, respected, and well-funded organization run by men of great character and 
capacity, while the FBPC was a disappointment. However, using our power-based 
analytical framework, we have challenged the traditional notions about the CFBH and 
FBPC and have argued that structural and compulsory regime elements, not institutional
iL
ones, were much more relevant in producing bargaining outcomes in the 19 century as 
well as in the interwar and post-war periods.
Whatever weaknesses the FBPC might have exhibited, it could never have 
surmounted the pressures placed on it by its own government. Changes in its structure, 
staffing, funding or rules of operation would have made little difference in the pattern of 
bargaining outcomes. This is because the national interest of the United States between
584 CFBH Archives (1938). File Ms34828. Clipping from The Economist, April 2, 1938, pp. 16-17.
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the wars and immediately after World War II forced bondholders’ interests into the 
background. Private investors were asked to subsidize their own government’s political 
and strategic ambitions by entering into lenient settlements with debtor states. In addition, 
the collapse of the private capital markets and the virtual capital export monopoly of the 
U.S. government completely eroded the FBPC’s bargaining leverage. In short, structural 
and compulsory regime elements overwhelmed the FBPC and were principally 
responsible for producing less favourable bargaining outcomes for U.S. investors. By 
contrast, Britain’s dire post-war financial position incentivized it to increase national 
income by improving bondholder recoveries, thereby aligning the larger national interest 
with the narrower interests of investors. The country’s willingness to use sanctions in the 
form of clearing arrangements and to link its trade and debt policies materially enhanced 
both the bargaining position and the observed outcomes for sterling bondholders.
The findings in our first two case study chapters have important implications for 
today’s debate surrounding the reform of the international financial architecture, 
especially on the question of whether we erect new bondholder representative bodies. 
Our conclusions in Chapters 4 and 5 have been that history has either mistakenly credited 
or blamed an institutional body for results that were produced by powers that were 
external to it. The CFBH of the 19th century benefited from the size and importance of the 
British capital market as well as the actions taken by an investor-friendly British 
government. By comparison, the FBPC was penalized by the general collapse of private 
capital markets and the debtor-friendly foreign policy of the U.S. government.
So, do private creditor representative bodies matter? While we would hesitate to 
say that they have no effect, our analysis implies that they certainly do not figure as 
materially in the overall production of negotiating outcomes to the extent previously 
thought. Therefore, financial architecture reformers need to be mindful that any calls for 
the establishment of a new bondholder council might lead to the creation of an institution 
whose impact would be largely circumscribed by those structural and compulsory 
elements unique to the current political and financial landscape.
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Chapter 6
When Creditors Were King: The “London Club” Bank Advisory 
Process, the Creditors’ Cartel and Sovereign Debt Restructuring in
the 1980s
I f  greed often drives people apart, fear often drives them together.
William Rhodes 
Citibank, Bank Advisory Committee Chairman
There is a thin line between “advisory” and “adversary. ”585
Unnamed Latin American Finance Minister
6.1 The London Club and the Four Faces o f  Power
In Chapter 4, we challenged the received wisdom about the British Corporation of 
Foreign Bondholders (“CFBH”), arguing that its achievements were less a product of its 
institutional capabilities and more the result of external structural and compulsory regime 
elements that tended to favour the interests of private creditors. More specifically, we 
concluded that bargaining outcomes between private bondholders and defaulting states in 
the late 19th century were chiefly driven by two things: the structural power of a 
centralized, hegemonic, British capital market, and the willingness of the British 
government to use a wide array of coercive actions -  ranging from diplomatic moral 
suasion to outright military force -  to benefit bondholders.
In Chapter 5, we similarly attempted to assess the institutional impact of the U.S. 
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council (“FBPC”) during the interwar and post-war 
periods. Here we argued that the sub-standard results achieved for bondholders during 
this era were not so much the inevitable consequence of a failed institutional experiment 
-  which is the prevailing view - but rather the legacy of a collapsed market and a series of 
actions taken by the U.S. government and its agencies to subvert investor interests. In 
stark contrast to the close and cooperative working relationship between the British 
government and the CFBH in the 19th century, the FBPC suffered repeated setbacks at the 
hands of the American government, and eventually, the multilateral financial institutions.
585 Mudge (1984), p. 65.
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To illustrate this argument, we showed how the Securities and Exchange Commission 
eliminated the FBPC’s main source of funding in the early days of the Council’s 
operations, and how, by the end of the 1930s, the State Department had largely 
supplanted the FBPC as chief negotiator with a number of Latin American countries.586 
In this capacity, the State Department coerced bondholders to accept much more lenient 
settlement terms with debtor states than the FBPC had initially recommended. In 
addition, the U.S. government, along with the IMF and World Bank, made decisions to 
offer bi-lateral and multi-lateral funding to troubled sovereigns that remained in default to 
U.S. bondholders. This more aggressive “lending into arrears” policy on the part of 
official creditors seriously compromised the negotiating leverage of the FBPC.587 In 
short, the political expediencies of the interwar and post-war periods pitted the broader 
national interests of the U.S. government against the narrower interests of its 
bondholders. The ultimate effect was to force the latter to subsidize the former without 
compensation. So, while structural and compulsory elements worked to benefit 19th 
century British bondholders and the CFBH, they worked against the interests of U.S. 
investors and the FBPC in the 1930s and 1940s.
In this chapter, we will assess the relative impact of the London Club on 
bargaining outcomes between commercial banks and sovereign debtors beginning in the 
1980s. The London Club was the first body to emerge with a mandate to manage 
commercial bank debt restructurings on a global basis. So, the London Club can be 
contrasted with the CFBH and FBPC on two counts: the nature of the debt being 
restructured (bond vs. commercial bank debt) and the nationality of the lender (domestic 
vs. global). That is to say, each of the bondholder councils was restricted to negotiating 
on behalf of their home country investors: the CFBH helped to restructure sterling bonds 
held by UK investors and the FBPC did the same for dollar bonds held by US investors. 
However, the London Club negotiated on behalf of commercial banks globally.
The effect of the London Club, as a private creditor representative body, will be 
measured against the influence of other regime elements -  official intervention and the 
credit market dynamic -  that have been included in our analytical framework. We will
586 Adamson (2002). See also Adamson (2005) and Eichengreen and Lindert (1989).
587 U.S. government loans were generally extended through the Export-Import Bank or the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation.
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also examine the changes in public discourse regarding the act of sovereign default and 
attempt to gauge how those changes influenced results for private creditors.
Although the London Club process is often idealized as a mechanism of 
coordination when compared to today’s institution-less, market-based regime for 
sovereign debt management, we intend to argue that the “success” of the 1980s regime 
for creditors did not emanate from organized and disciplined negotiations by bank 
steering committees, but rather from the heavy-handed exercise of coercion and control 
by the official sector. Once again, we will demonstrate that compulsory and structural 
power, not institutional power, drove bargaining outcomes in this era. Creditor 
governments threatened debtor states with severe sanctions to prevent them from 
declaring unilateral defaults, and non-cooperative regional banks were routinely 
intimidated by increased regulatory scrutiny. The IMF, bringing its much-needed 
incremental lending capacity to the table, was able to coerce banks of every size and 
nationality into lending new money to troubled debtors by making private involvement a 
pre-condition for the extension of official, structural adjustment loans.588 Additionally, 
large money-centre banks pressured smaller, regional and European banks into making 
new loans and staying within the multi-year rescheduling process. Non-compliance was 
punishable by exclusion from the global payments system or industry blacklisting. And, 
if private incentives were not sufficient to induce consent, recalcitrant banks would 
ultimately hear from the official sector.
The power of the banks, the IMF and creditor governments was further enhanced 
by a key structural element: they were the source of all credit to developing countries. 
Their control of the market made it possible for them to act in a cartelized fashion and 
extract large concessions from debtor states -  states that had no other place to turn for 
short-term trade credit and longer term development lending. However, that being said, 
we would maintain that the structural power that accrued to individual members of the 
London Club would not have been sufficient to drive bargaining outcomes in the banks’ 
favour. These outcomes were instead heavily dependent upon the IMF’s strict prohibition
588 In this example, compulsory and structural power were exercised concurrently.
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COQagainst lending into arrears and its insistence on concerted private lending. 
Commercial bankers connected with the process admitted that once the crisis began, the 
natural inclination of every bank was to reduce -  not increase -  its exposure to Latin 
America.590 Therefore, if left to their own devices, the banks would have been unable to 
surmount their collective action problems and would have presided over a complete 
collapse of the syndicated loan market. And, since a collapsed market eliminates a key 
incentive for debtors to repay, unilateral default would have been invited rather than 
avoided.591 In short, whatever control the commercial banks may have enjoyed over 
private capital export, they would not have continued lending to Latin America unless the 
IMF compelled it.
The question remains: Why did official creditors throw their weight behind 
private banks? After all, in the 1930s, the U.S. government preferred to decouple its 
actions from those of private creditors, ultimately making the decision to lend into 
arrears. The IMF chose a similar course in the period immediately following World War 
II. This changed in the 1980s because official and private financial interests were once 
again aligned. If creditor country governments and the IMF had abandoned the 
commercial banks, they would have done so at their own peril. This is because at the 
outset of the crisis, the largest money-centre banks had amassed a reckless level of 
balance sheet exposure to Latin America. Unilateral defaults by the debtor states would 
have led to major bank failures, and systemic collapse would have in turn triggered 
payouts under national deposit insurance schemes. This meant that creditor governments 
were as interested in the satisfactory resolution of the crisis as the banks themselves. 
Finally, since IMF quotas were heavily weighted toward G-5 countries, the multi-lateral 
institution acted in concert with creditor country governments to protect the solvency of 
the global banking system. In summary, any success which the 1980s debt regime might 
have achieved on behalf of private creditors went far beyond the London Club process.
589 When the IMF refused to “lend into arrears,” the Fund declined to make loans to sovereigns that were 
in default to - or engaged in a rescheduling with - private banks until such time as the debtor state had 
settled satisfactorily with the private banks. In the reschedulings, the Fund essentially forced private banks 
to lend new money as a pre-condition for IMF loans.
590 Author Interviews A, C & D.
591 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of how market collapse alters a debtor’s default calculus.
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Compulsory and structural power - exercised most effectively by governments and 
multilaterals -  were key contributors to bargaining outcomes.
6.1.1 Parallels Between The London Club and the CFBH
The London Club was not a formal organization like the CFBH or FBPC,592 but it 
nevertheless bore a much closer resemblance to its 19 century counterpart when 
evaluated through the lens of our power-based analytical framework. Although 
commercial bank negotiations are rarely compared to those of bondholders, and the debt
ft.
regime of the 19 century is seldom compared to that of the 1980s, there are a number of 
parallels worth noting.
6.1.1.1 Institutional Power
Members of the CFBH and the London Club appeared to exhibit strong cohesion 
and discipline. In the case of 19th century bondholders, the groups were small, relatively 
homogenous and drawn together by the administrative burdens of managing complex 
collateral pools. In the 1980s, large commercial banks enjoyed an alliance that came from 
operating out of the “clubby and oligopolistic confines of New York or London,”593 their 
shared regulatory and accounting conventions, and the legal traditions embodied in their 
syndicated loan documents. In addition, for both sets of creditors, the institutional 
element served as a clearinghouse for information and a venue for consensual decision­
making.
6.1.1.2 Compulsory Power
The degree and orientation of creditor country government intervention was also 
comparable in the 19th century and the 1980s. While the CFBH had close ties to the 
British Foreign Office and Treasury, and was often the beneficiary of coercive 
government action, the London Club linked itself with creditor county governments, 
global bank regulators and the IMF. This meant that a united and powerful creditors’ 
cartel pitted itself against weak, individual debtor countries in the 1980s, just as the
592 For purposes of this analysis, the London Club will be treated as having the same institutional standing 
as its predecessor organizations, the CFBH and FBPC.
593 Devlin (1989), p. 218. Cohesion was strong among large U.S. lenders. As we will demonstrate later, this 
was not the case for smaller, regional and non-U.S. lenders.
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British government apparatus was often used to intimidate debtor states in the 19th 
century. The IMF structural adjustment programs of the 1980s could also be viewed as 
the modem day equivalents of 19th century debt administrations.594 Both diluted the 
economic sovereignty of debtor nations with the goal of restoring creditworthiness and 
market access.595 And, in both periods, the interests of private investors appeared to be 
more closely linked with broader, national interests, a circumstance that served to 
improve the lot of bondholders.
6.1.1.3 Structural Power
The structure and condition of the credit markets were also similar in the 19th 
century and the 1980s, principally by virtue of their centralization and control. Prior to 
World War I, Britain enjoyed the largest and most liquid capital market in the world, and 
through disciplined arrangements with the London Stock Exchange, was able to 
systematically deny market access to defaulting sovereigns. In the 1980s, the commercial 
banks were the sole source of private credit to troubled sovereigns, and this monopoly 
enabled them to successfully withhold access to new credit until mutually agreeable 
settlement terms had been reached. In contrast to the 1930s and 1940s, the creditor 
country governments and the IMF stood firmly on the side of the private commercial 
banks in the 1980s, refusing to disburse official loans to countries that had not reached 
acceptable agreements with their private creditors. This gave the banks enormous 
bargaining leverage, since virtually all new credit for debtor states -  official and private - 
was conditioned upon the banks’ approval of settlement terms.596
6.1.1.4 Productive Power
Finally, from an ideological perspective, we can observe some similarities 
between the 19th century and 1980s. Sovereign default in the 19th century was deemed to 
be an “immoral and uncivilized” act worthy of intervention by “civilized” states, a
594 Ferguson and Schularick (2006).
595 Suter (1992), p. 105. Suter argues that in the 1930s: “there were virtually no cases of open political and 
economic control of debtor countries by creditors. By contrast, there has been substantial but indirect 
economic pressure by creditors in multilateral reschedulings due to IMF adjustment programs imposed on 
debtor countries.”
596 The IMF policy changed in 1989, after the announcement of the Brady Plan, in part to spur banks to 
reach a final settlement with sovereign debtors.
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rendering which revived itself in the 1980s after a brief respite in the inter-war period.597 
As we discussed in Chapter 5, the global nature of the Great Depression, the ravages of 
two world wars, and the defaults of nations like Britain, France and Germany in the 
1930s, had all induced far greater tolerance for debt suspension. With fiscal distress 
engulfing the great powers of Europe along with developing countries, default was seen 
as an acceptable policy choice - one which prioritized the needs of citizens over the 
demands of creditors. However, since the 1980s debt crisis confined itself to the 
periphery, the old stigma attached to default had conveniently re-emerged. This was in 
part because the act of default had become unthinkable in the 1980s. Commercial banks 
had concentrated a perilous amount of risk on their balance sheets, and outright default in 
the early days of the crisis would have rendered them insolvent. Banks were therefore 
better served by labelling the event as a “temporary, liquidity crisis” so that they could 
maintain the book value of their loans and use the time to salvage their badly 
compromised balance sheets. They were also careful to dissuade any country from 
considering a unilateral default by resuscitating the 19th century characterization and 
raising the spectre of its consequences.
6.2 The Performance o f  the London Club: Default Cases and Bargaining Outcomes
Given these observations, we would expect to see the London Club deliver better 
outcomes for banks in the 1980s than the FBPC delivered to bondholders in the 1930s 
and 1940s. The empirical evidence below suggests that while the banks did improve on 
the bargaining results achieved by their interwar and post-war counterparts, they were not
tV» tliable to replicate the strong results achieved by the CFBH in the late 19 and early 20 
centuries. However, we do see a clear shift of bargaining power back to creditors in the 
1980s, and the purpose of this chapter will be to explain why the shift occurred and 
which aspects of the regime of the 1980s were most responsible for it.
597 Winkler (1933), p. 9. See also Rippy (1934), p. 195.
Table 6A: Bargaining Outcomes (1871 - 1975)598
Time Period Dominant Creditor 
Representative 
Body
Duration
of
Defaults
Capitalization 
of Interest 
Arrears
Reduction in 
Interest Rates
Reduction in 
Principal
1871-1925 CFBH 6.3 years 71.6% 16.3% 12.0%
1926-1975 FBPC lO.lyears 35.2% 34.5% 23.2%
Source: Suter (1992)
Table 6B: Bargaining Outcomes (1926 -  19971s"
Time Period Dominant Creditor 
Representative Body
Duration of 
Defaults
Debt Forgiveness 
(inch forgiveness of interest 
arrears)
1926-1975 FBPC 10.1 years 55.9%
1980-1997 The London Club 8.5 years 35%
Sources: Cline (1995); Bowe and Dean (1997); Rieffel (2003); The World Bank (1996).
The first table above compares the results of the CFBH and the FBPC which were 
presented in Chapter 5. However, due to methodological differences in calculating pre- 
1980s and post-1980s data, it was necessary to put the measurements on a comparable 
basis. So, the second table more accurately compares the total debt forgiveness (including 
the forgiveness of interest arrears and reductions in contractual interest rates) received by 
debtors in the 1926-1975 period with amounts received by debtors in the Brady Plan 
deals of the 1980s and 1990s. Also, due to small differences in calculations of Brady Plan 
outcomes among several sources, the results of these sources have been averaged.
The empirical results suggest that London Club era saw a reduction in default 
duration, from 10.1 years to 8.5 years and a marked reduction in debt forgiveness, from 
55.9% to 35%, both of which were an improvement on the results delivered by the FBPC. 
While default durations were shorter in the 19th century -  just 6.3 years -  we would argue 
that expedient resolution was not the objective of the commercial bank creditors in the
598 Suter (1992), p. 94. Reduction in principal in the 1871-1925 period excludes those settlements in which 
the creditors assumed either political or economic control over the debtor or foreclosed on collateral. See 
discussions in Chapter 4.
599 The data in this table has been compiled from the following four sources: The World Bank (1996), pp. 
78-86; Cline (1995), p. 234; Bowe and Dean (1997), p. 13; Rieffel (2003), p. 171. Methodological 
differences between the sources serve to create small discrepancies in the results. Therefore, for the 
purposes of this study, the results have been averaged. Also, in order to compare the measurements of debt 
forgiveness for the periods 1926 -  1975 and 1980 -  1997, the figure for 1926 -  1975 had to be re­
calculated to include the forgiveness of interest arrears. See Suter (1992), p. 105 for this re-calculation as 
well as the author interview with Christian Suter, October 19-20,2006.
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1980s. In fact, this put them somewhat at odds with their bondholder counterparts. The 
table below helps to illustrate why it was the case that the London Club banks opposed 
more efficient settlement times.
Table 6C: Bank Exposure to Sovereign Debtors as a Percentage of Bank Capital
(1982- 1992)t0l>
Country 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
US
Banks
Troubled 130.1 119.8 104.3 86.6 74.8 63.6 52.7 40.4 32.0 28.9 26.7
Total 166.2 153.9 130.9 107.0 88.5 73.0 60.4 47.2 39.2 35.7 33.1
Tod 9 
US
Banks
Troubled 194.2 185.1 169.3 140.1 121.6 106.6 92.5 79.6 66.7 63.5 50.6
Total 255.1 242.3 211.5 174.0 144.5 122.9 104.2 90.6 78.9 76.5 61.4
UK
Banks
Troubled 85.0 82.5 78.2 68.6 52.4 42.4 30.3 21.0 13.6 12.2 -
Total 119.3 111.4 104.7 88.8 67.4 53.7 38.4 27.9 20.0 17.1 -
German
Banks
’
Troubled 31.4 32.6 45.1 50.7 38.5 33.5 29.0 28.0 21.8 19.9 18.5
Total 49.5 51.9 68.8 76.0 59.9 52.9 47.2 48.6 40.8 47.0 45.4
French
Banks
Troubled - - 135.0 126.6 78.9 62.8 52.8 51.7 37.1 33.5 22.7
Total - - 170.6 183.4 125.0 93.8 81.4 85.8 63.9 55.1 37.7
Source: Cline (1995)
This is not just a numbers game. We are concerned with the maintenance o f the international monetary 
system.601
William Rhodes 
Citibank, 1983
In 1982, the top nine U.S. money centre banks had exposures to troubled debtor 
states, including Latin America, that were close to two times their capital base.602 The
600 Cline (1995), Tables 2.10 to 2.14. See also Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Country 
Exposure Lending Survey.
601 Rhodes (1983), p. 28.
602 Cline (1995), Tables 2.10 to 2.14. In Cline (1983), the figures are different but still dangerous from the 
point of view of the American banking system, with the top 9 U.S. money centre banks having exposures to 
Latin America of between 107% and 262% of their capital, or close to 160% on average.
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situation was not much better for U.S. banks taken as a whole, with their aggregate 
exposure of 130% still sufficient to eradicate the equity of the entire system. In fact, loans 
to the three biggest Latin American debtor states -  Mexico, Brazil and Argentina -  
represented close to 80% of the capital in the U.S. banking system.603 And, the crisis was 
hardly confined to American lenders. Among U.K. banks, exposures to troubled debtors 
were in the range of 85% of capital, while they were 135% in France. Although German 
banks were better positioned and sources put the level of distressed debt at Japanese 
banks at 50% of equity, these were still exceedingly high percentages when compared to 
normal levels of non-performing loans.604 Even the less exposed banks could have faced 
a loss of confidence and a run by depositors as a result of their troubled loan portfolio.
While the threat to national banking systems might have varied by degree, the 
linkages among the world’s banks were such that no major country could feel immune. 
Paul Volcker, Federal Reserve Chairman at the time, recounted that although many 
people now think of the Latin American debt crisis as a problem for the third world, 
when it began, “it was just as much a problem for the first world, which found its banking 
system suddenly threatened with collapse.”605 Even Bill Rhodes, current Vice Chairman 
of Citigroup and one of the principal architects of the 1982 bank advisory committee 
process, admitted that among his goals, the one that was “first and foremost was to 
prevent the collapse of the international financial and banking system.”606
The clearest way to self-preservation for the banks was to ensure that no major 
debtor country declared a default and that each was instead incentivized to stay within the 
confines of the multi-year rescheduling program. The banks could then use the time to 
safely reduce their exposures to a manageable level, something which they successfully 
achieved. By 1989, when the Brady Plan was announced, U.S. banks had reduced their 
troubled loan exposure from 130% to 40% of capital.607
603 Devlin (1989), p. 217.
604 Cline (1995), Tables 2.10 to 2.14. See also Oatley and Nabors (1998), p. 46, for Japanese exposure 
level. Normal levels of non-performing loans as a percentage of capital would have been in the 1% - 2% 
range.
605 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 189.
606 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 311. See also Eichengreen and Lindert (1989), p. 7.
607 Corden and Dooley (1989), p. 34. “Even when banks write down the value of a loan in their books on 
the basis of their expectations of a possible loss, it is not necessarily in their interests to give up the 
possibility of full repayment. For an individual bank the argument against writing down the contractual 
debt is even stronger. If it does so while others do not, its share of eventual payments will be reduced.”
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Observers have also remarked on the strong contrast “between the lenders’ robust
rno
profitability up through 1986 and the borrowers’ depressed economies.” It was ironic 
that during the 1982 -  1985 timeframe, the debt crisis did not adversely affect the 
reported earnings of the U.S. banks, despite the fact that it “threatened their very 
solvency.”609 In some cases, the banks’ income was actually enhanced by the crisis 
because early rescheduling agreements required the payment of large front-end fees and 
higher interest rates.610 In fact, bank earnings as a percentage of assets from 1982 to 1986 
actually exceeded the levels earned in pre-crisis periods,611 and major banks managed to 
maintain their dividend payouts to shareholders through 1986 “as if the debt crisis hadn’t 
even occurred.”612
Therefore, the debt regime of the 1980s appeared to meet one of its primary 
objectives: to maintain the solvency of the world’s major banks and avoid the 
destabilization of the international financial system. Achieving this objective meant that 
efficient settlements were not on the agenda. By prolonging the negotiations, the banks 
were able to record profits and postpone losses for five years; and, when losses were 
finally taken, it was with the implicit understanding that they could be managed and 
absorbed. The experience of the banks contrasts rather sharply with the predicament of 
debtor sovereigns, who had experienced “losses in output and employment that would
/ i n
have been difficult to imagine possible in 1982.”
Given the above considerations, we would argue that the sovereign debt 
restructuring regime of the 1980s favoured creditor interests, both in design and 
outcomes.614 However, the question remains: Why? What aspects of the regime -  
institutional (London Club), compulsory (govemment/IFI), structural (market) or 
productive (discursive) -  drove regime design and the corresponding results? We will
608 Devlin (1989), pp. 234-235.
609 Sachs and Huizinga (1987), p. 567. “Reported net income rose between 1980 and 1986 for all of the 
nine major banks [Citicorp, BankAmerica, Chase Manhattan, Manufacturer’s Hanover, J.P. Morgan, 
Chemical, Security Pacific, First Interstate, Bankers Trust, First Chicago] with the conspicuous exception 
of BankAmerica, which suffered major losses on its domestic loan portfolio.”
610 Sachs and Huizinga (1987), p. 567.
611 Devlin (1989), pp. 234-235. This helped the banks double the level of their capital: 1982: $66.2 billion 
in primary capital, (Top 9 -  $27.1 billion); 1987: $129.1 billion, (Top 9 - $51.5 billion).
612 Sachs and Huizinga (1987), p. 574.
613 Devlin (1989), pp. 234-235.
614 Corden and Dooley (1989), p. 11.
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begin by examining each aspect of the regime, using the same framework developed in 
previous chapters.
6.3 The Creation o f  the London Club and Institutional Power
The process has been informal. There is no procedures book, no “cook book, " and no international 
bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over these issues. The forum has been the conference room, not the 
courtroom.615
Alfred Mudge 
Bank Advisory Committee Attorney, 1992
6.3.1 The Onset o f the 1980s Debt Crisis
Most accounts of the Latin American debt crisis begin with the phone call that 
Jesus Silva Herzog placed to Donald Regan, U.S. Treasury Secretary, on August 13, 1982 
announcing Mexico’s inability to continue to service its external debt. What is not as 
commonly reported is that upon Herzog’s arrival in Washington, D.C. he was 
immediately ushered into a meeting room where representatives were assembled from the 
State Department, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of 
Management and Budget, and lastly, the Federal Reserve.616 One can surmise from this 
line-up that the U.S. considered an imminent Mexican default to represent a formidable 
threat, not only to the U.S. economy, but to U.S. security as well. Difficulties in Mexico 
of any type are ordinarily of great concern to the United States. The two countries share a 
1,760-mile border, meaning that internal crises in Mexico can have a material impact on 
its North American neighbour. The degree of economic interdependence is also 
significant. In 1982, Mexico “was the third largest trading partner of the United States 
after Japan and Canada, sold more oil to the United States than Saudi Arabia, and 
purchased U.S. grain quantities second only to Japan.”617 When the crisis broke, a former 
State Department official aptly described it as a “tremendous violation of 
expectations.”618
615 Mudge (1992), p. 143.
616 Silva-Herzog (1991), p. 56. See also Dombusch and Marcus (1991).
617 Biersteker (1993), p. 84.
618 Hurlock (1984), p. 45. This characterization of the 1980s debt crisis came from Richard Cooper, U.S. 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs in the Carter administration.
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Given the seriousness of the crisis and the potential repercussions, banks were 
able to accomplish rather quickly what their bondholder counterparts in the 1930s could 
not: “they coordinated effectively to confront the problem debtor countries in order to 
avoid defaults and an immediate devaluation of their assets.”619 The debt crisis of the 
1980s centred largely around the debt owed to commercial banks by approximately 
twenty highly-indebted, middle-income developing countries, and it was on this task that 
the London Club focused its efforts.
6.3.2 The London Club as a Negotiating Body
As we discussed earlier, the London Club is not a formal institution like the 
CFBH and FBPC, but a framework for rescheduling loans between commercial banks 
and sovereign debtors. According to Eichengreen and Portes (1995), “it is a set of 
conventions rather than an institution...there is no fixed venue or continuing secretariat, 
but rather a body of agreed procedures and case law.” In the absence of a secretariat, 
written charter, of published minutes, the origins and early operations of the London Club 
are opaque.622 Even the lack of membership continuity has caused some to describe the 
London Club as “artificially contrived by...players who find it convenient or 
advantageous to camouflage their activities from others.”623 Suspicion naturally arises 
from this lack of transparency, leaving the London Club’s agenda open to speculation by 
outsiders. This section will therefore focus on the institutional activities of the London 
Club. How did it operate? Who were its members? What insight are we able to gain from 
those who participated in its negotiations with debtor states? What did it achieve?
The first London Club meeting was actually held six years before the onset of the 
Latin American debt crisis, when commercial banks met in 1976 to discuss a 
rescheduling for Zaire.624 In fact, between 1976 and 1982, the London Club apparatus 
was used to deal with the debt problems of Zaire, Turkey, Sudan and Poland. The origins
619 Devlin (1989), p. 217.
620 Unlike the CFBH and the FBPC, which dealt with restructurings of bond debt held by UK and US 
investors respectively, the London Club was the first body to emerge to handle restructurings of 
commercial bank debt globally.
621 Eichengreen and Portes (1995), p. 26.
622 Rieffel (2003), p. 103.
623 Brown and Bulman (2006), pp. 12-14.
624 Brown and Bulman (2006), pp. 12-14.
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of the “London Club” moniker had more to do with these first rescheduling meetings, 
which took place in London, than they did with the meetings for the 1980s debt crisis, 
which took place mainly in New York City. Rieffel (2003) also credits the “London” tag 
with the fact that most Eurocurrency loans were governed by English law and their 
benchmark base rate was the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (“LIBOR”).625
While post-hoc analyses of the creation of the London Club often present it as a 
seemless and natural effort, in fact, “the birth of the London Club was a messy affair.”626 
According to Rieffel (2003):
A close examination of the origins of the Bank Advisory Committee (BAC) 
process reveals the same pattern of muddling through that was seen after 
1994 in the search for an orderly process for restructuring bonds. Indeed, no 
machinery of any kind existed in 1975 for multi-bank reorganization of 
commercial banks debt. It had to be invented. Five years and more than five 
workout cases were required for the commercial bank process to 
metamorphose from a series of experiments to a recognizable process.627
The idea behind the London Club was simple. In order to streamline discussions between 
hundreds of lending banks and a troubled debtor state, a small committee of between ten 
to fifteen lead banks would take responsibility for bargaining with the sovereign. It was 
generally the case that the bank that had the largest exposure to a debtor state would be 
asked to organize and chair a Bank Advisory Committee (“BAC”).629 The lead banks 
would then communicate the outline of a proposed deal to the remaining lenders and 
work with them until a consensus could be reached on final terms. During the 
negotiations, each member of the BAC was charged with securing the cooperation of a 
group of smaller banks that were not directly represented on the committee.631 The 
challenge for the lead banks was that absent a formal, legal mandate from the debtor
625 Rieffel (2003), p. 103.
626 Rieffel (2003), p. 103.
627 Rieffel (2003), p. 95.
628 Aggarwal and Granville (2003), p. 67. In 1982, the 15 lead banks held 85% of die total distressed debt. 
The largest committees had fifteen members and the smallest had three to five.
629 Rieffel (2003), p. 108. BACs are also referred to as Steering Committees. “London Club” is an umbrella 
term for the Bank Advisory Committee Process.
630 Kearney (1993), p. 66.
631 Rieffel (2003), pp. 116-117.
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country or their banking syndicate, they had to develop proposals that would attract 
unanimous approval.
Citibank’s Bill Rhodes was careful to point out that membership on these 
committees was not decided unilaterally by the banks, but in conjunction with the debtor 
countries. In fact, according to Rhodes, the entire process could not begin unless the 
debtor sovereign formally requested the establishment of the committee:
These committees were organized in coordination with each of the debtor 
countries, and that is important to remember: They were not put together by 
the banks alone; they were requested by the debtor countries...The 
committees have served as an informal pipeline for the borrower 
governments, who otherwise would find it difficult -  if not impossible -  to 
negotiate with the thousand or so interested banks an any one time around the 
world.634
Rhodes went on to stress that when deciding the make-up of an advisory committee, the 
debtor state needed to take into consideration more than simply the size of a bank’s 
exposure - geography and regional influence were important as well:
We have learned much about organization. In the past, for example, when 
choosing a committee chairman, the government usually went to its leading 
bank lender and asked it to help put together the rest of the committee. Most 
often...it would tend to be an American bank. Now, however, we are 
broadening the geographical representation to include other regions of the 
world.635
Rhodes believed that the effectiveness of the steering committee was increased to the 
extent that it could mirror the interests of the institutions around the world that it 
represented. And, as we will discuss later, the need to harmonize a final deal around 
different regulatory and accounting conventions across the U.S., Europe and Asia 
certainly increased the importance of non-U.S. representation in the London Club 
process.
632 Mudge (1992), p. 143.
633 Rhodes, currently Citigroup Senior Vice Chairman, headed a number of high-profile steering 
committees during the 1980s debt crisis and was widely considered to be the architect of the 1980s bank 
advisory process. Today, he focuses his efforts on the debate about how to improve the international 
financial architecture and is a contributor to the IIF’s Principles fo r  Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring in Emerging Markets.
634 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), pp. 312-314. Comment by William Rhodes of Citibank.
635 Rhodes (1983), p. 26.
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6.3.3 The London Club Economic Sub-Committees
Often overlooked in accounts of the London Club is the key role played by 
economists. Until 1982, most banks in the United States conducted their foreign lending 
business without the benefit of thorough and disciplined in-house economic analysis. 
This meant that bank credit officers in the 1970s could not turn to a staff of experienced 
economic practitioners to help them spot potential lending pitfalls. In 1983, Jack 
Guenther, Citibank Economist observed: “I think this is one reason why the IMF -  with
f/if.
its experienced staff -  has seen its own role grow.”
However, once the crisis began, the banks set about to remedy this shortcoming. 
There were immediate efforts to establish a series of economic subcommittees, especially 
for the larger restructurings in Mexico and Brazil. And, these subcommittees were not 
necessarily dominated by U.S. economists. The banks sought input from around the 
world and invited practitioners from Japan, Europe, Canada and South America. The role 
of the economic subcommittee was to independently evaluate economic data that was 
given to the banks by the debtor countries and the IMF. Nothing was taken for granted or 
accepted at face value. In addition, they worked directly with the finance ministers of 
debtor governments to prepare data for distribution to the banks, and they frequently had 
a say in how debtor sovereigns presented their economic information. For instance, in 
1983, the Bank of Mexico produced a quarterly financial report in a format which had 
been prescribed by the banks’ economic subcommittee. Similarly, in Brazil, the data 
packages produced by the Central Bank were strongly influenced by the advisory 
committee economists. Not only did the economic subcommittees work closely with the 
debtor states, they also had regular dialogue with the IMF and central banks globally. 
Their mission was a difficult one. They were expected to provide reliable economic data 
around which debtors and creditors could frame their negotiations, and they often had to 
deliver a verdict on what they considered to be the debt servicing capacity of a given 
state. In the case of Mexico, the London Club was dealing with over five hundred
636 Guenther (1983), p. 33.
637 Rhodes (1983), pp. 26-27.
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banks and in the case of Brazil, over six hundred. It was therefore imperative that they 
had the best available information on which to base their restructuring decisions.
6.3.4 London Club Guiding Principles and Negotiations
According to Rieffel (2003) the London Club had three guiding principles: i) 
negotiations were to take place on a case-by-case basis with debtor states so that 
agreements could be specifically tailored to the particular circumstances of each country; 
ii) agreements were voluntary, meaning that they were not imposed by official bodies like 
the IMF; and, iii) agreements were market-based, implying that they had to be flexible, 
pragmatic and, above all, “apolitical.” Since the London Club banks were ultimately 
responsible to their shareholders, they also endeavoured to conclude their earliest deals 
with the countries needing the fewest concessions. This way, they would establish the 
most favourable precedents for dealing with the harder cases.639 O’Brien (1993) argued 
that the “case-by-case” principle was not so much meant to bring tailored solutions to 
debtors, but to give the banks additional bargaining leverage. With their insistence on 
bargaining individually with debtor states, the banks “ensured that the powerful cartel of 
creditors faced a weak debtor.”640
Each negotiation would generally begin with a debtor presenting to the BAC the 
terms of its preferred restructuring deal. Almost immediately, the BAC would commence 
its deliberations to prepare a counter-offer from the banks. The economic subcommittees 
played a key role in this process. They had to independently determine the debt capacity 
of the troubled sovereign and construct detailed balance-of-payments projections. The 
economists also had to ensure that they accounted for all of the debt outstanding, since a 
sovereign’s records were not always reliable 641 London Club negotiators confided that 
reports on sovereign debt positions were not only unreliable, but that delays in
638 Rhodes (1983), p. 27.
639 Rieffel (2003), pp. 109-110. In order for deals to be considered “market-based,” they had to be agreed at 
rates that were above LEBOR, the banks’ marginal cost of funds. In addition, the payment terms had to be 
set in accordance with a country’s capacity to pay, something that was more easily determined in theory 
than in practice.
640 O’Brien (1993), p. 94.
641 Rieffel (2003), pp. 117-120.
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publication made them analytically useless,642 Rick Bloom, a London Club negotiator for 
Bank of America, pointed out that Argentina had under-reported its bank debt by $10 
billion in 1982, and that one major bank had to concede that its own exposure to 
Argentina was twice the level reported to its board, because bank affiliates, offshore 
subsidiaries and consortia banks were slow to identify their defaulted loans 643
Despite these information gaps, the steering committee banks and the debtor state 
eventually managed to converge and produce a final terms sheet. This tentative 
agreement was considered “accepted” only when near unanimous approval was obtained 
from all the participating banks; the level of unanimity was considered to fall somewhere 
north of 95%.644
6.3.5 London Club Legal Conventions
In seeking broad consensus from participating banks, the London Club process 
was certainly helped by the standard legal provisions in syndicated loan agreements. 
These provisions had the effect of increasing the cohesion among the banks by making 
unilateral action much less attractive. The most important clause from this perspective 
was the sharing clause. It required the agent or lead bank in a syndicated loan to 
distribute any proceeds received from the debtor state to all participating banks on a pro­
rata basis. It also compelled a participating bank to share any payments received from the 
borrower - even if they came as the result of independent legal action - with the rest of 
the syndicate members. This discouraged member banks from “going it alone” or 
invoking legal options, since their upside was limited. As a result, creditors developed 
informal, behavioural rules that included a commitment to negotiate rather than seek 
legal action.645
Once again, post-hoc analyses of London Club restructuring agreements tended to 
give the banks and their lawyers too much credit for “considered and rational judgement”
642 Author Interviews A & C. The interviewees also admitted that the banks’ own records concerning their 
sovereign exposure were less than accurate and accounting systems had to be materially upgraded to ensure 
that all exposure was captured.
643 Rieffel (2003), p. 123.
644 Rieffel (2003), p. 123.
645 Rieffel (2003), p. 108. Other important legal conventions included the pari passu clause, which required 
the debtor state to treat banks in a syndicated loan no less favourably than banks in similar loans. Cross­
default clauses permitted syndicate banks to declare a default if the sovereign borrower defaulted on 
another loan.
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when they observed a trend towards increasing standardization of loan documentation. 
Attorneys representing the banks tended to dispute this characterization, preferring a 
more “human explanation.” According to Walker and Buchheit (1984), of the New York 
law firm Cleary, Gottlieb:
The community of lawyers around the world actively engaged in sovereign 
debt workouts is surprisingly small. It is not uncommon to find a single law 
firm representing either the lenders or the borrowers in a number of different 
negotiations all taking place simultaneously. Given the natural human instinct 
to follow precedent when confronted with new and complicated assignments, 
an increasing standardization of documentation... is probably inevitable. Thus 
legal documentation... prepared in the context of one negotiation not only can 
be, but often [is], marked up as the basis for another borrower’s restructuring. 
Provisions which may play a useful role in one agreement are sometimes 
uncritically incorporated into its progeny.646
Cleary Gottlieb believed that the standardization of restructuring agreements - often a 
response to time pressure and overlapping bank representation - did not necessarily 
produce optimal results for banks or their borrowers. While it might have appeared to be 
the outcome of careful deliberation, it was not. Other attorneys were quick to point out 
that with the passage of time, the focus on precedent forced the banks and borrowers into 
a “lowest common denominator” approach to negotiation. According to Davis (1992):
When it is in their interest, the banks say, ‘We can’t give you X even though 
we gave it to another country, because you have not done the following,’ or 
‘You have to agree to Y because another country agreed to it.’ And, in other 
circumstances, when it is in their interest, the government negotiators will 
say, ‘Well, you gave it to country X, so you have to give it to us,’ while 
resisting other points agreed to by other countries by stressing how different 
their country’s position is from that of those countries that acquiesced in these 
demands 64
Therefore, the negotiation tended to devolve into a process where each side argued from 
points of precedent, but only when it served their interest to do so. As time progressed, it 
became even more difficult to achieve consensus, either among the creditors or between 
the creditors and debtors. In fact, the inability to surmount fractured interests without 
coercion was just one of the many weaknesses of the London Club process.
646 Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 140.
647 Davis (1992), pp. 149-150.
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6.3.6 The Weaknesses o f the London Club Bank Advisory Committee Process
6.3.6.1 The Principle of Consensus
The simple fact that the process operated on the principle of consensus meant that 
each committee bank held a powerful veto and could, in theory, stall negotiations for long 
periods of time. And, even after the bank committee reached agreement on a set of terms 
with the debtor state, close to 100 percent acceptance was then required from hundreds of 
participating banks. Whereas you could often get agreement from the first 90 to 98 
percent “in a relatively short time,” it often took “months to obtain commitments from 
the last 2 to 3 percent.”648 Some likened the BACs to a “miniature United Nations, 
making consensus laborious and time consuming.”649 Practitioners engaged in London 
Club negotiations agreed that any attempt to idealize the 1980s framework would be 
“profoundly a-historical,” since it was far from being “smooth and organized.”650 As we 
will discuss later, the only available tools for securing such acceptance were compulsory 
in nature: moral suasion by lead banks, regulators, and central banks and the threatened 
loss of access to the global payments system.651
6.3.6.2 Debtor Confusion: The Lack of Coordination Among Classes of Creditors652
fn addition to the principle of consensus, the lenders -  both private and official -  
offered the debtor little help in trying to coordinate complex negotiations among various 
classes of creditors. Jeffrey Garten (1982), a partner at Lehman Brothers, argued that the 
almost comical “Alphonse-Gaston” routines that developed led to costly delays and 
terrible confusion as a debtor state continued to suffer economic decline:
The separate negotiations with the IMF and each category of creditor are 
uncoordinated. The creditors demand an IMF programme as a pre-condition 
for rescheduling debt. The IMF, on the other hand, needs to know the 
outcome of the rescheduling before it can develop a viable stabilization 
programme based on an accurate projection of the country’s foreign exchange
648 Davis (1992), p. 150.
649 Rhodes (1989), p. 26.
650 Author Interviews, A, C, D, and I.
651 Buchheit (2003), p. 12.
652 Classes of creditors included the London Club, Paris Club and IMF. The Paris Club was established in 
1956 as a forum to negotiate official, bi-lateral debt restructurings on a govemment-to-govemment basis.
196
position. In addition, the governments prefer to act after the banks reschedule 
their loans. Of course, the banks want to wait for the governments.653
So, while the creditors were struggling to secure for themselves the largest share of the 
debtor’s foreign exchange pie, the financial cost of uncoordinated negotiation was being 
borne by the debtor state. In addition, the whole process was an immense drain on the 
talent and energy of the sovereign’s finance ministry, who could have put their time to 
much better use by tackling the domestic economic problems that gave rise to the crisis in 
the first place.
6.3.6.3 London Club Fatigue: Negotiation Without End
The cast o f characters, drawn from the principal commercial banks around the world... is getting 
physically, and perhaps mentally, tired o f this process.654
Francis Logan 
BAC Attorney, 1992
Given the above considerations, it was not surprising to see London Club 
negotiators begin to complain of fatigue. According to Francis Logan (1992) a Cleary, 
Gottlieb attorney, creditors not only grew weary with the demands of debtors, but also 
found it increasingly difficult to get along with each other.655 Richard Davis, a lawyer 
representing the BACs, argued that the fatigue ostensibly developed from the “never- 
ending” nature of the process.656 It was also a function of the fact that the general 
perception of the crisis had changed. After all, the term “crisis” connotes something that 
comes to a head, but the 1980s debt problems appeared to be more of an unsolved,
f - c n
prolonged dilemma. This meant that early on, when the risks to the banks were 
perceived as being very high, senior decision-makers attended meetings and had the 
power to commit their institutions; however, once the immediate risks receded, senior 
management delegated the task to more junior personnel. Eventually, meetings were
653 Garten (1982), pp. 281-283.
654 Logan (1992), p. 155.
655 Logan (1992), p. 157.
656 Davis (1992), p. 147.
657 Davis (1992), p. 148.
658 Mendelsohn (1983), p. 10.
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attended by people who primarily recorded information, voiced complaints, and made 
phone calls for guidance on every important issue.659
While Citibank’s William Rhodes was careful to point out how much progress 
had been made from 1982 to 1989, the lawyers were much more circumspect.660 They 
argued that hard work, good luck and collective effort on the part of the banks helped to 
avoid systemic financial collapse, but that no solution had been found for the plight of the 
debtor countries, despite the rhetoric from Rhodes and U.S. Treasury Secretary James 
Baker.661 In fact, in 1983, Rhodes proved to be overly optimistic about the potential 
economic recovery of debtor states. He predicted that by 1984, Mexico would have its 
private sector restructured and that in the following year, 1985, Mexico would be “back 
in the marketplace,” His assessment was off by approximately five years.
6.3.7 Why Did it Take So Lon2? Was the London Club the Rivht Process?
As we suggested at the beginning of this chapter, the commercial bank lenders 
would have been rendered insolvent if debt forgiveness were offered in 1982, at the 
outset of the Latin American debt crisis. Therefore, a process which was both consensus- 
building and time-consuming helped the banks meet one of their principal objectives: to 
bolster their loan-loss reserves and build their equity bases through nearly seven years of 
healthy profits. The stakes were so high that the banks “had to assume that the crisis 
could be managed.”663 The outcome could not be determined solely by market forces, 
since systemic risk had to be eliminated first.664
With a vested stake in the London Club process, the bankers were naturally more 
careful to defend it. Bill Rhodes argued that the “flexibility and innovativeness of the 
case-by-case, market-based, cooperative approach” was often underestimated by outside 
observers,665 and that “imposed” debt solutions would have severely curtailed
659 Davis (1992), p. 149.
660 Logan (1992), p. 154.
661 Logan (1992), p. 156.
662 Rhodes (1983), p. 31.
663 Rhodes (1989), p. 19.
664 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 319. Comment by Manuel Guitian, Assciate Director, Central Banking 
Deparmemt, IMF.
665 Rhodes (1989), pp. 23-24.
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commercial bank lending to developing countries.666 Others have also offered a defence 
of the banks’ position. Rieffel (2003) argued that it was “necessary to ‘bump down the 
stairs’ before beginning broad-based debt reduction. Leaping from the top to the bottom 
would have risked systemic consequences that could be avoided by taking more time.” 
Some bankers simply admitted that “no one ever imagined a different way to do it.”668 
Cline (1995) maintained that the London Club approach “bought time” for the triage 
process that would eventually separate those countries that needed debt forgiveness from 
those that did not669 Rodney Wagner of J.P. Morgan declared with the benefit of 
hindsight that “we at Morgan have never thought that the LDC debt problem would be 
short-term in nature, a so-called liquidity problem.”670 He admitted that the main goal of 
the lengthy process was to save the banks so that the “fear of collapse of the financial 
system” would pass.671
However, some economists, including Jeffrey Sachs (1986), argued that it was a 
“myth” to assume that U.S. banks could not have afforded debt relief prior to 1989. Sachs 
suggested that debt relief in the form of five years of forgiven interest payments to all but 
the three largest debtors -  Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela - would have represented only 
15 percent of bank capital for the major U.S. banks and 5 percent for all U.S. banks. In 
other words, it was affordable.672
It was not until 1989, seven years after the crisis started, that Latin American 
debtor states were finally offered debt forgiveness of close to 35% in the form of the 
Brady Plan. The plan was menu-driven, allowing the banks to choose from among four, 
equivalently valued alternatives.673 The design of the Brady Plan also served an important 
American political agenda -  it required U.S. banks to suffer some pain for their perceived
666 Rhodes (1989), p. 27.
667 Rieffel (2003), p. 152.
668 Author Interview I.
669 Cline (1995), p. 224; Rieffel (2003), p. 153.
670 Wagner (1989), p. 35.
671 Wagner (1989), p. 36.
672 Sachs (1986), p. 408. If the relief were also extended to include Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, the cost 
would rise to 41 percent of money centre bank capital and 14 percent of total bank capital.
673 Option 1: A par bond, exchanged for the same principal amount of old loans but bearing a fixed, below- 
market interest rate; Option 2: A discount bond, exchanged at a substantial discount from the principal 
amount of old loans but paying interest based on the current market rate; Option 3: A debt-equity swap 
yielding a local-currency claim that could be exchanged for shares in an enterprise being privatized; and, 
Option 4: A cash buyback at a discount. See Cline (1995) and Rieffel (2003), p. 172.
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folly. There was a strong feeling, especially among American voters and politicians, that 
the commercial banks should not be bailed out for their imprudent lending to Latin 
America. At the time, N.Y. Congressman Chuck Schumer argued that “no taxpayer 
bailout” was an “article of faith in the debate on Third World debtors.”674
Yet, the protracted sovereign debt negotiations of the 1980s allowed banks to 
reduce their troubled loan exposure from an average of 130% to 40% of primary capital
£nc
and avert financial collapse. The strategy of rolling over debt and waiting seven years 
for a debt restructuring worked very well for the banks, both in containing losses and 
even making profits in some cases. Those banks that had written their debt down below 
the level of the haircut, were able to recognize profits when they exchanged their loans 
for Brady Bonds. In addition, the banks were often more than compensated for their 
losses as the prices of the restructured instruments rose in the market. The ex-post 
sovereign spreads on private credit in the 1989-1994 period were 23.3% for Latin 
America, well above the 16.7% for all emerging market debt as a class 676 However, it 
would not have been possible for the banks to achieve such results without the strong 
backing of their governments and the IMF. The 1980s sovereign debt restructuring 
regime was highly coercive in almost every respect, and in the next section, we will 
establish the important role that coercion played in the negotiation process.
6.4 Compulsory Power
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the official sector ran the sovereign debt restructuring business much 
like Wyatt Earp ran Tombstone, Arizona on a Saturday night: there could be as much shouting and 
blaspheming as you wanted, but everybody had to check their guns before they came into town.677
Lee Buchheit 
Cleary, Gottlieb, 2005/2006
Creditors had all the sticks on their side in the 1980s.
Author Interview D 
February 4,2005
674 Schumer (1989), p. 233.
675 McGovern (2003), p. 74. See also Cline (1995), Tables 2.10 to 2.14 and Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, Country Exposure Lending Survey.
676 Klingen, Weder et al. (2004), pp. 27-29.
677 Buchheit (2005-2006), pp. 339-340.
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While the London Club process may have seemed cohesive and cooperative to 
outside observers, in truth, its success was largely dependent upon the use of coercion 
and compulsion at many levels. Within bank syndicates there were divergent interests. 
Large money-centre banks could not afford to walk away from the restructurings, and 
smaller, regional banks were loathe to lend new money. Different accounting and 
regulatory policies were often a source of friction between U.S. and European banks, 
forcing solutions that were American-centric and cumbersome for the non-U.S. banks. In 
many instances, the IMF was seen as using its own lending capacity as a “stick” for the 
banks. And, finally, creditor country governments and regulators had a vested interest in 
safeguarding their own domestic financial systems, making them less reluctant to threaten 
potential defaulting states with meaningful sanctions.678
In this section, we will examine the use of coercive power in the London Club 
process and argue that it was critical in skewing bargaining outcomes in favour of the 
banks. We will look at how this power was exercised over U.S. regional bank holdouts, 
non-U.S. banks, and sovereign debtors. In the majority of cases, the most effective form 
of persuasive power was official, in the sense that it was exercised by creditor country 
governments, their agencies, and the IMF; however, in some instances, large, money-
fiTIQcentre banks were also able to directly influence the actions of regional banks.
6.4.1 The Coercion o f Regional Banks
Regional banks were the holdout creditors of the 1980s debt crisis. They were 
more numerous than their money-centre banking counterparts and, in theory, posed a
678 Rhodes (1989), p. 20. In many ways, the creditors’ cartel that formed between the commercial banks, 
creditor country governments, financial regulators and the IMF was somewhat unusual in that it developed 
among parties that often had adversarial or competitive relationships. After all, the banks that made up a 
steering committee were usually competing for the same clients and business outside of the London Club. 
Bank regulators often found themselves in contentious relationships with the commercial banks they 
monitored, and the international financial institutions - like the IMF and World Bank - “traditionally kept 
their distance from commercial lenders.” In the face of these obstacles, Rhodes credited the success of the 
London Club working arrangement with the leadership provided by certain key individuals: Jacques de 
Larosiere at the International Monetary Fund; Paul Volcker and Tony Solomon at the Federal Reserve; 
Gordon Richardson at the Bank of England; Tim McNamar and Marc Leland at the U.S. Treasury; and a 
group of senior international bankers led by Walter Wriston, Chairman of Citibank, and Sir Jeremy Morse, 
Chairman of Lloyds Bank.
679 Although our analytical framework attributes compulsory power capabilities mainly to creditor country 
governments and multilaterals, this chapter also examines how lead banks had the capacity to coerce 
regional banks in the London Club process.
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threat to the consensus-driven, decision-making process of the London Cub. In the 
Mexican bank syndicate alone, there were 180 U.S. regional banks with exposures 
ranging anywhere from $625 million to less than $10,000.68°
From the perspective of the regional banks, the London Club process was two- 
tiered. The inner core was comprised of dominant international banks like Citibank, J.P 
Morgan, Chase Manhattan, Bank of America, Lloyds and Dresdner. Smaller, regional 
banks were in the periphery, often treated with contempt and referred to as “stuffees ”681 
In the core, the large banks bargained among one another to set the terms. In the 
periphery, the regional banks were expected to ratify them without question. According 
to Nancy Gibbs (1984), an attorney representing regional banks in Mexico, the term 
“cram down” was not “an unduly harsh description of what in fact occurred.”682 Banks 
were given less than a week to commit to a complex new deal that was outlined in a 
twenty-foot long telex. And, Mendelsohn (1983) offered this observation from an 
executive of a smaller bank: “We simply get a telex from the steering group banks that 
they are meeting in Zurich or wherever, that they have agreed on such and such terms, 
and would we kindly telex our agreement no later than 2 p.m.”683 When asked how the 
larger banks secured agreement from regional banks, one London Club negotiator 
replied: “Regulatory pressure, moral force and yelling.”684
The bargaining leverage of the core came from three principal sources. First, the 
lead banks were heavily engaged in cross-depositing through the inter-bank market, 
meaning that they were an important source of funds for regional banks. Money centre 
banks also offered a critical range of products and services to regional banks, including 
correspondent banking and loan syndication. According to Lipson (1985a), these 
interdependencies permitted “both reciprocity and retaliation,” thereby facilitating policy 
coordination.685
680 Gibbs (1984), p. 11.
681 Author Interview I. The term “stuffee” was a derogatory reference to regional banks by their money 
centre counterparts, since the latter would routinely offload unwanted loans to the former via the 
syndications process.
682 Gibbs (1984), pp. 23-24.
683 Mendelsohn (1983), p. 15.
684 Author Interview C.
685 Lipson (1985a), p. 205.
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Second, from a documentary perspective, the regional banks did not have the 
same degree of control over the voting process. They could not, for instance, call a 
default since voting was weighted by loan values and generally required a two-thirds 
majority.686 Therefore, the larger banks were better able to block any regional bank 
efforts to trigger a default. This gave the money centre banks an effective veto over the 
wishes of the smaller syndicate banks.687
Third, the money centre banks controlled the flow of information. The simple act 
of forming a BAC meant that a debtor government would limit its contact to the banks 
that were members of the steering committee. So, even those regional banks that had 
local offices in Latin America were unable to obtain better information from troubled 
sovereigns than their BAC counterparts. This afforded the lead banks a power base 
almost as influential as the size of their loan commitments and meant that they could 
shape the terms of the restructuring.688 And, those regional banks without an international 
staff were left to feel as if they were at the bottom of the banking food-chain. In fact, lead 
banks were not terribly moved by grievances of smaller banks which, in their estimation, 
“were happy enough to enter the markets in a subsidiary role when the going was good,” 
and should therefore not complain in times of adversity 689 According to one steering 
committee member: “There are obviously some ‘Johnny come lately’s’ who went in late 
without adequate staff and did not understand and are now having a difficult time.”690
Next to an outright default by a debtor state, the main threat to the London Club 
process was an effective hold-out strategy by regional banks. It may have been a 
“perilous and lonely course” for any small bank to choose, but it remained a distinct 
possibility. Therefore, a considerable amount of effort was invested in preventing i t691 
There were a number of pragmatic options devised by the lead banks to deal with 
potential holdouts. Sometimes, there would be “arm-twisting at the chairman or CEO 
level.”692 If that was unsuccessful, state and federal regulators or central bank authorities
686 Aggarwal (1987), pp. 23-24.
687 Lipson (1985a), pp. 216-217.
688 Gibbs (1984), pp. 23-24.
689 Mendelsohn (1983), p. 16.
690 Aggarwal (1987), p. 19. Cited in Financial Times, December 21, 1982, p. 8.
691 Lipson (1985a), p. 219.
692 Rieffel (2003), p. 114.
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were brought into the process.693 Central banks such as the Federal Reserve Board and 
the Bank of England were particularly adept at putting pressure on holdouts when the 
stakes warranted it.694 There were even cases where the central banks of debtor 
governments got involved in the monitoring process. In one instance, the Central Bank of 
Brazil gave Banker’s Trust the information it needed to send out ‘name and shame’ 
telexes to those regional lenders that had failed to restore their credit lines to Brazil695
However, before enlisting official help, the lead banks simply isolated the 
potential holdouts and used their banking relationships “to point out the error of their 
ways.” The goal was to make it clear that non-cooperation was transparent, that defectors 
would be punished in the future, and that “asymmetry of bank size” permitted “effective, 
low-cost sanctions.”696 According to one lead banker: “A small bank, especially, has to 
have access to the world money market and big customers; a reputation for being a solo 
artist is not considered desirable.”697
Yet, it was still the case that many smaller, regional banks harboured resentment 
against steering committee banks for what they felt was “unjustified pressure to go on 
lending.”698 Frederick Heldring, Chairman and CEO of the Philadelphia National Bank, 
spoke openly in 1989 about the errors of the London Club process. He argued that it had 
been wrong to lend new money to Latin American states simply to keep interest 
payments current, and he maintained that the banks should have accepted the need for 
debt forgiveness earlier in the process.699 Heldring also implied that since many of the 
regional banks were not threatened with collapse by the crisis, they were able to more 
honestly assess it for what it was: a solvency, not a liquidity, problem.700 And, his main 
concern was that by inducing stagnation and lower living standards in Latin America, the
701banks had sown the seeds of a “potential social revolution” in these countries.”
693 Rieffel (2003), p. 123. Author Inteviews A & C.
694 Lipson (1985a), p. 221.
695 Aggarwal (1987), pp. 25-27. Cited in Fortune, July 11, 1983.
696 Lipson (1985a), p. 220. See also Devlin (1989), p. 219.
697 Aggarwal (1987), p. 24. Cited in Wall Street Journal, April 13, 1984.
698 Mendelsohn (1983), p. 13.
699 Heldring (1989), pp. 30-31.
700 Heldring (1989), p. 33.
701 Heldring (1989), p. 32.
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The positions of the money centre and regional banks could not have been more 
divergent. It was therefore interesting to see how the steering committee banks actually 
used the recalcitrance of the regional banks to their advantage when negotiating with 
debtor sovereigns. For example, the BACs would often threaten troubled debtors with the 
negative reaction of “maverick” regional lenders, when the goal was principally to secure 
better terms for all the banks. According to Walker and Buchheit (1984):
During the course of the negotiations, the sovereign borrower can expect to 
hear much about risks posed by such maverick [regional] lenders who may 
refuse to participate in the restructuring process. The sovereign may be told 
again and again that its approach to particular points in the negotiations...will 
increase the chance that maverick lenders may reject the restructuring...The 
sovereign will rarely be in a position to verify whether potential maverick 
lenders are in fact possessed of the sensitivities claimed for them by the bank 
advisory group during negotiations. Nevertheless, the sovereign will be asked 
to concede a great deal to forestall possible adverse reactions by some lenders 
when both the imminence and relative importance of such reactions remains 
largely speculative.702
6.4.2 The Coercion o f Non-U.S. Banks
It was not just the regional banks that were at the receiving end of coercive power. 
Non-U.S. banks were also subject to coercion from U.S. steering committee banks and 
official institutions, including their own central banks and treasury departments. Because 
exposures were skewed within national boundaries - North American banks accounted 
for 35.7% of total international lending to Argentina, Brazil and Mexico - U.S. 
commercial banks often found it difficult to get their European or Asian counterparts to 
go along with what the Europeans criticized as the “American show.”703 This often 
resulted in a fair amount of “posturing” by non-U.S. banks which wasted valuable time 
and energy.704
In addition to smaller exposures, the lack of regulatory harmonization was the 
most frequent obstacle to cooperation. The Deputy Chairman of AG Becker Paribas 
voiced concerns over the fact that there were “vast differences in the supervisory systems 
around the world.” Each country had its “own specialized supervisory system...based
702 Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 156.
703 Aggarwal (1987), pp. 16-17.
704 Author Interview C.
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upon its history, its traditions, [and] the size of [its] banking system.”705 Nationalized 
French banks did not have to be concerned with showing a quarterly profit, and therefore 
could afford a longer-term view on the 1980s debt crisis. Swiss banks, which declared 
profits only on an annual basis, were also willing to take a longer view than the 
Americans. Moreover, European banks were encouraged by favourable tax laws to make 
larger provisions for loan losses on their foreign debt. In West Germany, for example, 
provisioning against potentially uncollectible loans significantly reduced tax liabilities, 
and in Switzerland, the central bank strongly promoted the building of extra loan loss 
reserves against exposure to Mexico and Brazil.
National regulatory differences were also evident on the issue of interest 
capitalization. For most continental European banks capitalizing interest did not require 
the approval of the board of directors.706 The European banks strongly suggested that the 
London Club capitalize interest payments instead of mandating new loans, especially 
since the loans were being used principally to fund the interest payments. As they saw it, 
the administrative burden of advancing new loans across a 600-member banking 
syndicate was much greater than making a simple accounting entry for capitalized 
interest. But, North American banks were vehemently opposed to the suggestion since 
they were obliged to classify loans as non-performing as soon as interest payments were 
past due by more than 90 days. For them, the illusion that interest was being paid -  even 
though the payments were coming from new loans -  was necessary for them to keep the
n(\iloans “performing;” and, only performing loans could be maintained at full book value. 
So, they successfully pushed back against their European counterparts to avoid the 
potentially disastrous costs to them of interest capitalization.708
Despite the questionable accounting treatment of U.S. troubled loans, the 
European banks has little power to change the London Club process. One French banker, 
who complained bitterly about Citibank’s “imperialism,” said that it would be “nonsense 
to try to increase French influence [for four reasons:] the bigger commitment by U.S. 
banks; [the fact that they] had lead managed the loans, they are respected the world over
705 Heinman (1983), p. 32.
706 Lipson (1985a), pp. 212-213.
707 Aggarwal (1987), pp. 20-21.
708 Rieffel (2003), p. 164.
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and they got organized quickly.”709 Even a major international lender like Lloyd’s bank, 
when telexing its acceptance of rescheduling terms to the London Club stated: “We are 
only doing this because the Bank of England asked us to.”710
6.4.3 The Coercion o f Debtor States
As tar babies go, few  have proven stickier for the official sector than the plight o f private sector lenders 
trying to recover their bad loans to foreign governments. Inevitably, these lenders have looked to their own 
governments for succour and protection against defaulting sovereign debtors. At several points and in 
several ways over the last two centuries, the official sector has tried to detach itself from this problem, only 
to discover how relentlessly adhesive it can be.711
Lee Buchheit 
Cleary, Gottlieb, 2005/2006
At no time did international banking occupy a market free o f such exogenous factors as governments.712
Philip Wellons, 1985
Although the commercial banks tried to perpetuate the “myth” that the 1980s debt 
crisis was a purely private affair between debtor states and their creditors, the process that 
developed was anything but apolitical.713 As we have discussed earlier, there were a 
number of places in the London Club process where politics and finance intersected, most 
notably with the activism of creditor country governments, regulators and the IMF.714 
And, from the moment that Mexican treasury officials communicated their payment 
difficulties to the U.S, “U.S. officials assumed that America’s own security, not just 
Mexico’s, was at stake.”715 From a foreign policy perspective, Latin America had long 
been regarded as a region that was vitally connected to U.S. interests, and there was no 
Latin American nation more strategically important to the United States than Mexico. 
While the foreign policy objectives of the U.S. may have had little salience for American 
bankers, the alignment of official and private interests in the 1980s debt crisis was a boon
709 Aggarwal (1987), p. 22. Cited interview with French commercial banker.
710 Aggarwal (1987), p. 28.
711 Buchheit (2005-2006), p. 333.
712 Wellons (1985), p. 441.
7,3 O'Brien (1993), p. 94.
714 Kahler (1986c), pp. 7-8. According to one Chase banker: “I do remember in April 1982 when Argentina 
went to war with [Britain], Chase had a loan drawdown request [from Argentina].. .1 was.. .trying to get 
them to retract their request and [got] the Fed, Treasury, State Department, and the Argentinian 
ambassador to the U.S. on the phone with the President of the Argentine Central Bank. They finally 
retracted their request...” See Author Interview C.
715 Cohen (1986a), p. 212.
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for private creditors.716 U.S. lenders had dangerous levels of loan exposure to a 
strategically important neighbour, thereby combining the threat of regional instability 
with domestic financial collapse.717 The dual domestic and international threat led the 
U.S. government and its agencies to support the London Club restructuring process and 
its main proponents, the money-centre banks. From a realist perspective, “national 
economic and political objectives took precedence,” and debtor states were strongly 
encouraged to cooperate with the banks.718
If the main internal threat to the London Club process was the defection of 
regional and non-U.S. banks, the main external threat was unilateral default by a major 
borrower. For this reason, official, coercive power was used to keep debtor states in line. 
Kahler (1986b) describes the first two years of negotiation, from 1982 to 1984, as a 
“game of chicken” with the penalties for non-cooperation large and largely unknown.”719 
Since most commercial banks benefited from government-sponsored deposit insurance 
programs, a series of sovereign defaults would have seriously undermined the domestic 
financial systems of creditor governments and socialized the costs of bank failure.720 So, 
to avert default, political pressure from creditor country governments, especially the 
United States, carried “the implicit message that sanctions of a non-fmancial kind” be 
imposed on any countries that failed to service their debt.721 The Deputy Treasury 
Secretary of the United States painted an alarming picture of what might happen to 
countries that default:
The foreign assets of a country would be attacked by creditors throughout the 
world; its exports would be seized by creditors at each dock where they 
landed; its national airlines unable to operate, and its sources of desperately 
needed capital goods and spare parts virtually eliminated. In many countries, 
even food imports would be curtailed.722
716 Aggarwal (1987), p. 38. Said one Citibanker: “Who knows which political system works? The only test 
we care about is: Can they pay their bills?” Cited in Wall Street Journal, December 21, 1981.
717 Wellons (1985), p. 471.
718 Wellons (1985), p. 442. See also Wellons (1986).
719 Kahler (1986b), p. 249.
720 Buchheit (2005-2006), pp. 338-339.
721 Krugman (1989b), p. 292.
722 O'Brien (1993), p. 100.
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In 1983, most bankers and bank supervisors dismissed the possibility that any indebted 
country would choose the path of outright default. A senior spokesman of a large and 
advanced developing country agreed, saying that “if his country ever defaulted, its ships 
and aircraft everywhere would instantly be seized by creditors, as would any goods that 
his country tried to export.”723 Loss of access to trade credit and the international 
payments mechanism would have been untenable for troubled sovereigns, forcing them 
into a barter arrangement for their goods on an international basis.724 Sachs (1986) argued 
that creditor country governments had, in effect, endorsed the London Club 
reschedulings,725 thereby prioritizing the protection of commercial banks, “at least on a 
short-run accounting basis.”726 Jose Angel Gurria Trevino, Undersecretary for 
International Affairs in the Mexican Finance Ministry, observed the one-sided nature of 
official support in the London Club negotiations: “The initial goal was to keep the banks 
going. They lent us a little bit and we had to produce the rest by putting a big squeeze on 
our balance of payments...Such enormous sacrifice by the debtors -  to keep the banks 
going!”727
Diaz-Alejandro (1986) argued that the ability of the commercial banks to enforce 
their desired terms rested not only on their own bargaining power but on the “willingness 
of the U.S. government to back them up at critical junctures.” Any decision by a debtor 
state to unilaterally default would have been “as much a foreign policy decision as a 
financial one.” And, whereas countries might be willing to break their ties with 
commercial banks and resort to autarkic financial policies, most would be hesitant to 
break with the rest of the international system. According to Diaz-Alejandro:
Breaking official ties with creditor governments would involve such crucial 
financial and non-financial areas as aid, trade policy, technology licensing, 
and arms deals. Moreover...defaults could let loose political passions that 
would threaten the debtor government itself. For a while, the leader may bask 
in nationalist glory, but the forces unleashed by default, especially an active
723 Mendelsohn (1983), p. 9.
724 Corden and Dooley (1989), pp. 34-35.
725 Sachs (1986), p. 398. Sachs maintained that reschedulings were prioritized over debt relief, where 
“relief’ is defined as any arrangement - such as below-market interest rates, forgiveness o f principal, or 
repurchases of debts by the debtor country at below par - that reduces the present value of contractual 
obligations of the creditor country.
726 Sachs and Huizinga (1987), p. 557.
727 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 319.
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one, may threaten constitutional order and could reopen the gates to populist- 
nationalistic authoritarian generals -  after all, the nation would be surrounded 
by enemies.728
Creditor country governments and the IMF could have altered the balance of power that 
gave the banks a stranglehold over sovereign debtors. The most effective way would have 
been to declare that official bi-lateral and IMF loans would no longer be conditioned 
upon the successful renegotiation of private debts. Unfortunately for the debtor countries, 
a change in the “lending into arrears” policy was not to be forthcoming, at least not until 
the banks had sufficiently recovered in 1989. This has led some to observe that, prior to 
1989, the “public good of IMF lending” had been “captured by private interests.”729
While the banks were busy congratulating themselves on the results achieved by 
the London Club process, debtor country finance officials were decidedly more critical. 
Speaking about the onset of the crisis, Jose Angel Gurria Trevino, Undersecretary for 
International Affairs in Mexico, said:
Banks typically reacted by folding and withdrawing the umbrellas that they 
offer their clients on sunny days...banks started calling in their short-term 
debts as they matured, sucking up what little was left in liquid reserves in 
LDCs’ vaults...Here was a dramatic exercise in lack of communication and, 
even more serious, complete lack of social sensitivity and total absence of 
political foresight. OECD central bankers took over and, in addressing their 
own fiscal and monetary imbalances, condemned hundreds of millions to 
prolonged poverty and declining standards of living. In so doing, they also 
created the most serious political problem facing the world in the nineties.730
Far from seeing the London Club process as orderly, Trevino called it “unprecedented, 
daring, and scandalous.” With the tenor of restructured debt and new money so short, the 
banks simply created “an unmanageable accumulation of maturities” for the debtor 
states.731 Latin American finance ministries were so consumed with the rescheduling 
process that they had little time to address the underlying economic problems of their 
respective countries. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Former Brazilian Finance Minister was
728 Sachs (1986), p. 411. Citation from Carlos Diaz-Alejandro.
729 Devlin (1989), p. 219.
730 Trevino (1989), p. 72.
731 Trevino (1989), p. 75.
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less diplomatic in his assessment of the 1980s debt regime. In his view, it merited a 
different name:
Perhaps it should be called something like the “slavery-collection approach” 
as it is reminiscent of the old-fashioned forms of collecting credits. When a 
debtor was unable to pay, he or she was reduced to slavery.7 2
Why did elites comply with the demands of the London Club? One of the principal 
reasons was fear of retaliation. According to Pereira: “The creditors are always 
threatening to cut the short-term trade credits, or to take even stronger steps against 
debtors who take unilateral measures.”733 Even after U.S. banks had made available $300 
million in new trade credit to Peru, one New York banker said: “If they get too 
confrontational, we’ll cut off all that. Then they won’t be able to import food or spare 
parts and there’ll be an immediate political cost.”734
From the banks’ perspective, the principal agitator in the group was Argentina. 
Widely believed to be the only country in Latin America that had the potential to pursue 
autarkic policies - given its self-sufficiency in food and energy, as well as its considerable 
industrial base - Argentina would often adopt a confrontational approach with the London 
Club. It openly supported the formation of a debtors’ cartel and even threatened to turn to 
the Soviet Union for help.735 According to Kaletsky (1985), one needs to examine a 
debtor’s incentives to default in the context of theoretical disincentives: sanctions (i.e., 
retaliation) and the lack of ongoing access to capital markets.736 In the case of the 1980s 
debt regime, the ability to impose sanctions and make new credit available were both 
within the grasp of the London Club banks and their governments. With the economic 
consequences of default to creditors so grave, it was not unreasonable for debtors to 
assume that lenders would follow through on any retaliatory threats.
732 Pereira (1989), p. 95.
733 Pereira (1989), pp.103-104.
734 Aggarwal (1987), p. 6.
735 Aggarwal (1987), pp. 7- 9. Cited in Wall Street Journal, June 26,1984 and Financial Times, November 
4, 1983.
736 Kaletsky (1985). Other formal models developed to explain patterns of negotiation and make policy 
recommendations include: Corden (1989); Bulow and Rogoff (1989b); Krugman (1989a). See also Frenkel, 
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6.4.4 Why Debtor States Didn ’t Organize into a Negotiating Cartel
Even with the unwelcome picture painted by creditors of the aftermath of default, 
the threat of sanctions was not solely responsible for preventing the formation of a 
debtors’ coalition.737 There were domestic factors that weighed heavily on the decision of 
the larger countries, especially Mexico and Brazil, to continue to play by the rules of the 
game. The weakness of Latin American collaboration could be said to reflect a 
divergence in their domestic capabilities for adjustment.738 By 1984/1985, Mexico had 
achieved modest growth and Brazil more rapid growth, so they were “unwilling to press 
their case with the bankers and set in motion unknown risks.”739 Even Argentina, who 
had agitated at the debtors’ meeting in Cartegena in 1984 to form a cartel, was happy to 
use the rhetoric of the Castro campaign to obtain better terms from creditors, but in the 
end, never used its bargaining power to secure any meaningful concessions.740 That being 
said, the creditors were sufficiently worried about the Cartegena conference to roll out 
new and more favourable terms to those states that remained in the London Club process. 
The message was clear: “those countries that cooperated with creditors would be 
rewarded.”741 Paul Volcker pointed out that “by good fortune or otherwise, there always 
seemed to be one important country that was doing well and sensed it had a lot to lose 
from joining others in a strong confrontation with creditors.”742 What Volcker neglected 
to say was that the “good fortune” in this instance accrued mostly to the banks, since they 
stood to gain the most by averting cartelized behaviour on the part of the debtors.
There were also issues of distrust and rivalry among Latin American countries, 
which played to the advantage of creditors. Many debtors felt that they would be “pulled 
down to the lowest common denominator if they joined together.”743 And, according to 
one banker, since “most countries were ruled by military dictators, there was a certain
737 Mendelsohn (1983), pp. 14-15. “Debtor countries themselves showed that they were opposed to the 
concept of any generalized debt renegotiations with creditor countries on common terms at a meeting in 
early 1983 of UNCTAD.”
738 Kahler (1986a), p. 34.
739 Krugman (1989b), p. 292.
740 The United States also timed the announcement of the Baker Plan to ensure that the Consensus of 
Cartegena never moved from rhetoric to action. Of all the debtor countries, Argentina seemed to understand 
its relative power in the debt negotiations. The country was largely self-sufficient, making it the most likely 
to successfully withstand potential creditor sanctions. See Ferrer (1983).
741 Devlin (1989), p. 223.
742 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 210.
743 Author Interviews A and C.
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amount of machismo in each country’s attitude toward the other; I think that they each 
felt they were different and could work a better deal on their own.”744 Another banker 
pointed out that coordination was limited by “national pride and feelings of 
superiority.”745
Unfortunately for debtors, these mutual suspicions limited their ability to 
coordinate bargaining positions. So, the strategy in which the banks required borrowers to 
“continue to pay a modest proportion of their interest in cash” and accept their legal 
responsibility for the rest “gave the U.S. authorities and major banks much more room to 
manoeuvre.”746 In fact, it seems that no government in Latin America “seriously 
attempted to work out the potential costs and benefits of some form of collective and/or 
unilateral action on the debt.”747 There were no earnest talks of a moratorium, and during 
the early rounds of rescheduling, the debtors “competed vigorously with each other to 
appear as the most creditworthy client of the banks.”748 The creditors and their 
governments encouraged this behaviour by promising more rapid and favourable 
treatment to those debtors that acted alone.749 From a theoretical perspective, the creditors 
and their governments were behaving in the same way as a monopolist. And, any 
monopolist confronted by competitive economic agents can engineer outcomes that are 
likely to result in the exploitation of the latter.750
Another factor that hindered cooperation among the debtors was the large 
variation in their size, geo-strategic significance, and total debt burden. For example, 
Mexico and Brazil benefited from their large markets and were able to obtain better terms 
in their rescheduling agreements than smaller countries like Uruguay and Bolivia. Even 
more important, Mexican officials were aware that their long border with the U.S. gave 
them enhanced bargaining leverage. After all, the U.S. would not want the debt 
restructuring efforts to impinge on domestic or political stability in Mexico. Therefore, 
Mexico felt that it would have little to gain from joining other countries, since that would
744 Author Interview C.
745 Author Interview A.
746 Kaletsky (1985), p. 47.
747 O'Brien (1993), p. 101.
748 Devlin (1989), p. 220.
749 Aggarwal (1987), p. 34. Cited in Institutional Investor, July, 1984, p. 233.
750 Devlin (1989), p. 222.
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only dilute its own bargaining position in the process.751 The fact that some countries 
“were more equal than others” was also evident by the IMF’s behaviour. According to 
one banker, the commercial bank “arm-twisting” that was so crucial in the cases of 
Mexico and Brazil was hardly noticeable in the cases of smaller debtor states, making it 
much more difficult for smaller countries to mobilize incremental external financing.
Further support for debtor acquiescence came from the Latin American business 
classes, who were opposed in principle to any action which might hinder their access to 
foreign credit, increase the cost of trade credit, or make selling abroad more difficult. 
Businessmen wanted the debt to be reduced through non-confrontational dialogue with 
creditors, and were happy to throw their weight behind IMF programs that promoted 
privatization and integration into the world economy. The investing class was also 
opposed in principle to debt repudiation, since it would throw open the question of the 
legality of contracts and the sanctity of private property. Finally, the debt negotiators 
within Latin America were a small group of technocrats from the Central Banks and 
Ministries of Finance whose personal accounts have revealed how closely aligned their 
values and attitudes were to those of their creditor counterparts.753 Sharing the bankers’ 
paradigm, the Latin American ministers “initially had a relatively passive bargaining 
strategy.”754 Even as late as 1985, a study of the debt problem by a Latin American 
commission dismissed as “radical” alternatives such as a moratorium or the unilateral 
conversion of bank debts into bonds.755 In any case, it would have been difficult to 
construct a debtors’ cartel without some major country assuming hegemonic leadership. 
Once Mexico and Brazil locked themselves into the London Club process, there were no 
remaining countries with the credibility to act as a regional hegemon. Unfortunately 
for the Latin American states, it was not until much later in the rescheduling process that 
the exaggerated nature of the creditors’ threats became apparent. By that time, the banks
751 Aggarwal (1987), p. 32.
752 Aggarwal (1987), p. 33. Cited from statement of Christine Bindert in Joint Economic Committee of the 
U.S. Senate and House, Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy, 98th Congress, 
2nd session, November 13,1984.
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755 Kahler (1986b), p. 259.
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had already successfully rebuilt their balance sheets; however, the debtor states were still 
dealing with economic decline.757
6.4.5 Coercive Role o f the IMF
The Managing Director of the IMF, Jacques de Larosiere, was described by Paul 
Volcker as a “bankruptcy judge on a grand international scale,” mediating between the 
debtor countries and the banks. Under de Larosiere, the IMF agreed to disburse 
incremental funds to Mexico only on the condition that the country’s 1400 creditors 
simultaneously extended $5 billion in new loans. Said one prominent U.S. banker: “It 
was clear that somebody had to step in to play a leadership role...The IMF sensed a 
vacuum and properly stepped into it.”758 The importance of the IMF’s role cannot be 
overemphasized. It acted where the U.S. government could not. At the time, over half of 
the total loan exposure to Latin America was held by non-U.S. banks, i.e., banks that 
would prefer IMF to U.S. influence. There is also evidence that the money centre banks 
welcomed the IMF’s role; while there was “some grumbling over the banks’ loss of 
autonomy...large banks generally appreciated the IMF’s stance because it facilitated 
collective action among lenders.”759 In other words, without the involvement of the IMF, 
the London Club process might have failed. Walker and Buchheit (1984) pointed out that 
the IMF adopted “an unabashedly paternalistic approach” by calling together the 
borrower and major commercial bank creditors to discuss how much each party would be 
expected to contribute to the workout.760 Once again, however, the reaction of troubled 
sovereigns to the IMF’s role was somewhat different. The IMF was seen as exerting its 
greatest pressure on debtor countries, “urging full repayment and macroeconomic 
adjustment.”761 So, while creditor optimism was growing during the course of 
negotiations, policymakers in debtor countries were presiding over a fairly continuous 
economic decline. With the exception of one mediocre year -  1984 -  they had “little to
757 Devlin (1989), p. 233.
758 Cohen (1986b), p. 152.
759 Lipson (1986), p. 229.
760 Walker and Buchheit (1984), p. 149.
761 Eichengreen and Lindert (1989), p. 7.
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nfSJcheer about.” In fact, the average decline in real per capita GDP from 1981 to 1985 for 
Latin American debtor states was 11.72%.763
Diwan and Rodrik (1992) have argued that the IMF did have an “efficiency 
enhancing” role to play in the Latin American debt crisis, based on two functions which 
the Fund could perform better than the commercial banks. The First was the enforcement 
of conditionality: the IMF could condition loan disbursements on specific policy reforms 
to be undertaken by the debtor government, and had a superior capacity to monitor those 
reforms. Second, the IMF had a comparative advantage in alleviating the asymmetric 
information that exists in the creditor-debtor relationship. They had closer relationships 
with the debtor country and were better at fact-finding than commercial banks.764 In fact, 
Brown and Bulman (2006) argued that the inability of private banks to monitor the policy 
conduct of debtor governments “allowed the IMF significant leverage.”765
If official institutions like the IMF helped to coordinate the behaviour of lenders 
so that “non-destructive” outcomes prevailed,766 they were also able to join the chorus of 
other official institutions and exert pressure at key points in the negotiating process. 
According to Rieffel (2003):
The IMF managing director would contact a BAC chairman on occasion to 
stress the implications of specific terms for the debtor country’s recovery 
prospects. G-7 finance ministers and their deputies would more often engage 
in arm-twisting with BAC chairman or members. The views of certain 
governors and senior staff members of the Federal Reserve Board were 
conveyed occasionally and were given great weight by banks generally.767
6.5 Structural Power
The debt regimes of the 19th century and the 1980s were similar to the extent that 
both were characterized by a high degree of centralization and control over the supply of 
credit. In the last quarter of the 19th century, Britain was the world’s dominant capital 
exporter, and through close cooperation with the London Stock Exchange, the CFBH was 
able to deny market access to defaulting sovereigns. During the 1980s, we observed
762 Sachs (1986), p. 402.
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similar aspects of centralization and control. The commercial banks, creditor 
governments and the IMF were the sole sources of all credit to developing countries. 
During the Latin American debt crisis, they coordinated their behaviour to ensure that no 
new funds were disbursed to any troubled debtor until such time as acceptable 
rescheduling agreements had been reached with private creditors. As a former Mexican 
finance minister pointed out: “There were big incentives to pay the banks, because, 
unlike bondholders, they had all the money.”768
Although the commercial banks and the more heavily-indebted non-oil exporting 
countries each had the ability to undermine the other’s stability, they were not exactly 
“mutual hostages.” The banks derived greater leverage from the fact that the Latin 
American debtors needed to continue to tap the international capital markets. This was 
most especially the case with short-term trade credits. Since official finance was tied to 
bank finance in the 1980s, the borrowing countries could not afford to alienate the 
system’s largest commercial lenders. To do so would have meant to disrupt the credit 
lifeline that supported the daily import and export trade, bringing food, energy and other 
essentials to developing economies.770
As we have already discussed, the power of private creditors was materially 
enhanced by the position of official creditors, most especially the IMF. By conditioning 
IMF adjustment lending on the satisfactory settlement of arrears with commercial banks, 
the IMF implicitly supported, “or at least never questioned, the onerous commercial 
terms that the banks demanded to effect reschedulings.”771 In addition, the IMF’s 
insertion into the London Club restructuring process gave the banks “one more lever” 
which they could use to control the debtors’ conduct. According to Devlin (1989):
In effect, when the Fund permitted a direct link to be established between the 
commercially based rescheduling demands of the private banks and its 
macroeconomic standby programs, it unwittingly allowed a major 
contradiction to emerge: an international public good (the Fund and its 
adjustment programs) became a partial hostage of the short-term private logic
768 Author Interview H.
769 Aronson (1979), p. 305
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of profit-driven banks...The pretence of being an honest broker in the 
adjustment process therefore became increasingly difficult to sustain.772
It should be noted that the banks were not initially pleased with the IMF’s assessment 
that large scale default could only be prevented if substantial new money were provided 
jointly by the Fund and the banks. The IMF was not bailing-out the banks, but bailing 
them in. According to James (1996), “the procedure of providing new funds was known 
by a variety of names, most politely ‘concerted lending,’ more clearly as ‘involuntary 
lending,’ and mostly (by the bankers) as ‘forced lending.’”773 However, since the banks 
had every interest in avoiding a potential default, they “could...be coerced into being 
compliant over additional lending.”774 Although the bankers may have initially 
complained about their loss of autonomy, the fact is that from the perspective of the 
debtor states, the IMF and the commercial banks represented a powerful, credit-exporting 
negotiating bloc.
Some have argued that the IMF was “gamed” by the banks, a charge that is not 
without empirical support. Despite the “new money” packages offered by commercial 
lenders, U.S. bank exposures to problem debtor countries fe ll in absolute dollar terms 
from 1982 to 1986. In effect, there was no “new money.” Loans were round-tripped from 
debtor countries back to the banks to make interest payments, and in most cases, the 
loans were considerably less than the interest bills owed to the banks. Therefore, the net 
resource transfer from the banks to the debtor states during these important early years of 
the crisis was negative. Who filled the gap? The IMF, with its structural adjustment 
loans.775 Official lending made it possible for the banks to withdraw, albeit at a slow 
pace, from the business of development lending to Latin America.776 Representatives of 
the IMF would later refer to this process as moral hazard in slow motion.777
To address this criticism, the Fund decided to decouple its lending programs from 
the business of commercial banks. In October, 1987, the IMF announced a $65 million 
standby agreement for Costa Rica which was not conditioned upon the Costa Rican
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government reaching a satisfactory settlement with its private creditors.778 Two years 
later, in 1989, the IMF decided to implement a more formal change in its “lending into 
arrears policy.” It was timed to coincide with the announcement of the Brady Plan, which 
moved the 1980s debt crisis from a series of temporary settlements to a permanent one.779 
Under the new IMF policy, the Fund was permitted to lend into situations where the 
“debtor country was implementing a credible adjustment program and was negotiating in 
good faith with its commercial bank creditors but had not yet concluded these 
negotiations.”780
6.6 Productive Power
6.6.1 Avoiding the “D ” Word: The Usefulness o f the IUiquidv Diagnosis
The U.S. government believes that current problems basically involve questions o f liquidity, not 
solvency.781
Marc E Leland
Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Affairs, 1983
Rolling loans gather no loss.
John C. Henman 
Deputy Chairman of A.G. Becker Pariabas, Inc.
Discursive practices surrounding the 1980s Latin American debt crisis not only 
helped to frame the nature of the problem, they also helped frame the solution. It was 
clear from the outset of the crisis that any diagnosis that centred around insolvency or 
default was unthinkable, especially from the perspective of the banks. So, the “d” word 
was avoided at all costs. Instead, the more acceptable, initial diagnosis of the problem 
afflicting Latin American countries was one of illiquidity. And, the negotiating process 
that was established flowed directly from this diagnosis, ruling out any need for debt 
forgiveness, at least in the early stages when the banks were the most vulnerable.782 This 
is not to imply that there was no basis for the illiquidity diagnosis. There were, in fact,
778 Devlin (1989), pp. 228-230.
779 Although the Brady Plan would not put an end to financial crises in Latin America, it did offer some 
measure of debt forgiveness and helped spur the flow of private capital back into the recovering states.
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219
several economic factors which suggested that the problems of Latin American countries 
might be temporary. Nominal and real interest rates were high by historical standards and 
were expected to fall. There was scepticism that worldwide inflation had been broken as 
late as 1984 and that any resumption of inflation would help Latin American export 
earnings while eroding the real value of their debt. And, even if inflation did not pick up, 
it was widely believed that commodity prices would rise in line with the worldwide 
recovery from recession.783 Bankers recalled that ““in the beginning...[we] really did 
believe [the illiquidity diagnosis] to be true. But, as more information came out -  and it 
didn’t always come out easily -  things looked worse.”784
Debt-management practitioners are more sceptical when it comes to making 
accurate distinctions between “illiquidity” and “insolvency” in a sovereign financial 
crisis. Robert Rubin, former U.S. Treasury Secretary, has argued that the terms 
“illiquidity” and “insolvency” are “approximately useless.” According to Rubin: “I don’t 
mean they’re useless if you want to have interesting discussions; I just mean they’re 
useless when you actually have to do something.”785 Paul Volcker agreed and has said 
that the distinction between illiquidity and insolvency is easier to make in a textbook than 
in the real world. He added that he was not certain that he had ever seen a “pure liquidity 
problem.”786 Bankers involved in the Latin American debt negotiations maintained that a 
diagnosis other than illiquidity was “unthinkable.” And, they were helped by the fact that 
it was virtually impossible to determine the question of solvency at the outset of the 
crisis. This was because timely, complete, and reliable information was scarce. In some 
cases, there was a two-year lag in getting consolidated debt figures from sovereign 
borrowers.787 One observer noted that “frugal middle-class Americans would have to give 
more information to their friendly neighbourhood bank to get a car loan than Poland gave 
to develop a country.”788 Finally, a European bank reported a shift in the value of its 
claims on Brazilian banks “from $2 million to $30 million in a single day.”789 In short, 
the inability to determine the question of solvency with any precision gave creditors a
783 Krueger (1991), p. 41.
784 Author Interview C.
785 Rubin (2003b), p. 283.
786 Volcker and Gyohten (1992), p. 210.
787 Author Interview C.
788 Aggarwal (1987), p. 9. Cited in Wall Street Journal, August 8, 1981.
789 Mendelsohn (1983), p. 10.
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valuable option: they could choose to support the illiquidity diagnosis in order to buy 
themselves the time they needed to build their loan loss reserves and repair their badly 
compromised balance sheets.
Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Former Brazilian Finance Minister, attacked the 
initial “illiquidity” diagnosis of the London Club banks as self-serving:
It is clear that the creditors’ first tendency will be not to recognize that it is 
unfeasible to pay the debt fully. First, they will define the problem as 
transitory, a problem of liquidity, asserting that a combination of financing 
and adjustment, with emphasis on adjustment, would solve the problem.790
Pereira accused the banks of dishonesty, arguing that while they had understood for some 
time that they would not be able to collect the debt in full, they still refused to recognize 
this officially. He argued that it was in their interest to simply ignore the underlying 
problem while they strengthened their own capital ratios. In Pereira’s view, the main 
culprits were the big U.S. banks - like Manufacturers’ Hanover, Chase Manhattan, and 
Bank of America. They were all opposed to a “global solution” that would involve some 
measure of debt forgiveness since they would not have been able to absorb the losses. 
Apart from the large money-centre banks, Pereira believed that the European and smaller 
regional banks would have been more receptive to offering forgiveness earlier.791
The choices that existed between a diagnosis of “illiquidity” and “insolvency” 
mirrored those that existed between the loan classifications of “performing” and 
“nonperforming.” According to one regional bank head:
What are obviously non-performing loans are called performing; dividends 
are paid on interest that has been loaned; and countries that should be 
classified as substandard or doubtful receive more lenient classifications.792
He added that the problem was not what was non-performing, but what was called non­
performing. The regional bank CEO went on to argue that he was among those who had 
correctly diagnosed the Latin American debt crisis as a solvency crisis from the outset 
and called upon the banking syndicate to immediately convert their short-term loans to
790 Pereira (1989), p. 94.
791 Pereira (1989), p. 101.
792 Heldring (1989), pp. 30-31.
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long-term, fixed-rate bonds.793 Of course, regional banks were not fighting for their very 
survival when the crisis began. And, unfortunately for them, the discursive power “trump 
card” was held by the largest banks that were running the London Club advisory 
committees.
Cline (1995) pointed out that even though a credible insolvency diagnosis began 
to appear in 1986, with the collapse of oil prices, it would have been too risky for the 
banking system to accept that premise until it had set aside sufficient loan loss provisions. 
Otherwise, “the debt strategy’s objective of international financial stability would have 
been compromised.”794 And so, in May 1987, when Citibank announced its $3 billion 
reserve against its Latin American debt exposure, it signalled to the market that it was 
both ready and able to absorb losses on these loans. Other banks followed suit, 
announcing new loan loss provisions of between 25% and 50% of their Latin American 
debt portfolio. Paul Krugman attempted to give debt forgiveness its economic 
justification in his 1988 essay on debt overhang, and shortly thereafter, the IMF and 
World Bank agreed that the dominant paradigm was changing to insolvency.795 From a 
discursive perspective, the major commercial lenders were able to privilege the 
“illiquidity” diagnosis, until such time as they no longer needed it.
6.6.2 The Changing Characterization o f Sovereign Default in International Law
The principal change in international law between the 1930s and the 1980s that 
affected sovereign debt management was the dilution of the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity. As sovereigns became more involved in commercial activities outside their 
own borders, the question arose: “Why should they not be answerable in foreign courts 
for their commercial conduct?” As a result, a more “restrictive” theory of sovereign 
immunity emerged, first in the United States with the 1976 passage of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), and two years later, when the United Kingdom 
enacted the State Immunities Act (“SLA”) of 1978.
Most syndicated loan agreements contained standard “waivers of sovereign 
immunity.” This meant that a sovereign acknowledged in advance that the loan could be
793 Heldring (1989), p. 33.
794 Cline (1995), p. 20.
795 Krugman (1988); Cline (1995), p. 16.
222
treated as a commercial transaction, permitting any dispute to be referred to the judicial 
body specified by the governing law provision. In theory, this meant that creditors could
nQ f.
pursue legal remedies for debt collection in London or New York. In practice, 
however, they were strongly encouraged not to. Official sector propaganda routinely 
warned against litigation, arguing that the only effective means to resolution was 
negotiated settlement in the London Club process. Also, even if some banks had launched 
unilateral lawsuits, any judgments would have been subject to inter-creditor sharing 
clauses, forcing them to distribute the proceeds among the remaining syndicate banks. In 
short, it would have been a lonely and expensive road for a solo lender to take.797 As a 
result, despite the new rights granted to creditors under international law, there was 
widespread forbearance from litigation by commercial banks during the Latin American 
debt crisis.
6.6.3 The Persistence o f  the Idea o f Honour
In the late 19th century and 1930s, bondholder councils routinely equated the act 
of honouring debt contracts with “morality” and “civility.”798 The goal was to inspire 
political leaders to choose the path of repayment over default. Of course, bondholder 
councils were much less successful with this tactic in the 1930s, when defaults engulfed 
both developed and developing countries, and the collapse of the bond markets offered 
little reward for faithful repayers. However, in the 1980s, we saw a resurgence of the old 
notion of honour among both the citizens and officials of debtor states 799
A former Brazilian finance minister noticed how measures to unilaterally reduce 
the debt had been referred to in his country as “calote, ” a “deprecatory Portuguese word 
for the immoral non-payment of a personal debt.” Although he likened the action more to 
a judicial statute, like Chapter 11 of U.S. bankruptcy law, he found it difficult to convince 
his constituency. He went on to say that this was partially due to “their cultural 
subordination” to industrialized countries who are somehow idealized as “keepers of the
796 Buchheit (2005-2006), pp. 338-339. In the United States, this restrictive theory of sovereign immunity 
was first formally acknowledged as State Department policy in 1952. However, it was not codified in U.S. 
law until 1976, with the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”).
797 Buchheit (2005-2006), pp. 339-340.
798 See the discussions of productive power in Chapters 4 and 5.
799 Creditor country governments largely confined themselves to threats of sanctions against potential 
defaulters, rather than appealing to national honour or pride.
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truth.”800 Even financially astute Brazilian businessmen supported the London Club and 
IMF processes because they assumed that a more confrontational stance with creditors 
would threaten Brazil’s integration with the North. While one could argue that the 
interests of the first world were not entirely bound up with the interests of the banking 
community, it was difficult for debtor states in the 1980s to separate the two. It was also 
difficult to de-link default and dishonour, although some leaders tried. They argued that 
integration with advanced capitalist democracies would not be accomplished by “good 
manners but rather through economic growth and price stability - precisely the two goals 
that are made unfeasible by the debt”801 Despite these appeals, debtor states found 
themselves locked into the London Club process for much of the 1980s.
6.7 Power and the Production o f  Bargaining Outcomes in the 1980s
Assessments of the 1980s sovereign debt restructuring regime are wide-ranging. 
Some scholars, like Cline (1995) believed that the experience proved that “contingent, 
evolutionary, and informed international policymaking succeeds.” After all, in Cline’s 
view, international financial collapse was avoided and sovereign debtors were able to re­
access the capital markets within a decade.802 Biersteker (1993) and Haggard and 
Kaufman (1989) were more circumspect. They , argued that the regime differentiated 
between large and small borrowers, treating the former more favourably, since they posed 
a real threat to the global financial system. Large debtors were accorded more attention 
and fared a bit better than their smaller neighbours, especially since they could credibly 
sustain “relatively autarkic policy measures.”803 Others took a dim view of the regime, 
seeing it as one that evolved with a “clear distributive bias, one directed principally 
against the developing countries.”804 According to Riley (1993), the crisis seemed to 
bypass the commercial banks, who reported healthy profits through 1986, and in 1987, 
took losses which were largely managed and easily absorbed. He argued that political 
leaders in borrowing states simply “pass[ed] along the costs of the debt in the form of
800 Pereira (1989), pp.103-104.
801 Pereira (1989), pp.103-104.
802 Cline (1995), p. 4.
803 Biersteker (1993), p. 7. For a similar argument, see also Haggard and Kaufman (1989), pp. 210-220.
804 Biersteker (1993), p. 2.
224
structural adjustment to their poorer citizens.”805 Biersteker (1993) concurred with this 
view, and observed:
The distribution of global burden sharing has fallen disproportionately on the 
debtor countries, not on their creditors. At the same time, the distribution of 
domestic burden sharing within the debtor countries has fallen principally on 
the poorest and most marginal.806
We have argued that the 1980s sovereign debt restructuring regime produced bargaining 
outcomes that were highly favourable to creditors and were largely impacted by regime 
elements external to the private creditor representative body.807 During the 1970s and 
early 1980s, commercial bank creditors accumulated dangerous levels of exposure to 
Latin American sovereigns on their balance sheets. When the debt crisis began in 1982, 
this risk concentration threatened the very solvency of the global financial system. 
However, it also translated into bargaining power. To stem the potential crisis, creditor 
governments, regulators, and the IMF spoke with a powerful, unified voice, bailing-in the 
large, money-centre banks at the helm of the London Club, and facing troubled debtors as 
a formidable negotiating bloc. While the London Club insisted on negotiating with debtor 
countries on a case-by-case basis to exploit the weakness in Latin American 
collaboration, creditor governments threatened troubled sovereigns with severe sanctions 
in the event of debt repudiation. And, creditor governments, along with their financial 
regulators, pressed smaller regional and international banks into compliance with the 
regime to ensure limited defection. The exercise of compulsory power was pervasive in 
the 1980s sovereign debt restructuring process, aimed not only at sovereign borrowers 
but at non-cooperative banks as well.
Adding even more leverage to the creditor side of the balance sheet, the IMF 
agreed to provide structural adjustment loans only to those debtor states that remained in 
the London Club process and settled satisfactorily with private banks. Debtors had little 
choice but to accede to the demand of the creditors’ cartel, especially since they could not 
tap any alternative channels of finance. The concentration of structural power with the 
banks and the IMF made debtors fear the consequences of disruption to their short-term
805 Riley (1993).
806 Biersteker (1993), p. 11.
807 Strange (1979). Strange also focuses on the design of the 1980s debt regime.
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trade credit. After all, short-term credits supported essential imports like food and energy, 
and the repercussions of being excluded from the international financial system would 
have had high political costs in debtor states.
In retrospect, it would be difficult to describe the 1980s regime as optimally 
efficient or equitable. U.S. bank accounting rules forced cumbersome new loan 
disbursements when interest capitalization would have been a more effective alternative. 
The process was certainly slow and laborious, taking an average of eight years to reach a 
final conclusion. However, it was precisely this inefficiency which worked to the banks’ 
advantage. Creditor groups were able to cling to the illusion that they were dealing with 
an illiquidity problem for years after the insolvency diagnosis began to gain currency, 
giving them more time to restore their weakened balance sheets.
Formally, the banks presented their London Club committee structure to the world 
as a public good, that is, “an innocent mechanism of coordination among the hundreds of 
lenders, which facilitate[d] the rescue of the borrower.” But, as Devlin (1989) observed, 
there was a “potential dark side to the committee structure” in that it “facilitate[d] 
collusion and the formation of an effective cartel geared to skew the distribution of the 
costs of [the] problem.”808 Most of the adjustment burden was forced on debtor countries 
in the early years through IMF programs, and while creditors ultimately suffered loan 
losses, it was only after they had safely provisioned for them out of many years of
809earnings.
808 Devlin (1989), p. 218.
809 O'Brien (1993), pp. 7 & 94. Cline (1995) and James (1996) both argue that the 1980s regime served an 
important purpose insofar as it prevented systemic collapse in the global financial system and eventually 
permitted private capital to flow back into Latin America. However, Sachs (1986) argues that debt relief 
could have been offered as early as 1986 to all but the largest three debtors, and O’Brien (1993) points to 
the “lost decade” of growth in Latin America as evidence that the regime’s distributive bias worked largely 
against debtor states.
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Chapter 7
Better a Debtor? The Institutionless Regime of the “Market-Based 
Exchange” and the Evolution of Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Since 1998
The outcome o f debt negotiations has become more favourable to debtors over the years.
Thomas Callaghy
7.1 Sovereign Lendins in the 1990s and Beyond
The Brady Plan helped to close the final chapter of the 1980s debt crisis. It also
had the effect of moving developing countries back to the bond market for the first time
since the Great Depression. In fact, by the second half of the 1990s, private creditors
accounted for over two-thirds of outstanding Latin American debt, with bondholders
taking a leading share.810 And, on the eve of the Asian crisis in 1997, close to 86% of the
net external borrowings of emerging markets countries were in the form of bonds.811 Why
had the issuance of emerging market bonds grown so rapidly in the period after the Brady
Plan? One reason is that commercial banks had largely decided to exit the business of
sovereign lending after the 1980s debt crisis. They had learned from bitter experience that
short-term, floating-rate loans were hardly the most appropriate funding vehicles for third
world infrastructure projects. By contrast, bonds, with their fixed rates and longer
durations, were much better suited to the task of development financing. Another reason
is that bonds, lacking the laundry list of covenants required by banks, carried terms that
were much less onerous than syndicated loans. This increased their attractiveness to
emerging markets finance officials since they imposed lower sovereignty costs. Lastly,
bonds were thought to carry a smaller risk of default than bank loans. This assessment
was a legacy of the 1980s steering committee process which excluded them from
810 Krueger (2003), p. 71.
811 IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005, pp. 252 - 253.
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ft 10settlement negotiations because they were regarded as too difficult to restructure. As a 
result, a small group of 1980s bondholders enjoyed de facto seniority over their 
commercial bank counterparts, despite the fact that their claims were pari passu.813 Even 
at the apex of the Asian crisis in 1997-1998, Korean eurobonds were treated as senior to 
bank claims. However, sentiments began to change in the late 1990s, principally because 
bonds had become a much more meaningful component of external sovereign financing. 
It was widely believed that improvements to the international financial architecture 
would have to address bond debt and find some new mechanism to “bail-in” bondholders. 
The IMF, heavily criticized for its large-scale financial bailouts from 1994 through the 
Asian debt crisis, responded to this challenge by “encouraging a number of highly 
indebted, emerging-market borrowers to default on their bond service payments.”814 This 
tactic forced bondholders to the negotiating table along with banks and official creditors. 
By the close of the 1990s, both Pakistan and the Ukraine had been encouraged by the 
official sector to “renegotiate [their] bonds as a precondition for the extension of official 
assistance.”815
Although bondholders were now “bailed-into” the restructuring effort, the 
international financial system still had no mechanism -  either formal or informal -  which 
would negotiate for bondholders in the same way that the London Club negotiated for the 
banks. Unfortunately, the framework for resolving the 1980s debt crisis could not be 
easily adapted to the new era of bond finance. The steering committees at the heart of the 
London Club worked well for commercial banks since they were driven by shared 
accounting and regulatory standards. However, they also operated by consensus, which 
meant that they were slow and laborious. This was not a major issue for banks since they 
held their sovereign loans at book value, giving them the flexibility to control and 
manage the write-off process. By contrast, bonds are marked-to-market on a daily basis, 
meaning that their prices immediately adjust to new information. As a result, bond 
investors are not prepared to engage in a decade-long negotiation process like the one run
812 It was also less onerous to exclude sovereign bond debt from the 1980s rescheduling process since the 
level of bond debt was negligible, especially when compared to the volume of commercial bank loans.
813 Although bond claims and bank claims had the same legal standing, the exclusion of bond claims from 
the restructuring process accorded them senior status.
814 Brown and Bulman (2006), pp. 23-24.
815 Brown and Bulman (2006), pp. 23-24.
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by the London Club in Latin America. Bondholders want to “return value to the paper as 
quickly as possible,” because any delays only result in bonds “languishing on the
0 1 /
creditors’ books at default or near-default levels.” Since the London Club process 
could not be easily reconciled with the new world of atomistic investors that included 
hedge funds, institutional money managers, pension funds and small retail investors, 
some new machinery had to be developed.
7.1.1 The Institutionless Regime and Bargaining Outcomes: 1998-2005
As in previous chapters, we will employ our power-based analytical framework to 
explain the development of the today’s sovereign debt restructuring regime and the 
bargaining outcomes it has produced. However, we need to be mindful of the fact that the 
current period differs from past eras in a few ways. First, when we examine sovereign 
debt restructurings since 1998, we are witnessing settlements that have emerged from the 
earliest evolutionary stages of a new regime -  the market-based debt exchange -  as 
opposed to those produced by the fully-developed and functioning debt regimes of the 
19th century, interwar period and 1980s. This also means that we have the smallest case 
sample for this period - only six - compared to between twenty to fifty cases in each of 
the previous periods, making our argument more tentative here than in previous chapters. 
While we recognize the weakness inherent in the small number of cases, we also believe 
that an analysis of this time period offers us a unique vantage point. It allows us to 
understand in much greater detail how the structure of the new machinery is being 
created and contested, and how the elements of the emerging regime impact bargaining 
outcomes.
The process that has evolved thus far - the market-based debt exchange - is 
straightforward. A country in financial distress and in need of restructuring its bonds 
hires sovereign debt advisors that are generally drawn from the investment banking and 
legal communities. The advisors then “sound out” a representative sample of 
bondholders with the objective of identifying the haircut that the majority of investors
816 Buchheit (2003), p. 17. Bondholders want sovereigns to make an offer that is NPV positive; in other 
words, bondholders expect an offer which, when discounted at prevailing market rates, will produce a 
valuation that is higher than the holder is showing on its books.
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would be willing to accept.817 The offer is made on a unilateral basis to the market, and 
individual bondholders have the opportunity during the tender period to accept or reject 
it. The process is very different from the ones we have observed in previous eras chiefly 
because it lacks any formal debtor-creditor negotiations. The institution-less nature of the 
regime appears to confer a distinct advantage on debtor states evidenced by the results 
that have been produced since 1998:
Table 7A: Debt Restructuring Outcomes: 1998 - 2005818
Country Settlement Period (Years) Haircut (%) Participation Rate (%)
Russia 1.67 69 98
Pakistan .83 30 95
Ecuador 1.00 60 97
Ukraine .25 40 95
Argentina 3.33 67 76
Uruguay .083 26 93
Average 1.19 48.67 92.3
Sources: Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005a); Roubini and Setser (2004a); Dhillon, Garcia-Fronti et al. (2006); Miller and 
Thomas (2006b).
Contemporary cases have produced some of the largest haircuts for bond investors - 
between 26% to 69%, with an average of 48%.819 However, the more remarkable 
observation is how quickly these outcomes were produced: 1.19 years on average 
compared to 6 years for bondholders in the 19th century and 10 years for the interwar 
period. And, if we exclude Argentina from the sample, the time from default to 
settlement would be an even more impressive 7 months. Not only has the level of debt 
forgiveness been significant, the results have been achieved in record time by all 
historical measures. This means that sovereigns have been able to restructure their debt 
on favourable terms and re-access the capital markets promptly. How were these 
outcomes produced?
817 “Sounding out” investors generally involves a series of informal discussions with large institutional 
investors. In a few cases, retail investors may be canvassed as well.
818 Sources: Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005a); Roubini and Setser (2004a), Table A3; Dhillon, Garcia- 
Fronti et al. (2006); Miller and Thomas (2006b).
819 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b), p. 43. Dhillon, Garcia-Fronti et al. (2006).
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7.1.2 The Three Faces of Power: Explaining Regime Formation and Outcomes Since
1998
This chapter will argue that the emerging regime delivers better results to debtors 
since structural and compulsory regime elements have worked to enhance debtor 
negotiating leverage, both in the process of regime formation and the resulting settlement 
negotiations. Since the current regime does not feature a private creditor representative 
body, the format of this chapter will need to deviate slightly from earlier chapters. First, 
we will examine only three aspects of regime power -  structural, compulsory and 
productive. Second, we will illustrate the impact of structural and compulsory power by 
looking at two specific cases. The first concerns regime evolution and centres on the 
contractual changes made to sovereign bonds by Mexico in 2003. These changes had the 
intended effect of burying the IMF’s proposal for a new Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism (“SDRM”), supplanting it instead with a debtor-driven menu of collective 
action clauses (“CACs”). We will show how Mexico, in a pre-emptive and largely 
symbolic endeavour, was able to ensure that the new CACs preserved the advantages that 
debtor states already enjoyed in the market-based exchange process. Our second case 
focuses on the outcomes produced in the aftermath of the Argentine default in 2005. 
Here, the degree and orientation of official sector intervention served to strengthen the 
hand of history’s largest sovereign defaulter. While structural and compulsory power 
figure in both cases, we will emphasize the role of structural power in the first case and 
compulsory power in the second. What we hope to demonstrate is that both forms of 
power, which materially enhanced creditor bargaining leverage in the 1980s, are 
currently working to benefit debtor states. This leaves sovereigns in a stronger position to 
influence the blueprint of the debt management regime and extract concessions from 
private creditors in settlement negotiations.
With respect to structural power, the growing importance of bond financing 
relative to bank lending has led to a decisive weakening in creditor unity. Additionally, 
the supply of credit is much more dispersed today than in previous periods - when 
Britain, the U.S. and the G-7 commercial banks dominated emerging market lending. 
This lack of cohesion and control has made it more difficult for creditors to coordinate
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their actions and speak with a common voice in cases of sovereign default. Furthermore, 
the global savings glut has made capital ever more promiscuous as it traverses the globe 
in search of yield. As a result, lenders have allowed distressed sovereigns to enjoy prompt 
renewal of their capital market access following a restructuring. As former U.S. Treasury 
Secretary, Robert Rubin, observed: “After the 1982 crisis, Mexico took seven years to 
regain access to the capital markets. In 1995, it took seven months.”820 Finally, changes 
in IMF policies have been more accommodating to debtor states. More specifically, the 
availability of official loans is no longer conditioned upon a satisfactory settlement 
agreement with private bondholders.821 This change has reduced the bargaining leverage 
that had previously accrued to private investors - leverage which they enjoyed during 
most of the 1980s through the mid-1990s. Taking all of these factors into consideration, it 
seems that the various structural power elements embedded in our analytical framework 
have aligned more closely with debtor interests during this period.
What about compulsory power? On this front, we see officials from G-7 
governments taking a more sympathetic approach to the plight of sovereign debtors. 
While their public position has been one of detachment and de-politicization, their less 
public actions have often served to advance the cause of emerging markets debtors. The 
case of Argentina will help to illustrate this dynamic. The other principal official actor -  
the IMF -  has been the trigger for two large sovereign defaults (Russia and Argentina) 
while encouraging at least two others (Pakistan and the Ukraine). Such actions would 
have been unthinkable during the 1980s debt crisis. As Salmon (2004) observed, with 
friends like these, the bondholders hardly need enemies.822
Finally, regarding productive power, we will examine whether debtor states in 
middle-income countries have benefited from the change in norms connected with the 
HIPC initiative.823 Although not in the same socio-economic basket as HIPC countries, 
middle-income developing countries began to portray unsustainable levels of sovereign
820 Rubin (2003a), p. 34.
821 This change in policy was meant to put banks and bondholders on equal footing with respect to IMF 
lending.
822 Salmon (2004a), pp. 42-46.
823 The HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Countries) Initiative sought the forgiveness of the unsustainable debt 
burdens of the world’s poorest countries, principally but not limited to those in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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debt as the joint responsibility of debtors and creditors, using the rhetoric of HIPC and 
the “odious debt” doctrine to their advantage.
In the next section, we will look at how sovereign debtors were able to capitalize 
on shifts in structural power to resist calls for a new and more comprehensive sovereign 
bankruptcy framework. The result was a regime that retained the character of the market- 
based debt exchange and incorporated contractual changes that were predominantly 
debtor-friendly.
7.2 Structural Power and The Resime Debate
While the market-based debt exchange evolved during the latter half of the 1990s, 
it was not without its challengers.825 The most radical alternative -  the SDRM - was 
proposed by Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, in 2001. The 
objective of this mechanism was to remove decision making from the market and vest it 
instead with a supra-national body. The IMF’s goal was to create a new regime that 
would make the process of sovereign debt restructuring more predictable, equitable, and 
transparent.
There was a fair amount of resistance to the Fund’s proposal from private lenders 
as well as sovereign debtors. Investors feared that the SDRM “would become a more 
efficient medium through which the geopolitical wishes of the G-7 governments could be 
imposed,” which was curiously what the SDRM was designed to avoid.826 They were 
also wary that the SDRM would boost the power of sovereigns during debt 
negotiations.827 Borrowers were not displeased with the market’s widely mounting 
opposition to the SDRM, since they shared its suspicion, albeit for different reasons. 
Countries like Mexico and Brazil voiced disapproval, principally along the lines that the
824 The “odious debt” defense was first articulated in the early 20th century and argues that a state’s debt can 
be declared “odious” if the loan proceeds were not used to serve the public interest. Private lenders forfeit 
their right to hold the state liable for the debt if they were aware of its intended hostile use. The debt then 
ceases to be a liability of the state and instead becomes a liability of the belligerent regime that contracted 
it.
825 See Appendix 7A for a summary of competing proposals for sovereign bankruptcy regimes since the 
1970s.
826 Buchheit (2005-2006), p. 343.
827 Helleiner (2006), p. 19.
828 Author Interview H.
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SDRM would distort market pricing for sovereign debt.829 But, off the record, emerging 
markets treasury officials were more concerned about the high sovereignty costs that an 
SDRM would impose. They were sceptical of submitting to a dispute resolution forum on 
a matter as politically sensitive as sovereign debt and maintained that the SDRM 
conflicted with their domestic bankruptcy laws. And, they did not think that a foreign 
actor should be able to “assert you are a bankrupt state” and then dictate settlement 
terms.830 There was also apprehension that a formal bankruptcy regime would make the 
IMF less willing to lend in a crisis, since it would be easier to simply drop troubled 
debtors into an international bankruptcy court.831 And, “to consign all current basket 
cases permanently to the international welfare rolls” was seen as a fundamentally flawed 
starting point.832 By April 2003, the SDRM was formally shelved, with the Fund issuing 
a statement admitting that “there was no longer enough support” for it.833 In the end, the 
IMF’s proposal seemed to enjoy only the very limited support of those within the Fund 
who had proposed it.834 However, of more interest to our analysis is the role played by 
sovereign debtors in its demise. More specifically, we will look at how Mexico’s 
unilateral installation of collective action clauses (CACs) in its 2003 benchmark 
sovereign bond issue helped to consign the SDRM to the intellectual dustbin.
7.2.1 The Rise o f Debtor-Designed Collective Action Clauses
Prior to 2003, sovereigns appeared content with the status quo -  they saw little 
value in either a supra-national bankruptcy framework or collective action clauses. If 
bond amendments weren’t feasible, bond exchanges, sometime with the use of exit
0*1 c
consents, were rapidly becoming an accepted method of restructuring debt. Successful 
exchanges were conducted by Pakistan (1999), Ecuador (2000), and the Ukraine (2000)
829 International Monetary Fund (2002), p. 6; International Monetary Fund (2003a), pp. 10 & 20; Helleiner 
(2006), pp. 19-20.
830 Author Interview H.
831 Author Interview H.
832 Truman (2002), p. 342.
833 Helleiner (2006), p. 20.
834 Blustein (2005), p. 177; Author Interviews D & H.
835 Buchheit and Gulati (2000), p. 68. Exit consents are disfiguring amendments to the non-payment terms 
of old bonds being exchanged in a restructuring. Their purpose is to encourage the acceptance of new 
bonds and reduce creditor holdouts.
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with participation rates of 95% or better.836 Market practitioners in the business of 
advising sovereigns in distress have commented that bond restructurings were made 
easier by the mark-to-market nature of the debt: “Since the bondholder takes the hit right 
away, all the sovereign needs to do is make an offer that it NPV positive.”837 Others have 
commented: “It was a bit of a myth that there was a gaping hole in the international 
financial architecture; unilateral bond exchanges have gone pretty well.”838
Even if investors and issuers could agree that CACs would somehow improve the 
sovereign debt management process, the question remained: Which CACs? There were 
several competing templates, and most creditor groups, like the G-10 and the IIF, 
believed that they would be effective only if they: i) offered a mechanism for the 
collective representation of debt holders; ii) allowed for a qualified majority of voters to 
alter the terms and conditions of debt contracts; and, iii) required the sharing among 
creditors of any assets received from the debtor, including, most critically, those that 
resulted from successful legal action.839
The G-10 later refined these recommendations by providing guidance on 
threshold levels, suggesting that two thirds of bondholders would be required to elect a 
bondholder representative, and a 75% vote would be needed to amend payment terms. 
The group also argued that the power to litigate should be concentrated exclusively with 
the' bondholder representative and any recoveries resulting from litigation should be 
shared pro-rata among all investors.840 As time progressed, creditor organizations started 
to propose model clauses that were increasingly more stringent. For example, in 2003, the 
IIF suggested that there needed to be an 85% vote in order to amend payment terms, as 
long as 10% of the bondholders did not object. This translated into a 90% - or near 
unanimous - approval by bondholders to effect amendments.841 Such a high threshold 
was seen as offering little improvement over the status quo. And, unfortunately for debtor 
states, the creditors’ position gained in momentum and consistency when several 
bondholder associations joined with the IIF to promote model clauses. Roubini and Setser
836 International Monetary Fund (2001), pp. 5-7.
837 Author Interview E.
838 Author Interview D.
839 Group of Ten (The Rey Report) (1996).
840 Group of Ten (2002).
841 Institute o f International Finance, International Primary Markets Association et al. (2003).
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(2004b) commented that if the creditor groups prevailed, “these changes would give 
external private creditors increased leverage over a sovereign debtor, and make it harder 
for a debtor to use the bond’s amendment provisions to drive creditors into a deal.”842
So, why did sovereigns ultimately agree to contractual changes in their bond 
documents? And, what drove their choice of clauses and voting thresholds? After all, as 
late as the fall of 2002, things were not looking very promising. The Mexican finance 
minister “had declared definitively that Mexico had no intention of including CACs in its 
bond issues.” However, the U.S. Treasury continued to encourage a change of policy 
on CACs. According to Deputy Treasury Secretary, John Taylor:
We, the Bush administration, promoted the collective action clauses very 
actively... and we had a lot of help from many people... we kept getting on the 
phone, kept calling ministers, kept calling our colleagues.844
The U.S. also pushed CACs at every country board meeting of the IMF. By January, 
2003, Taylor said that the Mexicans were sending signals that they were considering 
issuing a bond with collective action clauses. However, Mexico’s Deputy Finance 
Minister, Agustin Carstens, wanted to get assurances from Taylor that the Mexicans 
would not be criticized for the fact that they were deviating from the recommendations of 
the G-10, the IIF and the bondholder associations. Taylor told Carstens that he could 
count on America’s full support despite these deviations. Carstens then asked if Taylor 
could get the G-7 to publicly congratulate Mexico for its efforts and Taylor willingly 
obliged. However, Mexico’s real concern would soon surface. According to Taylor:
They asked me if I could be more public and definitive about my opposition 
to the SDRM. On this issue, I was pleased that I could do even better...I 
could ask the [new] Secretary of the Treasury [John Snow] to make things 
clear...[Snow] was very happy to drop any U.S. support for the SDRM and 
put all our effort behind collective action clauses.845
Mexico’s desire to put the SDRM out of its misery was also confirmed by Guillermo 
Ortiz, the president of Mexico’s central bank. He said that the initiative was taken on
842 Roubini and Setser (2004b), p. 5.
843 Helleiner (2006), p. 22.
844 Helleiner (2006), p. 22.
845 Taylor (2007), pp. 126-128.
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CACs “because it was a very good way to get rid of the SDRM.”846 While some have 
argued that the SDRM proposal was simply a tactic by the IMF to get sovereigns to 
implement CACs, most market actors disagree. According to one source:
[The SDRM] was not a ploy to push CACs. But, CACs were eventually used 
by powerful players to diffuse the SDRM. The U.S. Treasury, the French 
Tresor and HM Treasury all used the SDRM as a threat. They all said: You 
should take CACs instead!847
A source within the Mexican treasury confided that Mexico’s decision to include CACs 
was more a political than an economic one. It was made at the highest levels of 
government, both within and outside the Mexican treasury.848 The main driver inside the 
treasury was Alonso Garcia, Vice Minister, who personally made the decision to put 
CACs in the country’s 2003 bond issue. However, his decision also required the approval 
of Mexico’s Deputy Finance Minister, Agustin Carstens.849 It was fortuitous that 
Carstens was close to Taylor and the IFIs. According to Taylor, he and Carstens were 
neighbours; each owned an apartment in the same building in Washington, D.C, and 
Carstens later went to work for the IMF.850
Despite the fact that the U.S. Treasury was extolling the virtues of CACs, Mexico 
believed that there would be very few immediate economic benefits to issuing a 
sovereign bond that included CACs. This is because it would take time for these clauses 
to become operative in all outstanding bond issues. According to a source inside the 
Mexican treasury:
We feel that CACs won’t help at all over a three year horizon, will help more 
over a 10 year horizon and will help a lot over a 30 year horizon; and, since 
politicians think in the short term, the main advantage for us was to be 
perceived by the market and by the G-7 as a well-behaved international actor 
taking the initiative to improve the international financial architecture.851
846 Helleiner (2006), p. 22.
847 Author Interview H.
848 Author Interview H.
849 Author Interview G.
850 Taylor (2007), pp. 98-132.
851 Author Interview H.
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In leading by example, Mexico succeeded in making CACs virtually standard in New 
York law sovereign bonds. In 2003,47% of new sovereign bonds issued under New York 
law contained CACs. This figure jumped to 80% by the third quarter of 2004,852 and 
close to 100% by the first quarter of 2005.853 In addition, by moving forward unilaterally 
with its benchmark issue, Mexico helped to “put the nail in the coffin” of the IMF’s 
proposed bankruptcy regime.854 Finally, and perhaps most important, Mexico wanted to 
be sure that it did not leave the field open for creditors to design the standard 
documentation for New York law bonds, nor did it want to see less creditworthy issuers 
experiment with a more stringent collection of CACs. If that happened, it would have set 
a bad precedent.855 Mexico believed that the main strategic advantage in being the first- 
mover was to embed CACs in sovereign bonds that would be an expression of the 
preferences a highly creditworthy borrower.856 They purposely did not include the more 
onerous Rey Report, G-10 and IIF recommendations since they did not want to limit 
Mexico’s flexibility in a future debt crisis.857 The success of Mexico’s benchmark bond 
with its “regulation-lite” CACs was indisputable.858 The issue was heavily 
oversubscribed at a spread of 312.5 basis points over treasuries, a price which implied 
that the inclusion of debtor-friendly CACs did not increase the country’s borrowing 
costs.
7.2.2 CACs: A Reflection o f Sovereign Debtor Preferences
Once Mexico launched its 2003 bond issue, a sense of complacency set in among 
financial architecture reformers. Hadn’t Mexico’s leadership solved the major problems 
associated with sovereign bond restructurings? Wasn’t the financial system now better 
equipped to handle sovereign defaults? After all, John Taylor maintained that CACs 
reform was one of his most important achievements as Deputy Treasury Secretary.860
852 Drage and Hovaguimian (2004), p. 3.
853 Helleiner (2006), p. 20.
854 Author Interview G. Also see Blustein (2005), p. 230.
855 Author Interview H. There was some concern in Mexico that Uruguay would issue a bond with CACs, 
and since Uruguay was a much lower-rated credit, their CACs template might have been more stringent.
856 Roubini and Setser (2004a), p. 313.
857 Author Interview H.
858 Author Interview R.
859 Taylor (2007), pp. 126-128.
860 Taylor (2007).
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However, those close to Taylor argue that he “highlighted it as a success because he 
needed a success.”861 The “victory” was largely “symbolic” in the sense that it gave 
momentum to the CACs approach; it did not involve a “line by line” debate about the 
legal text that Mexico would use, and the outcome certainly did not reflect G-10 or 
creditor-country preferences.862 Yet, except for a few dissenting voices, most overlooked 
the fact that not all CACs are created equal.863 The specific choices made by Mexico -  
choices which were later replicated by most new sovereign issuers - would have an. 
important impact on the resolution of future sovereign debt crisis.864 While our goal is not 
to evaluate the optimality of the current CACs regime, we do want to explain the factors 
that led to its adoption. How was it that Mexico was able to install CACs that differed in 
meaningful ways from the recommendations made by the G-10 and other creditor 
groups? What factors enabled Mexico to make these choices, and how might they affect 
bargaining outcomes between debtor states and bondholders in the future?
When the G-10 originally published the Rey Report in 1996 and followed up with 
its specific recommendations for CACs in 2002, it was speaking as the representative of 
the largest creditor governments. In so doing, the G-10 introduced a template for CACs 
which it believed would improve the efficiency and equity of the sovereign debt 
restructuring process for debtors and creditors alike. As we mentioned before, the 
template included three main types of clauses which can be identified broadly as 
majority representation, majority amendment and majority enforcement. Majority 
representation clauses - sometimes referred to as engagement clauses - provided a 
mechanism for the establishment of a bondholder committee or some type of creditor 
representative. Majority amendment clauses were meant to allow a qualified majority of 
bondholders to vote for a change in the payment terms of bonds. Finally, majority 
enforcement clauses were intended to dissuade potential creditor litigation insofar as they
861 Author Interview R.
862 Author Interview R.
863 See White (2002); Ghosal and Miller (2003); Kroszner (2003); Sharma (2005) and Ghosal (2005) for a 
more critical assessment of CACs implementation.
864 Gelpem and Gulati (2007), p. 69. Author Interview N. In the case of Uruguay, a pro-forma analysis was 
done after the exchange to see how the exchange might have been affected by the presence of Mexican 
style-CACs. The analysis suggested that the presence of CACs would have increased investor participation 
by only a few percentage points. In the case of Belize (2007) the actual presence of CACs was believed to 
have pushed investor participation by only 1%, from 97% to 98%. So, the effect o f CACs has thus far been 
minimal.
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would require some form of sharing of litigation proceeds among all creditors. At the end 
of 2004, the Bank of England completed a study which examined the CACs contained in 
every sovereign bond issued since February 2003, the date of the Mexican benchmark 
issue.865 They concluded that of the three types of clauses recommended by the G-10, 
Mexico and other sovereign issuers had included only one: the majority amendment
O fL f .
clause. What accounts for this? We will argue that the way in which CACs have been 
introduced strongly reflect the preferences, and therefore the growing bargaining 
leverage, of debtor countries today.867 Additionally, we believe that this enhanced 
leverage resulted from important structural changes connected with the new capital 
market dynamic, most notably the shift from bank to bond financing by sovereigns since 
the 1990s. It Was also impacted by the willingness of major creditor governments -  
notably the G-7 -  to publicly support the choices of debtor states over those of their own 
creditor groups.
7.2.3 CACs: Majority Representation
There is a common belief that sovereign debtors are always eager to begin discussions with their creditors 
that will result in debt relief, while creditors always wish to postpone the evil day when they will be asked 
to grant such relief This is a breathtaking misconception868
Lee Buchheit
Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton
The original purpose of the majority representation clause was to foster early 
dialogue, coordination and communication among creditors and the sovereign. The G-10 
envisioned the creation of a permanent bondholders’ council or the election of a 
representative body with the power to engage the sovereign debtor in negotiation. 
However, this recommendation reflects the misperception that debtors in distress are keen 
to bring creditor groups to the table to obtain a new agreement. This is often far from the 
case, since the debtor is better off if it simply lets the private sector provide “extended
865 The Bank of England indicated that this study was not updated since 2004 since there have not been 
material changes to the original conclusions. This was also confirmed with a market practitioner (Author 
Interview N).
866 Drage and Hovaguimian (2004).
867 Gelpem and Gulati (2007), p. 57. According to Gelpem and Gulati, the bondholder association ECMA 
was furious upon hearing of Mexico’s new issue, calling it a “jam-job.”
868 Buchheit (2003), p. 19.
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involuntary financing.” In other words, by foregoing interest payments, sovereigns can 
retain those funds for domestic use. And, as Dhillon, Garcia-Fronti et al. (2006) point out, 
“trading and consuming while negotiating with creditors who are getting no debt service 
...confers a bargaining advantage to the debtor.”870 Kohlscheen and O’Connell (2006) 
argue in a similar vein that borrowers who can afford to be patient, insofar as they are 
able to retain their trade lines and some reasonable level international reserves, can shift
O'! 1
repayment terms in their favour, and by a larger amount the more patient they are.
Also, sovereigns learned from their experience in the 1980s that unifying creditor 
groups for bargaining purposes had the effect of undermining debtor negotiating power. 
For this reason, IMF post-mortems of the successful debt exchanges undertaken by 
Pakistan, Ecuador and the Ukraine in 1999 and 2000 are remarkably similar in their 
observation that none of the countries involved wanted to engage in negotiations with 
bondholders.872 Officials in Pakistan and Ecuador feared that calling a bondholders’ 
meeting might facilitate the organization of bondholders opposed to the restructuring. 
The Ukraine refused to call a bondholders’ meeting until irrevocable proxies in favour of 
the proposed amendments had been delivered. Ecuador did ask eight major institutional 
holders of its bonds to form a “consultative group.” However, according to Buchheit 
(2003), this group was strictly prohibited from engaging in “negotiation” and was told 
that its sole purpose was to “provide a formal medium through which Ecuador could 
communicate with the bondholder community and receive the views of bondholders on 
issues relevant to the exchange offer.”873 Pakistan used a similar approach with a number 
of its larger Eurobond holders. These cases demonstrate how sovereigns try to avoid 
convening bondholder meetings out of concern that “once their identities become known 
to each other, the bondholders may be able to coordinate their response.”874 In all three 
cases the IMF maintained that “the lack of a negotiating process ...increased the
869 Yianni (2002), p. 87.
870 Dhillon, Garcia-Fronti et al. (2006), pp. 394-395.
871 Kohlscheen and O'Connell (2006), p. 5.
872 International Monetary Fund (2001), pp. 5-7.
873 Buchheit (2003), pp. 14-15.
874 Buchheit (2003), pp. 14-15.
241
authorities’ leverage, and thereby contributed to the degree to which they were able to 
obtain favourable terms.”875
Even while undertaking the largest sovereign debt exchange in history, with $98.7 
billion in creditor claims, Argentina was advised by its attorneys not to negotiate with the 
two main bondholder councils that had formed on an ad hoc basis.876 According to one 
source familiar with the negotiation:
Nothing prevents creditors from forming [committees] -  but Argentina has 
ignored them. The lawyers for Argentina tell the country that the best way to 
succeed is to be aggressive. And, anyway, you can’t force a sovereign to live 
by the prescription of a bondholders’ council if it doesn’t want to.877
Other market practitioners maintain that it is hard to create a bondholder council because 
the remuneration is too low and the risk is too high. In other words, the incentive 
structure does not encourage bondholder committees. Bond trustees often resign when 
there is a default since they want to avoid the liability that attaches to the investors’ 
representative, especially in contentious restructurings.878
Roubini argues that investment banks, hired by sovereigns to represent them in 
their bond exchanges, discharge some of the responsibilities of the old bondholders’ 
councils.879 Yet, this misses an important point: investment banks are paid to represent 
the sovereign, not the bondholder. So, the elimination of traditional bondholder councils 
and their replacement by investment bank debt advisors is a development that increases 
the leverage of the debtor country in the bargaining exercise. In the end, investment 
banks are highly incentivized to find the lowest market clearing price for the sovereign; 
this is in marked contrast the bondholder councils of the 19th century and interwar periods 
who were seeking the highest price that the sovereign could afford to pay its creditors.880 
As bondholders see it, the main drawback of the current process is that “it is aggressive, 
non-consensual, take-it-or-leave-it.”881 So, is it reasonable for creditors to continue to call
875 International Monetary Fund (2001), pp. 20-21.
876 Republic of Argentina (2005); Author Interview G.
877 Author Interview D.
878 Author Interview G.
879 Roubini and Setser (2004a).
880 Author Interview K.
881 Author Interview D.
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for a majority representation clause? Would the creation of a permanent bondholder 
council help?
Several academics and law professionals have argued the case for creating a new 
bondholder council along the lines of the CFBH and FBPC.882 In 1995, Eichengreen and 
Portes called for the establishment of a permanent bondholder committee with “a charter, 
a permanent secretariat, a minimum set of conventions and a core of permanent
Q Q 'l
members.” In the same year, MacMillan called for the resurrection of the CFBH to co-
0 0 4
ordinate debt workouts and centralize negotiations with troubled debtor states. More 
recently, Portes (2004) called for the establishment of a permanent bondholder 
representative which he labelled the “New York Club.” This institution would be 
modelled on the CFBH and FBPC and would be added to the machinery of the Paris and 
London Clubs.885 As Portes sees it, the main benefit of a New York Club would be to 
engage with all bondholders in simultaneous negotiations, thereby overcoming much of 
the aggregation problem.886 He further suggested that there be a mediation agency to 
coordinate debt workouts bejtween the Paris, London and New York Clubs, with the goal 
of ensuring that information is disseminated on a timely basis.887
Today’s market practitioners are extremely wary of the potential efficacy of a 
bondholder council or committee, even if it could be created. According to one source: 
“It’s hard to get a bondholder group together -  bondholders are too diverse.”888 This 
sentiment was echoed by a former IMF staff member who said: “It is difficult for a 
bondholders’ council to emerge today given the differences within the bondholding 
investor class.”889 And, there are other problems connected with reviving a bondholder 
council in the 21st century. Holders of large blocs of a country’s bonds may want a voice 
in the negotiation, but they may also disappear as discussions progress. Investment 
positions, even large ones, can be sold in the midst of a restructuring, creating a fluid set
882 Eichengreen and Portes (1995); MacMillan (1995a); Portes (2004); Institute of International Finance 
(2006); Portes (2000).
883 Eichengreen and Portes (1995). See also Eichengreen (2000).
884 MacMillan (1995a); MacMillan (1995b).
885 Portes (2004).
886 Problems of aggregation occur when there is no way to coordinate voting across all bond issues, or 
across different classes of debt.
887 Portes (2004), p. 13.
888 Author Interview F.
889 Author Interview B.
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of players that can make ongoing negotiations difficult, if not impossible.890 So, unless 
some sort of permanent, standing council could be established, this type of problem 
would routinely plague the debt restructuring process.
If the current regime remains institutionless, it will be for several reasons: i) 
debtors are opposed to them; ii) important creditor governments are not willing to support 
them to the same degree they did in the 19th century and interwar period, and, iii) there is 
scepticism that they can be efficient and truly representative while providing some sort of 
continuity to the negotiation process.
7.2.4 CACs: Majority Amendment
The goal of majority amendment clauses is to ensure that there are effective 
means for debtors and creditors to re-contract, without a minority of bondholders 
obstructing the process. More specifically, New York law bonds needed to be altered to 
allow less than 100% of creditors (the previously prevailing standard) to amend the 
payment terms of the bond.891 However, as we discussed earlier, creditor groups 
proposed much higher voting thresholds, generally in the range of 85% - 90% of 
bondholders.892 Some went so far as to suggest 95%, a level which Setser (2005) argued 
was useless since vulture funds only needed to purchase 5% of a bond to block a 
restructuring.893 Mexico, having control of the text of its bond indenture, responded by 
setting the threshold at 75%, a level that would become the new market standard.894 The 
fact that Mexican style clauses have prevailed, with only a few exceptions, means that the
OAf
county was singularly successful in overcoming creditor group pressure.
Emerging market fund managers argued that the exclusive inclusion of majority 
amendment clauses was “a very narrow solution to a very narrow problem,” and “a one­
way transfer of value from bondholders to sovereigns.”896 From a bondholder’s 
perspective, the amendment clause would allow Mexico -  and other debtor states -  to
890 Author Interview G.
891 Non-payment terms in New York law bonds were already assigned a super-majority threshold.
892 Institute of International Finance, International Primary Markets Association et al. (2003).
893 Setser (2005), p. 9.
894 Drage and Hovaguimian (2004); Roubini and Setser (2004a). Although Brazil later issued a bond with 
an 85% threshold, it subsequently said that it would lower it to 75%.
895 Roubini and Setser (2004b), p. 6.
896 Salmon (2004a), pp. 42-46. Quotes are taken from two emerging-market firnd managers.
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engage in a future “cramdown;” in other words, it bestows on sovereigns the power to 
force minority dissenters into a deal, while at the same time removing any legal rights the 
dissenters have to protest that deal after the exchange.897 For these reasons, adoption of 
this clause was highly appealing to debtor states.
7.2.5 CACs: Majority Enforcement
A judgment is nothing more than a piece o f paper.
Bruce Nichols, Partner 
Davis, Polk & Wardwell
Once majority restructuring clauses are in place, the risk of disruptive creditor legal 
action is largely confined to the period when the restructuring is in process and before it 
is concluded. To limit the risk of creditor lawsuits in this period, the G-10 called for the 
implementation of majority enforcement clauses, which customarily include provisions 
for the sharing of litigation proceeds. Such sharing provisions reduce the benefits that 
individual creditors enjoy from launching unilateral legal action, much in the same way 
that sharing clauses in 1980s syndicated loan agreements restrained regional banks from 
suing. The Bank of England found that sovereign bonds issued since 2003 have not 
normally concentrated the power to litigate with a bondholder representative, nor have 
they called for the proceeds of litigation to be shared.898 The reason that CACs have not 
evolved to include sharing clauses is because sovereigns believe creditor litigation 
problems to be overstated by the official and policy community.899 To date, litigation has 
yet to derail a sovereign debt restructuring. Even vulture funds, long seen as posing the 
greatest litigation threat “do best in an environment where the overwhelming majority of 
creditors have migrated to the new deal.”900 The IMF has also weighed in on this subject:
Litigation against a sovereign has been relatively limited and there is 
inadequate evidence to suggest that the prospect of such litigation will 
invariably undermine the sovereign’s ability to reach an agreement with a
897 While there was much protest about the form of amendment clauses in the Mexican bond, they were 
identical to the ones used since the 19th century in English law bonds.
898 Drage and Hovaguimian (2004).
899 Author Interviews D, G & E.
900 Yianni (2002), p. 88.
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majority of its creditors. Litigation is not an attractive option for many 
creditors.901
It is not an attractive option because sovereigns generally have very little in the way of 
attachable assets in overseas jurisdictions. Their official properties, like embassies, and 
their central bank reserves held at the Bank for International Settlements, are exempt 
from their waiver of sovereign immunity.902 This makes successful litigation against a 
sovereign exceedingly difficult, although the landscape may change with over $24 billion 
in holdout claims remaining after Argentina’s 2005 debt exchange 903 Nevertheless, the 
current structure of majority enforcement provisions reflects the conviction on the part of 
debtors that the risks of litigation are not great enough to warrant more sweeping changes 
in bond indentures.
Some maintain that worries about bondholder litigation are “more an issue for the 
academic and official community. It’s not a huge market problem.”904 Others see holdout 
creditors as a “nuisance but a fact of life, and the cost of doing business for 
sovereigns.”905 Yianni (2002) characterized sovereign litigation as an irritating but minor 
problem in practice.906 Despite the well-publicized success of Elliott Associates against 
Peru, it seems that such victories are more the exception than the rule.907 In fact, the 
results of a survey taken by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b) demonstrate that even 
though litigation against defaulting countries is more feasible now than at any other time 
in history, creditors have been relatively unsuccessful in obtaining post-judgement 
payments from defaulting nations. The authors note that it is actually the defaulting 
countries that have “substantially improved their legal tactics to avert litigation losses.”908
901 Krueger (2002), p. 8. See also Setser (2005), p. 7.
902 Sovereigns agreed to waive immunity from lawsuits for commercial transactions beginning in the U.S. 
in 1976.
903 The World Bank Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes recorded a claim of $4.4 billion on 
February 7,2007 against the Argentine Republic by a group of Italian retail bondholders.
904 Author Interview D.
905 Author Interview G.
906 Yianni (2002).
907 Buchheit, Gulati et al. (2003).
908 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b), pp. 3-4. Out of a total of 36 cases of private creditor litigation 
against sovereign debtors since 1994,17 resulted in judgements to pay, 12 resulted in out of court 
settlements, with the remaining cases either pending or dropped. Moreover, in only six cases was 100% of 
the claim amount received by the private creditor.
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In the next section, we will look at the specific elements of structural power that 
have enabled sovereign debtors to wrest control of the debt management process from 
their private creditors. We will examine the. lack of bondholder collective will and the 
leniency and buoyancy of the capital markets, both of which have increased the 
bargaining leverage of debtor states. Also, in contrast to the 1980s, sovereigns now enjoy 
greater control over the text of their debt contracts. Finally, changes in the IMF’s 
“lending into arrears” policies have largely benefited debtor states by putting IMF 
resources at their disposal in advance of a final settlement with private creditors. All of 
these changes have amplified debtor power in the current period, giving them a stronger 
voice in the design of debt management regimes, and greater control over outcomes.
7.2.6 The Shift from Bank Debt to Bonds and the Myth o f  Bondholder Collective Will
Whereas commercial banks dominated the business of emerging market lending 
in the 1980s, bondholders returned to the scene in the 1990s, assuming the historically 
prominent role of their 19th century and 1920s predecessors. As the table below 
illustrates, bank lending has been dwarfed by lending from non-bank private creditors 
since the late 1990s. And, if we look at the contribution of private sector lenders more 
broadly, we can see that they have largely eclipsed the official sector during this period.
Table 7B: Net External Borrowings by Emerging Markets Countries -  Official.
Bank and Non-Bank Flows
Billions o f U.S. dollars
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(est)
Borrowing 
from Official 
Creditors
34.5 -8.1 24.1 10.6 0.7 -6.4 -50.9 -64.5 14.7 23,.6
Borrowing 
from Banks
-13.0 -10.9 -12.5 -18.0 13.8 30.8 40.1 57.8 41.9 40.5
Borrowing 
from Non- 
Bank Private 
Creditors
24.3 57.2 -0.8 29.6 106.4 171.6 246.6 301.2 223.2 256.5
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, Statistical Appendix, April 2007 (pp. 262-263).
What effects did the transition from bank to bond financing have on the sovereign 
debt restructuring regime of the late 1990s, and how did this change impact bargaining
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outcomes? Well, if we start at the most basic level, commercial banks and bondholders 
have fundamental differences in their degree of cohesion. So, by shifting the bulk of their 
debt from banks to bondholders, sovereigns were able to use this new weakness in 
creditor collaboration to their advantage.
If you examine a bond issue closely enough, you find that it “breaks down 
atomically into hundreds or thousands of bi-lateral contracts between the bond issuer and 
each investor; the appearance of an investor [syndicate]... is just that, an appearance with 
few practical or legal implications.”909 Bond investors, unlike banks, often have no 
ongoing business relationship with a debtor and are not subject to moral suasion by the 
official sector.910 As McGovern (2003) observed, “the era of commercial banks making 
sovereign loans and holding them to maturity is now a distant memory;” sovereigns are 
no longer able to sit in a room and negotiate with fifteen lead creditors.911 They are 
instead faced with a creditor group that is large, more anonymous and difficult to 
coordinate.912 Hedge fund managers are guided by mark-to-market considerations and are 
not apt to accept a negotiation process that takes years. While banks had incentives to 
prolong the 1980s negotiations to preserve their loan values, bond investors absorb losses 
immediately, as the market adjusts to new information about a sovereign’s financial 
difficulties.913 In addition, bond investors often have conflicting objectives; those who 
purchased their bond at full face value will fight for a more generous settlement than 
investors who purchased the same bond in the secondary market at a deep discount. 
Investors who owned credit default swaps might try to derail a pre-default restructuring 
and advocate default instead, affording them the opportunity to collect on their credit risk 
insurance. Hold-out creditors could opportunistically threaten litigation, both prior to and 
after a restructuring, creating greater uncertainty for sovereign debtors. This is in marked 
contrast to the 1980s, when “virtually all holders of distressed debt were banks, which 
had a regulatory incentive against declaring a creditor in default...as this would have 
required them to write down their loans.”914 That today’s bondholders (as a group) cannot
909 Buchheit and Gulati (2002), p. 1320.
910 Krueger (2002), p. 7.
911 McGovern (2003), p. 79.
912 International Monetary Fund (2003b).
913 International Monetary Fund (2001), pp. 20-21.
914 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b), p. 23.
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express some form of “collective will” actually works to the benefit of sovereigns in a 
debt renegotiation. With the disappearance of the powerful creditors’ cartel of the 1980s 
and the decline in systemic risk to the global banking system, sovereigns began to enjoy 
more room to manoeuvre in debt negotiations. For this reason, they have consciously 
avoided creditors’ attempts to mandate consolidated bondholder representation, either 
contractually or otherwise, and have been successful at obtaining larger haircuts through 
unilateral exchanges.
7.2.7 Capital Market Promiscuity
The historical record demonstrates that markets have not particularly punished 
sovereigns that have chosen to default, and that, contrary to expectation, defaulting 
countries are not tainted in the long run by their unwillingness to pay today.915 Even 
recent IMF studies have found that countries that defaulted in the 1990s “did not 
experience interruption in their market access.”916 And, if defaulting carries little cost, 
borrowers will eventually respond to the incentive. It is interesting that today’s lenders 
“seem singularly willing to ignore this risk.”917 Why don’t investors punish defaulting 
countries by driving up the cost of future borrowings or restricting market access?918 One 
explanation is that governments in debtor countries have very short life spans, so lenders 
do not project individual country risks from history. Another is that investors rely more 
on the current state of macroeconomic policies than they do on historical debt-service 
history. So, as long as a country has adopted fiscal and monetary policies that promote 
low inflation and sustained growth, “creditors hear no strong signal from the distant 
past.”919 For instance, Mexico returned to the capital markets within a year of its 
1994/1995 crisis, as did Korea after its 1998 crisis.920 Others have pointed out that 
Ecuador was not particularly punished for its default episode in 1999/2000 921 And, 
market practitioners believe that Argentina will soon have the ability to tap the capital
915 Eichengreen and Lindert (1989), pp. 4-5; Jorgenson and Sachs (1989); Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989); 
Eichengreen and Portes (1989).
916 Gelos, Sahay et al. (2003), p. 25.
917 Financial Times, Febrary 14, 2007.
918 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b), p. 4.
919 Fishlow (1989), pp. 86-105; Eichengreen and Lindert (1989), p. 5.
920 Author Interview K. See also Rubin (2003a), p. 34.
921 Author Interview D.
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markets, despite the harsh settlement terms it offered its bondholders in early 2005. They 
argue that the country’s presence in the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond Index gives 
hedge fund managers, who are measured on relative performance, strong incentives to 
hold Argentine bonds.922
The Financial Times recently noted that “with markets awash in liquidity, 
international investors’ appetite for risk means they are willing to buy [Argentine] debt 
paper issued locally.” In addition, Argentina recently signed agreements with 
Venezuela that allowed for the joint issue of $1.5 billion in bonds. The leaders of the two 
countries are even discussing the possibility of establishing a “Bank of the South to 
circumvent the economic reform policies of the IMF and Washington.”924 Contributing to 
the laxity on the part of the credit markets is the steady growth in private capital flows to 
developing countries which we discussed earlier. Underpinning these flows is the 
relentless search for yield. The current global savings glut has driven interest rates and 
risk premiums in developed countries to historic lows. As a result, money has flooded 
into emerging markets in the past four years seeking the possibility of higher returns.925
Table 7Cs National Interest Rates in Selected Developed and Emerging Market
Countries
Treasury Bill Rates (%)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
U.S. 4.82 4.66 5.84 3.45 1.61 1.01 1.37 3.15 4.89 4.87
Germany 3.42 2.88 4.32 3.66 2.97 1.98 2.00 2.03 3.38 3.80
United
Kingdom
6.82 5.04 5.80 4.77 3.86 3.55 4.43 4.55 5.01 5.33
Mexico 24.76 21.41 15.24 11.31 7.09 6.23 6.82 9.20 7.04 7.01
Brazil 28.57 26.39 18.51 20.06 19.43 22.10 17.14 18.76 13.04 11.77
Jamaica 25.65 20.75 18.24 16.71 15.54 25.94 15.47 13.39 12.30 11.65
Hungary 17.83 14.68 11.03 10.79 8.91 8.22 11.32 6.95 8.06 7.81
South Africa 16.53 12.85 10.11 9.68 11.16 10.67 7.53 6.91 8.28 8.29
Nigeria 12.26 17.82 15.50 17.00 19.03 14.79 14.34 7.63 6.50 6.90
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, May 2002, January 2007, and June 2007.
922 Author Interview G.
923 Financial Times, February 9, 2007, p. 13
924 Washington Times, March 8, 2007.
925 Financial Times, February 7, 2007, p. 13.
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With sovereigns less reliant on banks for funding and secure in the promise of 
promptly renewed capital market access, debtor countries today are less concerned about 
the consequences of default than they were in the 1980s. A Mexican treasury official 
commented that:
in the 1980s, we had an incentive to pay the banks since they had all the 
money. This symbiotic relationship no longer exists. Today, there is a lack of 
incentives for an orderly restructuring. You can get financing from the market 
in the future. Crises are so big today that you have to break the rules.926
Also, with no single point of control over an increasing supply of global credit, today’s
tfibondholders do not enjoy the structural power of their 1980s -  or 19 century -  
predecessors.927
7.2.8 Debtor Control Over the Text o f Bond Indentures
Another important change in the capital market dynamic since the 1980s has been 
a shift in control over the content of the debt contract. In the 1980s, attorneys 
representing bank lenders had the job of drafting syndicated loan documents. Protection 
of the lenders’ interests was therefore paramount. By contrast, the content of bond 
indentures is controlled by counsel representing the issuing country. Although the text of 
bond indentures is heavily influenced by precedent, the changes made by Mexico to 
standard collective action clauses (CACs) were made easier by the fact that Mexico’s 
chief counsel, the U.S. law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, was responsible for the documentation. 
While Gelperrt and Gulati (2007) point out that investors “can and do make their views 
[on legal matters] known to issuers” the fact is that, in the end, the only choice investors 
have is to “buy or not to buy.”928
7.2.9 Revision o f IMF “Lending into Arrears ” Policies
The IMF’s policy of not lending into arrears - or not lending to countries in 
default to their private creditors - was motivated by a desire to maintain the integrity of
926 Author Interview H.
927 Miller and Thomas (2006a), p. 23. Miller and Thomas (2006a) argue the threat of attachment which 
accompanies unpaid claims still effectively prohibits debtor access to primary capital markets, namely in 
London and New York.
928 Gelpem and Gulati (2007), p. 56.
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the global financial system. More specifically, the IMF wanted to be seen as supporting 
the proposition that debtor states should honour all of their debt contracts. When the 
Fund made a decision to relax this policy in 1998 with respect to bond debt, one market 
practitioner commented that the IMF had “lost any meaningful vision” of its original role 
“as guardian of the financial system.”929 Under the new IMF rules, sovereigns undergoing 
a bond restructuring could continue to enjoy access to official IMF funding, provided that 
some “good faith efforts” were being made to engage bondholders “in negotiation.”930 
However, the definition of what constituted “good faith efforts” or “negotiation” was left 
intentionally vague, giving the IMF considerable flexibility to continue to disburse funds 
in certain restructuring cases. The new policy therefore strengthened the hand of 
sovereigns by eliminating the power that private creditors previously enjoyed to block 
IMF loans.931 As we discussed in Chapter 6, this rule was relaxed with respect to bank 
debt in 1989, but only after the banks had safely provisioned for their expected Latin 
American losses. The response from bondholders after the 1998 decision was decidedly 
negative, expressing frustration that creditors had lost an important element of leverage 
over sovereigns. One market player voiced his disappointed by saying: “Don’t creditors 
deserve any sticks? There is no IMF on their side and no creditor governments.”932
The result of these structural changes was the gradual evolution of a regime for 
sovereign debt management since 1998 that produced results favouring debtor states. The 
unilateral debt exchange emerged from the vacuum which lacked a natural bondholder 
representative, and the official sector has thus far abdicated its historical role in 
empowering a bondholder institution. This has permitted sovereigns greater control in 
deciding the final terms of settlement with their private creditors. And, with respect to 
regime design, Mexico successfully bargained with the U.S. Treasury to ensure that the
929 Author Interview D. The IMF made the 1998 decision on “lending into arrears” in order to put all 
private creditors - commercial banks and bondholders -  on the same footing. In addition, the Fund wanted 
to deflect criticism that the old policy gave private bondholders too much leverage in a debt restructuring 
exercise.
930 See Cline (1995) and Eichengreen and Portes (1995) for a discussion of the “lending into arrears” policy 
with respect to the commercial banks.
931 For an alternative view, see Klimenko (2002), pp. 201-202. Klimenko argued that the shift in leverage to 
debtor states occurs mainly because the multilaterals have less leverage than before. The new lending into 
arrears policy allows debtor countries to “extract resources from the IFI’s” by remaining longer in a 
position of overhang.
932 Author Interview D.
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more revolutionary SDRM would be scrapped in favour of a debtor-driven menu of 
collective action clauses.933 While the U.S. Treasury saw the implementation of CACs by 
Mexico as a policy triumph, in fact, the value of CACs has yet to be proven. Virtually all 
the restructurings completed to date have used the unilateral exchange process without 
resorting to CACs.934 Also, market practitioners question the positive political spin that 
attached itself to the Mexican benchmark issue. According to one “Why did Mexico’s 
sovereign issue in 2003 get so much attention for the use of CACs; it’s not as big a deal 
as everyone makes it out to be. Sovereigns have long issued bonds with CACs under 
English law.”935 Even those closely connected with the Mexican initiative admit: “CACs 
today are really not as powerful as they could be. They are really a compromise -  a 
second best solution.”936 Yianni (1999) argued that the fact most restructurings have 
taken place in a CACs-free environment only serves to prove that the historical absence 
of CACs has not prevented sovereigns from working out favourable settlements.937 In 
other words, the Mexican shift to CACs may have received a good deal of attention, but 
the practical impact has been minimal.
7.2.10 Creditors Fizht Back: The I  IF and the Principles -  Re-opening the Regime 
Debate?
In an attempt to compensate for the deficiencies of the unilateral debt exchange and 
the trajectory of the current CACs templates, the IIF, a group which represents the 
interests of the financial industry, unveiled a voluntary code of conduct for emerging 
markets debtors and creditors more formally known as the Principles for Stable Capital 
Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets (hereafter called the 
“Principles”).938 According to the IIF, the Principles “articulate a well-defined process for 
debtor-creditor negotiations on restructuring terms that can attract broad based support 
from creditors.”939 They are therefore seen as a remedial step, one that will impose order,
933 See Truman (2002), p. 345, for the concept of an evolutionary versus a revolutionary change in the 
sovereign debt management regime.
934 Institute of International Finance (2007), p. 2.
935 Author Interview F.
936 Author Interview H.
937 Yianni (1999).
938 The Principles version under discussion was dated September 2006.
939 Institute of International Finance (2006), p. 2.
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transparency and efficiency on a process that is often seen as disorderly, opaque and 
inefficient The IIF maintains that:
the resolutions of past crises have often been ad hoc, protracted, and 
complicated, involving unnecessary economic dislocation and reductions in 
the values of emerging market assets, especially in cases that required debt
• 940restructuring.
Although no party is legally bound by any of the provisions of the Principles, the IIF 
hopes that the new code will provide a roadmap for debtor and creditor behaviour in 
future financial crises.941 For the purposes of our analysis, we will focus on a few of the 
more contentious IIF prescriptions for crisis resolution. The first concerns the formation 
of a creditor committee, with the costs of such a committee borne by the debtor state. The 
IIF has publicly stated that creditors prefer cooperative negotiations with committees and 
find “take-it-or-leave-it” unilateral offers inadequate.942 Yet, virtually all of the 
restructurings that took place between 1998 and 2005 took the form of unilateral 
exchanges. And, even after the publication of various drafts of the Principles, market 
practitioners pointed out that countries like Belize and Iraq “went the non-negotiated 
route.”943 Emerging markets debtors remain sceptical about the committee process as 
envisioned by the IIF :
A big problem is the cost of paying for a bondholder council -  why should a 
sovereign do that? We would have to pay for investors’ lawyers and financial 
advisors and what would be the outcome: to get a better deal for creditors? 
Countries are voicing their support now to appear cooperative. But, [the 
Code] is not [legally] enforceable.944
Another area of contention has been the IIF’s reference to the IMF’s “lending into 
arrears policy.” Under the Principles, the IMF is called upon to fully implement its 
lending into arrears policy, which, from the IIF’s perspective, means that the Fund would 
only lend to states that are “negotiating” with their creditors.945 In other words, unilateral
940 Institute of International Finance (2006), p. 2.
941 Institute of International Finance (2006), p. 14.
942 Institute of International Finance (2006), p. 12.
943 Author Interview N.
944 Author Interview H.
945 Institute of International Finance (2006), p. 13.
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exchanges would rule out access to IMF loans. However, in practice, the enforcement of 
“lending into arrears” has not been tied to a debtor’s adherence to IIF negotiating 
principles. By way of example, the IMF continued to grant Argentina access to official 
funds in the face of its default and its continuing refusal to engage in negotiations with its 
bondholders.
The most important question is whether the Principles will succeed as a framework 
for debtor/creditor negotiations in the future. Although some have expressed surprise at 
the IIF’s persistence and how far they have come, most remain unconvinced about the 
efficacy of the new code. According to one source: “At the beginning, no one really cared 
about it, and no one took them seriously. Most people still don’t believe that the 
Principles will work when they are most needed.”946
Other market sources exhibited more hostility: “Finance ministers may sign on, but 
their real view is that it is a complete waste of time.”947 Others were dubious that a 
sovereign that had “just defaulted on its contractual debt obligations would turn around 
and abide by a voluntary code of conduct.”948 Some sovereign finance officials believe 
that there is no real incentive for them to abide by the Principles “since all the costs go to 
the sovereign and all the benefits to the investors and banks.”949 Notwithstanding this 
protest, those who have publicly supported the IIF’s endeavors -  important borrowing 
states like Brazil, Korea, Mexico and Turkey - all took pains to ensure that the final 
product would not offend debtors’ sensibilities. According to Salmon (2004a), emerging 
markets officials “ensured that virtually everything creditors wanted in such a document 
was excised.”950 This has allowed sovereigns to publicly support the Principles while at 
the same time preserving their flexibility to act as a rogue debtor in the future. Although 
they might never choose to behave in a market-unfriendly manner, there is a good deal of 
value in safeguarding that option.
946 Author Interview H. See also Helleiner (2006), pp. 23-24.
947 Author Interview N.
948 Author Interview E.
949 Author Interview H.
950 Salmon (2004a), pp. 42-46.
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7.3 Compulsory Power and the Argentine Default
In general, the official sector is unsympathetic to bondholders' concerns -  and in the case o f  G-7 countries, 
it can be downright hostile.951
Felix Salmon 
Euromoney
The official sector -whether bi-laterally or through multilaterals like the IMF -  
has been an integral part of the sovereign debt restructuring regime through time. As we 
already discussed, the 19th century witnessed the frequent use of super-sanctions by the 
British government which had the effect of materially improving bargaining outcomes for 
private bondholders. Likewise, the favour shown by creditor governments and the IMF in 
the 1980s toward bank lenders endowed private creditors with significant leverage in 
their negotiations with troubled Latin American states. By contrast, the 1930s and 1940s 
saw the U.S. government prioritize the recovery of Latin American debtor states and the 
maintenance of good diplomatic relationships above the interests of its own bondholders. 
We would argue that with respect to the exercise of compulsory power in the current
• • thperiod, official creditors exhibit none of the overt partiality that they did in the 19 
century and 1980s toward their own creditors; nor are they openly working against them 
like they did in the interwar period. Instead, they have shown remarkable restraint 
publicly, while behind the scenes they have pursued a course of action that has had the 
effect of improving the lot of debtor states.
For instance, the decision by Mexico to install CACs that were much less 
comprehensive than the templates issued by creditor representatives, ultimately received 
the full support and praise of the U.S. and the G-7. Pursuant to Taylor’s own story, 
Mexico was never questioned about its choice of CACs; instead, the country was
AM
thoroughly commended and held up as an example for others to follow. Also, as 
history has shown, the collective action problems associated with bondholder groups has 
meant that official action was mandatory for the creation of bondholder representative 
bodies like the CFBH and FBPC. Yet, in the current period, creditor governments have
951 Salmon (2004a), pp. 42-46.
952 Taylor (2007), pp. 98-132. See also Author Interview R.
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shown no interest in helping to establish such a body. And, since 1998, the IMF, partly in 
response to the criticism it had received for large-scale bailouts in Mexico and Asia, 
walked away from Russia and Argentina, and even encouraged countries like Pakistan 
and the Ukraine to default on their bond debt to force investors to the negotiating table.953 
Official sector actions have thus far managed to undermine the bargaining position of 
private creditors.
7.5.1 Argentina: To Intervene or Not?
Historically, default cases that revolved around large and systemically important 
countries would attract much in the way of official sector attention and support. Yet, in 
this period, one of the most prominent defaulters -  Argentina - appeared to have been left 
to its own devices to work out a broad-based solution with private creditors. Argentina’s 
crisis commenced in earnest on December 5, 2001, triggered by the IMF’s decision to 
suspend a scheduled loan instalment. At the time, the country owed $82 billion in 
principal to hundreds of thousands of investors holding 150 different bond instruments 
issued in six currencies under the laws of eight jurisdictions.954 The resolution of this 
complex crisis took over three years -  the longest settlement period in this era - during 
which time the country suffered severe economic, political and social dislocation. In the 
end, three quarters of the bondholders agreed to take a haircut of nearly 70%.955 While 
some have said that the Argentine case proved that “borrowers and lenders can work out 
bond defaults on their own,” Buchheit (2005-2006) maintains:
this judgment would no doubt strike some of the bondholders as a bit like
concluding that World War I stands for the proposition that, left on their own,
nations can work out their differences.956
So, on the one hand, the official sector found itself maligned for its unusual detachment 
from the Argentine debt restructuring process; some went so far as to accuse the official
953 Brown and Bulman (2006), pp. 23-24.
954 Gelpem (2005a), p. 19. By the time the exchange offer was made, the claims had grown to nearly $100 
billion due to interest arrears.
955 76.6% of the bondholders accepted the exchange. The remaining bondholders (totaling approximately 
$24 billion in claims) were told that Argentina would not honor their debt, and some have filed claims 
under ICSID as well as in New York courts.
956 Buchheit (2005-2006), p. 343.
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sector of abdicating its responsibility. On the other hand, they found themselves praised 
for bowing out in favour of a market-based solution.
In this section we will argue that compulsory power did play a role in the 
Argentine debt exchange, although it was far more subtle than in past eras and ultimately 
helped Argentina achieve a better result from its restructuring. The principal reason for 
the shift in creditor government position was political: the new U.S. administration under 
George W. Bush wanted to distance itself from the interventionist policies of its 
predecessor, and the IMF, under Republican-appointee Anne Krueger, wanted to put an 
end to the lending packages that had attracted so much criticism during the Mexican and 
Asian crises in the 1990s. In the end, the Argentine bondholders were caught in this 
political sea change. Lacking official support and attention, they registered one of the 
largest haircuts in the history of sovereign default.
7.3.2 “W" Meets the Argentine Debt Crisis
When George Bush noticed Argentina’s President, Nestor Kirchner, walking 
toward him during a U.N. General Assembly Meeting in 2003, he was reported to have 
joked aloud to a number of other foreign leaders: “Here comes the conqueror of the 
IMF.”957 While Bush’s reaction might seem unusual - since the U.S. is the IMF’s 
principal shareholder - it nevertheless reflects the overall sentiment of the administration 
regarding the handling of sovereign debt crises. From the start, the Bush team would
• q<Qexpress reluctance to support excessive IMF lending in resolving financial crises. The 
neo-conservatives in the administration saw this as a healthy break from the 
interventionist policies of the Clinton/Rubin era. Certainly the installation of Anne 
Krueger, “a free market Republican,” as the Fund’s First Deputy Managing Director 
would help cement this policy within the IMF.959 How did debtor states feel about this 
IMF transformation? The view from Argentina was not very positive at first. In 2001, the 
country’s finance minister, Domingo Cavallo, argued that the U.S. had singled out
957 Helleiner (2005), p. 955.
958 Griffith-Jones (2002).
959 Helleiner (2005), pp. 961-962.
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Argentina “as an example to send the message that the new administration would avoid 
moral hazard no matter how much that decision would cost Argentina.”960
In addition to supporting policy change at the IMF, the Bush team also chose to 
react much less sympathetically to the plight of private creditors than previous 
administrations in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, the political aims of the new Bush 
administration with respect to Latin America were not that dissimilar from the objectives 
expressed by the Roosevelt administration in the 1930s. Bush hoped to counteract the 
popularity of the left-leaning governments of Chavez in Venezuela and Lula in Brazil by 
showing support for, and solidarity with, Argentina. So, in a story reminiscent of the 
1930s, Bush was willing to sacrifice the interests of American bondholders to achieve a 
larger, geo-strategic objective.961
7.3.3 US Promotes IMF Mid-Crisis Loan to Argentina
Amid much bondholder protest, the U.S. decided in the fall of 2003 to support a 
$13.3 billion IMF loan for Argentina while the country remained in default to private
Qdi'y
creditors. In addition to the problems presented by the previously discussed “lending 
into arrears” policy, the U.S. pressured the IMF to exclude specific targets for the 
country’s primary budget surplus. These targets are normally critical to any program 
since they help determine the amounts that would be available for debt servicing. Randy 
Quarles, a U.S. Treasury officer, later admitted that “the U.S.A. had deliberately pushed 
for the budget targets to be left undefined in the second and third years -  over IMF 
objections -  because it wanted the IMF not to take a stance in the debt negotiations with 
private creditors.”963
Even John Taylor, Deputy Treasury Secretary, conceded that during the Argentine 
crisis he believed that:
960 Helleiner (2005), p. 962.
961 Helleiner (2005), pp. 959 -  964. According to Helleiner: “While it is true that Italian and Swiss 
investors held the largest share of total private debt (15% and 10%, respectively), the U.S. share at 9% was 
not far behind and its absolute size left U.S. investors facing much larger losses than in other recent debt 
crises.”
962 Author Interview O.
963 Helleiner (2005), p. 954. Italics mine.
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neither the United States nor the IMF should take sides as Argentina 
negotiated with its creditors. There was a lot of pressure for us to take sides, 
usually the side of the creditors, but we resisted this pressure.964
Taylor was openly hostile toward the IMF and the policies followed by Clinton and 
Rubin. He expressed disdain for the poor handling of the 1998 Russian crisis and the 
excessive conditionality embedded in the 1997 Indonesian rescue loan. According to 
Taylor: “I began to think that no IMF would be better than the one we had, and I said so 
in a TV interview in 1998. [I said]: ‘I agree it should be abolished. I’d like to do it.’”965
However, U.S. Treasury Secretary Snow and Taylor remained supportive, 
sympathetic and engaged behind the scenes as Argentina undertook some very tense 
negotiations with the IMF in January 2004. Sources inside the U.S. Treasury confided 
that the U.S. was “very involved,” spending “an enormous amount of time in Buenos 
Aires.”966 In fact, American support was so appreciated by the Argentines that their 
finance minister “publicly thanked Snow for this help after the IMF board meetings.”967 
While it was not the aim of the American government to “disenfranchise bondholders,” 
there was an equally strong desire to avoid moral hazard.968 This was not easy to do when 
“Citigroup was in [the Treasury Secretary’s] office every week...pounding the 
table...and demanding public action.”969. Yet, the Treasury remained firm in its resolve 
not to be swayed by the banking community. A treasury official commented that “we 
were just not going to operate that way.”970 So, with U.S. help, the Argentine’s were 
given the lifeline they needed in the form of an IMF loan, much to the chagrin of private 
creditors. Yet, despite the enormous amount of U.S. effort that went into establishing the 
IMF credit facility, Taylor suggested to the Argentine treasury staff that they repay it as 
quickly as possible. According to Taylor: “that way, they would not have to worry about 
the IMF over-prescribing.”971
964 Taylor (2007), p. 93.
965 Taylor (2007), pp. 100-101.
966 Author Interview R.
967 Helleiner (2005), p. 956.
968 Author Interview R.
969 Author Interview R.
970 Author Interview R.
971 Taylor (2007), pp. 93-94. Argentina did pay back the IMF in full in January 2006.
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7.3.4 The IMF and the Power o f the Debt Sustainability Model
It is important to point out that the IMF wields a great deal of power in any 
negotiating process by virtue of its monopoly in the modelling of debt sustainability. 
These models ultimately determine how much will be available for private creditors to 
share. For instance, when a country finds itself in financial distress, the Fund staff must 
create .a model that projects the country’s future debt servicing capacity. This model 
specifically identifies the amount that will be available for the servicing of all classes of 
debt. Because the IMF receives priority over other creditors, it first removes from the 
calculation the monies required to service IMF loans. What remains can then be divided 
among the remaining official and private creditors.
Buchheit (2005-2006) describes the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis as the 
“genetic code, the financial DNA” of any debt restructuring exercise since it necessarily 
puts an upper limit on what bondholders could hope to receive. He then marvels at the 
fact that private lenders, while never being “bluntly deprived of the illusion of free will” 
in their negotiations with sovereigns, nevertheless fail to see that “behind the scenes a 
Calvinistic predestination has already been at work.”972 The IIF maintains that they are 
very aware of this unilateral power wielded by the IMF and have pushed to get the 
private sector involved in debt sustainability modelling. A combined public-private effort 
was more the norm during the 1980s debt crisis, when the banks’ economic sub­
committees had a seat at the IMF’s table. The IIF believes that the Fund currently “has
Q'7'i  ^ 9
too much power to determine how much is left over for private creditors.” Citing Iraq 
as an example, the IIF pointed out how that country’s debt sustainability model used an 
oil price of only $23 dollars a barrel, a figure that was well below market, due to political 
pressure from the Americans. This ultimately forced lenders to take an 80% haircut on 
their Iraqi debt.974
7.3.5 Argentina to the IMF: “Ciao ”
The unhappy relationship between Argentina and the IMF came to an end rather 
abruptly. President Kirchner announced that the country had repaid its remaining $10
972 Buchheit (2005-2006), p. 342.
973 Author Interview O.
974 Author Interview O. The Iraq case is not included in our analysis since it settled after 2005 and involved 
creditors that were primarily official as opposed to private. It was cited for illustrative purposes only.
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billion obligation to the Fund in January, 2006. Kirchner toasted the event by raising a 
cheer and bidding goodbye to the IMF “with a derisive ‘ciao.’”975 Kirchner was reported 
to have called the IMF “pathetic,” adding that, “there is life after the IMF and it is a good 
life.”976 Small investors -  both holdouts and non-holdouts -  were shocked by Argentina’s 
decision to pay off its $10 billion obligation to the IMF in full and well ahead of 
schedule. Many felt that if the country had that much liquidity, it should have first done 
more to honour the contracts with its foreign bondholders. According to Nicola Stark, the 
Co-Chairman of GCAB, small investors felt that they were being treated by Argentina 
like “lambs for the slaughter” and a “resource to be milked.”977
With their IMF obligation satisfied, a member of Kirchner’s treasury team 
decided to unleash an even more vitriolic indictment of the IMF’s staff and policies in a 
scathing Euromoney article. According to Argentina’s deputy finance minister, Guillermo 
Nielsen:
Anne Krueger...took Argentina into her own hands...It became clear that she 
didn’t have the sensitivity to deal with Argentina. There was no earnest effort 
to grasp the realities...Naively, I expected IMF missions to arrive in 
Argentina with a set of well-developed suggestions successfully tested in 
previous economic crises elsewhere. That was not the case... Most of the IMF 
officials we had to deal with in those early days found it difficult to
• 978distinguish between running an Excel spreadsheet and running a country.
Nielsen was determined to bypass the IMF and develop strong bi-lateral relationships 
with important members of the IMF board instead, especially the G-7 countries. He 
credited a 2002 meeting between Bush and Spain’s prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, as 
the event which convinced the U.S. administration to give Argentina the chance to 
“rebuild its economy with the support of the international community.” Nielsen was 
careful to say that Argentina never reached agreements with the IMF, but with its 
individual board members instead.979
975 Financial Times, February 9, 2007, p. 13
976 Washington Times, March 8,2007.
977 Statement by Nicola Stark, President of the Association Task Force Argentina at the Paris Club 50th 
Anniversary Celebration in Paris, France on June 14, 2006.
978 Nielsen (2006), p. 66.
979 Nielsen (2006), p. 67.
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7.3.6 Creditor Governments and the IMF Ignore Bondholder Concerns
Lacking creditor government and IMF Support, the Argentine bondholders were 
faced with having to accept what they viewed to be a meagre settlement. Prior to the 
exchange, Hans Hume, a co-chairman of the bondholder council GCAB, said: “If 
Argentina’s offer succeeds it will dramatically lower the cost of defaulting and strip 
power from creditors.”980
Unfortunately for the dissenting creditors, the Argentine debt exchange was a 
resounding success. Attracting 76.6% investor participation on claims of nearly $100 
billion, Argentina was able to materially scale down its foreign debt burden.981 The fact 
that the exchange was concluded against the backdrop of more than 200 law suits filed in 
New York, Itdly and Germany makes it all the more remarkable.982 According to Gelpem 
(2005a), Argentina’s financial crises left the impression that sovereign default shifted the 
balance of power to debtors in the absence of official intervention.983 Others argued that 
the crisis forced the acknowledgement of the limited bargaining power of bondholders 
“in a context where the U.S.A. and IMF were not supportive of their interests.”984 As the 
head of the Emerging Markets Group at JP Morgan Chase, Joyce Chang, pointed out in 
2004: “Argentina raises the question of what leverage do you have over a country once 
they stop payments...The answer is, not much.”985
While the Argentine exchange might have proven that market-based 
restructurings are possible absent a statutory mechanism, or for that matter, CACs,986 the 
question remains: What is the cost of official sector abstention? After all, a decision by 
the official sector not to take sides is hardly neutral. In the context of a sovereign default, 
such a decision by definition reduces the bargaining leverage of private creditors. This is 
because only a sovereign (or a multilateral) has the power to directly compel another 
sovereign to action. We would therefore argue that with the official sector standing aside
980 Helleiner (2005), p. 965.
981 Gelpem (2005a), p. 4.
982 Miller and Thomas (2006a), p. 14. The 200 lawsuits include 15 class action suits.
983 Gelpem (2005a), p. 4.
984 Helleiner (2005), p. 965.
985 Helleiner (2005), p. 965; Soederberg (2005). Out of all these voices, only Soederberg (2005) sees the 
new debt regime as one that gives creditors power over debtors. She argues that creditors use debt as a 
weapon to keep debtors in the capitalist system.
986 Roubini (2005), p. 1.
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- or in some instances working covertly to assist Argentina - the bondholders paid the
987price.
7.3.7 The Reaction o f Holdout Creditors and Possible Remedies
With ad hoc bondholder councils like GCAB condemning “Argentina’s 
cramdown,” what had seemed to be a modem attempt at creating a new creditor 
representative body had failed. As Gelpem (2005a) noted, “true to atomistic stereotype, 
sovereign bondholders could not hold a coalition.”988 At the moment, dissenting creditors 
are either waiting for judgments in lawsuits - or hoping to collect on judgments already 
awarded -  and as time progresses, their options are narrowing.989 The IMF attempted to 
push Argentina into a settlement with holdouts, but the Fund’s leverage materially 
diminished once the country repaid the IMF’s $10 billion loan. Argentina has publicly 
stated that it will never honour the claims of holdout creditors. And, to further enhance its 
commitment, the country adopted domestic laws which prohibit it from making payments 
to dissenting creditors. In addition, the “most-favoured-creditor” clause in its bond 
indenture requires Argentina, absent a judgment, to pay holdouts no more than 
bondholders who agreed to the original exchange.990 Italian holders of $4.4 billion in 
Argentine bonds have filed a claim with ICSID in the hopes of receiving a judgment.991 If 
the test case is a success for creditors, it may push for a re-evaluation of the provisions of 
bi-lateral investment treaties by states. For instance, sovereigns may ask that debt related 
to a restructuring be excluded from the definition of “investment.” Or, they may try to 
protect themselves against claims of expropriation from minority dissenters who have 
been outvoted through the use of collective action clauses.992
Finally, it is important to note that although participating creditors did poorly in 
the exchange and dissenting creditors remain unpaid, the broader markets did not punish
987 Dhillon, Garcia-Fronti et al. (2006), p. 378; Roubini and Setser (2004a).
988 Gelpem (2005a), p. 3.
989 Buchheit (2005-2006), pp. 338-339. See also Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2005b), pp. 10 -12. 
Although sovereigns technically waived immunity with respect to their debt obligations under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in 1976 and the State Immunities Act (“SIA”) in 1978, it is still 
difficult for a creditor to succeed in attaching a sovereign’s assets.
990 Republic of Argentina (2005).
991 The claim was filed on February 7, 2007, Case ARB/07/5, Giovanna Beccara and others vs. Argentine 
Republic. Details can be found at www.worldbank.com/icsid.
992 Gelpem (2005a), p. 7. “Uruguay’s treaty with the United States specifically shields it from expropriation 
claims by holdout creditors who have been outvoted using collective action clauses in Uruguay’s bonds.”
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Argentina. By writing off the debt and improving the country’s economic performance, 
Argentina saw the spread on its bonds narrow to around 400 basis points above 
Treasuries only six months after its debt exchange. To put this in context, this spread was 
“only very modestly above that of other emerging markets in the EMBI basket.”993
7.4 Productive Power
We have argued throughout this dissertation that discursive practices surrounding 
debt restructurings between sovereign states and private creditors have largely been 
underpinned by material power configurations. In our three historical case studies, we 
have shown how the disposition of creditor governments toward their own lenders and 
the dynamics of capital export have been influential in answering the question: What 
does it mean for a sovereign to default and how should a defaulting state be treated?994 
When Britain was the centre of capital export and a dominant military and imperial 
power in the last quarter of the 19th century, we found that adherence to the terms of a 
debt contract was seen as the moral undertaking of a civilized nation. Sovereign default 
was therefore regarded as an immoral and uncivilized act, a characterization which 
allowed for a good deal of interference by creditor governments in the affairs of 
financially distressed sovereigns. Oftentimes this interference coincided conveniently 
with the larger geo-strategic objectives of Britain relative to a particular defaulting state 
or region.
This 19th century portrayal was challenged, however, in the 1930s and 1940s 
when great powers -  including Britain, France and Germany- found themselves unable to 
meet payments on their own debt, much of it incurred in the finance of war. Suddenly, 
default became less of a moral failing and more the rational policy choice of a 
government looking to protect the economic well-being of its citizenry. Further 
buttressing this mutation in the meaning of sovereign default was the anti-banking 
rhetoric of the Roosevelt administration. The U.S. government publicly blamed the banks 
for making unsound loans to Latin America, thereby shifting the fault and responsibility 
to lenders. This permitted the administration to deal softly (and covertly) with Southern
993 Roubini (2005), p. 4.
994 Lavelle (2005), pp. 2 & 28. Lavelle argues that constructivism fails to account for important material 
factors the influence the relations between sovereign debtors and creditors.
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debtors, an approach which fostered politically desirable trade agreements in the run up 
to World War II. America’s strategic goals in this period were largely achieved at the 
expense of its own bondholders, and the discourse of reckless loan-making helped frame 
the poor settlements bondholders were offered.
During the 1980s, the characterization of default was in some ways reminiscent of 
the 19th century. Debtors were to blame, but the failing was less moral than technocratic. 
Borrowing countries were accused of having pursued reckless economic policies, but 
fortunately there was a remedy - the implementation of market reforms and austerity 
programs under the auspices of IMF structural adjustment loans.995 Underlying this 
discourse of reform and technocratic failure was the overriding necessity that creditor 
governments protect the solvency of their own banking systems. Therefore, a prescriptive 
remedy that gave rise to a lengthy rescheduling process served the interests of the main 
credit-exporting states. As the negotiations wore on, the world’s major banks were given 
the breathing room they needed to replenish their capital.
With this as background, what observations can we make about productive power 
in today’s regime? Although the current regime is evolving, it seems that productive 
power configurations in the current period bear some similarity to those in the interwar 
and post-war periods. Bondholders are believed to bear some of the blame for imprudent 
lending, and, as a result, creditor governments and the IMF have insisted that they be 
bailed-into the restructuring process. It may also be that the current crop of debt 
restructurings have taken place in the context of the public advancement of the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (“HIPC”) Initiative, a proposal which sought the forgiveness of 
the unsustainable debt burdens of the world’s poorest countries. While the middle-income 
developing countries covered in this study enjoy bond market access and would not 
qualify as HIPCs, they have often cloaked themselves in HIPC rhetoric to enhance their 
bargaining position with creditors. For instance, Argentina’s President was reported to 
have announced publicly in February 2004 that paying more to bondholders “would be 
the equivalent of a genocide against the Argentine people.”996 Leaders in Bolivia and 
Ecuador have suggested that they might follow Argentina’s lead and “expropriate
995 Ferguson and Schularick (2006) have noted how IMF structural adjustment programs were not that 
dissimilar from the debt administrations of the 19* century.
996 Helleiner (2005), p. 956. Statement from Argentina’s President Kirchner.
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property, renegotiate international contracts and default on their foreign debts.”997 In fact, 
the newly elected president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, referred to his country’s external 
debt as “illegitimate, adding that he might pursue his own ‘ Argentine-style’ default.”998
DeGoede (2005) argues that underlying most modem debtor-creditor power 
relations is a “strict regime of guilt and punishment”999 For this reason, many creditor 
states initially resisted the HIPC Initiative. They believed that if borrowers were not 
properly punished for failing to repay debt, the resulting moral hazard would encourage 
continued fiscal irresponsibility. DeGoede believes that creditors approach troubled 
debtors in the same way that one approaches an “unruly child” or “credit card junkie;” 
they see sovereigns as agents that have been repeatedly warned about the dangers of debt 
accumulation, and yet they continue to borrow recklessly.1000 As long as debtor states can 
be seen as solely responsible, they are the ones who must suffer the costs of a crisis, 
whether though economic dislocation, political upheaval, or adherence to austerity 
measures under IMF programs.
By comparison, the discourse of the HIPC Initiative and the Jubilee Debt 
campaign was one of shared responsibility -  with debtor and creditor each bearing some 
of the cost in cases of unsustainable debt. This contrasts sharply to the debt regime of the 
1980s and early 1990s. In fact, for the first time since the 1930s, western creditors were 
being asked to admit culpability for the part they played in making loans to developing 
countries. Ann Pettifor, of the Jubilee Debt Campaign, went so far as to ban the word 
“forgiveness” from the debt literature. According to Pettifor: “This would imply that the 
‘sin’ of falling into debt was committed solely by elites in debtor countries. Rather, the 
elites of the more powerful nations are considered to co-responsible.”1001 At the Paris 
Club’s 50th Anniversary Celebration, the Jubilee Debt Campaign, along with other 
NGO’s, criticized the Club for “privileging creditors’ interests” and doing little “to
997 Washington Times, March 8, 2007.
998 Washington Times, March 8,2007. Despite Correa’s rhetoric, he did make the scheduled debt service 
payment.
999 DeGoede (2005), p. 157.
1000 DeGoede (2005), p. 157.
1001 DeGoede (2005), pp. 159-161.
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guarantee a fair and transparent setting of sustainable outcomes for debt crisis 
resolution”'002
How relevant has the HIPC discourse been to debt restructurings for middle 
income countries? One sovereign debt advisor said: “It holds no weight with private 
creditors. They don’t care.”1003 Others thought that the HIPC discourse may have had 
some marginal influence on bi-lateral (government) lenders in the Paris Club. And, since 
the Paris Club works on the principle of comparability of treatment, it is conceivable that 
incremental debt relief could start with the Paris Club and migrate though the private 
creditor base.1004 However, we would clearly need a larger case sample of debt 
restructurings to reach a more definitive conclusion about the influence of HIPC 
discourse on bargaining outcomes.
Another question is why large defaulters have not availed themselves of the 
“odious debt” defence first articulated in the early 20 century by Alexander Sack, an 
international legal scholar. Under Sack’s doctrine, a debt can be declared “odious” if the 
proceeds were not used by the state to serve the public interest. And, to the extent that 
private creditors were aware that their loans were being used for such potentially hostile 
purposes, their right to hold the state responsible for repayment is forfeited. In other 
words, once debts are declared to be “odious,” a state and its citizenry cease being liable 
for them; the debts are transformed from a sovereign obligation to an obligation of the 
belligerent regime that originally contracted them.1005 Despite the availability of this 
doctrine, Gelpem (2005b) observes that “no national or international tribunal has ever 
cited Odious Debt as grounds for invalidating a sovereign obligation.”1006 Why? Gelpem 
suggests that countries are in fact able to get better deals by sidestepping the doctrine and 
using the unilateral debt exchange or some other restructuring mechanism. This is 
because the international tribunals at the heart of the doctrine require a painstaking 
examination of each loan to establish how the funds were used and whether the creditors
1002 Statement by 24 development NGOs including the Jubilee Debt Campaign, Christian Aid and Eurodad 
at the Paris Club 50th Anniversary Celebration on June 14,2006.
1003 Author Interview N.
1004 Author Interview G.
1005 Gelpem (2005b), p. 403.
1006 Gelpem (2005b), p. 406.
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were indeed complicit with the hostile regime.1007 In other words, by today’s standards, 
“it is an inefficient tool for securing quick debt relief.”1008 What Argentina and other 
sovereign debtors have learned is that the current market-based debt exchange offers 
them much greater flexibility in a sovereign debt negotiation, although they can still 
make use of the rhetoric of HIPC and the odious debt doctrine to influence public opinion 
and put pressure on private creditors.
7.5 Power and the Production o f  Bargaining Outcomes in Today’s Markets
While today’s debt restructuring regime remains a work in progress, we have 
been able to make a few observations, both relative to the 1980s regime and to our 
hypothesis that structural and compulsory power help to drive the formation and 
bargaining outcomes of sovereign debt restructuring regimes.
As banks relinquished control over the supply and distribution of credit in the 
early 1990s and the risk of solvency to the global financial system receded, sovereign 
debtors began to tap the global bond markets for their financing. Since bond investors 
were more widely dispersed and less organized than the banks, they found it difficult to 
speak with a common voice when it came to matters of sovereign debt restructuring. And, 
with hedge funds, institutional investors, pension funds and mutual funds all in a 
determined search for yield, the demand for emerging market sovereign debt in the 1990s 
surged. The result was a shift in structural power away from the homogenous bankers’ 
cartel to a heterogeneous pool of bondholders. However, the lack of collective will on the 
part of bondholders made it easier for sovereigns to control the bargaining process. 
Settlement periods were dramatically cut when compared to previous eras, and haircuts 
were closer to the levels last seen in the 1930s. This is because sovereigns used their 
newly found advantage to design a debt management regime that reflected their interests 
and preferences. Mexico’s 2003 benchmark bond issue buried the SDRM debate and 
helped standardize a series of debtor-friendly collective action clauses. The country set a 
lower threshold for majority amendment clauses than the one demanded by the G-10, and 
most sovereign issuers have followed Mexico’s example. This means that the current
1007 Adams (1991), Chapter 17.
1008 Gelpem (2005b), p. 414. See also Salmon (2004b); Buchheit, Gulati et al. (2006); Adams (1991); and, 
Kremer and Jayachandran (2002).
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trend in CACs has been to include majority amendment clauses but exclude majority 
representation and enforcement clauses, once again contravening recommendations made 
by creditor groups and falling far short of the optimizing solutions proposed by 
policymakers and academics.
The emerging regime of contractual, market-based, unilateral debt exchanges has 
permitted sovereigns to recapture some of the negotiating leverage they had lost in the 
1980s. Yet, as we found in the 1980s, a regime that is designed on the basis of power is 
not necessarily a model of efficiency or equity. For example, even with the rising use of 
majority amendment clauses, it will be years before they are operative in most of the 
outstanding debt stock, at which point the problem of aggregation across creditor classes 
will remain unaddressed. Also, the framework for negotiation is still uncertain. After 
Argentina defaulted on its debt in 2001, bondholders had to wait more than three years 
before the country was willing and able to present them with an exchange offer. Lastly, 
the efficacy of the IIF’s Principles - an attempt to advance the interests of creditors in the 
face of debtor power - has yet to be measured. Whether the Principles successfully guide 
the next crisis to a more orderly conclusion - or are completely ignored by debtor states - 
remains to be seen.
Not since the 1930s have sovereign debtors been accorded such support from 
officials of creditor states, something that can be illustrated not only by the case of the 
Mexican shift to CACs, but also by the process and settlement terms associated with the 
Argentine default. The unsympathetic disposition of creditor governments toward their 
own bondholders, coupled with changes to the IMF’s lending into arrears policy, has 
made today’s regime for sovereign debt management unfriendly, and sometimes even 
hostile, to the interests of private creditors. Perhaps today’s investors would do well to 
remember Borchard’s admonition over a half century ago to a generation of 1930s 
bondholders:
He who contracts with the sovereign or the state has nothing but the state’s 
honour and credit as a sanction...[T]he contract is...a gambling contract, 
depending for its performance entirely on the good faith and capacity of the 
debtor to pay.1009
1009 Borchard and Wynne (1951a), p. 3.
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Appendix 7A
Proponents of a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring
G-77 (1977) 
Oeschli (1981)
Cohen (1989)
Sachs(1995)
Chun (1996)
Schwarcz (2000)
Clementi (2001) 
Krueger (2002)
Proposed that creditors deal with sovereign debt problems in the broader context 
of development goals.1010
The first to propose a Chapter 11 framework for sovereign debt workouts. He 
argued that inefficiencies stemmed from poor coordination among private and 
official creditors.1011
Proposed an International Debt Restructuring Agency (“IDRA”) as an impartial 
intermediary established by multilateral convention as a joint subsidiary of the 
IMF/WB that would facilitate negotiations between debtors and creditors. The 
terms of relief would be decided by debtors and a qualified majority of creditors 
and would be enforced via cramdown.1012
Argued that the IMF should shed its advisory role and act more like an 
international bankruptcy court. Recommended that private sector involvement 
take precedence over IMF official lending. Also argued that debt reduction 
needed to be more aggressive to all governments to re-establish solvency.1013
Recommended the creation of an International Bankruptcy Agency (“IBA”), 
under the IMF’s umbrella, but separate and neutral. The IBA would force 
debtors and creditors to work together and overcome coordination problems. 
Chun suggested the use of Chapter 9 as a model. Argued that “a bankruptcy 
agency, not an emergency fund, is the more effective method for providing the 
fast, decisive action required to counter the extraordinary speed with which 
creditors can relocate their money worldwide.”1014
Argued that you should use ideas from international bankruptcy law. Suggested 
the adoption of a new international convention whereby: 1. A state can 
commence restructuring through a unilateral decision to suspend payments. 2. 
Debtor-in-possession financing is encouraged by granting priority. 3. Super­
majority voting by each class of creditors would bind all the creditors to a plan 
of reorganization. 4. The IMF would play its customary role of surveillance but 
not act as a LOLR 4. ICSID would be used for settlement disputes.1015
Saw the key problem as debtor-creditor coordination and argued that it would be 
helpful to have recourse to a neutral mediator or even the IMF to arbitrate.1016
Proposed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism with features that 
included: i) an IMF-endorsed standstill; ii) super-majority voting, both within 
and across classes of debt; iii) an impartial and independent dispute resolution 
forum; and, iv) incentives for debtor-in-possession financing.1017
1010 Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002).
1011 Oechsli (1981).
1012 Cohen (1989).
1013 Sachs (1995).
1014 Chun (1996), p. 2653.
1015 Schwarcz (2000).
1016 Clementi (2001).
1017 Krueger (2002).
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Cooper (2002) Supported the IMF’s proposal for an internationally sanctioned standstill on
sovereign debt as something that would represent a modest improvement on 
existing financial arrangements. Argued that a plan to empower the IMF to issue 
SDRs in an emergency, under stringent conditions, would also represent some 
progress.1018
Cymot (2002) Argued for a Chapter 9 (as opposed to a Chapter 11) approach to sovereign debt
workouts since Chapter 9 is used for municipalities. It therefore recognizes the 
sovereign immunity of the state and its need to retain operational control over its 
financial decisions. He suggests that ICSID be used as an arbiter since it exists 
as a forum where 134 sovereigns resolve their business differences. ICSID has 
established credibility as a neutral forum for investors and sovereigns.1019
Miller (2002) Argued that contractual and statutory approaches should be complementary and
pursued along a parallel track. Believed that by keeping the threat of statutory 
intervention alive, it would motivate lawyers to write ingenious contracts for 
creditor coordination.1020
Bossone (2002) Pro-SDRM, but argued that it should not be the primary vehicle for sovereign
debt renegotiation -  it should be a Phase II option. Phase I should consist of 
Private Sector Involvement (“PSI”). If PSI and the SDRM fail, then all-out- 
default would be the result. Since all-out default would carry the highest costs, 
the process would incentivize debtors to stay in Phases I and II.1021
White (2002) Argued that contractual changes like CACs were unlikely to accomplish an
orderly restructuring since they lack the features that are key to a more complete 
bankruptcy regime. CACs would not eliminate individual lawsuits, they would 
not give you a way to reconcile bondholder interests across bond issues or 
across classes of creditors, and they would not make up for the lack of new 
private loans after a default1022
Griffith-Jones (2002) Suggested the need for a “large and strong IM F’ to provide financial assistance 
PLUS an institutional framework for standstills and orderly debt workouts along 
the lines suggested by Krueger [in the SDRM.]1023
Miller and Zhang (2003) Called for mandated standstills followed by a debt restructuring to avoid the 
problems of big bailouts.1024
Ghosal and Miller (2003) Argued that the SDRM is a better alternative than CACs because a temporary 
stay on litigation is an important element in reducing the moral hazard 
associated with large IMF crisis loans. CACs, as currently structured, do not 
provide for this standstill.1025
Kroszner (2003) Pointed out the benefits of some type of dispute resolution forum in addition to
CACs. He believed that instead of the SDRM, we should “insert a clause into 
each debt instrument that would name a Forum as the venue for negotiation and 
resolution of sovereign debt claims. The Forum would operate akin to a
1018 Cooper (2002).
1019 Cymot (2002).
1020 Miller (2002).
1021 Bossone and Sdralevich (2002).
1022 White (2002).
1023 Griffith-Jones (2002).
1024 Miller and Zhang (2003).
1025 Ghosal and Miller (2003).
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domestic bankruptcy court in that a borrower could approach the Forum and 
request the initiation of proceedings of a restructuring.”1026
IMF (2003c) Argued that post-default, it would be best to work through a creditor committee 
and recommended the possible use of mediation and arbitration in a 
restructuring.1027
Sharma (2004) Remained sceptical that CACs on their own would be sufficient to satisfactorily 
mediate debt crises. Instead, “a complementary approach that combines 
elements of both the CAC and the SDRM...has the potential to help reduce the 
unacceptably large costs associated with disorderly defaults by sovereign 
governments.”1028
Ghosal (2005) Maintained that strengthening CACs has limited efficacy. Argued instead that 
there is “a role for an appropriately designed formal sovereign bankruptcy 
mechanism, like the SDRM.”1029
Miller and 
Thomas (2006b) Argued that, in theory, bonds with CACs can be restructured to ensure 
engagement and aggregation, but in practice, the courts remain vital to the 
process. They see a future for sovereign debt restructuring that includes CACs 
and courts, aided by creditor committees and codes of conduct. In short, 
collective action clauses will not suffice; some judicial process will be 
required.1030
1026 Kroszner (2003), p. 77.
1027 International Monetary Fund (2003c).
1028 Sharma (2004).
1029 Ghosal and Thampanishvong (2005), p. 5.
1030 Miller and Thomas (2006b).
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Appendix 7B 
Author Interviews
(A) January 27,2005
(B) January 28,2005
(C) January 30, 2005
(D) February 4, 2005
(E) February 7, 2005
(F) February 9,2005
(G) February 11,2005 
March 13, 2007
(II) February 17,2005 
March 12, 2007
(I) March 5,2005
(J) March 5, 2005
(K) March 8, 2005
(L) June 27,2006 
(M) October 19/20,2006 
(N) March 9, 2007
(O) March 15,2007 
(P) March 19,2007
(Q) April 23, 2007 
(R) April 26, 2007
Credit Officer for Latin America, Citibank, N.A. (1980s)
International Monetary Fund Staff Member (2000s)
Chief Credit Officer for Latin America, The Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A. (1980s)
Head of Latin American Debt Research for a major European 
investment bank (1990s, 2000s)
Head of Sovereign Debt Advisory Services for a major European 
investment bank (1990s, 2000s)
Head of Emerging Markets Origination (Eastern Europe) for a major 
European investment bank (1990s, 2000s)
. Head of Emerging Markets Origination (Latin America) for 
a major European Bank (1990s, 200s)
Former senior Mexican treasury official (2000s)
Head of Capital Markets Credit for Bank of America -  Asia (1990s)
Head of Capital Markets for Deutche Bank -  New York (2000s)
Board Member of IPMA (International Primary Markets Association) 
(2000s)
John Petty, President of Foreign Bondholders Protective Council
Christian Suter, University of Neuchatel, Switzerland
Head of Sovereign Debt Advisory Services for a major 
U.S. consulting firm (2000s)
Senior Official at the Institute of International Finance (2000s)
Rating Agency Official (Standard and Poor’s)
(2000s)
Sovereign Debt Arbitration Specialist (2000s)
Senior U.S. Treasury Official (2000s)
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Chapter 8
Sovereign Debt Management: Implications for Theory and Policy
Once upon a time, long, long ago in a place far, far away, crisis prevention and crisis management were so 
straightforward that they could be delegated to macroeconomists.
Barry Eichengreen
8.1 Theoretical Implications: Beyond the Sanctions-Reputation Debate
While the regimes that have emerged over the centuries to resolve sovereign debt 
crises have been far from optimal, they have nonetheless produced a pattern of bargaining 
outcomes that begs the question: why have debtor states paid more to creditors in some 
periods than in others? By answering this question using our “four faces of power” 
analytical framework, this study has contributed to both the theoretical discussion of 
sovereign repayment incentives as well as the policy debate surrounding the efficacy of 
bondholder councils.
We suggested that the “sanctions vs. reputation” debate portrays these two 
sovereign repayment incentives as competing, although empirical data suggest that they 
operate contemporaneously. And, if sovereigns take both factors into account -  the 
potential for creditor government sanctions and loss of market access -  when weighing 
their default options, it is more useful to examine how they might operate jointly to 
produce a negotiating result. What we found in our case study chapters was that 
compulsory and structural power (our analytical equivalent of sanctions and reputation, 
respectively) tended to reinforce each other in each historical period, producing outcomes 
which were highly favourable to creditors in the 19th century and 1980s, and highly 
favourable to debtors in the interwar and post-war periods as well as today. Not only does 
the model account for the results, it also helps to explain the historical pattern of the 
outcomes.
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Table 8A: Power and the Production of Bargaining Outcomes
Time Period Dominant Creditor 
Representative Body
Debt Forgiveness Compubory Power Structural
Power
1871-1925 Corporation of Foreign 
Bondholders
15.9% Favours creditors: 
Official sector provides 
moral suasion along 
with the threat o f super­
sanctions.
Favours creditors: 
Tightly controlled 
markets reward 
settlement with 
renewed access.
1926-1975 Foreign Bondholders 
Protective Council
55.9% Favours debtors:
U.S. government 
prioritizes deep haircuts 
for geo-political reasons 
and undermines 
negotiating position of 
bondholders.
Favours debtors: 
Private market collapse 
eliminates the “carrot” 
of renewed market 
access. Lending into 
arrears by official 
sector (U.S. govt, and 
IMF) further weakens 
bondholders.
1980-1997 The London Club 35% Favours creditors: 
G-7 and IMF unite 
behind commercial 
banks to stave off 
systemic collapse. 
Debtor states are 
intimidated and 
threatened by official 
sector.
Favours creditors: 
Commercial banks and 
the IMF control credit 
access and coordinate 
lending. IMF refuses to 
“lend into arrears” until 
crisis passes for 
banking system.
1998-2005 Market-Based Debt 
Exchange
48.67% Favours debtors: 
Creditor governments 
more sympathetic to the 
plight o f debtor states, 
preferring to de- 
politicize the work-out 
process.
Favours debtors: 
Investors highly 
decentralized, and 
markets highly liquid 
and forgiving. IMF 
willing to “lend into 
arrears” for bank and 
bond debt, thereby 
diminishing creditor 
leverage.
Outcomes in the 1980-1997 period reflect the final terms o f  settlement offered under the Brady Plan and not the interim 
settlements reached under the multi-year rescheduling agreements.
8.1.1 The 19th Century and the 1980s: Outcomes Favour Creditors
In the 19th century, we argued that creditors achieved such favourable results 
principally because the British government was willing to employ a wide range of 
coercive devices -from moral suasion to military action -  to positively impact their 
position. And, from a structural perspective, the large and highly controlled pool of 19th 
century British capital remained attractive enough to developing country debtors to force 
them into settlements, especially if they needed or wanted to regain market access.
In a similar vein, the 1980s London Club could rely on the supportive disposition 
of G-7 governments and the IMF while it negotiated with distressed sovereigns. In fact, 
intimidation and threats aimed at debtor states by creditor governments were as relevant
r t iin the 1980s as they were in the 19 century. Even the centralized market structure of the
aL
19 century reappeared in the 1980s. The commercial banks (along with the IMF)
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effectively controlled all lending to troubled debtors, and the banks’ monopoly position 
afforded them considerable leverage in their London Club negotiations. Access to credit 
-  including politically sensitive trade lines - could be blocked until lenders were satisfied 
with the settlement terms proffered by distressed sovereigns.
8.1.2 The Intenvar/Post-War Periods and 1998-2005: Outcomes Favour Debtors
During the 1930s, the U.S. government interceded directly in sovereign debt 
negotiations, coercing bondholders to accept meagre settlements so that America’s geo­
strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere could be advanced. U.S. bondholders 
routinely subsidized their country’s political ambitions, albeit without compensation. 
What influence did the 1930s markets exert on outcomes? Well, the private bond markets 
had collapsed and would not open again to emerging market sovereigns until the late 
1980s. This meant that the sole source of credit during this period was official, lodged 
chiefly with the U.S. government, its agencies and the new multilateral financial 
institutions. The tendency of these credit suppliers to “lend into arrears” for political 
reasons materially impeded the settlement prospects of bondholders.
While the moribund markets of the 1930s could not be more different from the 
highly liquid and forgiving markets of today, they have nonetheless exerted a similar 
effect on sovereign repayment incentives. Since 1998, the wide dispersion of credit 
supply and the lack of bondholder collective will have made it easier for sovereigns to 
make aggressive, unilateral offers to creditors. Additionally, the global savings glut and 
the low interest rate environment in G-7 countries have made capital even more 
promiscuous as it searches out the higher yields promised by emerging markets bonds. As 
a result, countries that default can restructure and regain market access faster today than 
in previous periods, a state of affairs that has tended to push today’s bargaining outcomes 
in favour of debtor states. However, structural power has not operated alone. Compulsory 
power in the form of creditor government intervention has amplified these good results. 
Today’s creditor governments exhibit a more sympathetic disposition toward the plight of 
their fellow sovereigns in distress than they did in the 1980s. The case of Argentina 
illustrated the willingness of the Bush administration to assist a defaulting sovereign in its 
negotiations with the IMF, while at the same time refusing to consider requests for help
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from its own private creditors. Apart from the case of Argentina, we have recounted 
several instances where the IMF has either triggered or encouraged sovereign defaults on 
bond debt in order to bring private investors into the restructuring process. Some have 
suggested that the choices made by the official sector have been fundamentally hostile to 
the interests of contemporary bondholders,1031 as well as partly responsible for the deep 
haircuts observed since 1998.
By using a framework that allows for the simultaneous (and reinforcing) 
operation of structural and compulsory power, we have been able to better explain the 
variation in bargaining outcomes over four discrete historical periods since 1870. This 
approach has also allowed for comparisons that have not customarily been made - like the 
ones we have drawn between the 19th century and the 1980s, and between the 1930s and 
today.
8.2 Policy Implications: The Efficacy o f  Bondholder Councils
Our analytical framework has also enabled us to assess the independent effect of 
private creditor bodies on bargaining outcomes. As an element of institutional power, we 
have uncovered some surprising facts about these organizations. Most importantly, our 
study challenges the received wisdom about their contributions to the sovereign state- 
private creditor negotiation process. We contend that they have been either incorrectly 
credited -  or blamed -  for the bargaining outcomes produced concurrent with their 
operation. More specifically, we argued that the British CFBH, routinely praised for 
shortening default durations and increasing bondholder recoveries in the 19th century, 
would have been essentially powerless if it did not operate in an era dominated by British 
capital export and a sympathetic, activist government. Similarly, we maintain that the 
FBPC, often dismissed as a failed experiment, would have been judged more favourably 
by history had it not been consistently challenged by the State Department and the 
multilaterals during a period of private market collapse. Finally, we claim that the 
London Club, viewed nostalgically by today’s market reformers as an idealized 
mechanism of creditor coordination, would never have held together without the heavy- 
handed exercise of control and coercion by the official sector and the mandated
1031 Salmon (2004a).
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coordination of private and official lending. In other words, over long historical periods, 
private creditors - even with institutional representation -  are not chiefly responsible for 
producing bargaining outcomes in sovereign debt restructurings. These outcomes are 
driven instead by structural and compulsory regime elements that lay outside the 
institution. This finding has important relevance to the current debate concerning the 
resurrection of bondholder councils.1032
When the IIF published its Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring in Emerging Markets in 2006, it called for “early and structured 
negotiations with a creditor committee,” in the event of a sovereign debt crisis.1033 
Richard Portes has also advocated the creation of a new bondholder council to be labelled 
the “New York Club,” and Rory MacMillan suggested that we resurrect the CFBH.1034 
Although these recommendations have gone unheeded for the moment, there appears to 
be a growing consensus, at least among the financial institutions represented by the IIF, 
that bondholders need some type of institutional representative. Our analysis of the 
sovereign debt management process over the past 135 years implies that the IIF should 
proceed with caution in this endeavour. If the goal is to create an organization that can 
positively influence distributional outcomes for bondholders, then the IIF (and its 
constituents) could very well be disappointed. As we have argued, any policy which calls 
for the resurrection of bondholder councils rests on an important misconception: that 
these councils were either singularly or even largely responsible for improving the 
historical bargaining outcomes for private creditors. We have found that these results 
were instead highly circumscribed by the structural and compulsory power configurations 
unique to each historical period. That being the case, any newly minted, 21st century 
bondholder council would find itself no match for today’s promiscuous capital markets 
and the detached sentiment of the official sector.
Those who highlight the efficiency gains that can be reaped from the
establishment of a new bondholder council are similarly challenged by our findings. The
{
shortest average duration from default to settlement has been observed since 1998, when
1032 Institute of International Finance (2007); Institute of International Finance (2006); MacMillan (1995a); 
Portes (2004).
1033 Institute of International Finance (2006), pp. 14-17.
1034 Portes (2004); MacMillan ( 1995a).
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no bondholder council was in operation. Of course, one could argue that these institutions 
require some trade-off between fairness and efficiency. Yet, the experiences of the FBPC 
call that assumption into question as well. Beginning in the 1930s, the presence of the 
American bondholder council seemed to do very little to improve either settlement times 
or distributional outcomes for bondholders. The interwar and post-war periods recorded 
the longest durations for settlements and the deepest haircuts for investors. Even the 
1980s London Club could not improve on the purported efficiency of the 19th century 
CFBH. One might, however, respond by saying that the British CFBH delivered 
something approximating a balance between fairness and efficiency. After all, an average 
settlement period of 6.3 years was not unimpressive in light of the limitations imposed by 
the communications technology and transport infrastructure of the time. Similarly, the 
15.9% level of debt forgiveness was the best for creditors across all four periods. We 
would reply that these findings with respect to the CFBH provide only anecdotal 
evidence that bondholder councils can deliver improvements to the fairness and 
efficiency of the sovereign debt restructuring process. To draw a conclusion from that 
one era would require us to discard the conflicting evidence we have uncovered from 
investigating the remaining three eras. It would also ask us to set aside our conclusions 
about the significant impact the other regime elements had on bargaining outcomes. In 
summary, then, we believe it is necessary to question any contemporary policy 
recommendation for a resurrected bondholder council that regards such bodies as a route 
to faster and more equitable debt settlements.
8.3 Areas for Further Research
This study relied to a great extent on data collected by other sovereign debt 
researchers, and we are especially grateful to Dr. Christian Suter for providing us with his 
original data set for the period 1820 -  1975. This has permitted us to put the historical 
measurements (from 1820 -  1975) on a comparable basis with the post-1980 calculations. 
That being said, creating a unified data set was not the principal objective of this 
dissertation. It would therefore be extremely valuable if scholars could continue to 
improve on the available data by creating a single study from primary sources that was 
regularly updated and utilized a consistent collection methodology. It would also be
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constructive if more work could be done on intra-period results for bondholders of 
different nationalities. This would permit researchers to better assess the connections 
between national interest and bargaining outcomes.
One of the goals of this dissertation was to provide a detailed analysis of the 
workings of the FBPC, an institution that has received little coverage in the academic 
literature. While we believe that Chapter 5 offers much in the way of original insight into 
the FBPC, it would nonetheless be useful to expand the available literature on this largely 
misunderstood organization. More specifically, our research in the FBPC archives could 
be supplemented by other primary sources, including the letters of Francis White, former 
President of the FBPC, and Herbert Feis, the principal State Department contact for the 
FBPC in its early years of operation. This type of supplemental research unfortunately 
exceeded the scope of our research project, but we believe that it would add a good deal 
to our understanding of the FBPC and the difficult environment in which it operated. 
There is also very little written about other bondholder councils -  most notably those 
from France, Germany, and the Netherlands. It would be particularly useful to understand 
how these other councils operated and how they collaborated in negotiations with the 
CFBH and FBPC.
Our brief discussions of productive power in the case study chapters have 
highlighted an area of sovereign debt management that has received very little attention -  
notably the element of discursive power that is embedded in the debtor-creditor 
negotiation process. We believe that further study along critical constructivist lines that 
would link discourse and power in sovereign debt restructuring and build on the work 
done by Rosenberg (1999) and deGoede (2005) would be a welcome addition to the 
literature.1035
From a theoretical perspective, we would challenge other researchers to assess the 
utility of the “four faces of power” analytical framework. While we have found it to be 
valuable for our particular research agenda -  specifically for the rigor it instilled into the 
collection and analysis of our historical data - we would be interested to know of its 
efficacy in other issue-areas of international relations and international political economy. 
The one drawback of the model we noted was the occasional difficulty of ascribing an
1035 Rosenberg (1999); DeGoede (2005).
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empirical finding to the correct power “basket” For instance, in Chapter 5, the question 
arose as to whether the installation of clearing arrangements against Germany by the 
British government represented an element of structural power -  given the fact that the 
nature of the trade imbalance permitted such an arrangement -  or compulsory power, 
since the UK government was making a deliberate policy decision that benefited British 
bondholders. We decided that the appropriate power characterization was “compulsory,” 
since the UK government could have elected not to establish a clearing arrangement. By 
way of comparison, when the US government was asked by the FBPC to link the signing 
of new trade agreements with debt settlements, the US government refused. In both cases, 
it was the orientation of creditor government action (compulsory power) that was 
decisive; the structural elements simply presented the respective governments with a 
policy option.
Any drawbacks associated with using the framework were far outweighed by the 
benefits. First, the application of the model to our four empirical cases firmly planted our 
study within the realm of international relations and IPE theory, drawing on their rich 
tradition of research in regimes and power. Second, each element of power highlighted 
by the framework could be aligned quite closely with an aspect of the sovereign debt 
restructuring regime. Finally, the taxonomy is easily transferable to other areas of inquiry 
which means that, over time, its use could lead to improvements in existing social science 
theory or perhaps even the unification of certain elements embedded in different 
theoretical schools.1036
8.4 Sovereien Debt Management and the Implications for Global Finance Governance
Finally, we want to look at what sovereign debt management can teach us about 
global financial governance more broadly. Given that these regimes are hybrids -  having 
both public and private elements -  we hoped that our framework would make the actions 
of private actors more visible. Did lenders, for example, use public goods for private 
benefit? Did they press their own governments into action to improve their bargaining
1036 Fuchs (2005a); Fuchs (2005b). It is also important to note that our approach bears some similarity to 
the one proposed by Doris Fuchs (2005a, 2005b) to analyze the impact of private business interests on rule- 
making in global governance. While Fuchs adopts a three-pronged model encompassing instrumental, 
structural, and discursive power, our model goes one step further, offering scholars the opportunity to 
examine the independent impact of institutional sources of power.
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positions with sovereign debtors? How might they have influenced the decision-making 
of the IMF in post-default situations?
Private actors -  more specifically bankers and investors -  have often found 
themselves criticized for skewing the rules of global finance in their favour. For instance, 
Stiglitz (2002) argued that “the institutions of global economic governance are no longer 
directly accountable to the public, but are politically and ideologically predisposed 
towards bankers and investors from the major capitalist countries.”1037 Scholte (2002) has 
gone so far as to argue that the rules governing global finance have become self- 
referential, such that “finance becomes an end in its own right rather than a means to 
general material betterment.”1038 Backing these arguments with empirical evidence, 
Hurrell (2005) observed that after the Asian crisis had subsided (and the world’s major 
financial institutions were stabilized), much of the talk about reforms to the international 
financial architecture “slipped off Washington’s agenda,” despite the fact that developing 
countries remained at considerable risk.1039 In other words, it appeared that the 
governance of global finance needed reform only to the extent that banks and investors in 
the industrialized world needed protection. It is therefore not surprising that the rules 
governing global finance are often accused of failing to meet the goals of equity and 
social justice, especially when there were times -  like the 19th century and the 1980s - 
when they appeared to cater largely to private and commercial interests.
Our findings with respect to the development and operation of sovereign debt 
regimes were therefore surprising in this context. We expected to observe much more in 
the way of blatant private influence over public decision-making. What we found instead 
was that, despite considerable effort on the part of private creditors, the exercise of their 
home government’s power was largely confined to those cases where there was an 
alignment of public and private interest. For example, the employment of super-sanctions 
in the 19th century -  illustrated best by the cases of Turkey, Egypt and Venezuela - was 
closely linked to the enhancement of British geo-strategic interests. Similarly, 
Whitehall’s decision to install clearing arrangements with Germany in the interwar period 
was designed to boost declining British national income. And, in America, the refusal of
1037 Rupert (2005), p. 207. See also Stiglitz (2002).
1038 Scholte (2002), pp. 197-199.
1039 Hurrell (2005), pp. 41-42.
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the Roosevelt administration to countenance repeated requests for help from the FBPC 
came at a time when public and private interests were in conflict. It was not until those 
interests coincided again in the 1980s -  with the threatened collapse of the commercial 
banking system -  that we observed renewed official sector involvement. However, it is 
important to note that when the interests of creditor governments and private lenders did 
historically align, the dynamic of the regime was altered such that private creditors 
benefited and their bargaining outcomes improved. But, since investors lacked control 
over the context in which national interests were created, they had to remain 
opportunistic and find ways to link their plight to some larger, national objective 
whenever possible.
Private actors have also had little influence over the structure and condition of the 
capital markets, although they were able to benefit from particular market configurations. 
For instance, when markets were highly controlled in the 19th century and 1980s, 
creditors were successful in creating rules to bar defaulters and limit access. However, 
they could not always block access to all available capital. Competing global exchanges 
and differing national priorities made that impossible, and bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
lending would generally flow with the sentiments of the official sector. So, as with 
compulsory power, the structural power elements of the larger regime favoured private 
lenders only intermittently.
This implies that debtor states have also managed to capitalize on certain power 
configurations to improve their bargaining results. As we demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
emerging markets borrowers have thus far succeeded in altering the rules of today’s 
regime and pushing outcomes in their favour by taking advantage of the wider dispersion 
of yield-hungry investors and the relative detachment of the official sector. So, while 
debtor states are often portrayed as rule-takers or even “victims” in matters relating to 
global finance, our analysis has shown that this depiction is not entirely accurate. In fact, 
since 2001, there have been no major emerging markets financial crises. This is because 
developing countries have taken determined steps to shield themselves from economic 
distress by adopting flexible exchange rates, building reserves, developing local currency 
capital markets, and pursuing prudent fiscal policies. The result is that developing
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countries are now net exporters of capital.1040 Their governments appear to have 
concluded that the best defence against future financial dislocation is a good offence.
Since sovereign debt restructuring more closely resembles a zero-sum bargaining 
game, it may not be directly comparable to other areas of global financial governance that 
emphasize cooperation. However, even in matters that can be painted as cooperative - 
like global financial regulation - it is possible to observe power at work. For example, 
Basle I, which was meant to strengthen the capital bases of global commercial banks, 
relied to an important extent on US and UK market (i.e., structural) power for its 
adoption.1041 Additionally, if we look at the IMF’s creation of financial market standards 
-  like ROSC and SDDS -  it is hard to ignore the role played by compulsory power.1042 
By choosing to publish a country’s level of compliance with these standards on its 
website, the IMF was essentially coercing member states to adopt them and observe them 
as closely as possible. Finally, there are likely to be issue-areas in global financial 
governance where outcomes are more heavily dependent on productive power. Therefore, 
it may be useful to examine how various aspects of power contribute to outcomes more 
broadly in global financial governance, regardless of whether cases are seen as primarily 
redistributive or cooperative.
Although private capital might have some power when it enters a country, it 
seems to be relatively powerless when it tries to exit.1043 As Stiglitz and Hurrell pointed 
out earlier, the rules of global financial governance in certain issue-areas seem to favour 
private interests, but we have found that the rules regarding post-default settlement have 
not been as consistent -  they have favoured private creditors in some periods and 
sovereign debtors in others. The tipping point seems to be the role played by creditor 
governments in the workout process and the availability of capital -  either private or 
official -  to distressed or recovering debtors. And, these two elements have managed to 
reinforce one another over the past 135 years. That being the case, we would argue that 
sovereign debt management is one area of global financial governance where the interests
1040 Financial Times, February 9, 2007, p. 13.
1041 Oatley and Nabors (1998). See also Simmons (2001).
1042 ROSC: Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes; SDDS: Special Data Dissemination Standards.
1043 Mosley (2000). Mosley asserts that private capital has more power to dictate policy to emerging market 
governments than to developed county governments, since a broader array o f economic indicators are 
scrutinized by emerging market investors.
285
of private lenders are less likely to enjoy uninterrupted prominence, being constrained 
instead by the expediencies of national interest and the systemic configuration of the 
international financial markets.
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